According to Pelagians and Rationalists man was created a rational free agent, but without moral character. He was neither righteous nor unrighteous, holy nor unholy. He had simply the capacity of becoming either. Being endowed with reason and free will, his character depended upon the use which he made of those endowments. If he acted right, he became righteous; if he acted wrong, he became unrighteous. There can be, according to their system, no such thing as concreated moral character, and therefore they reject the doctrine of original righteousness as irrational. This view of man’s original state is the necessary consequence of the assumption that moral character can be predicated only of acts of the will or of the subjective consequences of such acts. This principle which precludes the possibility of original righteousness in Adam, precludes also the possibility of innate, hereditary depravity, commonly called original sin; and also the possibility of indwelling sin, and of habits of grace. It is a principle therefore which necessarily works an entire change in the whole system of Christian doctrine. It is not, however, an ultimate principle. It is itself an inference from the primary assumption that ability limits obligation; that a man can be neither praised nor blamed, neither rewarded nor condemned, except for his own acts and self-acquired character, which acts must be within the compass of his ability. What is either concreated or innate, inherent or infused, is clearly not within the power of the will, and therefore cannot have any moral character. As this principle is thus far-reaching it ought to be definitively settled.
Consciousness proves that Dispositions as distinguished from Acts may have Moral Character.
By the mere moral philosopher, and by theologians whose theology is a philosophy, it is assumed as an axiom, or intuitive truth, that a man is responsible only for what he has full power to do or to avoid. Plausible as this principle is, it is, —
- Opposed to the testimony of consciousness. It is a fact of consciousness that we do attribute moral character to principles which precede all voluntary action and which are entirely independent of the power of the will. And it is a fact capable of the clearest demonstration that such is not only the dictate of our own individual consciousness, but also the conviction of all men. If we examine our own consciousness as to the judgment which we pass upon ourselves, we shall find that we hold ourselves responsible not only for the deliberate acts of the will, that is, for acts of deliberate self-determination, which suppose both knowledge and volition, but also for emotional, impulsive acts, which precede all deliberation; and not only for such impulsive acts, but also for the principles, dispositions, or immanent states of the mind, by which its acts whether impulsive or deliberate, are determined. When a man is convinced of sin, it is not so much for specific acts of transgression that his conscience condemns him, as for the permanent states of his mind; his selfishness, worldliness, and maliciousness; his ingratitude, unbelief, and hardness of heart; his want of right affections, of love to God, of zeal for the Redeemer, and of benevolence towards men. These are not acts. They are not states of mind under the control of the will; and yet in the judgment of conscience, which we cannot silence or pervert, they constitute our character and are just ground of condemnation. In like manner whatever If right dispositions or principles we discover within ourselves, whatever there is of love to God, to Christ, or to his people; whatever of humility, meekness, forbearance, or of any other virtue the testimony of consciousness is, that these dispositions, which are neither the acts nor products of the will, as far as they exist within us, constitute our character in the sight of God and man. Such is not only the testimony of consciousness with regard to our judgments of ourselves, but also as to our judgments of other men. When we pronounce a man either good or bad, the judgment is not founded upon his acts, but upon his character as revealed by his acts. The terms good and bad, as applied to men, are not used to express the character of particular actions which they perform, but the character of the abiding principles, dispositions, or states of mind which determine their acts, and give assurance of what they will be in future. We may look on a good man and know that there is something in him which constitutes his character, and which renders it certain that he will not blaspheme, lie, or steal; but, on the contrary, that he will endeavour in all things to serve God and do good to men. In like manner we may contemplate a wicked man in the bosom of his family, when every evil passion is hushed, and when only kindly feelings are in exercise, and yet we know him to be wicked. That is, we not only know that he has perpetrated wicked actions, but that he is inherently wicked; that there is in him an evil nature, or abiding state of the mind, which constitutes his real character and determines his acts. When we say that a man is a miser, we do not mean simply that he hoards money, or grinds the face of the poor, but we mean that he has a disposition which in time past has led to such acts and which will continue to produce them so long as it rules in his heart. The Pelagian doctrine, therefore, that moral character can be predicated only of voluntary acts, is contrary to the testimony of consciousness.