nempe et summorum cruciatuum, reum facit. Atqui corruptio originaria est involuntaria.

Ibid. 3. 4. 1. Inclinatio illa (ad peccandum) proprie dictum peccatum non est aut peccati habitus ab Adamo in ipsos propagatus, sed naturalis tantum inclinatio habendi id, quod carni gratum est.

Pelagius apud August. de peccato orig. 14. Omne bonum ac malum, quo vel laudabiles vel vituperabiles sumus, non nobiscum oritur, sed agitur: capaces enim utriusque rei, non pleni nascimur, et ut sine virtute, ita et sine vitio procreamur; atque ante actionem propriæ voluntatis id solum in homine est, quod Deus condidit.

Epist. ad Demetr. c. 3. Volens namque Deus rationabilem voluntarii boni munere et liberi arbitrii potestate donare, utriusque partis possibilitatem homini inserendo proprium ejus fecit, esse quod velit: ut boni ac mali capax, naturaliter utrumque posset, et ad alterutrum voluntatem deflecteret. A. def. 2. Iterum quærendum est, peccatum voluntatis an necessitatis est? Si necessitatis est, peccatum non est, si voluntatis, vitari potest. 5. Iterum quærendum est, utrumne debeat homo sine peccato esse. Procul dubio debet. Si debet, potest: si non potest, ergo non debet. Et si non debet homo esse sine peccato, debet ergo cum peccato esse; et jam peccatum non erit, si illud deberi constiteret. The maxim, Si debet, potest, has become immortal. It is the ground-work of the whole system to which it belongs, and is constantly repeated by its advocates, whether philosophers or theologians. In reference to Kant’s Ich Soll, also kann ich, Müller pithily answers: Ich sollte freilich können, aber Ich kann nicht. Müller’s Lehre von der Sünde. Band II. s. 116. Dr. Beecher, in the Spirit of the Pilgrims, 1828, held the following language: “The Reformers with one accord taught that the sin of Adam was imputed to all his posterity, and that a corrupt nature descends from him to every one of his posterity, in consequence of which infants are unholy, unfit for heaven and justly exposed to future punishment.” —“Our Puritan fathers adhered to the doctrine of original sin as consisting in the imputation of Adam’s sin, and in a hereditary depravity; and this continued to be the received doctrine of the churches of New England, until after the time of Edwards. He adopted the views of the Reformers on the subject of original sin and a depraved nature transmitted by descent. But after him this mode of stating the subject was gradually changed, until long since, the prevailing doctrine in New England (?) has been, that men are not guilty of Adam’s sin, and that depravity is not of the substance of the soul, nor an inherent physical quality, but is wholly voluntary, and consists in a transgression of the law in such circumstances as constitute responsibility and desert of punishment.” Work of Christ and Justification. The objections of Socinians against the Church doctrine of satisfaction, says Bretschneider, led Grotius to refer the satisfaction of Christ to the justitia Dei rectoria. According to this theory he says, “The satisfaction consists in this, Christ properly endured no punishment, but innocent in himself voluntarily submitted to suffering and death, in order that men might not be punished, and that God was satisfied

sin,” i. e. an innate, hereditary, sinful corruption of nature. Whatever effect Adam’s apostasy may have had upon himself or on his posterity; whether it left his nature uninjured, and merely changed unfavorably his circumstances; or whether our nature was thereby deteriorated so as to be prone to sin, it was not itself rendered morally corrupt or sinful. Adam was in no such sense the head and representative of his race, that his sin is the ground of our condemnation. Every man, according to this system, stands his probation for himself, and is not under condemnation until he voluntarily transgresses some known law, for it is only such transgression that falls under the category of sin. In regeneration, according to the principles above stated, there cannot be the production of a new moral nature, principle or disposition, as the source of holy exercises. That change must consist in some act of the soul, something which lies within the sphere of its own power, some act of the will or some change subject to the will. The influence by which regeneration is effected, must be something which can be effectually resisted in the utmost energy of its operation. This being the case, the sovereignty of God in the salvation of men must of necessity be given up.

With these views of the nature and liberty of man is connected a corresponding view of the moral government of God.

with this atonement made to his law or government.” Systemat. Entwickelung, p. 628.

Limborch Apol. thes. 3. 21. Satisfactio Christi dicitur, qua pro nobis pœnas omnes luit peccatis nostris debitas, easque perferendo et exhauriendo divinæ justitiæ satisfecit. Verum illa sententia nullum habet in scriptura fundamentum. Mors Christi vocatur sacrificium pro peccato; atqui sacrificia non sunt solutiones debitorum, neque plenariæ pro peccatis satisfactiones; sed illis peractis conceditur gratuita peccati remissio.

Curcellus Rel. Christ. Instit. 5. 19. 16. Non ergo, ut putant, satisfecit Christus patiendo omnes pœnas, quas peccatis nostris merueramus; nam primo istud ad sacrificii rationem non pertinet, sacrificia enim non sunt solutiones debitorum; secundo Christus non est passus mortem æternam, quæ erat pœna peccato debita, nam paucis tantum horis in cruce pependit et tertia die resurrexit. Imo etiamsi mortem æternam pertulisset, non videtur satisfacere potuisse pro omnibus totius mundi peccatis. * * * Quarto ista sententia non potest consistere cum illa remissione gratuita omnium peccatorum, quam Deum nobis in Christo ex immensa sua misericordia concedere, sacræ literæ passim docent.

Ibid. 7. 9. 6. Nullibi docet scriptura, justitiam Christi nobis imputari. Et id absurdum est. Nemo enim in se injustus aliena justitia potest esse formaliter justus, non magis, quam aliena albedine Æthiops esse albus.

Sin has entered the world because it could not be prevented in a moral system. God counteracts and restrains it by every means in his power consistent with the continuance of that system. The obstacle to its extirpation is the free-will of man; and the obstacle to its forgiveness is the license which would thereby be given to transgression. As God governs his rational creatures by motives, the work of Christ is a device to meet both these difficulties. It presents a powerful motive to man to forsake sin, and makes such an exhibition of God’s displeasure against sin, as answers in place of its punishment as a means of moral impression. The work of Christ was not a satisfaction to law and justice in the proper sense of those terms. Justice in God is simply “benevolence guided by wisdom.” The acceptance of the sinner is the act of a sovereign, dispensing with the demands of the law. The righteousness of Christ is not imputed to believers, but as the sin of Adam was the occasion of certain evils coming on his race, so the righteousness of Christ is the occasion of good to his people.

From these theoretical views, others of a practical nature necessarily follow. Conviction of sin must accommodate itself to the theory that there is no sin but in the voluntary transgression of known law; a sense of helplessness must be modified by the conviction of ability to repent and believe, to change our own heart and to keep all God’s commands. Faith must regard Christ’s work as a governmental display of certain divine attributes. Such directions as, receive Christ, come to him, trust in him, commit the keeping of the soul to him, naturally give place under this system to the exhortation, submit to God, determine to keep his commands, make choice of him in preference to the world. The view which this system presents of the plan of salvation, of the relation of the soul to Christ, of the nature and office of faith, modifies and determines the whole character of experimental religion.

The system antagonistic to the one just described has for its object the vindication of the supremacy of God in the whole work of man’s salvation, both because he is in fact supreme, and because man being in fact utterly ruined and helpless, no method of recovery which does not so regard him is suited to his relation to God, or can be made to satisfy the necessities of his nature. This system does not exalt a theory of morals or of liberty over the Scriptures, as a rule by which they are to be interpreted. It accommodates its philosophy to the facts revealed in the divine word. As the Bible plainly teaches that man was created holy, that he is now born in sin, that when renewed by the Holy Ghost he receives a new nature, it admits the doctrine of concreated holiness, innate sin, and of infused or inherent grace.⁴ It acknowledges Adam as the head and representative of his posterity, in whom we had our probation, in whom we sinned and fell, so that we come into the world under condemnation, being born the children of wrath, and deriving from him a nature not merely diseased, weakened, or pre-

nec laudemur, nec vituperemur. Item, nihil esse peccatum, nisi voluntarium. Hæ sententiæ apud philosophos de civili judicio dictæ sunt, non de judicio Dei.

Form of Concord, p. 640. Et primum constat, christianos non tantum, actualia delicta et transgressiones mandatorum Dei peccata esse, agnoscere et definire debere, sed etiam horrendum atque abominabilem illum hæreditarium morbum, per quem tota natura corrupta est, imprimis pro horribili peccato, et quidem pro principio et capite omnium peccatorum (e quo reliquæ transgressiones, tanquam e radice nascantur, et quasi e scaturigine promanent) omnino habendum esse.

Ibid. p. 641. Repudiantur igitur et rejiciuntur veterum et recentiorum Pelagianorum falsæ opiniones et dogmata vana * * * quod defectus ille et malum hereditarium non sit proprie et vere coram Deo tale peccatum, propter quod homo filius iræ et damnationis habeatur. Reformed Authorities.

Conf. Helv. II. cap. 8. Qualis (homo, Adam) factus est a lapsu, tales omnes, qui ex eo prognati sunt, peccato inquam, morti variisque obnoxii calamitatibus. Peccatum autem intelligimus esse nativam illam hominis corruptionem ex primis illis nostris parentibus in nos omnes derivatam vel propagatam. Conf. Gall. Art. II. Credimus hoc vitium esse vere peccatum, &c.

Belgic Conf. Art. 15. (Peccatum originis) est totius naturæ corruptio et vitium hæreditarium, quo et ipsi infantes in matris suæ utero polluti sunt, quodque veluti radix omne peccatorum genus in homine producit ideoque ita fœdum et exsecrabile est coram Deo, ut ad generis humani condemnationem sufficiat.

Articles of the Church of England, Art. 9. Peccatum originis * * * est vitium et depravatio naturæ cujuslibet hominis ex Adamo naturaliter propagati, qua fit, ut ab originali justitia quam longissime distet, ad malum sua natura propendeat, et caro semper adversus spiritum concupiscat, unde in unoquoque nascentium iram Dei atque damnationem meretur. Westminster Confession, ch. 6. 3. They [our first parents] being the root of all mankind, the guilt of this sin [their first sin] was imputed, and the same death in sin and corrupted nature conveyed to all their posterity, descending from them by ordinary generation. This corruption of nature, during this life, doth remain in those that are regenerated; and although it be through Christ pardoned and mortified, yet both itself, and all the motions thereof, are truly and properly sin. Inability. Lutheran Authorities.

Augsburg Confession, p. 15. De libero arbitrio docent, quod humana voluntas habeat aliquam libertatem ad efficiendam civilem justitiam et diligendas res rationi subjectas. Sed non habet vim sine Spiritu Sancto efficiendæ justitiæ Dei seu justitiæ spiritualis. Damnant Pelagianos et alios, qui docent, quod sine Spiritu Sancto, solis naturæ viribus possimus Deum supra omnes diligere.

