V AUGUSTINE AND THE PELAGIAN CONTROVERSY CONTROVERSY 1 tion to heresy, and a prophecy of controversy; just as the simultaneous confession of the unity of God and the deity of Christ, or of the deity and the humanity of Christ, inevitably carried in its train a series of heresies and controversies, until the definitions of the doctrines of the Trinity and of the person of Christ were complete. In like manner, it was inevitable that sooner or later someone should arise who would do so one-sidedly emphasize one element or the other of the Church’s teaching as to salvation, as to throw himself into heresy, and drive the Church, through controversy with him, into a precise definition of the doctrines of free will and grace in their mutual relations.
This new heresiarch came, at the opening of the fifth century, in the person of the British monk, Pelagius. The novelty of the doctrine which he taught is repeatedly asserted by Augustine,2: and is evident to the historian; but it consisted not in the emphasis that he laid on free will, but rather in the fact that, in emphasizing free will, he denied the ruin of the race and the necessity of grace. This was not only new in Christianity; it was even anti-Christian. Jerome, as well as Augustine, saw this at the time, and speaks of Pelagianism as the “heresy of Pythagoras and Zeno ” ; s and modern writers of the various schools have more or less fully recognized it. Thus Dean Milman thinks that ” the greater part ” of Pelagius’ letter to Demetrias ” might have been written by an ancient academic ”; ’ and Bishop Hefele openly declares that their fundamental doctrine, that “man is virtuous entirely of his own merit, not of the gift of grace,” seems to him ” to be a rehabilitation of the general heathen view of the world,” and compares with it Cicero’s words: G “For all the blessings of life, we have to return thanks to the Gods; but no one ever returned thanks to God for virtue.” 6 The struggle with Pelagianism was thus in reality a struggle for the very foundations of Christianitf; and even more dangerously than in the previous theological and Christological controversies, here the practical substance of Christianity was in jeopardy. The real question at issue was whether there was any need for Christianity at all; whether by his own power man might not attain eternal felicity; whether the function of Christianity was to save, or only to render an eternity of happiness more easily attainable by man.7 Genetically speaking, Pelagianism was the daughter of legalism; but when it itself conceived, it brought forth an essential deism. It is not without significance that its originators were ” a certain sort of monks ”; that is, laymen of ascetic life. From this point of view the Divine law is looked upon as a collection of separate commandments, moral perfection as a simple complex of separate virtues, and a distinct value as a meritorious demand on Divine approbation is ascribed to each good work or attainment in the exercises of piety. It was because this was essentially his point of view that Pelagius could regard man’s powers as sufficient to the attainment of sanctity - nay, that he could even assert it to be possible for a man to do more than was required of him. But this involved an essentially deistic conception of man’s relations to his Maker. God had endowed His creature with a capacity (possibilitas) or ability (posse) for action, and it was for him to use it. Man was thus a machine, which, just because it was well made, needed no Divine interference for its right working; and the Creator, having once framed him, and endowed him with the posse, henceforth leaves the velle and the esse to him.
At this point we have touched the central and formative principle of Pelagianism. It lies in the assumption of the plenary ability of man; his ability to do all that righteousness can demand- to work out not only his own salvation, but also his own perfection. This is the core of the whole theory; and all the other postulates not only depend upon it, but arise out of it. Both chronologically and logically this is the root of the system.
When we first hear of Pelagius, he is already advanced in years, living in Rome in the odour of sanctity,8 and enjoying a well-deserved reputation for zeal in exhorting others to a good life, which grew especially warm against those who endeavoured to shelter themselves, when charged with their sins, behind the weakness of nature.9 He was outraged by the universal excuses on such occasions - “It is hard! ” ” it is difficult! ” “we are not able! ” ” we are men! ” - “Oh, blind madness! ” he cried: “we accuse God of a twofold ignorancethat He does not seem to know what He has made, nor what He has commanded- as if forgetting the human weakness of which He is Himself the Author, He has imposed laws on man which He cannot endure.” 10 He himself tells us 11 that it was his custom, therefore, whenever he had to speak on moral improvement and the conduct of a holy life, to begin by pointing out the power and quality of human nature, and by showing what it was capable of doing. For (he says) he esteemed it of small use to exhort men to what they deemed impossible: hope must rather be our companion, and all longing and effort die when we despair of attaining. So exceedingly ardent an advocate was he of man’s unaided ability to do all that God commanded, that when Augustine’s noble and entirely scriptural prayer - ” Give what Thou commandest, and command what Thou wilt ” - was repeated in his hearing, he was unable to endure it; and somewhat inconsistently contradicted it with such violence as almost to become involved in a strife.12 The powers of man, he held, were gifts of God; and it was, therefore, a reproach against Him as if He had made man ill or evil, to believe that they were insufficient for the keeping of His law. Nay, do what we will, we cannot rid ourselves of their sufficiency: ” whether we will, or whether we will not, we have the capacity of not sinning.” 13 ” I say,” he says, “that man is able to be without sin, and that he is able to keep the commandments of God; ” and this sufficiently direct statement of human ability is in reality the hinge of his whole system.