Again, where is the necessity for any such discussion? Why should we again go over ground rendered hard by the footsteps of generations? Why discuss anew questions which have been debated every ten years since the days of Augustin? Why trouble ourselves to pick up and send back spent balls which have been discharged a thousand times before to no purpose? Every generation has indeed its own life to live. It must fight out its own battles, which are only a repetition of the conflicts of former ages. The same great questions are constantly recurring, and must be settled anew by every seeking soul. But these are mostly personal struggles. The doctrines are fixed. They have taken their place in the settled faith of the church; and the real struggle is in the breast of each individual, to come to a comprehension, appreciation, and acknowledgment of the truth. To help such individuals in their inward conflicts, to vindicate the faith from misapprehension, to commend it fairly to the acceptance of men, is now, in great measure, the work of the theological teacher. That there is a God; that the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are three persons, the same in substance, equal in power and glory; that God was manifested in the flesh for the redemption of man; that Jesus Christ our Lord is very God and very man in two distinct natures and one person for ever; that he died for our sins and rose again for our justification; that we are saved by faith in Christ as the Son of God, who loved us and gave himself for us; that the race whose nature he assumed, and whom he gave his life to redeem, is a fallen race—born in sin—by nature the children of wrath, under condemnation from their birth, infected with a sinful depravity of nature, by which they are disabled and indisposed to all spiritual good, and therefore must be born again, not of blood, nor of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man, but of God, are no longer open questions among Christians. These doctrines are part of the settled faith of Christendom, included in the creeds of all churches, Greek, Latin, Lutheran, and Reformed. We are aware that these doctrines are liable to assault from various quarters, and that every man should be prepared to give a reason for the hope that is in him. But this is no reason why we should treat the whole Christian system as something unsettled, to be discussed anew with every individual who may choose to assail any of its fundamental principles. It is time that men should feel and acknowledge that assaults against matters of common faith, are attacks, not against opinions of men, but against Christianity; so that the position of the assailant may be defined from the beginning. If the point assailed can be shown to be part of the common faith of the church, then we think the necessity for further debate is, in all ordinary cases, at an end. We hold to no infallibility of the church, but we hold to the certain truth of what all Christians believe. The fact of their agreement admits of no other solution, than the teaching of the Spirit of truth, who dwells in all believers. We regard it, therefore, as a matter of great importance that such questions should not be open, at least within the church (i. e. among Christians) to perpetually renewed agitation. The church has new conflicts enough before her, without fighting over and over her former battles.

Again, there is nothing new as to substance or form, in Professor Park’s objections to call for special attention. They are presented somewhat more rhetorically than usual, but with less than common logical force and discrimination. They are the old, ever recurring, and constantly repeated difficulties, which arise partly from the nature of the subject, and partly from the apparent impossibility of disabusing the mind of misconceptions to which it has become wedded. Language is at best an imperfect vehicle of thought, and when men have become accustomed to associate certain ideas with certain terms, they find it very difficult to free themselves from such trammels. There is a large class of words to which Professor Park attaches a meaning different from that in which they are used by theologians of the Reformed church, and he, therefore, unavoidably misunderstands and misrepresents their doctrines. To this class of terms belong such words as imputation, guilt, punishment, condemnation, satisfaction, justification, nature, natural, moral, disposition, voluntary, &c. In numerous cases he perverts these words from their established sense, and then pronounces judgment with the greatest confidence, on doctrinal propositions, of whose meaning he has no distinct apprehension. If instead of reading here and there a page in Turrettin, through dark green spectacles, which turn everything into spectres, he would read his whole work through with unclouded eyes, he would find himself in a new world, and would be saved the trouble of asking a multitude of irrelevant questions.

