Of course, the two modes of division may also be combined, the one being rendered subordinate to the other: in such a manner that either every period is divided into parallel series, or else every principal series, by itself, is cut up again into periods. The attempted delineation is the more imperfect, in proportion as these processes of division are conducted arbitrarily, or, at least, in proportion as mere externalities are made to constitute the basis of them.

§ 76. A historical object demands, preferentially, the former mode of division, in the same degree in which its various members are less independent of one another in their progress, and revolutionary nodes of developement are strongly prominent therein; and when the case is the reverse of this, the second method is to be preferred.

For, in the latter case, an original organic division predominates; in the former, a marked difference in the character of different periods.

§ 77. The more strongly the contrast between periods and epochs makes its appearance in a historical career, so much the more difficult is it in the case of the latter,— but so much the more easy in that of the former,—to separate the different elements (§ 74) from one another.

For, in periods of transformation, every kind of interaction is more lively, and every thing of an individual character is more dependent upon a common impulse; whereas, on the contrary, a quiet course of things favours the prominent appearance of the organic division.

§ 78. Since not merely the collective course of all human things in general,—but also, within this, the entire succession of manifestations of one and the same force,—constitutes a Whole: every coming forth to view of a minor historical Whole may be looked at in two ways,—on the one hand, as the origination of something new, which did not exist before,— but also, on the other hand, as the forth-formation of something which had existence somewhere.

This is evident at once from § 71. That which, at any given point in the course of time under observation, is certainly to be regarded as something new in relation to all that is running on side by side with it, may yet have a more intimate connexion with some one earlier momentum of the course than with all the rest.

§ 79. Thus, too, the career of Christianity admits of being treated, on the one hand, as a single Period [in the history] of one branch of the religious developement; but also, on the other hand, as a particular historical Whole, which takes its rise as a new thing, and pursues its own secluded course in a series of periods separated, by epochs.

That here, expressly, only one branch of the religious developement is under discussion, may be shown by a reference to § 74. In whatever manner we group the great multiplicity of forms which religion has assumed, there will always be some more nearly related to Christianity than the rest, so as to admit of being combined with it in one and the same group.

§ 80. Historical Theology, viewed as a theological discipline, connecting itself wholly with Christianity, can adopt, for its own purposes, only the latter mode of treatment.

Compare §§ 69 and 70. But, moreover, the Christian Faith could not be what it is, if the fundamental fact thereof were not posited, in an exclusive manner, as something original.

§ 81. Viewing the historical material of Christianity from the stand-point of the constitutive principle of Theology, we find that that which occupies the most immediate relation to Church-Guidance is the historical knowledge of the existing momentum, as being that out of which the Future is to be developed. This, consequently, forms one of the special divisions of Historical Theology.

Its purpose is, that we may be able rightly and appropriately to work upon what is healthy and upon what is morbid, as well as to help forward any members of the organization that have remained behind; and also to employ what is applicable, out of other departments, in connexion with our own.

§ 82. But since the Present can be understood only when it is viewed as a result of the Past: it follows, that the knowledge of the entire previous career of Christianity forms a second division of Historical Theology.

The remark is not to be understood as if this second division were a sort of auxiliary science in relation to the first; on the contrary, they are both related to Church-Guidance in the same way, and are not subordinate, but co-ordinate, to each other.

§ 83. The more a historical career is occupied in [the process or experience of] diffusion,—so that the inward life-unity, in proportion to the degree of the extension, appears more and more exclusively in contact with other forces,— in the same proportion do these forces, also, participate in [bringing about] the individual states which present themselves; so that the peculiar and essential character of the object is presented to view in the purest manner, only in those states which are of the earliest occurrence.

This, also, is equally true with regard to all historical phenomena of a kindred nature, and is properly the reason why so many nations mistakenly regard the earliest period of the life of humanity as the age of its highest perfection.

§ 84. Since, now, the Christian Life, also, has become continually more and more compounded and complicated, while, on the other hand, the final end of its theology consists in this,— to give a purer representation of its peculiar, essential character in each successive moment yet to come: the knowledge of Primitive Christianity naturally presents itself to our attention as a third special division of Historical Theology.

Primitive Christianity, it is true, is also included in the total career of Christianity; but it is one thing to treat of it as a series of momenta, and another to bring under observation that only, — derived even from different momenta,—which shall furnish materials for setting forth the pure notion of Christianity.

§ 85. Historical Theology is completely included within these three divisions,—the knowledge of Primitive Christianity, the knowledge of the entire career of Christianity, and the knowledge of the state of Christianity at the present moment.

Only, the order in which we have deduced them is not also the proper order in which to study them. On the contrary, the knowledge of Primitive Christianity, as connecting itself immediately with Philosophical Theology, forms the first stage, and the knowledge which relates to the Present, as constituting the transition to Practical Theology, the last.

§ 86. As, in dealing with any division of History, all that facilitates an acquaintance with the scene of action and with the outward relations of the object, or that is necessary towards the understanding of monuments of all kinds, is to be regarded in the light of auxiliary science; so also does Historical Theology call to its aid, as auxiliary sciences, first of all the other divisions of the same department of History (comp. § 40), and then, further, all that is necessary in order to the understanding of documents.

Accordingly, these auxiliary branches of knowledge are partly historical in the stricter sense, partly geographical, partly philological.

§ 87. For the purpose of that normal treatment of the subject which has already been pointed out, we cannot suitably define the boundary of Primitive Christianity, in relation to the further historical career of Christianity, otherwise than by taking the former expression to signify that period in which Doctrine and Community, in their mutual connexion, first went through the process of becoming, and did not as yet exist in their definitive constitution.

Even this definition, however, might easily be stretched out too far, because doctrine and fellowship, in their mutual connexion, continue always in the state of becoming; and a fixed boundary arises immediately, only when we exclude every age in which there already existed a difference of fellowship on account of a difference of doctrine. But too narrow limits, also, might be given to our definition, if one were to start from the assumption that a definitively constituted community existed as early as from the day of Pentecost downwards; and it receives a due degree of extension, only when we maintain, that the Christian Community, properly so called, was first definitively constituted when, with consciousness and universal recognition, Jews and Heathen had become united therein; and the same principle holds good also with regard to doctrine. Thus, both definitions agree tolerably well with that external one which assigns Primitive Christianity to the age of Christ’s immediate disciples.

§ 88. Since that knowledge of Primitive Christianity which has to be elicited for the purpose specified, is to be obtained only from the written documents which originated within the said period of the Christian Church, and rests entirely upon the correct understanding of these writings; the division of Historical Theology now before us, bears also, specifically, the name of Exegetical Theology.

Since the largest portion of that which is included in the other two divisions [of Historical Theology] also depends upon exposition, the appellation is certainly arbitrary; but still it may easily be justified, on account of the peculiar value of the writings with which we are here concerned.

§ 89. Since it is necessary that every Theologian should form his own exposition for himself, on account of the intimate connexion which it has with Philosophical Theology, the proper place of all [theological] principles: here, too, we find but little that one can allow himself to derive from the contributions of special proficients (comp. §§ 17 and 19) [in this department of study].

For the most part, merely that which we are obliged to borrow, for the purposes of exposition, from the auxiliary sciences.

§ 90. The knowledge of the further career of Christianity may either be exhibited as a whole, or be divided into the History of the System of Doctrine and the History of the [Christian] Community.

Because, namely, the History of the System of Doctrine is nothing else than the developement of the religious conceptions of the Community. The combination of the two, as well as the History of the Community in its separate delineation, bears the name Church History; as that of the System of Doctrine, exhibited apart, bears the name Dogma-History.

§ 91. Both branches in conjunction, as well as each by itself, present, when viewed in the direction of their length, an uninterrupted stream, in which, nevertheless, it is possible, by means of the notions of Periods and Epochs (comp. § 73), to find certain nodes of development, which may serve the purpose of giving fixity to the distinctions existing between such points as are separated by an epoch, and belong, therefore, to different periods; as also between such as lie within the boundaries formed by the same two epochs, but in such a manner that the one contains rather the result of the first, and the other appears rather as a preparation for the second.

If we yet further conceive of intervening points, containing, in any given period, the maximum of the developement of its commencing epoch, but still continuing to represent the zero of its closing epoch; this process, carried out through both branches and through all their periods, will furnish a plexus of the most valuable momenta.

§ 92. Since the total career of Christianity presents an infinity of details, there is room here, in the highest degree, for the distinction between that which is common property, and that which is the property of the special proficient.

The plexus just mentioned, wrought up in outline into an analogue of continuity, constitutes the minimum, the possession of which is necessary for every one; the investigation and completion of matters of detail, even when parcelled out amongst a large number of persons, forms an inexhaustible department of labour.

§ 93. It is not every momentum that is equally well adapted for delineation as a whole, having an inward connexion of its own; but this adaptation belongs in the highest degree to the point of culmination of a period, and least of all to a point occurring in the midst of an epoch, or in immediate proximity to the latter.