Form of Concord, p. 579. Credimus, quantum abest, ut corpus mortuum seipsum

disposed to evil, but which is “itself” as well as “all the motions thereof,” “truly and properly sin.” It admits that by this innate, hereditary, moral depravity men are altogether indisposed, disabled, and made opposite to all good; so that

vivificare, atque sibi ipsi corporalem vitam restituere possit, tantum abesse ut homo, qui ratione peccati spiritualiter mortuus est, seipsum in vitam spiritualem revocandi ullam facultatem habeat.

Ibid. p. 656. Credimus, quod hominis non renati intellectus, cor et voluntas, in rebus spiritualibus et divinis, ex propriis naturalibus viribus prorsus nihil intelligere, credere, amplecti, cogitare, velle, inchoare, perficere, agere, operari, aut cooperari possint.

Ibid. p. 643. Viribus suis coram Deo nihil aliud nisi peccare potest.

Ibid. p. 662. Antequam homo per Spiritum Sanctum illuminatur, convertitur, regeneratur et trahitur, ex sese et propriis naturalibus suis viribus in rebus spiritualibus et ad conversionem aut regenerationem suam nihil inchoare, operari aut cooperari potest, nec plus quam lapis, truncus aut limus. Reformed Authorities.

Conf. Helv. ii. cap. ix. Constat vero mentem vel intellectum, ducem esse voluntatis, cum autem cæcus sit dux, claret quousque et voluntas pertingat. Proinde nullum est ad bonum homini arbitrium liberum, nondum renato, vires nullæ ad perficiendum bonum.

Ibid. Cæterum nemo negat in externis, et regenitos et non regenitos habere liberum arbitrium. Damnamus in hac causa Manichæos, qui negant homini bono, ex libero arbitrio fuisse initium mali. Damnamus etiam Pelagianos, qui dicunt hominem malum sufficienter habere liberum arbitrium, ad faciendum præceptum bonum.

Thirty-Nine Articles. Art. x. The condition of man after the fall is such, that he cannot turn and prepare himself by his own natural strength and good works to faith and calling upon God. Therefore we have no power to do good works, pleasant and acceptable to God, without the grace of God by Christ preventing us, that we may have a good will, and working with us when we have that good will.

French Confession. Art. ix. Etsi nonnullam habet (homo) boni et mali discretionem: affirmamus tamen quicquid habet lucis mox fieri tenebras, cum de quærendo Deo agitur, adeo ut sua intelligentia et ratione nullo modo possit ad eum accedere: Item, quamvis voluntate sit prœditus, qua ad hoc vel illud movetur, tamen quum ea sit penitus sub peccato captiva, nullam prorsus habet ad bonum appetendum libertatem, nisi quam ex gratia et Dei dono acceperit.

Westminster Confession, ch. ix. 3. Man, by his fall into a state of sin, hath wholly lost all ability of will to any spiritual good accompanying salvation, so as a natural man being altogether averse from that which is good, and dead in sin, is not able, by his own strength, to convert himself, or to prepare himself thereunto. The Work of Christ and Justification. Lutheran Authorities.

Apology for the Aug. Con. p. 93. Christus, quia sine peccato subiit pœnam peccati, et victima pro nobis factus est, sustulit illud jus legis, ne accuset, ne damnet hos, qui credunt in ipsum, quia ipse est propitiatio pro eis, propter quam nunc justi

their ability to do good works is not at all of themselves, but wholly from the Spirit of Christ. It recognizes justice as distinguished from benevolence, to be an essential attribute of God, an attribute which renders the punishment of sin necessary, not merely as a means of moral impression, but for its own sake. It, therefore, regards the work of Christ as designed to satisfy justice and to fulfil the demands of the law by his perfect obedience to its precepts, and by enduring its penalty in the room and stead of sinners. His righteousness is so imputed to believers that their justification is not merely the act of a sovereign dispensing with law, but the act of a judge declaring the law to be satisfied.

reputantur; cum autem justi reputentur, lex non potest eos accusare, et damnare, etiamsi re ipsa legi non satisfecerint.

Form of Concord, p. 684. Justitia illa, quæ coram Deo credentibus ex mera gratia imputatur, est obedientia, passio et resurrectio Christi, quibus ille legi nostra causa satisfecit, et peccata nostra expiavit. Cum enim Christus non tantum homo, verum Deus et homo sit, in una indivisa persona, tam non fuit legi subjectus, quam non fuit passioni et morti (ratione suæ personæ) obnoxius, quia Dominus Legis erat. Eam ob causam ipsius obedientia (non ea tantum, qua Patri paruit in toto sua passione et morte, verum etiam, qua nostra causa sponte sese legi subjecit, eamque obedientia illa sua implevit) nobis ad justitiam imputatur, ita ut Deus propter totam obedientiam (quam Christus agendo et patiendo, in vita et morte sua, nostra causa Patri suo præstitit) peccata nobis remittat, pro bonis et justis nos reputet et salute æterna donet.

Quenstenberg. “Quia non tantum ab ira Dei, justi judicis, liberandus erat homo, sed et ut coram Deo possit consistere, justitia ei opus erat, quam nisi impleta lege consequi non poterat, ideo Christus utrumque in se suscepit, et non tantum passus est pro nobis, sed et legi in omnibus satisfecit, ut hæc ipsius impletio et obedientia in justitiam imputaretur. Reformed Authorities.

Helv. Confession, Cap. 11. Idcirco Christus est perfectio legis et adimpletio nostra, qui ut execrationem legis sustulit, dum factus est pro nobis maledictio, vel execratio, ita communicat nobis per fidem adimpletionem suam, nobisque ejus imputatur justitia et obedientia.

French Confession, Art. 17. Testamur, Jesum Christum esse integram et perfectam nostram ablutionem, in cujus morte plenam satisfactionem nanciscimur.

Belgic Confession, Art. xx. Credimus Deum, qui summe et perfectissime est tum misericors tum justus, Filium suum misisse, ut naturam illam assumeret, quæ per inobedientiam peccaret, ut in ea ipsa, natura satisficeret, atque ut Deus de peccato per acerbissimam mortem et passionem Filii sui justas pœnas sumeret.

Heidelberg Cat. lx. Quomodo justus es coram Deo? Sola fide in Jesum Christum, adeo ut licet mea me conscientia accuset, quod adversus omnia mandata Dei graviter peccaverim, nec ullum eorum servaverim, adhæc etiamnum ad omne malum propensus sim, nihilominus tamen (modo hæc beneficia vera animi fiducia amplectar), sine ullo meo merito, ex mera Dei misericordia, mihi perfecta satisfactio, justitia et

Regarding man in his natural state as spiritually dead and helpless, this system denies that regeneration is the sinner’s own act, or that it consists of any change within his power to effect, or that he can prepare himself thereto, or co-operate in it. It is a change in the moral state of the soul, the production of a new nature, and is effected by the mighty power of God, the soul being the subject and not the agent of the change thereby produced. It receives a new life which when imparted manifests itself in all appropriate holy acts. This life is sustained by the indwelling of the Holy Spirit, to whose influence all right exercises are to be referred. Salvation is thus in its provision, application, and consummation, entirely of grace.

Conviction of sin under this system is more than remorse for actual transgressions, it is also a sense of the thorough depravity of the whole nature penetrating far beneath the acts of the soul, affecting its permanent moral states which lie beyond the reach of the will: and a sense of helplessness is more than a conviction of the stubbornness of the will; it is a consciousness of an entire want of power to change those inherent, moral states in which our depravity principally consists, and a consequent persuasion that we are absolutely dependent on God. Christ is not regarded in this system as simply rendering it consistent in God to bestow blessings upon sinners; so that we can come to the Father of ourselves with a mere obeisance to the Lord Jesus for having opened the door. Christ is declared to be our righteousness and life; we are united to him not merely in feeling, but by covenant and vitality by his Spirit, so that the life which we live is Christ living in us. He is therefore, our all, our wisdom, righteousness, sanctification, and redemption; and consequently what the sinner is called upon to do in order to

sanctitas Christi imputetur ac donetur; perinde ac si nec ullum ipse peccatum admisissem, nec ulla mihi labes inhæreret: imo vero quasi eam obedientiam, quam pro me Christus præstitit, ipse perfecte præstitissem.

Westminster Confession. The Lord Jesus, by his perfect obedience and sacrifice of himself, which he, through the eternal Spirit once offered up unto God, hath fully satisfied the justice of his Father, and purchased not only reconciliation, but an everlasting inheritance in the kingdom of heaven, for all those whom the Father hath given unto him. Ch. viii. 5.

Ibid. ch. xi. Those whom God effectually calleth, he also freely justifieth * * * by imputing the obedience and satisfaction of Christ unto them, they receiving and resting on him and his righteousness by faith.

be saved is not merely to submit to God as his sovereign, or to make choice of God as his portion; that indeed he does, but the specific act by which he is saved, is receiving and resting on Christ alone for salvation. Hence, neither benevolence, nor philanthropy, nor any other principle of natural piety is the governing motive of the believer’s life, but the love of Christ, who loved us and gave himself for us. Whether the believer lives, he lives unto the Lord; or whether he dies, he dies unto the Lord, so that living or dying he is the Lord’s; who for this end both died and rose again that he might be the Lord both of the dead and of the living.

There are three leading characteristics of this system, by which it is distinguished from that to which it stands opposed. The latter is characteristically rational. It seeks to explain every thing so as to be intelligible to the speculative understanding. The former is confessedly mysterious. The Apostle pronounces the judgment of God to be unsearchable and his ways past finding out, as they are specially exhibited in the doctrines of redemption, and in the dispensations of God toward our race. The origin of sin, the fall of man, the relation of Adam to his posterity, the transmission of his corrupt nature to all descended from him by ordinary generation, the consistency of man’s freedom with God’s sovereignty, the process of regeneration, the relation of the believer to Christ, and other doctrines of the like kind, do not admit of “philosophical explanation.” They can not be dissected and mapped off so as that the points of contact and mode of union with all other known truths can be clearly understood; nor can God’s dealings with our race be all explained on the common-sense principles of moral government. The system which Paul taught was not a system of common sense, but of profound and awful mystery. The second distinguishing characteristic of this system is that its whole tendency is to exalt God and to humble man. It does not make the latter feel that he is the great end of all things, or that he has his destiny in his own hands. It asks, Who hath known the mind of the Lord? or who hath been his counsellor? or who hath first given to him and it shall be recompensed unto him again? God’s supremacy, the Apostle teaches us, is seen in his permitting our race to fall in Adam, and sin thus by one man to pass on all men, so that by the offence of one, judgment came upon all men to condemnation. It is seen in the nature of the plan of salvation, which excludes all merit on the part of those who are saved, and takes for granted their entire helplessness. It is still more clearly manifested in God’s administration of this economy of mercy; in its gradual revelation, in its being so long confined to one nation, in its being now made known to one people and not to another, in its being applied where it is known to the salvation of some, and to the greater condemnation of others, and in the sovereignty which presides over the selection of the vessels of mercy. It is not the wise, the great, or the noble whom God calls, but the foolish, the base, and those that are not, that they who glory should glory in the Lord. Thirdly, this system represents God as himself the end of all his works both in creation and in redemption. It is not the universe, but God; not the happiness of creatures, but the infinitely higher end of the Divine glory, which is contemplated in all these revelations and dispensations. For of him, through him, and to him are all things: to whom be glory for ever. Amen.