We will give specimens of the Professor’s objections to justify our description of their character. He represents the doctrine of the imputation of Adam’s sin, for example, as involving an unintelligible oneness of the race with Adam: an assumption that men sinned before they existed; that the moral character of the act imputed is transferred; that men, being regarded as morally guilty of Adam’s sin, are, contrary to all justice, punished for it. The true doctrine on this subject is nothing more or less than that the sin of Adam is the judicial ground of the condemnation of his race. There is no mysterious oneness of the race, no transfer of moral character, no assumption of the moral guilt of men for the sin of Adam, involved in the doctrine. Professor Park knows this, for he himself makes the question on this subject to be, whether God exercises distributive justice or sovereignty toward us, in causing us to suffer for the sin of Adam.³ If, then, our author is able for himself thus to eliminate the unessential elements of this doctrine, why does he overload it with all his queries and difficulties about oneness, transfer of character, &c., &c.? If, as Professor Park says, the whole dispute is about the word punishment, or, in other words, whether the evils brought upon our race by the sin of Adam be judicial or sovereign inflictions, then imputation does not involve any transfer of the moral character of the act imputed. This is still further plain, not only from the explicit declarations of the advocates of the doctrine, but also from the notorious fact, that no other imputation of the offence of Adam is acknowledged or contended for, than is asserted when is is said our sins were imputed to Christ, and his righteousness is imputed to believers. Every one knows it would be a gross calumny against the Lutheran and Reformed churches, to say they teach the transfer of moral turpitude (or moral ill-desert) to the Lord Jesus, or of the moral excellence of his righteousness to his people. The imputation of sin to Christ did not render him unholy, nor does the imputation of his righteousness render us holy. Why then should it be contended that the imputation of Adam’s sin renders his race morally guilty of his transgression?

As to the objection that it is unjust to condemn men for a sin not personally their own, there are three modes of answer. First, it may be shown that the objection bears with aggravated force against those who deny the doctrine of imputation. They admit that evils only less than infinite come upon the race in consequence of Adam’s sin; that God as a sovereign determined that if Adam sinned all his race should sin; he decreed to bring men into existence with such a constitution of their nature and under such circumstances, as to render their becoming sinners absolutely certain, and then to condemn them to eternal misery for the sin thus committed, in the first dawn of reason. All this is done in sovereignty. The other doctrine teaches that the evils which afflict our race on account of Adam’s sin, are part of the just penalty of that transgression. Professor Park himself says, “Our calamities hang suspended on the sovereign purpose of heaven: we say, directly; he (his reviewer) says, indirectly: we say, without any intervening links; he says, with the intervening links of imputation, guilt, &c.”⁴ When we first read this sentence we could hardly believe that Professor Park had been given up to speak the truth thus simply and clearly. It is precisely as he states it. A man is put to death, he says, by a sovereign act; we say, with the trifling intermediate links of guilt and just condemnation. He is welcome to all the converts he can make by this statement of his case.

A second method of answering this charge of injustice is to show that it bears against undeniable facts in the providence of God. It is vain to say anything is wrong which God actually does. It is a plain fact that the penalty threatened against Adam in case of transgression has been inflicted on his posterity. Death, the pains of child-birth, the unfruitfulness of the earth—all the visible manifestations of God’s displeasure, fell upon the race as well as upon the original transgressors. These evils were denounced as a curse, as a penalty, and as such they have come on all mankind.

A third answer to this objection is found in the express declarations of Scripture. The Bible does not say we are merely pardoned, by a sovereign act, on account of Christ’s death; but that we are justified by his blood. Neither does it say we suffer certain evils inflicted in a sovereign manner, of which Adam’s sin is the occasion; but it says, we are condemned for that sin. If justification means more than pardon, then condemnation means more than the sovereign infliction of evil. This is Paul’s method of answering difficulties. If an objection can be shown to bear against the providence or the word of God, it is thereby handed up to a higher tribunal, where the objector can prosecute it or not as he sees fit.

Another subject on which our author has many difficulties is the doctrine of inability—or the denial of the doctrine “that ability limits responsibility; that men are responsible only so far as they have adequate power to do what is required of them; that they are responsible for nothing that is not under the control of the will.”⁵ On this subject there are three forms of doctrine more or less prevalent in this country. The first is that of plenary or adequate power; the second, the doctrine that man is naturally able, but morally unable to keep the commandments of God; the third, the doctrine that since the fall men are both “indisposed and disabled” to all spiritual good. The symbols of the Lutheran and Reformed churches which inculcate this last mentioned view of the subject, clearly teach, first, that since the fall man retains all his faculties of soul and body, and is, therefore, still a free moral agent; second, that he not only has the power of choosing or refusing what is agreeable or disagreeable, but has the power of performing things “civilly good;” the inability asserted is restricted to things spiritually good, or things connected with salvation; thirdly, that this inability arises out of the sinful state of the soul, and is removed by spiritual regeneration and the co-operation of the Holy Ghost. The second form of this doctrine mentioned above, is a kind of neutral ground, and is a very convenient hiding and dodging place. Many who profess that view of the subject, mean by natural ability, nothing more than what the old theologians mean by man’s free agency; and by moral inability they mean what those divines intend, when they say men are since the fall disabled and indisposed to all spiritual good. On the other hand, however, there are many who understand by natural ability, plenary power; and the only inability which they admit, is a disinclination which it is in the power of the will, i. e., of the sinner in the exercise of his natural strength, to remove.