It is always the case that, during a revolution, nothing but that which is matter of detail can come under discussion; in its isolation, too, and hardly otherwise than in the form of controversy. In the immediate proximity of an epoch, it is true, the want of a connected delineation may already become perceptible, but the attempts which may be made to meet this want cannot have any other than an imperfect result. This is apparent even in the first beginnings which were made by the Church after the apostolic period; as well as amongst ourselves in the earliest times of the Reformation.

§ 94. In the case of those periods which admit of a satisfactory solution of the problem, a spontaneous separation ensues between the exhibition of the doctrine of the period in question, and the delineation of its social condition.

For although the same peculiar, essential character, either of the Church, or of some partial Church-Community, finds expression in both, yet the two depend upon co-efficients so different, that they must be, to a considerable extent, independent of each other in the changes they undergo, and therefore also in their condition at any given moment.

§ 95. The delineation of the social condition of the Church in any given momentum, constitutes the problem of Ecclesiastical Statistics.

It is only within a short period that this topic has begun to be treated of in its proper order, as the object of a distinct discipline; and therefore much yet remains to be done, as it respects both matter and form.

§ 96. Even when a separation exists, the problem nevertheless continues to be, for every individual Church-Community, essentially the same.

In this case, each Community will certainly have an especial interest in being most exactly acquainted with its own condition; and, in so far, an inequality will occur; which, however, occurs also when the Church is not divided. On the other hand, it cannot but be a circumstance productive of great mischief, when the persons entrusted with the guidance of any one of these individual Church-Communities are not acquainted with the true condition of the rest.

§ 97. The connected exhibition of the System of Doctrine as currently received at any given time,—whether by the Church in general, (that is, when no separation is found to exist),—or, otherwise, by any distinct Ecclesiastical Party,—we designate by the term Dogmatics or Dogmatic Theology.

The term doctrine is taken here in its fullest comprehensiveness of meaning. The appellation Systematic Theology, which is still frequently employed to designate this branch of our science,—and which, with reason, suggests especially that the System of Doctrine is not to be delivered as a mere aggregate of single propositions, but that the connexion ought to be clearly made manifest,—nevertheless conceals, on the other hand, to the detriment of the subject, not only the historical character of the discipline before us, but also its relation to Church-Guidance as constituting its purpose and aim; from which concealment manifold misapprehensions must needs arise.

§ 98. In periods in which the Church is divided, it is possible only for each party itself to effect a dogmatic treatment of its own System of Doctrine.

Impartiality and equality would not be attainable,—either upon the supposition that a theologian of one party should attempt a connected treatment of the doctrinal systems of other parties in a parallel order, (since, for him, only one of these connexions has the character of truth, the other not),—or again, if he should confine himself to a connected treatment of that system to which he adheres, merely adducing the deviations of other systems in their appropriate place, (because then, the latter would be torn out of their natural connexion). The former process takes place, nevertheless, so far as the leading points of doctrine are concerned, under the title of Symbolics; and the other, under the title of Comparative Dogmatics.

§ 99. Both disciplinæ, Statistics and Dogmatics, are likewise of an infinite extent; and occupy, therefore,’the same position with the second division of Historical Theology, as it respects the difference between that which is common property, and that which constitutes the department of the special proficient.

This is immediately evident with regard to Ecclesiastical Statistics. But in the department of Dogmatics, too, not only is every individual doctrine susceptible of determination to an extent which is almost infinite, but the exhibition of it, moreover, in connexion with the deviating modes of conception peculiar to other times and places, affords an endless task.

§ 100. It is necessary that every one should form for himself his own historical view, as it respects both the knowledge of the entire career of Christianity, and that of the momentum which lies immediately before him.

Otherwise, that activity in the Guidance of the Church, which has each of these branches of knowledge, in an equal degree, for its basis, would not possess the character of an independent personal activity.

§ 101. If, for this purpose, it is necessary to make use of historical delineations,—which can never be wholly free from peculiar views and judgments of the delineator,—it is necessary that every one should possess the art of separating therefrom, in as pure a state as possible, the material which he is to elaborate for himself.

This, again, applies to Dogmatics and Statistics, not less than it does to Church History.

§ 102. As for the entire department of Historical Science, so also for Historical Theology, Historical Criticism is the universal and indispensable Organon.

It is contrasted with the material auxiliary sciences before adverted to, in that it is a form of scientific skill, which effectuates a certain purpose.

SECTION THE FIRST.—EXEGETICAL THEOLOGY.

§ 103. The Christian Writings which are derived from the period of Primitive Christianity are not all, on this account, objects of Exegetical Theology; but only in so far as they are held capable of contributing to the original, and therefore (comp. § 83), for all periods, normal representation of Christianity.

It is involved in the nature of the case, and is, besides, completely established as a matter of fact, that there also existed, in the very first instance, an imperfect, and consequently to some extent false apprehension,—and therefore also a like representation,—of the Christian Faith in its distinctive individuality.

§ 104. The collective body of the documents just referred to as containing that which is of a normal character, forms the New Testament Canon of the Christian Church.

Consequently, the correct understanding of this Canon is the sole essential problem of Exegetical Theology, and the collection itself is the sole original object with which the latter has to deal.

§ 105. To this New Testament Canon belong essentially both those normal documents which relate to the effectual working of Christ upon, and in conjunction with, his disciples, and likewise those which relate to the joint labours of his disciples, as directed towards the establishment of Christianity.

This, moreover, is what we are to understand by the ancient division of the Canon into εὐαγγέλιον and ἀπόστολος. There exists no reason in the nature of the case, for laying down any distinction between these two constituent portions in respect of canonical dignity. Which, however, would in a manner be done, if it were to be maintained that the two were related to each other as origin and progress; and still more so, if one were at liberty to deny to the activity of the disciples, when left to itself,¹ the attribute of normal dignity.

§ 106. Since neither the temporal limit of Primitive Christianity, nor the personale thereof, can be determined with precision; it follows also that the external boundary-line of the Canon cannot be established with perfect fixity.

In regard to both in common,—period and persons,—it would, indeed, be possible to lay down a settled formula which should designate the Canonical; but this formula would, nevertheless, fail to lead to any certain distinction with regard to what is actually before us, on account of the uncertainty which prevails with regard to the personality of several individual authors.

§ 107. The unsettledness just referred to, consists in a wavering of the boundary-line which separates the department formed by the Writings of the Apostolic Fathers from that of the Canonical Writings.

For, the period of the Apostolic Fathers lies between that in which the Canon first began to be formed, and that in which it already possessed a separate existence. And the term Apostolic Fathers is to be understood here as having such a compass of meaning, that the uncertainty spoken of applies to the first part of the Canon in the same manner as to the second.

§ 108. Since the notion of normal dignity, too, is one which cannot be reduced to fixed, immutable formulæ; neither is it possible, with perfect certainty, to lay down the limits of the Canon by the help of internal reasons for determination.

If we reckon the normal character, as applied to individual propositions, to include on the one hand perfect purity² [in the propositions themselves], and on the other hand, a certain copiousness in the inferences and applications which admit of being developed from them; we have no reason to assume the existence of the first characteristic, absolutely, anywhere but in Christ alone; and with regard to the second, also, we must concede that in all other [teachers], natural imperfection might possibly exert an obstructive influence.

§ 109. Christian Writings of the Canonical Period to which we deny the attribute of normal dignity, we designate by the term Apocrypha; and as against these also, therefore, the limit of the Canon is not completely fixed.

Most of the New Testament Apocrypha, it is true, bear this name merely because they were supposed, or because they professed, to belong to the canonical period. The term itself, used in this sense, is arbitrary, and it would be better to exchange it for some other.

§ 110. It is necessary that the Protestant Church should vindicate its claim to be still occupied continually in the more precise determination of the Canon; and it is this which constitutes the highest exegetico-theological problem for the higher Criticism.

The New Testament has received its present form by means of the Church’s decision; although this decision may not be capable of being precisely quoted, or of being pointed out in any single act. It is a decision to which we do not concede an authority exalted above all inquiry, and we have a right, therefore, to make the wavering which has existed a point of connexion for new investigations. The problem referred to is the highest, because it is a matter of more importance to determine whether a work is canonical or not, than to decide whether it is to be assigned to a certain author, or to some other; the result of the latter inquiry having, possibly, no effect at all upon its canonical character.

§ 111. It is within the province of this Criticism to institute investigations under both the following heads: namely, whether certain matter to be found in the Canon is not, strictly speaking, uncanonical; and whether there does not exist, out of the Canon, matter which is canonical, but which has not been recognized as possessing that character.

Quite recently, there was an investigation of the latter kind in progress; those of the former class have, properly speaking, never been discontinued.

§ 112. Both problems apply not merely to entire books, but also to single sections and passages thereof.

An uncanonical book may contain new canonical passages; even as, in a canonical book, the greatest part of that which has been interpolated by a later hand will be uncanonical.