It is an undeniable historical fact, that this system underlies the piety of the Church in all ages. It is the great granitic formation whose peaks tower toward heaven, and draw thence the waters of life, and in whose capacious bosom repose those green pastures in which the great Shepherd gathers and sustains his flock. It has withstood all changes, and it still stands. Heat and cold, snow and rain, gentle abrasion and violent convulsions leave it as it was. It cannot be moved. In our own age and country, this system of doctrine has had to sustain a renewed conflict. It has been assailed by argument, by ridicule, by contempt. It has been pronounced absurd, obsolete, effete, powerless. It has withstood logic, indignation, wit, and even the Hexagon. Still it stands.⁵ What then is to be done? Professor Park, with rare ingenuity, answers, “Let us admit its truth, but maintain that it does not differ from the other system. There are two theologies, one for the feelings, the other for the intellect, or what may be made to mean precisely the same thing, two forms of one and the same theology; the one precise and definite, designed to satisfy the intelligence, the other vague and intense, adapted to the feelings. Both are true, for at bottom they are the same. It is in vain to deny this old theology. It is in the Bible, in the creeds, in the liturgies, in the hymns of the Church, and in the hearts of God’s people. It will not do to laugh at it any longer; it has too much power. We must treat it with respect, and call it doctrine, when we mean only ‘images, illustrations and intense expressions.’”

We are now prepared, we think, for a fair statement of the Status Quæstionis. The question is not, which of the antagonistic systems of theology above described is true; or whether either is true. Nor is the question, which of the two Professor Park believes. His own faith has nothing to do with the question. So far as the present discussion is concerned, he may hold neither of these systems in its integrity; or he may hold the one which we believe to be true, or he may hold the opposite one. The point to be considered is not so much a doctrinal one as a principle of interpretation, a theory of exegesis and its application. The question is, whether there is any correct theory of interpretation by which the two systems above referred to can be harmonized? Are they two theologies equally true, the one the theology of the intellect, the other the theology of the feelings? In other words, are they different forms of one and the same theology?

We take the greater interest in this question, because this is evidently the last arrow in the quiver. Every thing else has

excused for a feeling of security. We invite our critic to come within this strong tower, and to place his feet upon this same rock, and he will find how strength-inspiring it is, even though his personal humility should be increased by the experiment. We beg of him at least not to confound confidence in a system which has been held for ages, with self-confidence. Our Independent brethren seem to have lost the idea of the church. Some of them have even written against the article in the creed which affirms faith in that doctrine. They appear to think that every man stands by himself, that nothing is ever settled, that every theological discussion is a controversy between individuals. But there is such a thing as the Church, and that church has a faith, and against that faith no one man and no angel is any fair match.

been tried and failed; and, if this fail, there is an end of this series of conflicts. Whatever is to come after must be of a different kind, and from a different quarter. We propose then, First, to show that the above statement of the question presents fairly and clearly the real point at issue; Secondly, to consider the success of this attempt to harmonize these conflicting systems of theology; and Thirdly, to examine the nature of the theory by which that reconciliation has been attempted.

That the above statement of the question presents clearly and correctly the real point at issue, we argue in the first place from the distinct avowals of the author. He expresses the hope “that many various forms of faith will yet be blended into a consistent knowledge, like the colors in a single ray.”⁶ “Many pious men,” he says, “are distressed by the apparent contradictions in our best theological literature, and for their sake another practical lesson developed in the discourse is, the importance of exhibiting the mutual consistency between all the expressions of right feeling. The discrepancies so often lamented are not fundamental, but superficial, and are easily harmonized by exposing the one self-consistent principle, which lies at their basis.”⁷ Over and over it is asserted in the discourse, that while the intellectual theology is ‘accurate not in its spirit only, but in its letter also,’ the emotive theology involves ‘the substance of truth, although when literally interpreted it may or may not be false.’ The purport of one entire head in the sermon is to prove, that the one theology is precisely the same with the other in its real meaning, though not always in its form; that the expressions of right feeling, if they do contradict each other ‘when unmodified,’ can and must be so explained as to harmonize both with each other, and with the decisions of the judgment. * * * The sermon repeats again and again, that it is impossible to believe contradictory statements, ‘without qualifying some of them so as to prevent their subverting each other;’ that the reason ‘being the circumspect power which looks before and after, does not allow that of these conflicting statements each can be true, save in a qualified sense; and that such statements must be qualified by disclosing the fundamental ‘principle in which they all agree for substance of doctrine,’ ‘the principle which will rectify one of the discrepant expressions by explaining it into an essential agreement with the other.’”⁸ The sermon then was designed to harmonize those “apparent contradictions” in doctrinal statements by which pious men are distressed. It was intended to teach that the two theologies, the intellectual and emotive, though they may differ in form, agree in substance of doctrine. Accordingly he says, “Pitiable indeed is the logomachy of polemic divines. We have somewhere read, that the Berkleians who denied the existence of matter, differed more in terms than in opinion from their opponents, who affirmed the existence of matter, for the former uttered with emphasis, ‘We cannot prove that there is an outward world,’ and then whispered, ‘We are yet compelled to believe that there is one;’ whereas the latter uttered with emphasis, ‘We are compelled to believe in an outer world,’ and then whispered, ‘Yet we cannot prove that there is one.’ This is not precisely accurate, still it serves to illustrate the amount of difference which exists between the reviewer and the author of the humble convention sermon.”⁹ And further, it is said expressly, “One aim of the sermon was to show that all creeds which are allowable can be reconciled with each other.”¹⁰ Precisely so. Thus we understand the matter. We do not overlook the word allowable in this statement. It was doubtless intended to do good service. We did not understand the sermon to advocate entire scepticism, and to teach that whatever may be affirmed, can with equal propriety be denied. Nor was it understood to teach that all religions are true, being different forms of expression for the same generic religious sentiment. Nor did we understand our author to advocate that latitudinarianism which embraces and harmonizes all nominally Christian creeds. He says expressly, “There is a line of separation which cannot be crossed between those systems which insert and those which omit the doctrine of justification by faith in the sacrifice of Jesus.”¹¹ The sermon, therefore, was not regarded as a plea for Socinianism as an allowable form of Christianity. But it was understood to teach that “all allowable creeds can be reconciled with each other.” The only question is, what creeds are regarded as coming within this limitation. That the two great antagonistic systems which we have attempted to characterize are considered as belonging to this category, is evident because these are the systems which from the beginning to the end of the sermon, and still more clearly in the reply, are brought into view and compared with each other. To this fact we appeal as the second proof that the statement of the question at issue, as given above, is correct. The systems, which our author attempts to reconcile, are those we have described in the former part of this article. In the first place the radical principles of one of those systems are distinctly presented in the sermon. Those principles, as before remarked, are, that moral character is confined to acts, that liberty supposes power to the contrary, and that ability limits responsibility. These principles are all recognized in the following passages of the sermon, if we are capable of understanding the meaning of the author. After representing the convinced sinner as saying: “I long to heap infinite upon infinite, and crowd together all forms of self-reproach, for I am clad in sin as with a garment, I devour it as a sweet morsel, I breathe it, I live it, I am sin,” &c., he adds,

“But when a theorist seizes at such living words as these, and puts them into his vice, and straightens them or crooks them into the dogma, that man is blameable before he chooses to do wrong; deserving of punishment for the involuntary nature which he has never consented to gratify; really sinful before he actually sins, then the language of emotion forced from its right place, and treated as if it were a part of a nicely measured syllogism, hampers and confuses his reasonings, until it is given to the use for which it was first intended, and from which it never ought to have been diverted.”¹² “Is it said, however, that a passive nature, existing antecedently to all free action, is itself, strictly, literally sinful? Then we must speak a new language, and speak, in prose, of moral patients as well as moral agents, of men besinned as well as sinners, (for ex vi termini sinners as well as runners must be active;) we must have a new conscience which can decide on the moral character of moral conditions, as well as of elective preferences; a new law prescribing the very make of the soul, as well as the way in which the soul, when made, shall act; and a law which we transgress (for sin is ‘a transgression of the law’) in being before birth passively misshapen; we must also have a new Bible, delineating a judgment scene in which some will be condemned, not only on account of deeds which they have done in the body, but also for having been born with an involuntary proclivity to sin, and others will be rewarded not only for their conscientious [conscious?] love to Christ, but also for a blind nature inducing that love; we must, in fine, have an entirely different class of moral sentiments, and have them disciplined by Inspiration in an entirely different manner from the present; for now the feelings of all true men revolt from the assertion, that a poor infant dying, if we may suppose it to die, before its first wrong preference, merits for its unavoidable nature, that eternal punishment, which is threatened, and justly, against even the smallest sin. Although it may seem paradoxical to affirm that ‘a man may believe a proposition which he knows to be false,’ it is yet charitable to say that whatever any man may suppose himself to believe, he has in fact an inward conviction, that ‘all sin consists in sinning.’ There is comparatively little dispute on the nature of moral evil, when the words relating to it are fully understood.”¹³ As to the other points we have such language as the following: Man’s “unvaried wrong choices imply a full, unremitted, natural power of choosing right. The emotive theology, therefore, when it affirms this power is correct both in matter and style; but when it denies this power, it uses the language of intensity; it means the certainty of wrong preference by declaring the inability of right, and in its vivid use of can not for will not is accurate in substance, but not in form.”¹⁴ One of the expressions put in the lips of the emotive theology, and which is pronounced correct both in matter and style is: “If I had been as holy as I had power to be, then I had been perfect.” Another is, I know thee that thou art not a hard master, exacting of me duties which I have no power to discharge, but thou attemperest thy law to my strength, and at no time imposest upon me a heavier burden than thou at that very time makest me able to bear.”¹⁵ In note F. at the end of the sermon it is said: “The pious necessarian has a good moral purpose in declaring that the present and future obligations of men, do and will exceed their power.” This, in the connexion, implies that in the judgment of the writer, men’s obligations do not exceed their power.