With regard to Professor Park’s objections to the old doctrine on this subject, we have but three remarks to make. First: Most of his difficulties arise from his not understanding the question. He overlooks the limitations and explanations of the doctrine given in the Protestant confessions. We no more believe than Professor Park does, that men can be under obligation to create a world by their own power. The old doctrine does not represent the inability of the sinner as being the same in kind, though as invincible in degree as that of the blind to see, or of the deaf to hear. The inability of the blind to see does not arise out of their moral state, has not reference to moral acts, and is not removed by a moral change. It is, therefore, of an entirely different nature from the inability under which the sinner is represented to labor. The objection, therefore, which takes for granted their identity, is simply an argumentum ad ignorantiam. Secondly: Whether men are, or are not able, of themselves to do all that God requires, is a question of fact, and is to be determined accordingly. Where is the man who has ever regenerated himself? Where is the man who has loved God perfectly even for one hour, much less for a lifetime? Where is the sinner who by any exercise of his natural strength, though in imminent danger of perdition, can turn himself unto God? Let Professor Park, with all his boasted power, go on his knees and utter ten sentences in a manner to satisfy his own conscience. He knows he could not do it, if the salvation of the world depended on it. The plain, simple fact of consciousness and observation, is that men cannot do what they know they are bound to do; and every denial of this fact, is either palpably false, or true only in an esoteric and deluding sense. As every man knows that his affections are not under the control of his will, the only way to sustain the doctrine, that ability is the measure of obligation, is to take the ground that we are not responsible for our affections; that the command to love is absurd; and then the very foundation of religion and morals is overthrown. Thirdly: As the Scriptures nowhere tell men they can regenerate themselves, but expressly declare that the natural man cannot discern the things of the Spirit of God, so that blessed Agent, in leading men to a knowledge of themselves, uniformly convinces them of their entire helplessness, i. e. that they cannot of themselves repent, believe, or even think any good thought. It is not a matter of surprise, therefore, that the doctrine of adequate power, or that men “can by their natural strength turn themselves unto God,” is repudiated as anti-Christian no less by Romanists than by Protestants. It is just as abhorrent to the theology of New England, as it is to that of the Reformed church.

It is, however, on the subject of involuntary sin that Professor Park is most zealous, and on which he seems most confident of carrying the public sympathy with him. The term involuntary is not very happily chosen, as it is used in very different senses. Any thing may be said to be voluntary which inheres in the will, or which flows from an act of the will, or which consists in such an act. Then again, the word will may be taken to include all the “active powers of the mind,” so that all liking and disliking are acts of the will; or it may be taken in the stricter sense for the imperative faculty of the mind, or power of self-determination. In this sense, only acts of choice, volitions generic or imperative, are acts of will. To say that all sin is voluntary in the first of these senses, is a very different thing from saying it is voluntary in the sense last mentioned. Yet it is easy and very tempting to quote, as Professor Park does, Augustin’s admission that all sin is voluntary in one sense, as an authority for teaching it is voluntary in a sense which would overthrow the whole of that father’s system.

On this subject of original sin, we have in this country three principal forms of doctrine. The first is founded on the principle that all sin consists in the voluntary transgression of known laws; whence it follows that whatever may be the condition of human nature since the fall, there is nothing of the nature of sin in man until in his own person he voluntarily transgresses the law of God. The second is “the exercise scheme,” which assuming that the soul itself is a series of exercises, teaches that moral agency begins at the commencement of the existence of the soul, and that since the fall all moral exercises, though “created” by God, are sinful, until at regeneration a holy series is commenced. The third is the common doctrine that men derive from Adam a sinful nature, i. e. that they are born destitute of original righteousness, and with unholy dispositions or principles, which corruption of nature is commonly called original sin. This, beyond the possibility of doubt, is the doctrine embodied in the symbols, inculcated in the teaching, and implied in the rites of every Christian church. Our author indeed says that some theologians have taught this doctrine.⁶ Some indeed! He might as well admit that some men have eyes. True or false, the doctrine of inherent, hereditary, sinful corruption of human nature since the fall, is part of the faith of the whole church. In assailing that doctrine, Professor Park arrays himself, not against some theologians, but against the Christian world, and he should have the courage to acknowledge his position. He denies a doctrine, the rejection of which (connected with the assertion of plenary powers), Edwards says, does away with the necessity of redemption. He puts himself in special opposition to the faith of the New England churches; for the New England divines, the less they made of imputation, the more stress did they lay on inherent sin.

