The whole mode of procedure is moreover unnecessary. Our constitution has made ample provision for the correction of all errors and disorders. Our system is very complete. Cast your eye down to the source of power in our Church, the body of the people, and see an organized succession of Church courts, guarding the interests of truth, and securing order and purity up to the General Assembly. Then look the other way, and see a system of control and supervision, going down in regular gradations, from the General Assembly to the synods, from synods to presbyteries, from presbyteries to individual ministers and Church sessions, and from sessions to every individual member of the Presbyterian Church. What can be more complete than this system? Why do we want nullification here? What interest is not guarded? What exigency is not provided for? There never was a government that had a provision for every case, like our government. For a case like the present, where an occasional majority, a mere factitious majority, are determined to perpetuate the power of the Church in their own hands, and conscious that unless they do it now, Providence will never give them another opportunity, we grant the constitution has not provided.

The proposition to exclude from the next General Assembly the commissioners of all those judicatories which your committee may think proper to cite, is still more obviously an outrage upon the constitution. Chap. v, sect. 9, to which the resolution refers, gives no warrant for such a proceeding. That whole chapter relates to a specific subject, to process against a minister. Is the process, which you are about to issue, against any member of the next Assembly? No man is a member of the Assembly, until he is commissioned as such by his presbytery. And when a man comes here with his commission from a presbytery, he comes with authority paramount to all the authority which one General Assembly can have over another. Your committee of commissions are bound by them, and not by the votes of former Assemblies. In chap. iv. the provision authorizing a Church session to suspend a member, under process, from communion, tallies exactly with that respecting the trial of a minister. Here is, in each case, an express authority for laying persons charged under a disability during trial. Where is the authority for laying a judicatory under disability? What has this General Assembly to do in the case at any rate? We have not to try them. When the next General Assembly come up, if they find themselves in such a position that it would be a disgrace to religion to allow the membership of such and such persons, they might possibly pass a vote of exclusion. But what have we to do with the regulations of the next General Assembly? This is not a perpetual body like a synod or presbytery. The members of the next Assembly will come up with their commission from the presbyteries, and how can your committee of commissions exclude them from their seats? Besides, why should we punish presbyteries? This suspension of the right of representation is a real punishment. Why punish the presbyteries when only the synod is cited? Or are we to have a new measure wedge so beveled as to split only on one side, and so as to save such presbyteries in the synods cited as are of a fair, orthodox complexion, and let them remain in good standing? If that is the plan, we should like to see the warrant for it in the book. To illustrate the character of this high-handed and overbearing measure —a measure hitherto unparalleled in the history of legislative or judicial proceedings—suppose that one of these United States should come into collision with the national government, on some point, what would be said if the government should propose, as a first step, to cite a sovereign state to appear at the bar of congress, and then appoint a committee to act as the scavengers of common fame, and bring into congress an ass-load of such matters as common fame deals in, for trial; and to crown the whole, propose during the pendency of the process, to deprive the representatives of that state from their seat in the next congress? Why, the next congress would puff at such a resolution, just as the next General Assembly will puff your vote to deprive its commissioners of their seats. They will look at the commissions of the presbyteries, and will run over the puny and ineffectual legislation of this Assembly, just as a railroad car, impelled by a powerful locomotive, runs over a rye straw that may lie across its track.

The advocates of the resolutions argued substantially thus. The main question relates of course to the power of the Assembly. Has it the right to act in the manner proposed, viz., to summon inferior judicatories to its bar, and to institute and issue process against them? We maintain that it has both in virtue of specific provisions of the constitution, and of the general nature of our system. As to the first point, it is very plain. It has been said, on the other side, that the Assembly is a mere court of errors, and possesses no original jurisdiction. This, however, is not the fact. It is a court of general review and control. It can direct its eye over the whole Church, and wherever it sees evils to be corrected, it can correct them. The mode in which it is to be informed of such evils, and the mode of correction are definitely prescribed. The ordinary means of conveying such information are the complaints, appeals and references of lower judicatories, or of their members, or the review of records. But there may be cases which none of these reach; an express provision is made to meet such cases. “Inferior judicatories,” says the Book of Discipline, chap. 7, sec. i., 5, “may sometimes entirely neglect to perform their duty; by which neglect, heretical opinions or corrupt practices may be allowed to gain ground, or offenders of a very gross character may be suffered to escape; or some circumstances in their proceedings, of very great irregularity, may not be distinctly recorded by them; in any of which cases their records will by no means exhibit to the superior judicatory a full view of their proceedings. If, therefore, the superior judicatory be well advised by common fame, that such irregularities or neglects have occurred on the part of the inferior judicatory, it is incumbent on them to take cognizance of the same, and to examine, deliberate and judge in the whole matter as completely as if it had been recorded, and thus brought up by the review of the records.” Here is not merely the authority, but the command to do precisely what these resolutions propose. When common fame, says the rule, informs the superior judicatory of the existence of error or disorder, it is incumbent on that judicatory to take cognizance thereof, and to examine, deliberate and judge in the whole matter. Common fame has informed this Assembly of the existence of irregularities of a very serious nature. Not vague, uncertain rumour, but definite statements, which, we are morally sure, are correct. We know that there are many synods embracing churches not regularly organized, ministers and elders who never have adopted our Confession of Faith. We know that these and other evils have been long continued and widely extended, and we propose to act in relation to them precisely as the Book of Discipline directs. The first step, says the rule, to be taken is, “to cite the judicatory alleged to have offended to appear at a specified time and place.” Well, sir, is not this precisely what we propose to do?