Not only are these general principles thus recognized, but the two systems are compared very much in their details, and their harmony is exhibited by disclosing the fundamental principle in which they agree for substance of doctrine. The one system says, The sin of Adam is imputed to his posterity. The other says, The sin of Adam is not imputed to his posterity. The fundamental principle in which they agree is, That the sin of Adam was the occasion of certain evils coming upon his race. The former statement is only an intense form of expressing this definite idea. The one system asserts, That the nature of man since the fall is sinful anterior to actual transgressions. The other says, All sin consists in sinning, a passive nature existing antecedently to all free action cannot be sinful. Still these declarations are consistent. Sinful in the former must be taken to mean prone to sin. “This nature, as it certainly occasions sin, may be sometimes called sinful, in a peculiar sense, for the sake of intensity.”¹⁶ The one system says, That men, since the fall, are, while unrenewed, utterly indisposed, disabled, and made opposite to all good—so that their ability to do good works is not at all of themselves, but entirely from the Spirit of Christ. The other asserts, That such language is merely a “vivid use of can not for will not, accurate in substance, though not in its form.” The one teaches that the commands of God continue to bind those who are unable perfectly to keep them. The other asserts, That unable here means unwilling, because God always attempers his law to our strength. The one says, That man is passive in regeneration, that he therein receives a new nature, a principle of grace, which is the source of all holy exercises. The other repudiates the idea of “a blind nature inducing love,” having a moral character, but it may be called holy as tending to holiness, just as, “for the sake of intensity,” we may call that sinful which tends to sin. In like manner the different representations concerned the work of Christ, however apparently conflicting, are represented as different only in form. Thus in regard to our relation to Adam, the consequences of his apostacy, the natural state of man, ability and inability, the nature of regeneration, the atonement of Christ, the justification of sinners before God, the statements of the two systems are declared to be identical in meaning, however different in form, or a mode of statement is proposed which is made to comprehend both. We can hardly be mistaken, therefore, in saying, that the design of the sermon is to show that both of these are allowable, and may be reconciled. If anything is clear, either in the sermon or the reply, it is that these systems are represented as different modes of presenting one and the same theology, the one adapted to the feeling, the other to the intellect. If this is not the case, then Professor Park has failed to convey the most remote idea of his meaning to a multitude of minds, more or less accustomed to such discussions, and must be set down as either the most unfortunate or the most unintelligible writer of modern times.

If this is a proper statement of the case, it must be admitted that the author has undertaken a great work. We know no parallel to it but the famous Oxford Tract, Number Ninety; and even that was a modest effort in comparison. Dr. Newman merely attempted to show that there was “a non-natural sense” of the Thirty-nine Articles in which a Romanist might sign them. He did not pretend, if our memory serves us, that the sense which he put upon them was their true historical meaning. But Professor Park proposes to show, if we understand him, that the two systems above referred to are identical; that the one is the philosophic explanation of the other; that they are different modes of stating the same general truths, both modes being allowable; that the one, in short, is the theology of the feelings, and the other the theology of the intellect. When we reflect on what is necessarily, even though unconsciously, assumed in this attempt, when we raise our eyes to the height to which it is necessary the author should ascend before all these things could appear alike to him, we are bewildered. It is surely no small matter for a man to rise up and tell the world that the Augustinians and Pelagians, Thomists and Scotists, Dominicans and Franciscans, Jansenists and Jesuits, Calvinists and Remonstrants,¹⁷ have for centuries been contending about words; that they perfectly agree, if they had but sense to see it; that all the decisions of synods, all the profound discussions of the greatest men in history, relating to these subjects, are miserable logomachies. We can understand how even a babe in Christ, under the teaching of the Spirit, may rightfully and in full consciousness of Truth, lift its solitary voice against the errors of ages. But we cannot understand how any uninspired man could have the courage to say to the two great parties in the church, that they understand neither themselves nor each other; that while they think they differ, they actually agree.

That this attempt to reconcile “all allowable creeds” is a failure, no one would thank us for proving. Can it be necessary to show that the differences between the two systems brought into view in this sermon are substantial differences of doctrine and not a mere difference in words? To say that the sin of Adam is imputed to his posterity is to express a different thought, a different doctrine, from what is expressed by saying that his sin was merely the occasion of certain evils coming upon his race. The one of these statements is not merely an intense, figurative, or poetic expression of the thought conveyed by the latter. The former means that the sin of Adam was the judicial ground of the condemnation of his race, and therefore that the evils inflicted on them on account of that sin are of the nature of punishment. My neighbor’s carelessness or sin may be the occasion of suffering to me; but no one ever dreamt of expressing didactically that idea, by saying that the carelessness or crime of a reckless man was imputed to his neighbors. There is here a real distinction. These two modes of representing our relation to Adam belong to different doctrinal systems. According to the one, no man is condemned until he has personally transgressed the law. Every man stands a probation for himself, either in the womb, as some say, or in the first dawn of intelligence and moral feeling. According to the other, the race had their probation in Adam; they sinned in him, and fell with him in his first transgression. They are, therefore, born the children of wrath; they come into existence under condemnation. It is now asserted, for the first time, so far as we know, since the world began, that these modes of representation mean the same thing.

Again, that the corrupt nature which we derive from our first parents is really sinful, is a different doctrine from that which is expressed by saying, our nature though prone to sin is not itself sinful. These are not different modes of stating the same truth. They are irreconcilable assertions. The difference between them is one which enters deeply into our views of the nature of sin, of inability, of regeneration, and of the work of the Holy Spirit. It modifies our convictions and our whole religious experience. It has in fact given rise to two different forms of religion in the Church, clearly traceable in the writings of past ages, and still existing. We refer our readers to President Edwards’s work on Original Sin, and request them to notice with what logical strictness he demonstrates that the denial of the sinfulness of human nature and the assertion of the plenary power of men to obey the commands of God, subverts the whole plan of redemption. Our author says, he firmly believes, “that in consequence of the first man’s sin, all men have at birth a corrupt nature, which exposes them to suffering, but not to punishment, even without their actual transgression.”¹⁸ In the Thirty-nine Articles of the Church of England, it is said of original sin, or “depravity of nature,” in unoquoque nascentium iram Dei atque damnationem meretur. Are not these statements in direct opposition? Does not the one deny what the other affirms? Can they, by any candid or rational interpretation, be made to be mere different modes of stating the same doctrine?

These two systems differ no less essentially as to the doctrine of ability. According to the one, man has, since the fall, power to do all that is required of him. According to the other, though he remains a rational creature and a free moral agent, he is utterly unable either to turn himself unto God, or to do any thing spiritually good. According to the one doctrine, responsibility and inability are incompatible; according to the other, they are perfectly consistent.¹⁹ Surely these are not different modes of asserting the same doctrine. The man who asserts the entire helplessness of men, does not mean the same thing with the man who asserts that they have full power to do all that God commands. These systems are not reconciled, as to this point, by the distinction between natural and moral ability; because the point of separation is not the nature but the fact of the sinner’s inability. No one denies that this inability is moral so far as it relates to moral acts, arises from the moral state of the soul, and is removed by a moral change. It is, however, none the less real and absolute. The question is, What is the state of the unrenewed man? Has he power of himself to change his own heart? Can he by any act of the will, or by the exercise of any conceivable power belonging to himself transform his whole character? The one system says Yes, and the other says No. And they mean what they say. The one does not, by the assertion of this power, mean merely that men are rational and moral beings. The other by its negative answer does not mean merely that men are unwilling to change their own heart. It means that the change is not within the power of the will. It is a change which no volition, nor series of volitions, can effect. It is a change which nothing short of the mighty power of God can produce. Such is the plain doctrine of Scripture; and such is the testimony of every man’s consciousness. If there is anything of which the sinner has an intimate conviction, it is that the heart, the affections, his inherent moral dispositions are beyond his reach; that he can no more change his nature than he can annihilate it. He knows that those who tell him he has this power, are but paltering in a double sense and mocking at his misery. That this inability, though thus absolute, is perfectly consistent with continued responsibility, is also a plain fact of consciousness, and a clearly revealed doctrine of Scripture. None feel their guilt so much as those who are most sensible of their helplessness. It is, therefore, absurd to represent the assertion of this entire inability as consistent with the assertion that men have full power to do all that is required of them. These statements differ in their essential meaning; they differ in their associated doctrines; they have a different origin and they produce widely different effects.

Again there is a real difference of doctrine and not a mere difference of terms between the statement that Christ’s work opens the way for pardon by the moral impression which it makes, and the statement that it was a full and proper satisfaction to the law and justice of God. Here again is a difference which affects the whole scheme of redemption, and consequently the whole character of our religion. According to the one representation the believer is simply pardoned and restored to the favor of God; according to the other he is justified. When a criminal is pardoned and restored to his civil rights, does any one say, he is justified? The word justification expresses far more than the remission of the penalty of the law and the restoration of the offender to favor. And those who teach that the sinner is justified by the imputation of the righteousness of Christ, teach something very different from those who make Christ’s work the mere occasion of good to his people, by rendering their pardon and restoration to favor consistent with the interests of God’s government. According to the one system, the deliverance of the believer from condemnation is an act of a judge; according to the other, it is an act of the sovereign. In the one case, the law is set aside; in the other case, it is satisfied. To remit a debt without payment, out of compassion for the debtor, for the sake of example, or out of regard to the goodness or request of a third party, is a very different thing from the discharge of the debtor on the ground that full payment has been made in his behalf. No less different is the doctrine that Christ’s work renders the remission of sin possible, and the doctrine that he has made a full satisfaction for the sins of his people. As these doctrines are different in their nature, so they differ in their effects. The one gives the sense of justification, of that peace which arises out of the apprehension that our sins have been punished, that justice is satisfied, that the law no longer condemns, but acquits and pronounces just. If any man is unable to reconcile this conviction, that justice no longer condemns the believer, with the most humbling sense of ill-desert, he must be in a state of mind very different from that which has characterized the great body of God’s people. It is this sense of personal ill-desert combined with the assurance that justice can lay nothing to the charge of God’s elect, when clothed in the righteousness of Christ, which produces that union of peace with a sense of unworthiness, of confidence with self-distrust, of self-abasement and self-renunciation with the assurance of God’s love, which gleams and burns through all the writings of the apostles, and which found utterance in the devotional language of the saints in all ages.²⁰

It is not necessary to pursue this comparison further. If there be any power in language to express thought; if human speech be anything more than an instrument of deception, then these systems of doctrine are distinct and irreconcilable. The one asserts what the other denies. It would be easy to confirm this conclusion by the testimony of the leading advocates of these conflicting creeds. They have stated in a hundred forms that they do not mean the same thing; that the one class rejects and condemns what the other asserts. It is then only by doing despite to all the rules of historical interpretation that any man can pretend that they mean substantially the same thing.