Most of Professor Park’s objections to this doctrine belong to one or the other of two classes; they either arise from misapprehension, or they involve a petitio principii. The source of a large part of them is indicated in the following sentence: “A thorough Calvinist can no more believe in the passive sin of the heart, than he can believe in the sin of the muscles and veins.”⁷ It is assumed that nature means the essence of the soul with its constitutional faculties and sensibilities, A sinful nature, therefore, must mean a sinful substance, something made. Hence the objections about physical depravity, God’s being the author of sin, the absurdity of men being responsible for the “make” of their souls, &c., &c. All these objections are swept away by the simple remark, that nature in such connexion means natural disposition, and is expressly declared not to mean essence or substance. Cannot a man have a new nature without having a new soul? Cannot we believe in a holy nature without believing in holy muscles? In every rudimental treatise on original sin our author will find distinctions and definitions which ought to have precluded the possibility of his advancing such objections as these.

Another class of his difficulties arises from his taking for granted there can be no such thing as moral dispositions, as distinct from active preferences. To him it appears an axiom that all sin consists in sinning. “What,” he asks, “is the passive voice of the verb sin? What is the inactive form of the word evil-doers? Why is language made without any such phrases as to endure or suffer criminality without any criminal volition?”⁸ These are some of the questions to which he says he has a right to demand an answer. We would reply with all seriousness and respect, that years ago, when we were harassed by the same difficulties, we derived more satisfaction from Edwards on the Religious Affections, and from his work on Original Sin, than from any other source. We there found a philosophical exhibition of the nature of dispositions, principles, or habits, as distinguished from acts; and a clear demonstration that such dispositions, whether innate, infused, or acquired, may have a moral character. The venerable father of New England theology taught us that it was not “necessary that there should first be thought, reflection, and choice, before there can be any virtuous disposition;”⁹ and therefore that it is not inconsistent with the nature of virtue that Adam should be created “with holy principles and dispositions.” He showed us that as it was possible for Adam to be holy, before any act of preference, so it is possible for man to be unholy before any such act. He made it plain to us that the Scriptures everywhere inculcate the doctrine that there may be, and are, moral principles distinct from moral acts and antecedent to them, in the distinction which they make between the tree and its fruits, between the heart and the thoughts, feelings, and preferences which proceed out of it; in their description of the natural state of men as born in sin, and by nature the children of wrath; in their representing even infants as needing redemption and regeneration; and in their account of a new birth, as the infusion of a new life, a holy principle, inherent and permanent, as the source of all holy preferences, feelings, words and works. He pointed out to us a fact which seems to have escaped Professor Park’s notice, viz., that all human languages (so far as known) bear the impress of this distinction between moral principles and moral acts. A good or bad man means something more than a man whose preferences are good or bad, whose acts are right or wrong. It is implied in such expressions that there are certain abiding moral states which constitute the man’s character, and afford ground of assurance what his acts will be. He further showed us how deeply this doctrine entered into the religious experience of God’s people, and how intimately it is connected with the whole scheme of redemption. It is not for us to retail his arguments, but we apprize Professor Park that if he hopes to succeed in his present course, or to carry with him the sympathy and confidence of New England, the first thing he has to do is to answer Edwards on the Will, Edwards on the Affections, and Edwards on Original Sin. When he has done this, it will be time enough to come all the way down to us. In the meanwhile, we think it best to step aside, and let him face his real antagonist.¹⁰

Our first general reason, then, for discontinuing this discussion is, that our author, instead of adhering to the true question in debate, wishes to introduce a doctrinal controversy for which we feel no vocation and see no occasion. Our second reason is to be found in his manner of conducting the discussion. He represents our articles as little else than a series of misstatements, and our method of argument as little better than “nicknaming.” See pp. 628 and 605, et passim. He will not, therefore, object to our respectfully pointing out some particulars in which it appears to us he has come short.

