By John McTaggart Ellis McTaggart. London: Edward Arnold. 1906.1
Dr. McTaggart presents us in this volume with a reasoned plea for atheism. His atheism is based neither upon materialism nor upon a complete scepticism, but upon an idealistic metaphysic. The particular form of idealism to which he holds is that which (as he supposes) underlay the systems of Fichte, Hegel, and Lotze; and which conceives reality as ultimately consisting of a harmonious system of self-existent selves: it may perhaps be designated idealistic pluralism. He does not in this volume set forth the grounds on which he holds to this metaphysic. It is not its purpose to establish his metaphysical basis. It is its purpose to examine the evidence for the great trilogy of natural religion—God, Freedom, Immortality—with a view to determining whether this evidence is adequate. The method of the reasoning is, therefore, critical, and its trend is negative. Dr. McTaggart holds, indeed, that there exist arguments of sufficient strength to justify a belief in human immortality. But these are not the arguments which are commonly relied upon, but reduce to those which establish the idealistic theory of the fundamental nature of reality. And as it is not the purpose of this volume to determine the fundamental characteristics of reality these arguments are not adduced. All that is done is, by a critical examination of the arguments ordinarily relied upon in disproof of immortality, to remove objections out of the way, and then to suggest that, as the really telling arguments for immortality are metaphysical rather than moral, they tend to commend to us a doctrine of eternity rather than of immortality—a doctrine of preëxistence as truly as of postexistence, for human beings—Dr. McTaggart himself being inclined to construe this eternity of existence in terms of transmigration. With his fundamental conception of reality as a system of selves, freedom presents no necessary inconsistency, provided this freedom be not construed out of relation to the law of causality. Accordingly, if we understand him aright, Dr. McTaggart argues for the doctrine of human freedom ordinarily called the freedom of self-determination, but called by him, in accordance with a distribution of theories of his own, the freedom of self-direction; although it is possible that he may push his determinism to a mechanical extreme. This chapter is chiefly notable for its clear and convincing refutation of the theory of indeterminism. It is in its examination of Theism, however, that the interest of the volume culminates. There is no suggestion of a God inherent in Dr. McTaggart’s fundamental metaphysic: and he finds no reason to believe in a God in the lines of argument usually relied on to prove His existence. He feels quite certain that there is no such God as the higher Theism demands—an omnipotent Creator and Director of all. To him all existent reality is eternal and ultimate (p. 234)—and there is therefore no place for a Creator, and the Divine Being, if such exists, is limited by the coexistence of the rest of existing reality. He might find a place for a non-omnipotent, non-creative God—if there was only valid evidence of His existence. But he discovers none. “There seems to me,” he says, “only one reason why we should not believe in his existence—namely, that there is no reason why we should believe in it” (p. 260). The issue of the whole discussion is therefore that the slate is clean: we have no guidance on these great subjects of God, Freedom, Immortality except the implications of our metaphysical theory. And as in Dr. McTaggart’s view a true metaphysic conceives reality as an eternal self-existent system of selves, a true religion, founded on this metaphysic, will do without a God, but will allow a self-determined freedom and an immortality construed as eternity a parte ante as well as a parte post. Meanwhile all non-metaphysicians are warned off the religious terrain. No man is justified in holding opinions on these great subjects save as the result of metaphysical study. Religion is therefore for the metaphysician alone. “And thus we are driven to the conclusion that, whether any religion is true or not, most people have no right to accept any religion as true” (p. 293). We may regret this, but we may in part console ourselves with the reflection (among others) “that the man who has no religion cannot have a bad one” (p. 294).
As Dr. McTaggart’s purpose in this volume is not to establish conclusions but to clear away conclusions illegitimately established, we should perhaps attend more to his critical method than to what we may incidentally learn of his positive opinions. The progress of his discussion is as follows. He first undertakes to demonstrate the importance of dogma, or rather its indispensableness to religion. Next he endeavors to show that the customary arguments relied on for the establishment of religious dogma are illegitimate. Taking up then the three great dogmas, he examines in turn the ordinary basis for belief in Immortality, Freedom, and God, and finds it in all cases inadequate; indicating, however, as he goes on, that there exists nevertheless good reason in his metaphysical assumption for belief in immortality and freedom, defined in accordance with its requirements, but not for belief in God. Summing up, finally, he contends that there remains nothing but our metaphysical determinations to rely upon for the establishment of dogma. The dialectic employed by Dr. McTaggart in his destructive reasoning is very sharp and clear-cut, but not seldom also very formal, descending at times into purely verbal reasoning and even to something not far removed from what has been not very euphoniously called “choplogic.” Great reliance is placed upon definition and the verbal analysis of definition; and it would go hard with any logician if he could not put into his definition precisely what he purposed subsequently to bring out of it by analysis. Dr. McTaggart’s logical sense is very acute, and with much of his reasoning the reader will be carried convincingly along: but it not seldom fails to convince because it fails in content. We cannot take space here to illustrate either its excellences or its defects. These may, however, be sufficiently suggested by some desultory remarks on one or two points of primary importance to Dr. McTaggart’s argument.