What, then, is the theory by which our author proposes to effect the reconciliation of conflicting creeds? According to our understanding of the matter, he presents his theory in two very different forms; one is philosophical and plausible, the other is a truism. The one admits of discussion, the other can be refuted, as a means of reconciling creeds, only by stating it. The one is this, viz., that right feeling may express itself in diverse, conflicting, and therefore in some cases, wrong intellectual forms. The other is, that figurative language is not to be interpreted literally. It is the adroit or unconscious interchange of these entirely different forms of his theory, that gives at once plausibility and confusion to his discourse. The frequent and sudden transition from a principle which no one denies, to one which no orthodox man admits, bewilders and deludes his readers. When startled by the fell sweep of his theory in one of its forms, he suddenly turns to them the other, and shows them how perfectly simple and harmless an affair it is. We shall endeavor very briefly to prove, first, that the author does present his theory in both of the forms above stated; and secondly, that in the one form it is false and destructive, and in the other nugatory.

But what is the theory which teaches that right feeling may express itself in diverse, and even in wrong intellectual forms? The sermon does not present any elaborate exposition or philosophical discussion of it. This was not to be expected in a popular discourse. In order, however, to be properly understood, it is necessary that it should be exhibited somewhat in detail. We do not mean to attribute to Professor Park any thing more than the principle itself, as above stated; we do not wish to be understood as even insinuating that he holds either its adjuncts or its consequents. The doctrine is substantially this. Religion consists essentially in feeling. It is not a form of knowledge, because in that case it could be taught like any other system of knowledge; and the more learned on religious subjects, a man is, the more religion he would have. Much less can it consist in willing or acting, because there is no moral excellence either in volition or outward action, except as expressive of feeling. Religion must, therefore, have its seat in the feelings. There is in man a religious sentiment, a sense of dependence, a consciousness of relation to God. This gives rise to the persuasion that God is, and that we stand in manifold relations to him, and he to us. This is faith, i. e., a persuasion which arises out of feeling, and which derives from that source its contents and its power.²¹ This is a form of intuition, a direct vision of its object; apprehending, however, that it is, rather than either how or why it is. To this follows knowledge. That is, the cognitive faculty, the understanding, the logical consciousness, or whatever else it may be called, makes the intuitions included in faith the objects of consideration, interprets and defines them, and thus transmutes them into definite thoughts. Of the materials thus furnished it constructs theology. In every system of theology, therefore, there are these elements, feeling, faith, knowledge, science. The two former may be the same where the two latter are very different. Hence feeling and faith may retain their true Christian character even when they cannot be reconciled with the philosophical convictions of the mind in which they exist.²² This provides for the case of the “tearful German” mentioned by Professor Park, who was a Christian in his heart, but a philosopher (i.e. in this connexion an infidel) in his head. Further, with the same religious feeling and faith there may be very different theologies; because the interpretation given to the intuitions of faith are, to a great extent, determined by the philosophy, the knowledge, cultivation, prejudices and spirit of the individual, and of the age or church to which he belongs. There is, therefore, no one Christian theology which can be pronounced true to the exclusion of all others. Different theologies are different forms of expressing or of interpreting the same religious sentiment. They are all true.²³ As the force of vegetable life manifests itself in the greatest diversity of forms and in very different degrees of perfection, so Christianity, which is also a power, manifests itself in various forms of faith, which are all to be recognized as expressions of a genuine Christian consciousness. If religion were a form of knowledge, if Christianity consisted in certain doctrines, or had Christ’s immediate object been to set forth a theological system, there could be no room for such diversity; there could be only one true theology.²⁴ But revelation is not a making known a series of propositions. So far as it is an act of God, it is the arrangements and dispensations by which he awakens and elevates the religious consciousness of men; and so far as it regards the recipients, it is the intuition of the truth consequent on this elevation of their religious feelings. And inspiration is the state of mind, the elevation of the religious consciousness, to which this immediate perception of the truth is due. It follows from all this that the Scriptures, great as is their value, are only in an indirect sense the rule of faith. They contain the record of the apprehension of divine things consequent on the extraordinary religious life communicated to the world by Jesus Christ; and although they have a certain normal authority as the expression of a very pure and elevated state of religious feeling, still of necessity that expression was greatly modified by the previous culture of the sacred writers. In other words, the form in which they presented these truths, or the interpretation which they gave to their religious intuitions was influenced by their education, their modes of thought, and by the whole spirit of their age.²⁵ Our faith, therefore, is only indirectly founded on Scripture. Its immediate basis is our own religious consciousness, awakened and elevated by the Scriptures, and by the life which, proceeding from Christ, dwells in the church. The simple, historical interpretation of the sacred writings does not give us the divine element of the truth therein contained; it gives us the temporary logical or intellectual form in which that divine element is embodied. But that form, in the progress of the church, may have become obsolete. The theology of an age dies with the age. The race passes on. It is making constant progress. Not only is the scientific element, which enters into every system of theology, becoming more correct, but the religious consciousness of the church is getting more pure and elevated; and, therefore, a theology suited to one age becomes very unsuitable to another.²⁶

Such, to the best of our understanding of the matter, is the theory to which the radical principle of Professor Park’s sermon belongs. To understand that principle, it was necessary to have some idea of the system of which it is a part. We repeat, however, what we have already said, viz: that we attribute to our author nothing more than he has avowed. We do not say, and we do not know, that he holds the theory above stated in any of its steps beyond the principle that right feeling may express itself in diverse, inconsistent, and therefore, at times, erroneous intellectual forms. That he does teach this principle, and that it is one aspect of the theory by which he proposes to reconcile “all allowable creeds,” we think plain, in the first place, from the formal statements of his doctrine. The sermon from beginning to end treats of two theologies, which differ in form, i. e. in their intellectual statements, but have a common principle. Both are, therefore, allowable, because they are only different expressions of the same thing. It is a matter of perfect indifference whether these are called two theologies, or two modes of expressing one and the same theology. The difference between them in either case is the same.²⁷ “Sometimes,” says our author, “both the mind and the heart are suited by the same modes of thought, but often they require dissimilar methods, and the object of the present discourse is, to state some of the differences between the theology of the intellect and that of the feeling, and also some of the influences which they exert upon each other,” p. 534. “The theology of feeling differs from that of the intellect. It is the form of belief which is suggested by, and adapted to the wants of the well-trained heart. It is embraced as involving the substance of truth, although, when literally interpreted, it may or may not be false,” p. 535. “In the theology of reason, the progress of science has antiquated some, and will continue to modify other refinements; theory has chased theory into the shades; but the theology of the heart, letting the minor accuracies go for the sake of holding strongly upon the substance of doctrine, need not always accommodate itself to scientific changes, but may use its old statements, even if, when literally understood, they be incorrect,” p. 539. “Our theme,” he says, “reveals the identity in the essence of many systems which are run in scientific or æsthetic moulds unlike each other.” “There are, indeed, kinds of theology which cannot be reconciled with each other.” p. 559. “Another practical lesson developed in this discourse is, the importance of exhibiting the mutual consistency between all the expressions of right feeling,” p. 137. We see not how these and many similar declarations are to be understood, otherwise than as teaching that the intellectual forms under which right feeling expresses itself, may be, and often are diverse and inconsistent. The difference is not that between literal and figurative language, but between systems run in different scientific moulds. The intellectual forms of doctrine may change, theory may succeed theory, but the feelings may adhere to these antiquated forms, and continue to express themselves in modes which the reason pronounces to be false.

But, in the second place, a large class of the illustrations employed by our author, puts this matter out of all doubt. They are instances not of figurative, imaginative, or intense expressions, but of purely intellectual and doctrinal statements. This we have already abundantly proved. That the sin of Adam is imputed to his posterity, that they are condemned for that sin, that its consequences to them are of the nature of punishment is a different doctrine from that expressed by saying we are exposed to evil in consequence of that sin. That inherent depravity is truly and properly sin, is a different intellectual proposition from the statement that it is not properly sin. That no mere man since the fall is able perfectly to keep the commandments of God, is a different doctrine from that asserted by saying, that God never requires of us more than we are able to perform. These statements suppose different theories of moral obligation, of moral agency, and of the freedom of the will. So too, the propositions, Christ bore the penalty of the law, his sufferings were of the nature of punishment, he fully satisfied the demands of the law and justice of God, are recognized forms of stating a doctrine concerning the atonement, which has ever been held to be incompatible with the governmental or Socinian theory of the nature of Christ’s work. As these and others of a like kind are included in the author’s illustrations of his theory, they prove beyond doubt that his theory is that right feeling may express itself in diverse and inconsistent intellectual forms. It matters not what name he may give it. It is the precise doctrine of those who hold that the different systems of theology are not to be distinguished as true and false, but as different interpretations of the same genuine Christian consciousness; or that right feeling may express itself in incompatible intellectual forms.²⁸ This is the philosophical, grave, and plausible aspect of our author’s theory. He presents the matter, however, in another and very different light.

The second form in which the doctrine of the sermon is presented, is that figurative language is not to be interpreted literally, that poetry is not to be treated as prose! This, as a device for reconciling “all allowable creeds,” as we said above, needs no refutation beyond the statement of it. That our author does run down his theory to this “infinite little,” is plain both from his exposition and illustration of his doctrine. The emotive theology may, he says, be called poetry, “if this word be used, as it should be, to include the constitutional developments of a heart moved to its depths by the truth. And as in its essence it is poetical, with this meaning of the epithet, so it avails itself of a poetic license, and indulges in a style of remark, which, for sober prose, would be unbecoming, or even, when associated in certain ways, irreverent.”²⁹ Being poetical in its nature, the theology of feeling is better adapted to the hymn-book than to creeds. He ascribes a great deal of mischief to the introduction of the language of poetry into doctrinal symbols. Men, he says, will never find peace “until they confine their intellect to its rightful sphere, and understand it according to what it says, and their feeling to its province, and interpret its language according to what it means, rendering to poetry the things which are designed for poetry, and unto prose that which belongs to prose.”³⁰ “Our theme” i. e. the theme discussed in the sermon, he says, “grieves us by disclosing the ease with which we may slide into grave errors. Such errors have arisen from so simple a cause as that of confounding poetry with prose.”³¹ The emotive theology, as appears from these statements, is poetry. It is the poetic exhibition of doctrines. The conflicts of theologians arise, in a measure, from their not recognizing this fact. They interpret these poetic forms as though they were the sober and wary language of prose. He sustains the doctrine of the sermon, in this view of it, by quotations from Blair, Campbell, Burke, and even a certain commentary on the Epistle to the Romans. “In accordance with these simple principles,” he says, “not dug out of the depths of German metaphysics, but taken from the surface of Blair’s Rhetoric, the sermon under review describes the theology of feeling as introducing obscure images, vague and indefinite representations.”³² The doctrine of the discourse, therefore, is the perfectly harmless truism that poetry is not prose, and therefore is not to be interpreted as though it were. Accordingly he asks the commentator referred to, how it happens, that when he “comes to criticise a New England sermon, he should forget the rhetorical principles with which he was once familiar.”³³ These representations present the author’s theory as a simple rhetorical principle, which no one denies.