In the first place, we think his articles are, to a great degree, characterized by evasions, and playing with words. For example, one point of distinction between the two systems of theology, is that the one teaches that the sufferings of Christ were penal, the other that they were simply didactic; that is, designed to exhibit truth and make a moral impression. This point is evaded by the remark that the author only denied that Christ suffered the entire penalty of the law, which his reviewer must admit, as he does not hold that Christ suffered remorse. Another point of difference is, as to whether the law of God is set aside in the salvation of sinners, or whether its demands are satisfied by the righteousness of Christ. This corner is turned by saying that what he rejects is complete satisfaction which his reviewer cannot maintain, as he admits the law to be still binding as a rule of duty. Again, the theology of the intellect, we are told, would not suggest the unqualified remark that Christ has fully paid the debt of sinners. Here the pirouette is performed on the word unqualified, and the real point is left untouched. To such an extent is this word-play carried, that language seems in his hands to lose its meaning. He can make anything out of anything. In his former article, setting up himself and his reviewer as representatives of opposite systems, he showed that there was nothing the latter could say in the matter of doctrine which he could not say too; and in the present article, he “avows before the wide world” his hearty belief that we are regarded and treated as sinners on account of Adam’s sin, that we are punished for it, by which, he says, he means that we “are not punished in the most proper sense.” (See p. 623.) Thus the words satisfaction, impute, ability, inability, &c., &c., are kept going up and down like a juggler’s balls, until no man can tell what they mean, or whether they have any meaning at all. We feel ourselves to be no match for our author in such a game as this, and therefore give the matter up. He may keep the balls going, and we will take our place among the admiring spectators.

In the second place, we object to the personal character which he has given the discussion. The only interest which our readers can be presumed to take in this matter, relates to the truths concerned. But our author seems far more anxious to prove that his reviewer contradicts himself and agrees with him, than to establish the truth of his theory. This ad hominem method of argument is greatly commended by our author’s friends, and considered very effective. Were he ever so successful in his attempts to convict his reviewer of self-contradiction, we cannot see that he would be much the better for it. His theory would remain unproved and its evil tendencies uncounteracted. In our partial judgment, however, our author nowhere appears to less advantage than in these personal attacks. To make sure of his object he goes back twenty years, and ascribes to us articles in this Review some of which we probably never even read. Taking such a sweep as this it is hard that he should catch nothing. We will select what we consider the most plausible examples of self-contradictions, examples over which our author has specially triumphed, and show in few words the source of his mistake.

In our former article we denied that ability or adequate power is the measure of obligation. As a direct contradiction to this, he quotes from the Biblical Repertory for 1831, the passage, “Man cannot be under obligation to do what requires powers which do not belong to his nature and constitution.” This, he says, ends the strife. These propositions are not only perfectly consistent, but it is the express object of the writer of the article for 1831 to teach the very doctrine that ability is not the measure of obligation, and this Professor Park could not possibly fail to see and know if he read the article he quotes. The above propositions are consistent, for the one does not affirm what the other denies. The one affirms that nothing can be obligatory which transcends the powers of our nature and constitution. The examples given by the writer are, that a rational act cannot be required of an irrational animal, nor a man be required to transport himself to heaven. The other simply denies that adequate power, or as it is explained, the power of the will, is the measure of obligation; for example, it is not necessary that a man should be able to change his affections at will in order to his being responsible for them. The object of the writer is thus distinctly stated: “The maxim,” he says, that obligation to obey a command supposes the existence of an ability to do the act required, relates entirely to actions consequent on volitions.” “Man,” he says further, “cannot alter the perceptions of sense; he cannot excite affections to any objects at will. * * * We utterly deny,” he adds, “that in order to a man’s being accountable and culpable for enmity to God, he should have the power of instantly changing his enmity to love.”’¹¹ Where is now the contradiction between the Repertory of 1831 and the Repertory of 1851? And where is now our author’s self-respect?