§ 113. As the higher Criticism solves its problem, for the most part, only by approximation; and as there exists no other measure with regard to the fitness of a particular decision, than that which is afforded by the congruence of internal and of external indications: so here, too, the main questions are simply these,—with what degree of determinateness it is indicated by external signs, that an article under investigation belongs either to the subsequent period of the Apostolic Fathers, or to the region—remote from the Church’s centre—of the Apocryphal mode of treatment,—and how far internal indications suggest, that the mode of apprehension and of thought by which the article is characterized are not such as to connect themselves strictly with what is essential in the Canonical representation.

So long as these two classes of indications are in opposition to each other,—or so long as, in each class, some are ranged on the one side and some on the other,—it is not possible to arrive at a critical decision.—That under the term centre of the Church, neither any given space, nor any official dignity, is here to be understood, but only the perfection of the [Christian] spirit³ and [of Christian] insight, is a point which probably needs no discussion.

§ 114. It would be possible for Criticism to have detected both these classes of articles, and to have arrived, with perfect certainty, at a new and different determination of the question as to what is canonical and what is not, without its being necessary, on that account, that the Canon itself should be differently ordered.

It would not be necessary: because, surely, the uncanonical may be acknowledged to be so, although it retains its old position; and a like recognition may be extended to that which is proved to be canonical, although it remains excluded from the Canon. In that case, however, it must be permissible to have the Canon in two forms; that which has been handed down historically, and that which has resulted from the application of the detective processes of Criticism.

§ 115. The same may be said with regard to the position occupied by the books of the Old Testament in our Bible.

That the Jewish Codex does not contain any normal exhibition of peculiarly Christian dogmas, is a principle which will, probably, be almost universally acknowledged. It is not, however, on this account necessary,—although it must also continue to be permissible,—to deviate from that usage of the ancient Church which unites the Old Testament with the New so as to form a whole, the Bible.

§ 116. The multiplication of the books of the New Testament by means of copies from the originals, was necessarily subject to the same accidents which attended the same process in the case of all other ancient works.

Ocular demonstration has long ago subverted all the prejudices which formerly prevailed with regard to this matter.

§ 117. Even the surpassing number and variety of copies which we possess of most of these books, affords no security against the possibility that, in the case of some single passages, the original reading has nevertheless been lost.

For, this loss may have occurred at a very early period,—even in the first transcript; and possibly also, it may be remarked, in such a manner that the damage could not be made good again.

§ 118. The definitive problem of the lower Criticism,—that of discovering the original reading, throughout, as accurately as possible, and in the way best adapted to carry conviction along with it,—is altogether the same in the department of Exegetical Theology as it is elsewhere.

The terms lower and higher Criticism, are employed here according to established usage, without any intention either of vindicating their propriety, or of defining more closely their limits with respect to each other.

§ 119. Therefore the New Testament Critic, also, is both bound to follow the same rules, and entitled to make use of the same means, as are applicable elsewhere.

Hence it cannot be forbidden, in case of necessity (comp. § 17), to hazard conjectures; nor can any special rules have existence, which are not necessarily capable of being deduced from such as are common.

§ 120. In the same degree in which Criticism solves the problem presented to it, there must also result a minute and connected History of the Text of the New Testament, and vice versa; so that each of them serves as proof and warranty in relation to the other.

Even such true services as may be rendered in the way of conjecture, must be able to appeal to some momenta or other in the history of the text; and on the other hand, again, any striking emendations which may be made must necessarily serve also to illustrate the history of the text.

§ 121. In connexion with the theological purpose of an occupation with the Canon, the restoration of the original is of immediate value only where the normal contents are in some way or other concerned.

This principle, however, is by no means to be limited in its application to Dogmatic Passages, as they are called,—but is to be extended to all that admits of being employed in any way, in connexion with such passages, as parallel or illustration.

§ 122. This forms the basis of the distinction which,—since the critical problem is a thing of infinite extent,—it is necessary to lay down here, between that which is to be required of every Theologian, and that which constitutes the department of special proficiency.

The requirement here mentioned is properly of force, only in reference to the Protestant theologian; for strictly speaking, the Roman Catholic theologian has the right to demand⁴ that the Vulgata shall be delivered to him in such form and manner that there shall not be any critical problem left remaining.

§ 123. Since it is possible for every theologian (taking the word even in its broader sense) to find himself in such a case (comp. § 121) as also to need, for purposes of exposition (comp. § 89), the possession of a critical conviction: it is necessary, in order that he may be able, by an independent effort, to avail himself of the labours of the specially proficient, and to choose between the results at which they have respectively arrived,—that he should be in possession, as well of the critical principles and rules which are applicable to the case supposed, as also of a general acquaintance with the most important critical sources, and with their value.

A meagre guide to these acquisitions is to be found, on the one hand, in the Prolegomena to the critical editions; and the like is also furnished, on the other hand, along with and amongst the divers matters which it is usual to call Introduction to the New Testament.

§ 124. It is to be required of every special proficient in the department of New Testament Criticism, that he shall have mastered all that pertains to a constituting of the Text, completely and consistently, according to the same principles throughout; and also to the proper and suitable getting up of a Critical Apparatus.

These are problems of a purely philological character. It is, however, not easy to conceive that a philologer should, apart from any interest in Christianity, apply his skill to the solution of these problems in relation to the New Testament, since there are other writings to which this book is far inferior in point of linguistic importance. If, however, Theology should at any time be destitute of special proficients in this department, it would also follow that we should no longer have any security with respect to that which is requisite to be accomplished for the theological purpose of the study before us.

§ 125. In all that has been said hitherto (§§ 116—124), we have been proceeding upon the assumption, that none but he who has to do with the Canon in its original language is in a position to construct an interpretation for himself.

Otherwise, the critical problem would be of no moment except for the translator; and this, too, only within the limits described in § 121.

§ 126. Since it is not possible for even the most masterly translation to do away with the irrationality [non-equivalence] of languages; it follows that no discourse or writing is to be perfectly understood, except in its original language.

By irrationality is meant simply this well-known characteristic,—that neither a material nor a formal element of one language is wholly resolvable into a like element of another. Therefore, a discourse or writing which is presented through the medium of a translation—and consequently also the translation itself, as such—can be perfectly intelligible only to him who is capable of tracing it back to the original language.

§ 127. The original language of the books of the New Testament is Greek; but a good deal that is of importance (according to the principle laid down in § 121), is to be looked upon as being in some cases an immediate translation from the Aramaic, and in others, as having been mediately influenced by that language.

The assertions formerly put forth, that certain individual books of the New Testament were originally written in Aramaic, hardly require to be any longer taken notice of. Much, however, of that which has been preserved in the shape of discourse or dialogue, was originally spoken in Aramaic. The mediate influence referred to is to be found in that modification of the language which is known under the name of Hebraism.

§ 128. Even the manifold references, direct and indirect, which occur in books of the New Testament to those of the Old, suffice to create the necessity for a closer acquaintance with the latter, and therefore, for a knowledge of them in their original language also.

The more so, since these references relate, in part, to passages of great importance, in regard to which it is necessary to form an interpretation for one’s self; and where, consequently, a correct judgment as to the relation which the common Greek translation of the Old Testament bears to the original language is indispensable.

§ 129. The more limited the diffusion and the productivity [copiousness] of a dialect, the less capable is it of being fully understood except in connexion with all that are akin to it. This principle, applied to the Hebrew language, makes it necessary that, in order to the fullest understanding of the Canon, there shall be also a competent acquaintance with all the Semitic dialects.

For this reason, the Arabic and Rabbinical dialects have, from the first, been brought to bear upon the interpretation of the Bible.

§ 130. This requirement, however, which includes a great deal that is, immediately, altogether foreign to the purpose of our theological studies, is to be enforced only in the case of those who aspire to a mastery in the department of Exegetical Theology, and that in the particular direction to which it refers.

In reference to this purely philological tendency, we may repeat the observations made at § 124.

§ 131. But we have to expect from every theologian, in so far as the department of Philology is concerned, a thorough knowledge of the Greek language (especially the prose form of it) in its various developements; an acquaintance with both the original languages of the Old Testament, and, by means of this knowledge, a clear insight into the nature and extent of the Hebraism of the New Testament; and finally,—in order that he may be able to make use of the labours of such as have attained to special proficiency,—in addition to an acquaintance with the literature of the entire department, he should have, in particular, an independently formed judgment with respect to what constitutes excess and defect, the natural and the affected, in the application of Orientalism.⁵

For in this respect, faults are constantly committed in both directions,—on the one hand from partiality, on the other from prejudice.

§ 132. The perfect understanding of a discourse or writing is a work of art, and involves the need of an Art-Doctrine, or Technology, which we designate by the term Hermeneutics.

We apply the term Art, even in a more restricted sense, to every compound production in connexion with which we have a consciousness of certain general rules, the application of which in detail cannot be reduced, again, to other rules. It is a common, but unjustifiable practice, to restrict the use of Hermeneutics to larger works, or difficult matters of detail, exclusively. The rules which may be adopted, can form a Technology only when they are drawn from the nature of the entire process, and when, therefore, they also comprehend the entire process.