It is objected, however, that this whole rule refers to a case of judicial action in the court below, a special case improperly adjudicated, the knowledge of which is brought to the superior court, which is then authorized to examine into it and order it to be rectified. There is, however, no such limitation; and it would be preposterous that there should be. The rule specifies any “neglect or irregularity,” which covers the whole ground, and does not confine the power of the superior court to specific cases of improper or irregular decisions. If it were known that Socinianism was allowed to be openly professed by the members of some of our presbyteries, may such presbyteries escape all interference or control by simply doing nothing, by neglecting all notice of such departures from the truth and all record on their minutes? Would not the superior court, under the rule which directs that when, from the neglect of a judicatory to perform its duty, heretical opinions or corrupt practices are allowed to gain ground, it is incumbent on the superior judicatory to take cognizance of the same, and to examine and judge in the whole matter, have a right to cite such negligent judicatory and examine into the case? This is the precise case for which the rule was made.

But again it is asked, “What can you do, if you do cite? you can only remit the charges and tell the inferior judicatory they must correct their irregularities. You cannot try and punish here.” Suppose this to be true, what has it to do with the question? The objection has reference to the mode of issuing the case, and not to the right, or to the mode of commencing the process. The resolution on the very face of it, professes to be the first step in the process. When the judicatories cited appear at your bar, the first question to be decided will be, are the charges sustained? and the second, how is the cause to be disposed of? It will be time enough then to decide, whether the Assembly shall “deliberate and judge in the whole matter,” or send the case down to the implicated judicatories with an injunction to correct the evils complained of. The objection, to say the least of it, is premature. It would be absurd however that a court should have the power to decide, and then be obliged to leave the execution of their decision to the option of the court below. The superior judicatory has undoubtedly the right to see that its decisions are carried into effect.

This however is not now the point. The simple question is about citation.

The perfect regularity of the course proposed is so plain that it is in various ways admitted by the brethren on the other side, as far as synods are concerned; the grand objection is that the right of citation is confined to the judicatory next above, and consequently that the General Assembly has no authority to cite a presbytery. To this objection it would be a sufficient answer to say that the resolutions make no mention of presbyteries. They simply recommend the appointment of a committee to ascertain whether there are sufficient grounds to cite any inferior judicatories to your bar. If that committee should, in their report, go beyond synods, and recommend the citation of presbyteries, it would be time enough to object to the adoption of such recommendation, that the Assembly had no immediate jurisdiction over the presbyteries; that they could be reached only through the synods. But, if in the ascending series of our system of Church courts, so highly praised by the eloquent gentleman on the other side, a synod may be omitted in case of appeal, complaint, or reference, and the cause be brought directly from the presbytery to the Assembly, as is constantly allowed, can any good reason be assigned, why, in the descending series, a synod may not in like manner be passed over, and the Assembly act immediately on the presbytery? It is indeed proper and expedient, in the great majority of cases, that both in ascending and descending the cause should go regularly up or down through the several courts, but this is not always the case. There are occasions when it is just as necessary, for the sake of speedy justice, that the highest court should act on a remotely inferior one, as that an appeal should come directly from the latter to the former. The book renders it incumbent on the next superior judicatory to take cognizance of the neglect of the court below, but this does not forbid the highest court from interfering when any special emergency renders it necessary or desirable. If, while the Assembly was actually in session, a presbytery should decide that they would depose any of their ministers who should preach the doctrine of the trinity, we suspect few men on this floor would think it necessary to wait for the synod to interfere, especially if they had reason to believe the synod would sustain the decision.