On page 630 he goes still further back, and quotes from the Repertory of 1830, the proposition: “the loss of original righteousness and corruption of nature are penal evils;” whereas in another place, the Repertory says, “we do not teach, however, that sin is the punishment of sin.” Professor Park asks, “What are we to believe? Now, original sin is a penal evil; but then we do not teach that sin is penal!” Taken in their connexion these propositions are perfectly consistent. It is a common objection to the doctrine of original sin that it represents sin to be the punishment of sin. To this it is answered, that if this means either that God causes men to commit one sin as a punishment for having committed another, or that he infuses evil principles into men’s hearts as a punishment of their own, or of Adam’s sin, then we deny that sin is the punishment of sin. As these are the senses in which objectors are wont to use the expression, it is perfectly proper and perfectly intelligible to deny that we teach what they charge upon us, when they say sin is the punishment of sin. On the other hand it is perfectly intelligible and perfectly correct to express the idea that original sin is the certain consequence of God’s judicial abandonment of our race, by saying it is a penal evil. Paul teaches, Rom. i. 24, that God judicially abandons men to uncleanness, and that immorality is a punishment of impiety. In this sense sin is the punishment of sin. But in the sense that God causes men to sin, or infuses sin into them, as objectors say, sin is not the punishment of sin. Cannot our author understand this? The Bible says God does not tempt men; in other places it says, He does tempt them. The apostle says, the heathen know God, and in another place that they do not know him. What would be thought of a sceptic who should try to overthrow the authority of Scripture by parading such verbal contradictions as contradictions in doctrine?

Again, the denial that nature, in the sense of essence, is or can be sinful, is represented as contradicting the assertion, that nature in the sense of moral disposition, can have a moral character; and the assertion that the Augustinian system characteristically exalts the sovereignty of God, is inconsistent with saying that the opposite system represents the law of God, in the pardon of sinners, as being set aside by a sovereign act. In view of such contradictions, Professor Park asks, “What will this gentleman say next?” Why, he says he would just as soon spend his time in picking up pins as in answering such objections as these, of which we should say, in the language of feeling, there must be some hundreds in our author’s two articles.

There is another class of these arguments ad hominem. There are certain familiar facts and principles which lend an air of plausibility to our author’s theory, and which we were careful to distinguish from it. We admitted that figurative language and the language of emotion were not to be pressed unduly; that true believers agree much more nearly in their inward faith than in their written creeds; that the mind often passes from one state to another, at one time receiving as true what at another it regards as false. When in his search for contradictions the author finds in our pages the acknowledgment of such truths as these, he brings them forward with exultation as the very doctrine of his sermon. He quotes, for example, the following passage from the Biblical Repertory, Vol. xx. p. 140: “There is a region a little lower than the head, and a little deeper than the reach of speculation, in which those who think they differ, or differ in thinking, may yet rejoice in Christian fellowship.” On page 598 of his present article he says, “Lest our reviewer suspect this remark of Germanism, let him have the goodness to re-peruse his own saying, ‘this is a doctrine which can only be held as a theory. It is in conflict with the most intimate moral convictions of men;’ and further, ‘it is the product of the mere understanding, and does violence to the instinctive moral judgment of men;’ and further still, ‘even among those who make theology their study, there is often one form of doctrine for speculation, another, simpler and truer for the closet[!] Metaphysical distinctions are forgotten in prayer, or under the pressure of real conviction of sin, and need of pardon, and of divine assistance. Hence it is that the devotional writings of Christians agree far more than their creeds.’” We can almost pardon our author considering the straits to which he is reduced, for quoting these passages as agreeing with the doctrine of his sermon. The difference between them is, however, we are sorry to say, essential.