§ 133. Such a Technology has existence, only in so far as the precepts admitted form a system resting upon principles which are immediately evident from the nature of thought and of language.

So long as Hermeneutics continue to be dealt with merely as an aggregate of isolated observations, general and particular,—no matter how acute or how worthy of recommendation the latter may be,—they do not as yet deserve to be called a Technology.

§ 134. Protestant Theology cannot accept any representation with regard to the Canon, which should exclude from the pursuits that have reference to the latter, the application of the Technology in question.

For this would be possible only upon the supposition that, in some way or other, the existence of a miraculously inspired, perfect understanding of the Canon was taken for granted.

§ 135. The New Testament Scriptures, on account of their inward contents, as well as of the outward circumstances with which they stand connected, are especially difficult of interpretation.

For the former reason,—because we have here the communication of peculiar religious notions, in their first development, by writers who, for the most part, belonged to the less cultivated circles of society, who employed a language which was not vernacular to them, and employed it in an irregular manner,—and such a communication is very liable to be misunderstood. For the latter,—because we are ignorant, to a great extent, of the circumstances and relations which modify the course of thought, and our first discovery of them has to be made from the documents themselves.

§ 136. Inasmuch as, by reason of the peculiar purpose which Exegetical Theology has in view, the New Testament Canon ought to be dealt with as a whole, while on the other hand every individual document which it contains, considered in and for itself, constitutes a separate whole; we have further to entertain this special problem,—the effecting of a mutual adjustment and combination between the two modes of treatment here specified.

The entire exclusion of the one or the other of these standpoints, resulting as it does from opposite forms of theological one-sidedness, has, in all ages, served to introduce error and confusion into the business of exposition.

§ 137. The Special Hermeneutics of the New Testament can consist only of more precise determinations of the general rules [of Hermeneutics], made with a reference to the peculiar circumstances of the Canon.

It is all the more a matter of necessity that the progress of New Testament Hermeneutics towards the stricter form of a Technology should be but gradual, from the circumstance that their first foundations were laid at a time when even general Hermeneutics existed, as yet, only in the form of a collection of observations.

§ 138. There are two forms which the Technology of interpretation may be made to assume; but in whatever way we choose to take it, it constitutes the proper centre of Exegetical Theology.

Either, General Hermeneutics may be made wholly prominent, so that the special portion shall assume the shape of corollaries; or, vice versâ, Special Hermeneutics may be organized in a connected manner, and the general principles may then be introduced merely in the way of reference.—It is true, certainly, that [Hermeneutical] practice is subject to conditions derived from Philology and Criticism; but the principles [of Hermeneutics] exert, themselves, a most decided influence, both upon the operations of Criticism, and upon the more subtile class of observations in Philology.

§ 139. Here again, therefore, no reason presents itself for a man’s venturing to rely upon others; on the contrary, it is necessary that every one should strive to attain as high a degree of mastery as possible.

The further the subject-matter with which we have to deal has been elaborated already, the less proper is it that this mastery should seek to show itself in the particular path of new interpretations.

§ 140. No document can be perfectly understood, except in connexion with the entire circle of mental representations out of which it has proceeded, and by the help of an acquaintance with the life-relations both of the writers and of those for whom they wrote.

For, every document bears the same relation to the collective life of which it is a part, that a single sentence does to the whole discourse or writing in which it occurs.

§ 141. The historical apparatus for the exposition of the New Testament embraces, accordingly, an acquaintance with the earlier and later Judaism, as also with the intellectual and civil condition of those localities in which and for which the New Testament Scriptures were composed.

The books of the Old Testament, therefore, constitute at the same time the most general auxiliary to the understanding of the New: after them come the Old and New Testament Apocrypha, and the later Jewish writers in general, as also the historians and geographers of the period and locality in question. All these aids require, in like manner, to be used in their original language,—critically,—and according to the rules of Hermeneutics.

§ 142. Up to the present time, many of these sources of aid have not been used, either in their greatest possible completeness, or with a due degree of caution.

Both parts of the assertion are true especially with regard to the contemporary and the more recent Jewish writings.

§ 143. This collective apparatus, therefore, claims the activity of a number of theologians for a long time to come, in order that the previous labours of such as have been masters in this department may be corrected and supplemented.

Viewed in another direction, these labours go back into the department of Apologetics, inasmuch as the opponents of Christianity are in the habit of endeavouring, again and again, to explain Christianity wholly by means of that which was previously given, and moreover do not always represent it, [even on this basis], as having been a progress and improvement. That which belongs to the department before us, however, is simply the preparation, in due purity and completeness, of the historical material.

§ 144. As much of this as is adapted to be common property, is usually delivered, partly under the title Jewish and Christian Antiquities, and partly in combination with divers other matters, in the so-called Introduction to the New Testament.

In the latter, which, perhaps, in general, stands in need of a transformation, one still misses a great deal which, nevertheless, belongs especially (according to § 141) to this head, because we need to bring it with us to the reading of the New Testament. That which a man may allow himself to derive from the labours of special proficients in this department, consists, on the one hand, in collectanea from individual sources, and, on the other, in commentaries upon the separate books of the New Testament.

§ 145. As yet, the chief problem of Exegetical Theology is not by any means to be looked upon as completely solved.

Not even when we leave out of sight the circumstance that there are individual passages, some of which will never be corrected with perfect certainty, while others of them will never be explained to the satisfaction of all.

§ 146. With regard, also, to the auxiliary branches of knowledge which belong to this department, a two-fold problem continues to present itself,—the problem of a constant advance towards the completion of their material, and towards the conversion of that which has already been elaborated, into common property.

Even the first study, under the guidance of such as are masters in the art, must not merely lay the foundation for the last, and furnish the commencement of practice in accordance with the precepts ‘of Technology; but must also at least unlock the various individual departments of study, in reference to that mastery which is yet to be attained in them.

§ 147. A continued occupation about the New Testament Canon, which should not be prompted by a personal feeling of interest in Christianity, could only be directed against the Canon.

For, the purely philological and historical gain which the Canon promises to afford, is not sufficiently extensive to entice a man to the kind of occupation referred to. But even the investigations of opponents (comp. § 143.) have been of great service; and will become so again on future occasions.

§ 148. It is necessary that every occupation about the Canon which is not connected with a philological spirit and philological skill, should keep within the limits of the department of edification; for in that of theology, it could only serve to create confusion by its pseudo-dogmatic tendency.

For the sort of proceeding referred to cannot be founded in a pure and strict desire to understand [what is taken up in this manner.]

SECTION THE SECOND.—HISTORICAL THEOLOGY IN THE MORE

RESTRICTED SENSE; OR, CHURCH HISTORY.

§ 149. Church History,—taking the word in its more extended signification (comp. § 90),—is that knowledge which relates to the total developement of Christianity, from the time of its having obtained a settled footing as a historical phenomenon.

What Christianity has wrought in an outward direction, abstractedly from the developement here referred to, does not belong to the department before us.

§ 150. Every historical mass is capable of being viewed, on the one hand, as a single indivisible Being and Doing which is in the state or process of Becoming,—and, on the other hand, as a compound which is made up of an infinite number of individual momenta. The properly historical manner of contemplation is that in which the two aspects are intimately combined.

The one is merely the characteristic spirit of the whole, viewed in its aspect of mobility,—particular facts not being allowed to separate themselves; the other is merely the enumeration of its states in their diversity, without their being combined into a unity in the identity of their common impulse. The historical manner of contemplation includes both elements; the combination of a body of facts into a single image of the inward [principle or spirit], and the exhibition of this inward [principle] in the evolution of the facts.

§ 151. In like manner also, every fact constitutes a historic individuality only in so far as these two elements are posited identically; the external, a change in what is co-existent,—and the internal, a function of the [characteristic] energy, [conceived of as] in motion.

In this mode of expression the internal is posited as soul, the external as body, the whole, consequently, as a life.

§ 152. The observation and retention in the memory of local changes, is an operation all but mechanical; whereas, on the other hand, the [ideal] construction of a fact, the combination of the external and the internal into a historical view,⁶ is to be regarded as a free intellectual activity.

It is on this account, too, that where the observation of a thing by several persons has been wholly the same, they nevertheless differ in their apprehension of it as a fact.

§ 153. The description of local changes, as such, in their contemporaneousness and succession, is not History, but Chronicle; and a thing of this kind, having reference to the Christian Church, would not be able to make good its claims to be regarded as a theological discipline.

For, of the entire career of Christianity, it would not present that [portion or aspect] which sustains any [immediate] relation to Church Guidance.

§ 154. It is only for the sake of continuity, that such events as are not properly to be regarded in the character of historical elements, require to be also taken up into the historical apprehension.

To this class belong changes amongst the persons who were influentially active in distinguished positions, where, at the same time, the peculiarity of their personal character did not exercise any perceptible influence upon their public proceedings.

§ 155. Historical apprehension is a talent, the developement of which in each individual is effected, though in a different degree, by means of his own historical life,—but which can never wholly dispense with the mechanical expertness before referred to [§ 152].