A large class of the illustrations of the doctrine of the sermon are adapted to this view of the case. Passages of Scripture, which speak of men as hiding under Jehovah’s wings, which represent God as jealous or angry; which speak of him as a rock or high tower; or which describe him as armed with sword and buckler; the figurative language of our hymn-books, which speaks of God’s burning throne, his smiling face, his open arms; the intense and hyperbolical language of emotion, as when the Psalmist says, I am a worm and no man; and when the sinner says, I am less than nothing, are all cited as illustrations of the principle contended for. There can, therefore, be no doubt, that one aspect of our author’s theory is that poetry is not to be interpreted as though it were prose. But is this the only aspect of his doctrine? Was it with this penny-whistle he discoursed such music as stole away the senses of a Boston audience? When he stood up as a vates præscius venturi, to foretell the blending of all creeds into one colorless ray, and to predict the end of religious controversy, was Blair’s Rhetoric the source of his inspiration? Did he persuade the shrewd Athenians of America, that it was a feasible matter to interpret the Westminster Confession as a poem, and that men never would have peace until that feat was accomplished? Such is the modest interpretation which he gives his “humble convention sermon.” We entertain for it a much higher opinion. We believe it teaches something more than lies on the surface of the Scotch Principal’s dull lectures. If it does not, then we grudge the ink—worth less than a farthing—we have spent in writing about it.³⁴

It is the principle that right feeling may express itself in wrong intellectual forms, incorrect and dangerous as that principle is, that gives dignity and importance to the sermon under review. This is a grave matter. The theory with which it is connected is not to be treated lightly. It has been elaborated with so much skill, sustained by so much power, and adopted by so many leading minds, that it deserves the most serious examination. It would be a very important service if some competent hand would undertake such a scrutiny, and philosophically discuss the various points which the theory in question involves, separating the warp of truth from the woof of error in its complicated texture. No one can read even the bald outline of that theory as given above, without feeling its power, and seeing that there is an element of truth in it which gives it a dangerous plausibility. We must leave such an examination, however, to those whom God calls to the work. We have an humbler office. There are two methods of dealing with a false theory. The one is, the refutation of its principles; the other is, to show that its admitted results are in conflict with established truths. The latter is much the shorter, and generally much the more satisfactory, as it is the common scriptural method of dealing with error. We propose, therefore, simply to indicate one or two points in which the theory, one of whose principles our author has adopted, stands in conflict with the Bible.

In the first place the radical principle of the theory, viz., that religion consists essentially in feeling, is contrary to the scriptural doctrine on the subject, and is opposed to what the Bible teaches of the importance of truth. According to Scripture, religion is not a blind feeling, desire, or emotion, but it is a form of knowledge. It is the spiritual discernment of divine things. The knowledge, which in the Bible is declared to be eternal, or spiritual life, is not the mere intellectual, or speculative apprehension of the truth; but such apprehension is one of its essential elements, and therefore of true religion. No man can have the spiritual discernment of any truth which he does not know. The intellectual cognition is just as necessary to spiritual knowledge as the visual perception of a beautiful object is to the apprehension of its beauty. Men cannot be made religious by mere instruction, but they cannot be religious without it. Religion includes the knowledge, i. e. the intellectual apprehension of divine things, as one of its essential elements, without which it cannot exist. And therefore it is often called knowledge. Hence, to know God, is the sum of all religion. The vision of the glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ, is the vital principle of inward Christianity. Hence throughout the Bible, the knowledge of God, wisdom, understanding, and words of like import, are used as designations of true religion. With spiritual discernment is inseparably connected a feeling corresponding to the nature of the object apprehended. This is so intimately united with the cognition as to be an attribute of it—having no separate existence, and being inconceivable without it. And it is to the two as inseparably united that the name of religion properly belongs. Neither the cognition without the feeling, nor the feeling without the cognition completes the idea of religion. It is the complex state of mind in which those elements are inseparably blended, so as to form one glowing, intelligent apprehension of divine things, which constitutes spiritual life. But in this complex state the cognition is the first and the governing element, to which the other owes its existence; and therefore, in the second place, the Scriptures not only teach that knowledge is an essential constituent of religion, but also that the objective presentation of truth to the mind is absolutely necessary to any genuine religious feeling or affection. It is by the truth as thus outwardly presented, that the inward state of mind, which constitutes religion, is produced. We are begotten by the truth. We are sanctified by the truth. It is by the exhibition of the truth, that the inward life of the soul is called into being and into exercise. This is the agency which the Spirit of God employs in the work of conversion and sanctification. Hence truth is essential to the salvation of men. It is not a matter of indifference what men believe, or in what form right feeling expresses itself. There can be no right feeling but what is due to the apprehension of truth. Hence Christ commissioned his disciples to teach. The Church was made the teacher of the nations; she has ever regarded herself as the witness and guardian of the truth. Heresy she has repudiated, not as an insult to her authority, but as destructive of her life.

Is not this scriptural view of the relation between knowledge and feeling, confirmed by consciousness and experience? Is not the love of God intelligent? Is it not complacency in the divine character as intellectually apprehended? Does not the love of Christ suppose the knowledge of Christ? Can the man who looks upon him as a creature, feel toward him as God manifest in the flesh? Can the feeling which has for its object the Son of God bearing our sins in his own body on the cross, be the same as that which regards him as an amiable martyr? Repentance, faith, love, reverence, gratitude, every affection and exercise which enters into true religion, our own consciousness tells us, derives its character and owes its existence to knowledge, to the intelligent apprehension of the truth as revealed in the word of God. The history of the world is a continued illustration of the truth, that inward character depends on knowledge. This is one of the great principles of Protestantism; and therefore Protestants have ever been the advocates of religious instruction. It is a purely Romish doctrine, that “Religious light is intellectual darkness.”³⁵ Knowledge, according to Protestants, is one of the elements of faith, without which it cannot exist. It includes assent to some known truth. In the one church, therefore, truth has a paramount importance; in the other ignorance is regarded as the mother of devotion. If a man trust in the cross, the Romish system tells him he need not know what the cross means. It matters not whether he thinks he is saved by the wood of the cross, by the magic influence of the sign, or by Christ as crucified for the sins of the world. These are different expressions of the feeling of confidence. A distinguished Unitarian clergyman once said to us, that there was no difference between his doctrine as to the method of salvation and that of the orthodox. Both believe that we are saved through Christ, and even by his death. The one says how this is done; the other leaves the manner unexplained. The general truth both receive. The difference is not a difference of doctrine, but of the mode or form in which the same doctrine is presented.

In opposition to the scriptural doctrine on the subject, the theory under consideration teaches that religion consists in feeling, as distinguished from knowledge, and that it is in a great measure independent of it. In the extreme form in which this doctrine is presented by its great master, it is immaterial, so far as religion is concerned, whether a man be a Pantheist or Theist; whether he regards God as a mere force, of which neither intelligence nor moral excellence can be predicated, or as a spirit, infinite in his being, wisdom, power, holiness, justice, goodness and truth. And even in the more moderate form, in which it is set forth by some of his followers, truth is of subordinate importance. As the essence of religion is feeling, it may exist under very different intellectual forms, and find expression in conflicting systems of doctrine. Both, therefore, as to the nature of religion, and as to the importance of truth, there is a vital difference between this theory and the teachings of the word of God.

Secondly, this theory subverts the doctrine of a divine revelation, in the correct and commonly received sense of those terms. Revelation is the communication of truth by God to the understandings of men. It makes known doctrines. For example, it makes known that God is; that God is a spirit; that he is infinite; that he is holy, just, and good; that Christ is the Son of God; that he assumed our nature; that he died for our sins, &c. These are logical propositions. They are so set forth, that the meaning of the terms employed, and the sense of the propositions themselves, are understood, and understood in the same way by the renewed and the unrenewed. That the one class perceive in the truths thus revealed an excellence, and experience from them a power, of which the other class have no experience, does not alter the case. Revelation, as such, is addressed to the understanding; to the understanding indeed of moral beings, capable of perceiving the import of moral propositions; but it is very different from spiritual illumination. All this the thoery in question denies. It makes revelation to be the awakening and elevating the religious feelings, which when thus roused, have higher intuitions of spiritual things than were possible before. Doctrines are not matters of revelation. They have no divine authority. They are constructed by the understanding. They are the logical statements of the supposed contents of these immediate intuitions, and are therefore fallible, transient, variable; assuming one form under one set of influences, and a different under another.

Thirdly, this theory necessarily destroys the authority of the Scriptures. This follows from what has already been said. If it subverts the true idea of revelation, it subverts all that rests on that idea. But, besides this, it teaches that the influence under which the sacred writers thought and wrote was not peculiar to them. It is common to all believers. Inspiration is an exalted state of the religious feelings, quickening, and rendering clearer the religious perceptions. The light within is therefore co-ordinate with the light in the Scriptures. This theory is a philosophical form of Quakerism, and stands in much the same relation to the normal authority of the Scriptures. The practical operation of this doctrine confirms the view here given of its nature and tendency. There is of course a great difference among its advocates, as to the reverence which they manifest for the word of God, and as to the extent in which they agree with its teachings; but in all there is abundant evidence that the Bible has lost its ancient authority as a rule of faith. They construct systems which do not profess to be expositions of what is taught in the word of God, but deductions from the religious consciousness as it now exists. Few of them hesitate to say that the Bible is full of errors, not merely of history and science, but of such as are connected with religion; that it is disfigured by misconceptions, false reasoning and erroneous exhibitions of doctrine. How can it be otherwise if its logical propositions are but the fallible interpretation given to their feelings by the sacred writers. Our readers cannot ask us to say more in opposition to a theory which thus deals with the Scriptures, which represents its doctrinal statements as due to the peculiar training of the sacred writers, and which teaches that propositions categorically opposed to each other may be alike true—true relatively, since none is true absolutely.

Professor Park may ask, What has all this to do with his convention sermon? That discourse does not teach that all religion consists in feeling, nor does it advocate the view of revelation and inspiration deduced from that principle. Very true. But it does teach one of the main principles of the theory in question. It does teach that right feeling may express itself in inconsistent intellectual forms. Does it not teach that we may say the sin of Adam is imputed to his race; that our nature since the fall is sinful; that Christ’s sufferings were of the nature of punishment; that he satisfied the law and justice of God, &c.? And yet are not all these propositions pronounced to be false, in the very sense which those who use them mean to convey? Is it not the avowed design of the sermon to show that all “allowable creeds” may be reconciled? Does not the author attempt to show that the two great systems of doctrine which have been in conflict for ages, are but different forms of expressing the same right feelings? If this is so, we know no method of refutation more fair or more conclusive, than to point out the origin, and to trace the consequences of a principle by which these results are brought about. To object to an argument designed to show that a doctrine is false, by proving that the principles which it involves, and the consequences to which it leads, are unsound and dangerous, is to object to its being refuted at all.