Besides, it has been generally understood that the brethren opposite entertained different opinions as to the power of the Assembly from those which they now express. It was supposed they believed that this body could stretch its long arm over a synod and reach a presbytery, and even make and unmake it at pleasure. It is not many years since they actually exercised this power, and in known opposition to the wishes of a synod, constituted a new presbytery within its bounds. They were understood then to teach that the Assembly was clothed with plenary powers; that as a synod included presbyteries it possessed their powers in a wider sphere, and that the General Assembly, including both synods and presbyteries, might do all that either could do, within the whole compass of the Church. Can these brethren complain if we should assume this matter as a res adjudicata? Must they cry out the moment their own principles are commended to their acceptance? Do they suppose that the constitution means one thing when they are in the majority, and another when they are in the minority? One brother indeed, (Mr. E. White,) all but avows this principle. He says, “The act of the General Assembly erecting a presbytery in this city was null and void, and, in my view, the Synod of Philadelphia acted right in nullifying the procedure,” though he voted to condemn the synod, and to enforce the act he pronounces null and void. Such candour, however, is unusual. Taking then the extreme supposition that the Assembly had not, by the constitution, the right to act directly upon presbyteries, yet as these brethren have legalized the opposite interpretation, they would have no reason to complain if we should now act upon it. We say this, however, merely on the supposition that the case of citation of a presbytery is parallel to that of creating such a body. This we do not admit, and therefore are not prepared to allow that even those who have hitherto condemned the erection of a presbytery by the General Assembly, are inconsistent in advocating the right of citation.* The constitution is not a donation of powers, it is a limitation of them. The General Assembly does not derive its powers from the constitution, but from the delegation of the presbyteries. It is the presbyteries in Assembly collected. It is therefore an unsound principle that the Assembly has no right to exercise any power not expressly granted. It has the right to do any thing in the discharge of its duties as a supreme judicatory and supervising body of the Church, which the constitution does not forbid. The presbyteries have limited and circumscribed the inherent powers of this body. We have no right to pass those limits. We can do nothing the constitution forbids, but we can do a vast many things which it does not enjoin. This whole discussion, however, is premature. Should the proposed committee recommend the citation of presbyteries, we can then decide whether we have the right to cite them or not.

The principal objection, however, is directed against the resolution which proposes that the members of judicatories cited should be excluded from a seat in the next Assembly. The argument on which this resolution is supported may be very briefly stated. It is readily admitted that there is no express warrant for such a proceeding in the Book of Discipline. The authority for it, however, is not the less clear and satisfactory. The constitution expressly recognizes the right of a superior judicatory to cite and try an inferior one. This is admitted. But the constitution makes no specific directions how the trial is to be conducted. Does it follow that it cannot be conducted at all? Does the constitution recognize a right, and impose a duty, and then, by mere silence, preclude the possibility of exercising the right, or discharging the duty? Certainly not. If the Assembly has the right of trying, it has the right of ordering the trial, and, in the absence of special limitations or directions, must be guided by the nature of our system, by precedent, and the general principles of law and justice. The constitution of the United States confers on the senate the right of trying public officers when impeached, but it prescribes no mode of procedure. Must the proceedings therefore stop, or be arrested at every step by the demand of an express warrant to collect testimony, to take depositions, or to send for persons and papers? When the right to try is conferred, every thing else is left to be regulated by precedent, the general principles of law, and the necessities of the case. In like manner the constitution recognizes the right of congress to preserve its own authority; but where is the warrant for its committees of investigation, for its power of arrest, its right of expelling its own members? There is no more reasonable and universally recognized principle than that a grant of power implies a grant of all that is requisite for its legitimate exercise. When therefore our constitution recognizes the right of the Assembly to cite and try inferior judicatories, it recognizes the right to conduct such trial. It prescribes minutely the method to be adopted when an individual is on trial before a session or presbytery, but it gives scarcely any directions for the mode of proceeding when a judicatory is on trial. The only course therefore to be taken is to consult the nature of our system, and the general rules of justice and propriety. In our system we find the principle distinctly recognized that when a man is on trial before a judicatory, he ceases to have a right to a seat in that judicatory, until his cause is issued; and still further, that even when the decisions of an inferior court are under review in the superior one, the members of the former are excluded from their seats. These, especially the former, are not merely constitutional rules, but they are self-evidently just and reasonable. Now by parity of reasoning, when a synod is on trial before this house, its members have no right to a seat in it. The resolution refers to chap. v. sect. 9, of the Book of Discipline, for no other purpose than to show that the constitution recognizes the correctness of the principle upon which the Assembly proposes to act. As to the objection that the judicatories in question are not on trial before this Assembly, and that the next Assembly may disregard our decision, we answer that these judicatories are placed on trial the moment they are cited; the citation is the commencement of a judicial process, and the next Assembly will be as much bound to regard the preliminary decision of this house, as its final decision. When this house decides that there is sufficient ground to cite a particular synod, and to suspend its members from a right to a seat, its decision is as much obligatory, as when it decides in the issue of a case on the final deposition or excommunication of a person or persons regularly on trial. Its decisions may be puffed at; but it will be in violation of the provision of the constitution and of justice, that no judicial decision shall be reversed, except by regular process.

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