As in ordinary life, so also within the domain of Science,—an excited selfish interest, and consequently also every thing of a party character, contributes more than any thing else to falsify the historical view.

§ 156. Historical knowledge with regard to that which is not a matter of personal experience may be obtained in two ways: immediately, but with much labour in the formation of a connected view,—by using the sources; easily, though only mediately,—by the use of historical descriptions.

Hardly will it be possible to do without the latter in any department of History; certainly not in that of Church History.

§ 157. What we call sources, in the more restricted sense of the word, are monuments and documents which testify to a fact by the circumstance that they themselves constitute a part of it.

In this stricter sense of the word, even historical descriptions by eye-witnesses are no longer sources. Still, they are the more deserving of the name, in proportion as they approximate to the nature of a chronicle, and merely give again, quite in an unpretending way, what the writers themselves observed.

§ 158. It is possible to attain to a historical apprehension of one’s own in the use of historical descriptions, only by effecting an exclusion of that which has been introduced by the author.

This process is facilitated when we are able to compare several accounts of the same series of facts; especially if they are taken from different points of view.

§ 159. The knowledge of any given condition of the whole, as presenting an image of the inward [principle or spirit] (comp. § 150), is attained only by combining, in their proper relations, a mass of individual facts which have a mutual connexion.

This, therefore, is the greatest service which the talent of historical apprehension is capable of rendering; it is that which implies and includes within itself every thing besides.

§ 160. As a theological discipline, Church History, in the more extended signification of the term (comp. § 90), ought especially to distinguish between that which has proceeded from the characteristic energy of Christianity, and that which has its foundation partly in the nature of the organs set in motion, and partly in the influence of heterogeneous principles; and to endeavour to measure each in its advance and its recession.

Only, it was a very infelicitous method, to divide the description itself, on this account, into that of favourable and unfavourable occurrences.

§ 161. From the first appearance of Christianity, and therefore as early as the age of Primitive Christianity, we are able to distinguish,—and also to separate from one another in the historical delineation,—various functions of this new, efficacious principle; which, again, are themselves susceptible of manifold subdivision.

This, also, is true universally, in relation to all important historical phenomena; in relation not merely to all religious communities, but also to those which have a civil character.

§ 162. No one of these functions, however, admits of being perfectly understood in its developement, apart from its relation to the others; and every division of time which is capable of being treated apart as a relative whole, becomes what it is through the reciprocity of the influences which these functions exert upon one another.

For the living energy is posited entire in every momentum, and can be apprehended, therefore, only by having regard to the reciprocal dependence of all the different functions.

§ 163. The entire career of Christianity, therefore, is to be completely apprehended only by adopting a very manifold [many-sided] combination of both methods of proceeding, it being necessary that each should supplement at one point what has been defective in the other at another.

While we are engaged in tracing the course of one function only, the prospect of the total life continues removed from our immediate observation, and we must reserve it to ourselves as a subsequent object to make good this defect. While we are occupied in bringing together into a single picture such traits as exhibit themselves contemporaneously, it is not possible for us to form an accurate estimate of the individual elements, and we must reserve it as a subsequent object to measure the latter by a comparison with what is homogeneous to them, but of earlier and of later occurrence.

§ 164. In the process of historical contemplation, the more we split up these different functions into the individual and minute, the more frequent must be the interposition of points which unite again what has been disjoined. The larger the dimensions assigned to the parallel masses, the longer may the observation of these individual portions be continued without interruption.

The periods, therefore, may be so much the greater, and must be so much the smaller, in proportion as the functions which are treated of are of greater or of smaller dimensions, respectively.

§ 165. The most important epoch-points, however, are always those which not only have a like value as it respects all the functions of Christianity, but are also of importance in relation to the historical developement out of the Church.

Since the appearance of Christianity, itself, constitutes at the same time a turning-point in the history of the world,—other epochs approximate in importance to this, only in the degree in which they resemble it in this respect.

§ 166. The formation of Doctrine, or the progress of the religious self-consciousness to distinctness,—and the fashioning of the Common Life,—or, of the impulse to fellowship, gratifying itself in each by means of all and in all by means of each,—are the two functions which are most easily separable, in the developement of Christianity.

This may be perceived from the fact, that great changes sometimes occur on the one side, while on the other every thing remains in the old position,—and that a certain point of time may be of importance in relation to the one side, as constituting a node of developement, while it appears to be of no consequence with respect to the other.

§ 167. The formation of the Ecclesiastical Life is especially co-determined (comp. § 160) by political circumstances, and by the condition of society upon the whole; the developement of Doctrine, on the other hand, by the state of science upon the whole, and especially by the dominant philosophemes.

This co-determination is natural and unavoidable, and is not, therefore, a condition which, in and of itself, marks the existence of morbid states; but it certainly contains the ground of their possibility. Epoch-points of a more general character which proceed from a new developement of knowledge, will also manifest themselves in the Christian Church most of all in the history of doctrine; such, on the contrary, as proceed from developements in the civil condition [of society] will also manifest themselves chiefly in the ecclesiastical life.

§ 168. On the side of the Ecclesiastical Life, again, the particulars most easily separable are, the developement of the System of Worship [Cultus], that is, of the mode in which religious life-momenta are made a matter of public communication; and the developement of Morals, that is, of the common stamp which the influence of the Christian principle impresses upon the different departments of action.

The System of Worship bears the same relation to Morals as the more limited department of Art (in the stricter sense of the word) does to the more indefinite one of Social Life in general.

§ 169. The developement of the System of Worship is especially co-determined by the nature of those means of delineation, suited to its purpose, which are to be found in [any given] society, and by the manner in which these are distributed among its members. The progress of Christian Morals, on the other hand, by the state of developement and distribution of the spiritual⁷ faculties in general.

With regard, namely, to the former particular: that communication or circulation of religious excitements⁸ which is to be effected in accordance with the excitements themselves, is dependent solely upon delineation. With regard to the other: all those motives of which the religious sentiment has to possess itself, are at rest in the condition here referred to.

§ 170. Both, however,—Morals and Worship,—are also, in their progress, so intimately connected with each other, that whenever they differ too greatly as to the degree of movement or repose [prevailing in each respectively], it follows that either the System of Worship gets the appearance of having degenerated into empty usages or into superstition, while the Christian Life gives proof of its existence in the department of Morals,—or else, on the contrary, it seems as if, while Christian piety maintained itself by means of the System of Worship, the prevailing morals presented merely the result of motives foreign to Christianity.

These different modes of judgment serve as the manifestation of an internal antagonism existing amongst the members of the community, and having a connexion with the disproportion referred to in the text.

§ 171. The more sudden the occurrence of any important changes in either of these two departments, the more numerous are the re-actions to which they are exposed. Those only, on the other hand, which take place more slowly, approve themselves as having a character of thoroughness.

The former assertion, however, is self-evident, only with regard to such changes as do not extend to several departments at the same time. It is easy, therefore, prematurely to regard changes of this kind as epoch-points, where, nevertheless, they often leave but few effects behind.

§ 172. Slow changes cannot be apprehended under the form of continuous series; on the contrary, they admit of being brought to view only at certain points, which are to be made individually prominent, and which exhibit the advances effected from one season to another.

These points, moreover, must not be selected arbitrarily, but must have a resemblance, although only in a subordinate sense, to those which constitute epochs.

§ 173. The historical apprehension, in this department, is the more perfect, the more definitely the relation of the Christian impulse to the moral and the artistic constitution of society presents itself to view, and the more convincingly that which belongs to the healthy developement of the religious principle is separated from what is weakly and morbid.

For in this way the claims of Church-Guidance upon a scientific knowledge of Christian History are satisfied.

§ 174. The Ecclesiastical Constitution,—especially in the Evangelical Church, where it is destitute of all outward sanction,—can only be considered as appertaining to the department of Morals.

This proposition, rightly understood, lies beyond the range of all those controversies which yet prevail with regard to the [Ecclesiastical] Law of the Evangelical Church, and merely expresses the essential difference between a civil and an ecclesiastical constitution.

§ 175. Those greater nodes of developement which also exert an influence out of the Church, upon the civil life, will manifest themselves within the Church most immediately and most strongly in its Constitution.

Just because no other section of Christian Morals is so intimately connected (comp. § 167) with political circumstances.

§ 176. The highest degree of suitability belongs to that arrangement, in which the historical delineation of the collective Christian life is made to follow the order of developement of the Church’s Constitution.

For, this constitution exerts the most direct influence upon the System of Worship,—is indebted for its stability to the state of morals upon the whole,—and constitutes, at the same time, the expression of the relation between the religious and the civil communities.

§ 177. The System of Doctrine is developed, on the one hand, by means of that reflection which is continually directed towards the Christian self-consciousness in its different momenta, and on the other hand, by means of that effort which has for its object to establish, with more and more of general agreement and of precision, the expression by which this consciousness shall be represented.

Each of these tendencies is a check upon the other, the one having an outward, the other an inward direction. For this reason, different periods are characterized by the preponderance of the one or the other.