It is a familiar fact of consciousness and observation that faith is sometimes determined by the understanding, and sometimes by the inward experience and instinctive laws of our nature. It is also a familiar fact that the convictions produced by the considerations presented by the understanding, give way when those considerations pass from the view of the mind, and it is brought under the influence of the feelings and the common laws of belief. Thus, a man may be a sincere idealist so long as the metaphysical arguments in favor of the system are before the mind; but as soon as the attention is withdrawn from those arguments, and the mind is brought under ordinary influences, he believes in the external world as truly as other men. Thus too, a man puzzled with the difficulties which beset certain doctrines, or controlled by his philosophical theories, may be a sincere Arminian; or he may really believe that responsibility is limited by ability, that he has no sin in him but his acts, and that he can change his heart by a volition. But when these theories are absent, and the mind is brought into contact with the simple word of God, or governed in its conviction by the inward teachings of the Spirit, he can adopt all the language of David or Augustin. Still further, it is not uncommon to meet with experiences similar to that of Schleiermacher. He was educated as a Moravian, but became addicted to a Pantheistic form of philosophy, and wrote a system of divinity, which such men as Hengstenberg regard as subverting some of the essential doctrines of the gospel. Yet, he often relapsed into his former faith, and thought, felt, acted, and it is hoped, died as a Moravian. All this is true, and this, and nothing more than this, is contained in the extracts quoted by Professor Park from our pages. Has any one before our author, ever inferred from these facts, that idealism and materialism are different modes of one and the same philosophy; or that Arminianism and Calvinism, Moravianism and Pantheism, are but different forms of one and the same theology? Let it be remembered that Professor Park proposes to reconcile all allowable creeds; that he proposes to do this by his theory of two theologies, the one of the intellect, and the other of the feelings, distinguished not as true and false, but as “one system of truths exhibited in two modes,”¹² that he applies his method ex professo to harmonizing the Augustinian and anti-Augustinian systems, and in the article under consideration, applies his principles to the case of imputed and involuntary sin, for this reason among others, “that it is more difficult to reconcile the New England, and the old Calvinism, on these subjects, than on any other.”¹³ Is there not a difference between Professor Park and ourselves? Is there not a difference between saying that pious men, when not speculating, think and feel very much alike, and saying that conflicting creeds are one system of truths presented in different modes? Whether Professor Park has come to this conclusion by the same steps as the German theologians, or not, the fact is clear that the conclusion is the same. Their theory is, Christianity is a life and not a doctrine. Their conclusion is that this life manifests itself in different theologies, which differ not as true and false, but as the same system of truths in different modes. He says it is “an unworthy attempt,” on our part, to link his sermon with the German theory. We expressly and repeatedly stated we intended no such thing,¹⁴ though we are free to confess, it appears to us more respectable to take the theory with the conclusion, than to take the conclusion without the theory. We would far rather adopt the Schleiermacher doctrine on this subject out and out, than the principle which to so great an extent pervades Professor Park’s articles, of teaching error in the established formulas of truth.¹⁵ We begin to suspect that when our author wrote his Convention Sermon he had no developed theory whatever. There probably floated in his mind the simple principles, that men often say things in an excited state of the feelings, which mean more than their sober judgment can approve; that good people agree much nearer in experience than in their creeds; and that a man often changes his faith with his varying states of mind: and he thought he could, out of those principles, construct a scheme of union of allowable creeds, and do away with the inconvenient distinction of sound and unsound theology. But in the excitement of the work, his Pegasus ran away with him, and carried him over into the German camp, and when a friendly hand rouses him up and tells him where he has got to, he insists he is still safe at home.

There is another feature of Professor Park’s mode of conducting this discussion, which is very little to our taste. He constantly endeavors to represent us as assailing New England theology. This is a ruse de guerre every way unworthy of a candid disputant. We stated as the three radical principles of the anti-Augustinian system—“First, that all ‘sin consists in sinning;’ that there can be no moral character but in moral acts; secondly that the power to the contrary is essential to free agency; that a free agent may always act contrary to any influence, not destructive of his freedom, which can be brought to bear upon him; thirdly, that ability limits responsibility: that men are responsible only so far as they have adequate power to do what is required of them, or that they are responsible for nothing not under the control of the will.”¹⁶ If there is one characteristic of New England theology more prominent than any other, it is opposition to these principles. The world-wide fame of President Edwards as a theologian, rests mainly on his thorough refutation of them in the works we have already referred to. In this opposition, Bellamy, Dwight, and the other great men of New England were no less strenuous than Edwards. The aberration of the advocates of the “Exercise Scheme,” though it led them to a denial of at least the first of the above principles, was in the direction of ultra Calvinism. It was not until the rise of what is popularly called New Havenism, that these principles were rejected by any other class of New England divines reputed orthodox. It is Professor Park, and not we, who is the assailant of New England theology; a fact which he will not be able to conceal. We recently heard of certain Unitarian gentlemen who seemed honestly to believe that Trinitarianism is dying out in this country. It is possible that a similar hallucination may lead Professor Park to regard the little coterie to which he belongs as all New England.