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← XVI. The Theology of the Intellect and That of the Feelings, Article I · Contents · XVIII. The Theology of the Intellect and That of the Feelings, Article III →

Footnotes

1. Professor Park says repeatedly his reviewer does not blush to say this, and does not blush to say that. ↩

2. Sermon, p. 535. In the following article the references to Professor Park’s Sermon are to the edition of it contained in the Bib. Sacra for July, 1850; and those to his Remarks on the Princeton Review are to the Bib. Sacra for January, 1851. That the point at issue is what is stated in the text will be made more apparent in the sequel; for the present it may be sufficient to refer to the following passages. In giving his reasons for the title of the sermon, Professor Park says: “Secondly, the title was selected as a deferential and charitable one. The representations which are classified under the theology of feeling are often sanctioned as ‘the true theology,’ by the men who delight most in employing them. What the sermon would characterize as images, illustrations, and intense expressions, these men call doctrines.” “We call one system of theology ‘rational’ or ‘liberal,’ simply because it is so called by its advocates; much more then may we designate by the phrase ‘emotive theology,’ those representations which are so tenaciously defended by multitudes as truth fitted both for the feeling and the judgment.” Remarks, p. 140. / “A creed, if true to its original end, should be in sober prose, should be understood as it means, and mean what it says, should be drawn out with a discriminating, balancing judgment, so as to need no allowance for its freedom, no abatement of its force, and should not be expressed in antiquated terms, lest men regard its spirit as likewise obsolete. It belongs to the province of the analyzing, comparing, reasoning intellect; and if it leave this province for the sake of intermingling the phrases of an impassioned heart, it confuses the soul, it awakens the fancy and the feelings to disturb the judgment, it sets a believer at variance with himself by perplexing his reason with metaphors and his imagination with logic; it raises feuds in the church by crossing the temperaments of men, and taxing one party to demonstrate similes, another to feel inspired by abstractions. Hence the logomachy which has always characterized the defence of such creeds. The intellect, no less than the heart, being out of its element, wanders through dry places, seeking rest and finding none. Men are thus made uneasy with themselves and therefore acrimonious against each other; the imaginative zealot does not understand the philosophical explanation, and the philosopher does not sympathize with the imaginative style of the symbol; and as they misunderstand each other, they feel their weakness, and ‘to be weak is to be miserable,’ and misery not only loves but also makes company, and thus they sink their controversy into a contention and their dispute into a quarrel; nor will they ever find peace until they confine their intellect to its rightful sphere, and understand it according to what it says, and their feeling to its province and interpret its language according to what it means, rendering unto poetry the things that are designed for poetry, and unto prose what belongs to prose.” Sermon, p. 554. ↩

3. We give from authoritative symbols and writings a few extracts confirming the account given in the text of the two systems referred to. Our Relation to Adam. / Apology of the Confession of the Remonstrants, p. 84. Fatentur Remonstrantes, peccatum Adami a Deo imputatum dici posse posteris ejus, quatenus Deus posteros Adami eidem malo, cui Adamus per peccatum obnoxium se reddidit, obnoxios nasci voluit, sive quatenus Deus malum, quod in poenam Adamo inflictum fuerat, in posteros ejus dimanare et transire permisit. At nihil cogit eos dicere, peccatum Adami posteris ejus sic fuisse a Deo imputatum, quasi Deus posteros Adami revera censuisset ejusdem cum Adamo peccati et culpae, quam Adamus commiserat, reos. / Limborch Theol. Christ. 3. 3. 8. Quod itaque imputationem peccati Adami attinet, qua statuitur, Deum primum Adami et Evæ peccatum omnibus ipsorum posteris ita imputasse, ut omnium peccatum sit omnesque in Adamo peccaverint et propterea mortis ac condemnationis æternæ rei facti sint, eam impugnamus. / Ibid. 3. 3. 19. Dicimus, Deum innoxios posteros non punire ob peccatum Adami. Original Sin. / Apol. Conf. Remonstr. p. 84. Peccatum originale nec habent (Remonstrantes) pro peccato proprie dicto, quod posteros Adami odio Dei dignos faciat, nec pro malo, quod per modum proprie dictæ poenæ ab Adamo in posteros dimanet, sed pro malo, infirmitate, vitio aut quocunque tandem alio nomine vocetur. * * * Peccatum autem originis non esse malum culpæ proprie dictæ, quod vocant, ratio manifesta arguit; malum culpæ non est, quia nasci plane involuntarium est, ergo et nasci cum hac aut illa labe, infirmitate, vitio vel malo. * * * Multo minus itaque fieri potest, ut sit culpa simul et poena. / Limborch Theol. Christ. 3. 4. 4. Nullam scriptura in infantibus corruptionem esse docet, quæ vere ac proprie sit peccatum. 4. 5. Absurdum est statuere. Deum homines punivisse corruptione tali, quæ vere ac proprie dictum est peccatum, et ex qua omnia actualia peccata tanquam ex fonte necessario scaturiunt, et deinde propter illam corruptionem homines denuo punire pœna inferni. / Ibid. 4. 7. Nullum peccatum poena dignum est involuntarium, quia nihil magis debet esse voluntarium, quam quod hominem poenæ et quidem gravissimæ, æternæ ↩

4. Our Relation to Adam. Lutheran Authorities. / Form of Concord, p. 639. Primo, quod hoc hereditarium malum sit culpa seu reatus, quo fit, ut omnes, propter inobedientiam Adæ et Hevæ, in odio apud Deum, et natura filii iræ simus. / Form of Concord, p. 643. Seductione Satanæ, per lapsum, justo Dei judicio (in pœnam hominum) justitia concreata seu originalis amissa est. / Art. Schm. p. 317. Peccatum ab uno homine ortum esse et introiisse in mundum, per cujus inobedientiam omnes homines facti sunt peccatores, morti et diabolo obnoxii. / Apology for Aug. Con. p. 58. Defectus et concupiscentia sunt pœnæ [of Adam’s sin of which the context speaks]; mors et alia corporalia mala et tyrannis diaboli proprie pœnæ sunt. / Gerhard, (Tom. II. p. 132, § 52). Adam non ut privatus homo, sed ut caput totius humani generis peccavit; et nos, qui lumbis Adæ peccantis delituimus, in et cum eo non modo corrupti, sed et rei iræ, Dei facti sumus. / Quenstedt (vol. II p. 53). Peccatum Adami per imputationem nostrum factum est, qui omnes posteros cum culpæ tum pœnæ implicuit, et ut representator, fons, caput et seminarium totius humanæ naturæ suam illis labem aspersit. Reformed Authorities. / Shorter Catechism. The covenant being made with Adam not only for himself, but for his posterity, all mankind descending from him by ordinary generation, sinned in him and fell with him in his first transgression. / Formula Consensus Helvetica X. Sicut autem Deus fœdus operum cum Adamo inivit non tantum pro ipso, sed etiam in ipso, ut capite et stirpe, cum toto genere humano. * * * Censemus igitur, peccatum Adami omnibus ejus posteris judicio Dei arcano et justo imputari. * * * Dulplici igitur nomine post peccatum homo natura, indeque ab ortu suo, antequam ullum actuale peccatum in se admittat, iræ ac maledictioni divinæ obnoxius est; primum quidem ob παράπτωμα et inobedientiam, quam in Adami lumbis commisit; deinde ob consequentem in ipso conceptu hæreditariam corruptionem insitam. Original Sin. Lutheran Authorities. / Augsburg Confession, p. 9, (Hase’s Edition). Item docent, quod post lapsum Adæ omnes homines, secundum naturam propagati, nascantur cum peccato, hoc est, sine metu Dei, sine fiducia erga Deum, et cum concupiscentia, quodque hic morbus, seu vitium originis vere sit peccatum, damnans et afferens nunc quoque mortem his, qui non renascantur per Baptismum et Spiritum Sanctum. Damnant Pelagianos et alios, qui vitium originis negant esse peccatum. / Apology for Aug. Con. p. 58. In scholis transtulerunt huc (adversarii) ex philosophia prorsus alienas sententias, quod propter passiones nec boni, nec mali simus, ↩

5. The New York Independent, in a notice of our former review, objected to the tone of confidence with which we wrote on this subject. How can we help it? A man behind the walls of Gibraltar, or of Ehrenbreitstein, cannot, if he would, tremble at the sight of a single knight, however gallant or well-appointed he may be. His confidence is due to his position, not to a consciousness of personal strength. A man at sea with a stout ship under him, has a sense of security in no measure founded upon himself. A Christian surrounded by learned sceptics may be deeply sensible of his own weakness, and yet serenely confident in the strength of his cause. We then who are within those old walls which have stood for ages, even from the beginning, who can look around and see the names of all generations of saints inscribed on those walls, and who feel the solid rock of God’s word under their feet, must be ↩

6. Sermon, p. 561. ↩

7. Reply, p. 137. ↩

8. Reply, p. 149. ↩

9. Reply, p. 173. ↩

10. Reply, p. 175. ↩

11. Sermon, p. 559. ↩

12. Sermon, p. 552. ↩

13. Sermon, p. 568. It ought to be remembered that there is not a creed of any Christian church (we do not mean separate congregation) in which the doctrine, that inherent corruption as existing prior to voluntary action is of the nature of sin, is not distinctly affirmed. The whole Latin church, the Lutheran, all the branches of the Reformed church, unite in the most express, “nicely measured” assertions of faith in this doctrine. In view of this fact we think the tone of the paragraph quoted above, and especially of the concluding sentences must be considered a little remarkable. We hope we shall hear no complaints hereafter, of over-weening confidence. ↩

14. Sermon, p. 548. ↩

15. Sermon, p. 547. ↩

16. Reply, p. 174. ↩

17. These terms are used in their historical sense; Augustinianism and Pelagianism are designations of forms of theology distinguished by certain characteristic features. The former does not include every opinion held by Augustine, nor the latter every doctrine taught by Pelagius; so of the other terms. When, therefore, it is said that the sermon proposes to show that these classes substantially agree, the only fair interpretation of such language is, that it proposes to show that the characteristic theological systems thus designated may be reconciled. Professor Park has taught us that it is not enough to express our meaning clearly. He has shown that he would consider the above statement refuted, should he adduce, as might easily be done, many points in which he would admit the inconsistency between the opinions of Augustine and Pelagius, the Jansenists and Jesuits, Calvinists and Remonstrants. In our former article we said, that the doctrine that present strength to moral and spiritual duties is the measure of obligation, is one of the radical principles of Pelagianism. He considers himself as confuting that statement, by asking whether Pelagius held this or that other doctrine. We did not say he did. What we did say, however, is none the less true and uncontradicted. We hope, therefore, no one will take the trouble to show in how many points the Jesuits differed from the Jansenists in morals and discipline, or even in theology, as a refutation of the statement in the text. ↩

18. Reply, p. 166. ↩

19. The maxim that men cannot be bound to do what they are unable to perform, relates properly to external acts dependent on the will; and to those which are not adapted to our nature. No man is bound to see without eyes, hear without ears, or work without hands; nor can a creature be required to create a world, nor an idiot to reason correctly. But the maxim has no more to do with the obligations of moral agents in reference to moral acts, than the axioms of geometry have. ↩