§ 178. The order in which, according to what has just been said, the different points of doctrine come forth to view, and the principal masses of the didactic dialect shape themselves, must be capable of being understood, at least in a general way, by a reference to the peculiar, essential character of Christianity.

For it would be contrary to the order of nature, if such conceptions as are most closely allied to this essence, were to be developed last of all.

§ 179. It is only in a morbid condition of the Church that individual and personal (or it may be even extra-ecclesiastical) circumstances, can exert any considerable influence upon the course and the results of that occupation which has to do with the System of Doctrine.

If this has, nevertheless, not unfrequently been the case, still, writers of history, especially those of a more recent date, have placed far more to the account of such circumstances than the truth warrants us in doing.

§ 180. In proportion as it is impossible for the developement of the System of Doctrine to keep clear of fluctuation and dissension, in the same proportion is prominence also given to the effort, to prove, on the one hand, the agreement of a given statement with the utterances of Primitive Christianity, and on the other hand, to establish it by a reference to certain propositions conceded elsewhere, and not deriving their origin from the Christian Faith, and which, accordingly, will be philosophemes.

Both these efforts would be made,—though probably at a later period, and in a different degree,—even if no controversy existed; for an impulse to the former is supplied by the characteristic social spirit of Christianity, and to the latter by the necessity of convincing ourselves of the existence of an agreement between the religious self-consciousness, when it has attained to distinctness, and the action of the speculative productivity.

§ 181. Only during the prevalence of a morbid condition can these two efforts become opposed to each other in such a manner, that the one party shall resolve not to proceed, in the determination of doctrine, beyond the declarations of Primitive Christianity, while the other introduces propositions of philosophy into the Christian System of Doctrine, without even caring to prove, by a reference to the Canon, that they also appertain to the Christian consciousness.

The former class present obstacles to the development of the System of Doctrine,—the latter, in an equal degree, interfere with and falsify its principle.

§ 182. A knowledge of the changes which take place in the mutual relation of the two tendencies referred to, is essential to an understanding of the doctrinal developement.

Through the neglecting of such momenta, we but too often get a mere chronicle instead of history, and the theological purpose of the discipline is lost altogether.

§ 183. Equally important is it to take knowledge of the relations subsisting between the movements of theoretical doctrines and those of practical dogmas; and where these movements become broadly distinct from each other, it is natural to separate Dogma-History, properly so called, from the History of Christian Morals.

On the whole, certainly, there have been more manifold and more violent agitations in connexion with the formation of the System of Faith [Glaubenslehre], properly so called; this, however, renders it the less allowable for the opposite tendency to be overlooked.

§ 184. If we take into consideration how many auxiliary branches of knowledge are required in order to follow out these different branches of Church History; it is manifest that this department of labour is of infinite extent, and that it postulates a broad distinction between that of which every one must be possessed, and that which is furnished only by the united labours of all who attain to special proficiency in the department before us (comp. § 92).

To these auxiliary branches of knowledge belong,—if every thing is to be understood in its connexion,—the entire science of History, so far as it has any relation to the periods in question, and,—if every thing is to be derived from the sources,—the entire study of Philology, so far as it concerns the matter in hand, and especially Diplomatic Criticism [the Criticism of Documents].

§ 185. It can only be observed, in general, that out of this infinite circuit of acquisitions, every theologian must be in possession of that which he requires in order to an independent participation in the Guidance of the Church.

This formula,—to all appearance a very narrow one,—supposes, however, that in addition to his particular, local activity, every theologian strives to exercise a general influence also; although it may not be possible distinctly to point out the latter in its effects.

§ 186. Since, now, at any given time, the existing state of things out of which a new momentum is to be developed, is capable of being understood only by a reference to the Past in its totality, while nevertheless its immediate connexion is with the most recent occurrence that has formed an epoch: it follows, that a correct view of the latter, rendered intelligible by means of all the principal revolutions which have preceded it, according to the degree of its connexion with them, is the first and principal thing required.

It is manifest that, in such a case, no particular regard can be had to the question, whether the prevailing character of the existing momentum is not already that of a preparation for the epoch which is to come; for this question must itself receive its immediate solution from a view of the relation [actually] sustained by the former towards the latter [for which, of course, we must wait until the coming epoch presents itself as a fact.]

§ 187. In order, however, that these observations may not retain the character of a mere series of single, unconnected pictures, it is necessary that they should be combined by means of the plexus (comp. § 91)—not meagrely filled up—of the chief momenta belonging to every branch of Church History in every period.

And this, as it is designed to be the foundation of an independent activity, must also be, as far as possible, a survey constructed from accounts of various character.

§ 188. But this, too, grows into a living historical view,⁹ such as also to possess an impulsive energy, only when the entire career of Christianity is apprehended at the same time (comp. 150) as the exhibition of the Christian spirit in its [state or aspect of] movement, and when, consequently, every thing is referred to one inward [principle].

Not until it has assumed this form, is it possible for the knowledge of the entire career referred to to exert an influence upon the Guidance of the Church.

§ 189. Every local exercise of influence calls for a more precise acquaintance with the particular department in which it takes place; and this knowledge must approximate to completeness in the same degree in which it bears more directly upon the Present.

The rule becomes modified, of course, according to the extent of the locality; it being often the case that the smallest locality, that which is occupied by a single congregation, has no separate history of its own, but can only claim attention as forming part of a larger whole.

§ 190. It is necessary, however, that every one should also exercise himself in personal research, and the use of the sources, at least in connection with some one small portion of History.

Whether it be that in the pursuit of this study, he merely makes a careful and constant reference to the sources, or that he attempts an independent construction from them. Otherwise, a man could hardly have at his command even so much of Historical Criticism as is requisite in order to a right use of accounts which are at variance with one another.

§ 191. A pursuit of the Study of Church History, proceeding beyond the measure just laid down, must be directed towards the accomplishing of something new.

Nothing is more unprofitable than a heaping up of historical knowledge which neither serves to any practical purposes, nor is communicated to others in the way of delineation.

§ 192. These new services may tend towards a correction or completion of the material, as well as towards an increase of truthfulness and liveliness in the delineation.

The deficiencies which still exist in all these respects are unmistakeable, and are easily to be explained.

§ 193. In the pursuit of the study of Church History, it is not possible for the interest of the Church and the interest of Science [that is, as apprehended and sympathized with by the individual] to become contradictory the one to the other.

Since we are content to abstain from laying down rules for others, we limit the application of this proposition to our own Church; to which, as an inquiring and self-forth-forming community, even the most perfect impartiality cannot be productive of injury, but only conducive to progress. The liveliest degree of interest, therefore, which the Evangelical Theologian may feel in his Church, must not be allowed to prejudice either his investigation or his delineation. And just as little is it to be feared that the results of his investigation will weaken his interest in the Church; in the worst case, they can but impart to it the impulse to co-operate in the removal of the imperfections which are discerned.

§ 194. The labours of any individual in the department of Church History must, on the one hand, take their rise from his own inclination, and, on the other, be determined by the opportunities which present themselves to him.

A lively interest on behalf of Theology will always know how to bring the former into connexion with the latter, or even to provide the latter for the use of the former.

SECTION THE THIRD.—THE HISTORICAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE

PRESENT CONDITION OF CHRISTIANITY.

§ 195. Under this head we have to do (comp. §§ 94—97) with Dogmatic Theology,—or the knowledge of the doctrine now current in the Evangelical Church; and with Ecclesiastical Statistics, or the knowledge of the existing social condition in all the different sections of the Christian Church.

We must leave it to the further carrying out of our plan, to justify us in assigning this place to Dogmatic Theology; which, in other systems, (also under the name of Systematic Theology), has been made to occupy quite a different position. Here we have only to show that the two disciplinæ mentioned in the text, exhaust the heading prefixed, in its whole extent. This is clear from the consideration that as the Church is altogether a Community, there is, strictly speaking, nothing in it to be known which would not form a part of its social condition. The System of Doctrine is taken up apart from the latter topic, merely because its delineation admits of and requires a peculiar mode of treatment. It is true that there are other parts of the social condition, with regard to which the same thing might also take place; but these have not, hitherto, been specially elaborated as theological disciplinæ. But if, in periods when the Church is divided, (according to § 98), it is possible only for each Church-Community in particular to elaborate its own system of doctrine in a dogmatic form: the question arises, how is the Evangelical Theologian to arrive at a knowledge of the doctrine which is current in other Christian Church-Communities, and what is the place which our outline is to appropriate to this purpose? The most direct method is, to have recourse to the dogmatic representations which they themselves give of it; which become for him, however, mere historical reports. On the other hand, the place to be assigned to this knowledge in our Outline, is to be found in the History of Christian Doctrine, followed down as far as the existing momentum; for which history the said representations constitute the genuine sources. But Statistics, too, in treating of each individual Community, may have a place specially devoted to the statement of its doctrine.

I. DOGMATIC THEOLOGY.

§ 196. A dogmatic treatment of the System of Doctrine, apart from personal conviction, is not possible; on the other hand, it is not necessary that all those elaborations of it which have reference to the same period of the same Church-Community should agree amongst themselves.