Again, there is not in the long article under consideration any frank and manly discussion of principles. His great object seems to be to elude pursuit by a copious effusion of ink. We had two leading objects in our late review. The one was to state clearly what it was our author proposed to accomplish; and the other was, to examine the means by which he endeavored to attain his end. We endeavored to show that the task which he undertook, was to reconcile the two great conflicting systems of theology, the Augustinian and the anti-Augustinian; and then we endeavored to set forth the theory, under its different aspects, by which this reconciliation was to be effected. If he intended his “Comments” to be an answer to our review, it was incumbent upon him to take up these points. He should have proved either that we had not fairly presented the two systems of theology referred to, or that they were not included under his category of allowable creeds. Or if satisfied as to these points, he should have shown either that we misapprehended his theory, or that that theory was philosophically true. So far as we can discover, he has hardly made a show of attempting to accomplish any one of these objects. We therefore do not feel it necessary to pursue the subject any further. If, on the other hand, our author did not intend his “Comments” as an answer; we have, of course, nothing to say. In either case we remain unanswered.

We hope the reasons above given will satisfy our friends of the propriety of our discontinuing this discussion. We have one other, which, we trust we may present without offence. It is a common remark that a man never writes anything well for which he has “to read up.” Professor Park has evidently labored under this disadvantage. Old-school theology is a new field to him; and though he quotes freely authors of whom we, though natives, never heard, yet he is not at home, and unavoidably falls into the mistakes which foreigners cannot fail to commit in a strange land. He does not understand the language. He finds out “five meanings of imputation!” It would be wearisome work to set such a stranger right at every step. We would fain part with our author on good terms. We admire his abilities, and are ready to defer to him in his own department. But when he undertakes to teach Old-school men Old-school theology it is very much like a Frenchman teaching an Englishman how to pronounce English. With the best intentions, the amiable Gaul would be sure to make sad work with the dental aspirations.

The End

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← XVII. The Theology of the Intellect and That of the Feelings, Article II · Contents

Footnotes

1. Bib. Sac. p. 646. ↩

2. Princeton Review, April, 1851, p. 320. ↩

3. Bib. Sacra, p. 616, et seq. What is more remarkable, our author, after stating at great length, the old theory of imputation, and making it include “a common existence” in Adam, ante-natal sin, and transfer of moral ill-desert, and laboriously sustaining his representations by a long array of misunderstood quotations, says, at last, p. 621, “The dispute turns chiefly on this word, punishment, and is merely verbal!” We never saw a house built with so much trouble thus recklessly pushed over by its author. If the old doctrine differs from the new simply in the use of a word, then the former does not involve all the absurdities and atrocities which through so many weary pages he had been attributing to it. We cannot see why we should be called upon to answer objections which their author thus summarily disposes of. ↩

4. Bib. Sacra, p. 617. ↩

5. Princeton Review, April, 1851, p. 309. ↩

6. Bib. Sac. p. 628. “What is the theory of passive, inherent sin? Our reviewer frankly defines his doctrine when he says that we have ‘an innate, hereditary, sinful corruption of nature;’ that we have derived from Adam ‘a nature not merely diseased, weakened, or predisposed to evil, but which is ‘itself’ as well as ‘all the motions thereof truly and properly sin.’ Having already admitted that many theologians have believed in our moral guilt for the crime of Adam, we also admit that some have believed in our moral guilt for the very make of our souls. The two themes have by some been indissolubly blended, and it has been, therefore, maintained that our inherent as well as our imputed sin is ill deserving, and is justly punishable with the second death.” ↩

7. Bib. Sac. p. 642. ↩

8. Bib. Sac. p. 645. ↩

9. Edwards on Original Sin, p. 140. ↩

10. Should Professor Park accomplish the task indicated in the text, he will find his work scarcely begun. There is Julius Müller’s “Lehre von der Sünde,” the most elaborate and philosophical work on the subject of sin which has appeared since the Reformation. That work must be answered, and then he will have before him all the great army of Romanist and Protestant divines; and when all these are disposed of, he will be prepared for Augustin, and after him for PAUL. We humbly hope to be in heaven long before our turn comes. ↩

11. Biblical Repertory, July 1831. ↩

12. Bib. Sac. p. 596. ↩

13. Bib. Sac. p. 607. ↩

14. Princeton Review, April, 1851, pp. 333, 337. ↩

15. This, after all, appears to us the most objectionable feature of this whole theory, that it justifies the use of language out of its established sense. Professor Park has openly avowed that there is scarcely any form of expressing Old-school doctrine which he could not adopt. ↩

16. Princeton Review, April 1851, p. 309. ↩