20. In reference to this subject Professor Park uses the following language in his remarks on our review. In regard to the remark that Christ has fully paid the debt of sinners, he asks, “Does not the reviewer himself qualify this phrase, in his common explanations of it? Why does he so often teach that Christ has not paid the debt of sinners in any such sense (which would be the ordinary sense of the phrase) as to make it unjust in God to demand the sinner’s own payment of it? Why does he teach, that although the debt of sinners is paid, in a very peculiar sense, yet it is not so paid but that they may be justly cast into prison until they themselves have paid the uttermost farthing? Another illustration is, ‘the unqualified remark that Christ suffered the whole punishment which sinners deserve.’ And does not the reviewer elsewhere thrust in various modifications of this phrase, saying Christ did not suffer any punishment in such a sense, as renders it unjust for the entire punishment of the law to be still inflicted on transgressors; that he did not suffer the whole, the precise eternal punishment which sinners deserve, that in fact he did not suffer any punishment at all in its common acceptance of ‘pain inflicted on a transgressor of law on account of his transgression, and for the purpose of testifying the lawgiver’s hatred of him as a transgressor?’ Why, then, does the reviewer here represent this ‘unqualified remark’ as identical with the ambiguous phrase ‘Christ bore our punishment,’ and as a ‘summation of the manifold and diversified representations of Scripture?’” Reply, p. 162. It may serve to convince the author that there is a real difference between the two systems under comparison, to be told, that his reviewer does hold that Christ has paid the debt of sinners in such a sense that it would be unjust to exact its payment from those who believe. The reviewer does hold that Christ has suffered the punishment of sin, in such a sense that it would be unjust to exact that punishment of those who accept of his righteousness. This is the very idea of justification. Paul’s whole argument is founded on this principle. The law cannot justify those whom it condemns; neither can it condemn those whom it justifies. There is no condemnation (no danger of it,, no exposure to it) to those who are in Christ Jesus. Who shall lay anything to the charge of God’s elect? It is God that justifieth, who is he that condemneth? This view of justification arises from the very nature of substitution and vicarious punishment. The punishment of sin is necessary from the holiness and justice of God. That punishment may, as we learn from Scripture, be endured by one competent to sustain the load, in the place of others. Christ, the eternal Son of God, assumed our nature, took our place, fulfilled all righteousness, completely obeying the precept and enduring the penalty of the law as our substitute. Its demands were thus satisfied, i. e., it has nothing to demand, as the ground of justification, of those interested in the righteousness of Christ. That righteousness being imputed to them is the ground in justice of their being accepted as righteous in the sight of God. In themselves they are hell-deserving, to them their acceptance is a matter of grace, because it is not their own righteousness, but the righteousness of another that is the ground of their justification. As this is the form in which this doctrine is presented in Scripture,so it has its foundation in our own moral constitution. Men have a constitutional sense of justice, an intimate conviction that sin ought to be punished: and therefore they cannot be satisfied until such punishment is inflicted. No mere pardon, no restoration to favor, no assurance that the evil effects of forgiveness will be prevented, can satisfy this intimate conviction. In all ages, therefore, men have demanded an atonement; and by atonement they have not understood a means of moral impression, but a method of satisfying justice. As these means have been ineffectual, the sacrifices of the heathen only serve to reveal the sentiment to which they owe their origin. But in the vicarious sufferings of the Son of God, in his bearing the punishment of our sins, what was merely symbolized in the ancient sacrifices was fully realized. This view of the nature of Christ’s work and of the imputation of his righteousness is pronounced even in our day, by Hengstenberg, “the foundation-doctrine of the gospel, the life-point whence sprung the Reformation.” Kirchen-Zeitung, 1836, No. 23. ↩

21. Twesten’s Dogmatik, p. 20. Glaube ist überhaupt ein auf dem Gefühle beruhendes Fürwahrhalten. ↩

22. This however is true only within certain limits. Twesten, p. 30. Zwar hängen Gefühl und Glaube nicht schlechterdings von den Bestimmungen des Wissens ab; sie führen ja selbst ihren Gehalt und ihre Sicherheit mit sich, und man wird sich mancherley Gegenstände des religiösen Wissens denken können, die verschiedene Ansichten zulassen, ohne dass dadurch der religiöse und christliche Character des frommen Bewusstseyns verändert wird. Diess geht aber doch nur bis zu einem gewissen Punct. * * * Obgleich also die Religion weder Erkenntniss ist, noch von der Erkenntniss ausgeht, so verhält sie sich doch nicht gleichgültig gegen dieselbe, und es ist z. B. für den religiösen Glauben nicht einerley, ob wir aus wissenschaftlichen Gründen meinen, behaupten oder leugnen zu müssen, dass der Mensch unsterblich sey. Twesten belongs to the most moderate and orthodox class of Schleiermacher’s disciples. The master carried this matter much further, “Ja nach Schleiermacher,” says his interpreter, Gess, “können sich religiöse Gefühle sogar mit solchen Begriffen einigen, welche sich unter einander widersprechen. So heisst es (Reden p. 112:) es gebe zwei verschiedene Vorstellungen von Gott, eine, die ihn den Menschen ähnlich mache, und eine, die ihn nicht als persönlich denkend und wollend denke, sondern als die über alle Persönlichkeit hinausgestellte allgemeine, alles Denken und Seyn hervorbringende Nothwendigkeit. Welche von beiden die richtige sey, daran liege dem Gefühle nichts—‘sondern fromm kann jeder seyn, er halte sich zu diesem oder zu jenem Begriffe; aber seine Frömmigkeit muss besser seyn, als sein Begriff. Und nichts scheint sich weniger zu ziemen, als wenn die Anhänger der Einen die, welche von der Menschenähnlichkeit abgeschreckt, ihre Zuflucht zu dem Andern nehmen, beschuldigen, sie geyen gottlos; oder ebenso, wenn diese wollten jene wegen der Menschenähnlichkeit ihres Begriffes des Götzendienstes beschuldigen und ihre Frömmigkeit für nichtig erklären.’ Gess’s Schleiermach. System, p. 21 ↩

23. Twesten, p. 35. Aber so viel ist doch klar, dass es hiernach nicht bloss eine christliche Dogmatik giebt, die ausgenommen alle übrigen geradezu unchristlich wären, sondern dass verschiedene dogmatische Systeme auf den Namen der christlichen Anspruch machen können. * * * Gleich wie die Lebenskräfte der Natur in einer grossen Mannigfaltigkeit von Erscheinungen hervortreten, verschieden nach der Art und Stufe ihrer Entwickelung, doch alle Aeusserungen derselben Kräfte: Kraft des göttlichen Lebens ist, in einer Fülle verschiedener Glaubensformen offenbaren, die sämmtlich Formen des christlichen Lebens und Bewusstseyns sind. ↩

24. Twesten, p. 33. Bestände die Religion nun zunächst in einer Lehre, und wäre Christi nächste Absicht gewesen, ein system von Dogmen aufzustellen; so könnten wir nicht umhin, uns zu der einen oder der andern Meinung zu schlagen,—that is, he must, in the case supposed, admit that the Lutheran system was the only Biblical and Christian system, or more or less opposed to it. There could in that case be but one true system. ↩

25. Twesten, p. 36. Vergegenwärtigen wir uns den Apostel Paulus, nach seiner Nationalität und Bildung, nach dem Ideenkreise, in dem er erzogen war, der Art der Gelehrsamkeit, die er sich angeeignet hatte, dann nach seiner Stellung in der apostolischen Kirche, den Hindernissen, die er zu beseitigen, den Gegnern, die er zu bekämpfen hatte: konnte diess ohne Einfluss bleiben auf die Art, wie er das Christenthum auffasste und vortrag, und musste es nicht, von allem Andern abgesehen, seiner Lehre ein anderes Gepräge geben, als sie auch bey innerer Geistesverwandtschaft und unter ähnlichen Umständen z. B. bey einem Luther haben konnte, der nicht in der Schule Gamaliels, sondern der Scholastik gebildet war, und nicht Juden aus den Geschichten und Andeutungen des Alten, sondern Päpstler aus den Lehren des Neuen Testaments von todten Werken zum lebendigen Glauben führen sollte? ↩

26. Morrell’s Philosophy of Religion, p. 223. “The inevitable result of this is, that those who take their stand pertinaciously upon the formal theology of any given period, remain stationary, as it were, in the religious consciousness of this period, while that of the age goes far beyond them, that their theology is no longer an adequate exponent of the religious life of the times, and no longer satisfies its just demands.” ↩

27. One of the complaints against us, which Professor Park urges most frequently, is that we misrepresent him as teaching two “kinds of theology,” instead of “two different forms” of one and the same theology. After many iterations of this complaint, he loses his patience, and asks, “Will the reviewer never distinguish between two doctrines, and the same doctrine expressed in two forms?” We are afraid not. There is not the slightest difference between the two statements, except in words. There are no doctrines so wide apart, but that some general truth may be found of which they are but different forms. Atheism is one form, and Theism is another form of the one doctrine, that the universe had a cause. The Socinian and the church exhibition of the design of Christ’s death, are but different forms of the one doctrine, that we are saved by Christ. It is therefore perfectly immaterial whether Professor Park teaches that there are “two theologies,” or “two forms of one and the same theology.” His readers understand the former expression precisely as they do the latter, after all his explanations. The former is the more correct, and has the usage of all ages in its favor. One great difficulty in regard to this sermon is, that its author wishes to change the established meaning of terms, and call new things by old words. ↩

28. When the writers, to whom we have referred, represent conflicting systems of theology as alike true, they of course mean that there is a higher view which embraces and harmonizes them all; that they are different aspects of the same general truth; and further, that they have a common element, which is differently combined in these several systems. They would accept Professor Park’s statement of the identity in essence of systems run in different scientific moulds, or of “the mutual consistency of all the expressions of right feeling,” as a proper expression of their doctrine. ↩

29. Sermon, p. 538. ↩

30. Sermon, p. 554. ↩

31. Sermon, p. 558. ↩

32. Reply, p. 158. ↩

33. Reply, p. 160. ↩

34. Yet the author seems to labor through this whole reply to persuade his readers that this is all he meant. This is the source of his retorts and sarcasms. “Do you hold that God is a rock, or that he came from Teman? Do you forget your own principle, that figurative expressions are not to be taken according to the letter? What pitiable logomachy then is it, to contend about doctrinal discrepancies. Cannot is only another form of will not; sinful is only a figure for “not sinful.” If we all admit we are saved by Christ, what is the use of disputing how he saves us? We are all agreed, if we did but know it. You say the thing figuratively, I say the same thing literally; I mean just what you mean, mean what you please, (within allowable limits.”) ↩

35. Newman’s Parochial Sermons, Vol. I., p. 124. ↩