One might be disposed to deduce both the propositions which are here contradicted, from this fact, that the dogmatic treatment has to do merely (comp. §§ 97 and 98) with the doctrine current at the given time. But the man to whom this doctrine is not a matter of conviction,—though he may, indeed, furnish a report concerning it, and concerning the manner, too, in which its inward connexion is conceived of,—cannot establish this connexion by means of the exhibition which he gives of it. Yet it is the latter circumstance alone which gives to the mode of treatment a dogmatic character; the former is merely a historical exhibition, such as may be given in like manner of all systems by one and the same man, if possessed of the requisite knowledge.—On the other hand, there is, in the Evangelical Church, no necessity for entire agreement, for this reason, that even at one and the same time, different views have currency side by side. Every thing namely, is to be looked upon as having currency, which is officially asserted and officially heard, without calling forth an official contradiction. The limits of this difference, therefore, certainly, are sometimes broader and sometimes narrower, according to time and circumstances.

§ 197. We should not give the name of a system of Dogmatics, either to the laying down and supporting by proof of a body of propositions which were prevailingly characterized by a deviation from the views generally current, and which expressed merely the conviction of the individual; or, on the other hand, to such a system as, in a period marked by the prevalence of diverse theories, would only consent to admit that, in regard to which no controversy existed.

No one will deny the former part of this assertion. But the controversial question, too, proceeding thence,—as to whether text-books can be admitted to have a dogmatic character, when they merely give a historical report concerning the current system of doctrine, and, on the other hand, lay down in connexion with proof such propositions, exclusively, as might have an official prohibition adduced against them,—serves as a further confirmation of our notion. —A purely irenical composition of this kind will, for the most part, prove so meagre and indefinite, that there will be everywhere a want, not only of the middle terms which are necessary to effect a proof, but also of that precision in the definition of notions, which is necessary to procure for the delineation the confidence of the reader.

§ 198. The immediate use of Dogmatic Theology in connexion with Church-Guidance is, to show in how many ways, and up to what point, the principle of the current period has developed itself on every side; and how the germs of improved configurations which belong to the Future are related thereto. At the same time it furnishes the department of practice with the norm for the popular mode of expression; by way of guarding against the recurrence of old forms of confusion, and of preventing by anticipation the occurrence of new ones.

This practical interest is to be referred exclusively to the conservative function of Church-Guidance; and it was from this that the gradual formation of the system of Dogmatics originally proceeded. The division enunciated in the former sentence of the paragraph is explained by what was said in general with regard to the contents of every individual momentum (comp. § 91).

§ 199. In every momentum which admits of a separate delineation, (comp. § 93), that which, in the System of Doctrine, is derived from the last preceding epoch, bears in the most marked degree the character of having been ecclesiastically determined; and that, on the contrary, which serves rather to prepare the way for the succeeding epoch, presents itself as originating with individuals.

The former seems ecclesiastically defined, not only in a higher degree than the latter, but also in a higher degree than that which has been derived by transmission from earlier periods.—There is the more reason for tracing back the latter to individuals merely, in proportion as we may be unable, for the present, distinctly to anticipate a new configuration.

§ 200. All points of doctrine which are developed by the dominant principle of the period, must agree amongst themselves; whereas, on the contrary, all others, so long as we can but say of them that they have not this for their point of departure, appear as forming an unconnected plurality.

The dominant principle itself, however, may be variously apprehended, and this may give rise to a number of dogmatic delineations, connected in themselves, respectively, but differing from one another, and all laying claim, perhaps not without reason, to a like degree of ecclesiasticality.—When the heterogeneous, isolated elements become connected, they either present themselves to view as constituting a new apprehension of the principle already dominant, or else they announce the developement of a new principle.

§ 201. As a complete acquaintance with the state of doctrine embraces not merely that which is essentially interwoven with the further developement, but also that which, although as a personal theory it was not unimportant, yet, as such, again disappears; so also must a comprehensive dogmatic method of treatment give a proper degree of attention to everything that has a contemporaneous existence in the Church Community with which it is connected.

A place will always, of necessity, be found for this, if, in the attempt to establish the connexion laid down, [that is, as being the true inward connexion of the System of Doctrine] comparisons and parallels are not neglected.

§ 202. A dogmatic delineation is perfect in proportion to the degree in which it possesses, along with the assertory character, a divinatory character also.

In the former is manifested the author’s confidence in his own theory; in the latter, the clearness with which he apprehends the existing state of things upon the whole.

§ 203. Every element of doctrine that is constructed in the spirit of a desire to hold fast that which is already matter of general acknowledgment, along with the natural inferences therefrom,—is of an orthodox character; every element constructed with a tendency to keep the System of Doctrine in a state of mobility, and to make room for other modes of apprehension, is heterodox.

It seems to be too great a limitation of these terms, when they are applied exclusively to the relation which doctrinal opinions bear to a certain norm that has been set up; the same antagonism may also be found where there is no such norm in existence. Rather may we say that, according to the explanation given above, it is possible for the Symbol to have its own origin from the orthodox tendency; and so it has happened, often enough. What, on the other hand, may appear strange in our explanation, is, that it does not refer at all to the contents of the propositions, in and for themselves; and yet this, also, is easily justified upon a closer reflection.

§ 204. Both classes of elements are alike important, as in relation to the historical progress of Christianity in general, so also in relation to every important momentum as such.

As, notwithstanding any degree of uniformity which might exist, there would still be no true unity without the former class of elements; so, notwithstanding any measure of diversity, there would still be no conscious, free mobility without the latter.

§ 205. It is false orthodoxy, to wish for a continued retention, in the system of dogmatic treatment, of that also, which, in so far as the public communications of the Church are concerned, is already completely antiquated; and which, moreover, does not, by its scientific expression, exert any determinate influence upon other particulars of doctrine.

It is evidently necessary that a doctrinal definition to which these remarks become applicable, should be rendered moveable again, and that the inquiry should be conducted back to the point at which it stood previously.

§ 206. It is false heterodoxy, to manifest hostility, in the system of dogmatic treatment, to such formulæ as have their well-grounded point of support in the communications of the Church; and the scientific expression of which, too, does not create any confusion as it respects their relation to other particulars of Christian Doctrine.

This principle, therefore, does not by any means extend to justify that servile spirit of accommodation, which would allow the retention of all that happens to be used by a number of persons for the purpose of edification, even though it may not be in accordance with the fundamental doctrines of our faith.

§ 207. A dogmatic delineation [of the System of Doctrine] intended for the Evangelical Church, will avoid both these forms of irregularity: and notwithstanding that mobility of the letter which we sought to vindicate, will still find it possible to be orthodox in regard to all the chief particulars of doctrine; but it will also be compelled,—notwithstanding that it confines itself exclusively to that which has currency,—to give a start, in particular places, to some things which are heterodox, also.

The natural relation of the two elements will,—if this discipline is symmetrically developed from its proper notion,—always be that which is here laid down; and a change in this respect will become necessary, only when one of the two extremes has been for a long time predominant.

§ 208. Every dogmatic theologian who either innovates, or cries up what is old, in a one-sided manner, is but an imperfect organ of the Church: and if occupying a falsely heterodox stand-point, he will declare even the most strictly proper orthodoxy to be false; and if a falsely orthodox stand-point, he will combat even the mildest and most inevitable heterodoxy as a destructive innovation.

These fluctuations have been the principal cause which has hitherto almost continually prevented the Dogmatic Theology of the Evangelical Church from developing itself in a peaceful progress.

§ 209. Every doctrine which is taken up into the dogmatic combination, must support by proof the manner in which it is specifically determined; on the one hand, by an immediate or mediate tracing back of its contents to the New Testament Canon, and on the other, by the agreement of its scientific expression with the construction which is put upon certain kindred propositions.

All the propositions, however, upon which, in this sense, it is possible to fall back, are subject to the same rule; so that here there is no other subordination than this,—that those propositions are least in need of either of the operations specified, which have their popular, their Scriptural, and their scientific forms of expression most nearly identical with one another, so that every fellow-believer verifies them at once by a reference to the certainty of his own immediate religious self-consciousness.—This distinction will probably survive as a relic of another, which, as it was commonly understood, is already to be considered antiquated; the distinction between Fundamental Articles, and others [which were regarded as not fundamental.]

§ 210. If any important change takes place in the treatment of the Canon, there must also be a change in the mode of proof of individual doctrines, notwithstanding that their contents remain the same without alteration.

The orthodox dogmatic interest should never be allowed to form an obstacle to exegetical inquiries, or to dominate over them; but the falling away of individual proof-passages, as they are called, does not, in and of itself, constitute a testimony against the correctness of a current doctrine. On the other hand, canonical proof which continues to maintain its validity, must needs impart security to a doctrine against the heterodox tendency.

§ 211. In regard to the propositions which definitively express the peculiar character of the existing period, a tracing of them back to the Symbol may stand in the place of canonical proof, provided we are still able to appropriate the interpretation which was then current [that is, at the time when the Symbol was composed].

In these cases it will also be advisable to make this agreement with the Symbol conspicuous, in order the more definitely to distinguish these propositions from others [of a different character] (comp. §§ 199, 200, 203.) The principle, however, does not by any means apply to propositions which have been transferred from earlier periods into the Symbol of the current one, by a process of mere repetition.

§ 212. Since the peculiar character of the doctrine of the Evangelical Church is inseparable from that antagonism between the Evangelical and the Romish Churches to which the issue of the Reformation first gave fixity; it follows, too, that every proposition which is to be traced back to our Symbols, is completely worked out only in so far as it bears within itself the antithesis to the corresponding propositions maintained by the Romish Church.

For it would not be possible, either for a proposition in regard to which the antithesis had already, on our part, been abrogated, or for one with which this antithesis had nothing to do, to find sufficient verification in a reference to the Symbol.

§ 213. The strictly didactic form of expression, which, by means of the connectedness subsisting amongst the individual formulæ, gives to the dogmatic procedure its scientific stability, is dependent, at any given time, upon the existing condition of the philosophical disciplinæ.

Partly on account of the logical relation of the formulæ to one another, and partly because many of their notional definitions are based upon elements which belong to Psychology and to Ethics.

§ 214. The dialectic element of the System of Doctrine is capable of entering into conjunction with every system of philosophy that does not, by the principles it maintains, exclude or deny the religious element,—either in general, or in that particular form of it to which Christianity professes immediately to belong.

Therefore, all decidedly materialistic and sensualistic systems,—which, however, perhaps, will hardly be allowed to pass for truly philosophical at all (and all properly atheistic systems will also have the same character)—all such systems are to be excluded from being employed in connexion with the discussion of Dogmatics. It is a difficult thing to lay down, in general, limits which shall be stricter than those now specified.

§ 215. Individual doctrines may therefore be differently apprehended in contemporary dogmatic systems, and may also be expressed differently at different periods, while in both cases no diversity presents itself in their religious contents.

By reason of the diversity which characterises the co-existing or successive Schools and their terminologies. It is only in consequence of misapprehension, however, that such differences come to be also matter for a dogmatic controversy.

§ 216. In like manner, an appearance of similarity may arise between propositions, the religious contents of which have, notwithstanding, more or less of diversity.

Not only is it possible, in detail, for the difference of different theological schools belonging to the same Church to conceal itself behind the identity of the scientific terminology; but it is also possible for Protestant and Catholic propositions, especially where they have a certain degree of remoteness from the leading-points of the Symbols, to appear of like import.

§ 217. The Protestant treatment of Dogmatics must strive to bring into distinct consciousness the relation sustained by every separate article of doctrine to the antagonism that governs the period in which we live.

This is a want in the department of Church-Guidance, which can be satisfied only in the way pointed out; a department in which incorrect views with regard to the state of this antagonism—(as to whether, and where, by the approximation of the opposing parties, it is already in process of disappearing,—or, on the contrary, as to whether, and where, it is first beginning to develope itself more definitely)—must needs be productive of the most awkward confusions.

§ 218. Dogmatic Theology in its entire compass is a thing of infinite extent, and requires that a separation shall be made between the department of special proficiency and that of common property.

This distinction, however, of course, relates merely to the extent of the material to be elaborated; not to the certainty and strength of the conviction, nor to the manner in which it is obtained.

§ 219. It is to be demanded of every Evangelical Theologian, that he be occupied in the formation of a personal conviction with regard to all passages, properly so called, of the System of Doctrine: not merely as these have been developed from the principles of the Reformation considered in themselves, and in opposition to the Romish doctrines; but also in so far as there is anything new which has taken shape, and which possesses a historical significance, at least in relation to the current momentum, that is not to be overlooked.

By a passage, I understand such a proposition or body of propositions, as, on the one hand, has a determinate place in the Canon and the Symbol, and, on the other, cannot be passed by without its resulting that other propositions or bodies of propositions, of the same compass and value, become obscure and unintelligible.—The expression, be occupied in the formation of a conviction, does not by any means involve the existence of a sceptical state, but merely that maintenance of an inward receptivity with regard to new investigations, which is essential to the spirit of our Church; a receptivity, in so far as it is possible, on the one hand, that there may be a change in the treatment of the Canon, and, on the other, that a new source may be opened up in relation to the dogmatic phraseology. This requirement, too, relates, immediately, not to faith in that aspect in which it is the common possession of all Christians; but to the strictly didactic construction of the enunciations which have reference to it.

§ 220. The study of Dogmatics must therefore commence with the understanding and testing of one or more strictly-connected exhibitions of that which has been ecclesiastically determined; by way of a further developement of the Symbols, which, from their very nature, are but fragmentary.

A knowledge of Dogma-History, (although only in the same manner in which it is possible for the laic, also, to be in possession of its essential features), must necessarily be taken for granted at the outset of this proceeding.—For the rest, we should distinguish between, and group together, respectively, such delineations as develope their propositions, for the most part, from the letter of the Symbols, and such as profess to continue faithful to the spirit of the Symbols, although they subject the letter of them, likewise, to the operations of Criticism.

§ 221. In relation to the new matter, which is not to be understood by means of the Symbol,—and in so far as it belongs to this department,—it must be left to reflective observation to decide, in the first instance, whether or not this new matter contains several particulars which point backwards to a common origin, and give indication of a common design.

For, in proportion as this is the case, may we the more safely suppose that the views in question have obtained a historical footing.

§ 222. An accurate knowledge of all contemporary methods of treatment and all controversial questions in agitation, as well as of all venturesome opinions, and a settled judgment as to the foundation and value of these various forms and elements, constitute the department of special proficiency in connexion with Dogmatics.

This settled judgment is to be understood with a reservation of that fresh receptivity (comp. § 218), which is not less necessary to the Master than to the beginner.—By venturesome opinions are to be understood not merely the ephemeral phenomena of a capricious and ill-regulated personality, but also every thing which, as being, properly speaking, morbid, is to be traced back to anti-Christian, or at least to anti-Evangelical impulses, and becomes an object for the practical application of Polemics.

§ 223. In the preceding delineation, little regard has been had to the now prevailingly customary division of Dogmatic Theology, into the discussion of the theoretical side of the System of Doctrine, or Dogmatics in the stricter sense,—and the discussion of its practical side, or the Christian Doctrine of Morals; the less so, because this separation cannot be looked upon as essential; even as it does not possess, either in general, or in relation to the Evangelical Church, the character of originality.¹⁰

Neither the designations theoretical and practical, nor the terms Doctrine of Faith [System of Faith, Glaubenslehre] and Doctrine of Morals, are perfectly accurate. For the Christian rules of life are also theoretical propositions, when viewed as developements of the Christian notion of the Good; and they are propositions of faith, not less than those which are dogmatical in the proper sense, since they have to do with the same Christianly-religious self-consciousness,—only that they have to do with it in its manifestation as impulse, [and not as taking the form of conception or of feeling.] —Now, although it cannot be denied that the treatment of the two in combination belongs to a period in the history of the theological sciences which must be regarded as in many respects imperfect, still, a progressive improvement, even in this department, may very well be conceived of, apart from a separation of the kind referred to.

§ 224. If this separation affords to both kinds of propositions, respectively, the advantage of being more easily apprehended in their connexion, it has been accompanied by an additional, special advantage as it regards the Christian Doctrine of Morals, in that the latter is now subjected to a more extended treatment in detail.

This last-mentioned advantage, however, is not essentially a consequence of the separation. For it is possible to conceive of a treatment of the two in combination, in which the proportion [of attention given to each respectively] should be the reverse of that which actually existed before the separation; and then the separation would have led to the same advantage in favour of Dogmatics. It may be urged as a set-off against the advantage first named, that a well-ordered, lively combination of the two appears to furnish an especial security against the facility with which it is possible for the dogmatic propositions, properly so called, to degenerate into lifeless formulæ, and the ethical into merely outward prescriptions.

§ 225. The division of this department may very easily give rise to the supposition of its being possible that, in conjunction with altogether diverse apprehensions of the System of Faith, there might nevertheless be but one and the same apprehension with regard to the System of Morals,—and vice versâ.

This error has already obtained a very profound hold upon our ecclesiastical commonwealth; and it can be effectually counteracted only by our taking up the position which the scientific treatment of the matter affords.

§ 226. This division finds a considerable amount of justification, as well in the fact that the verification by means of the Canon and the Symbol assumes, in the case of the ethical propositions, a form differing a good deal from that which it has in the case of the dogmatical,—as also in the circumstance that the respective terminologies derive their origin from different departments of science.

In this respect we have, it is true, connected the theological sciences, in general, with Ethics, and the disciplinæ dependent upon the latter; but if we look at Dogmatic Theology in particular, we must admit that the terminology of the System of Faith, properly so called, has its origin, to a great extent, in that philosophical science which, under the name of Rational Theology, had its place in the System of Metaphysics,—whereas, on the other hand, the Christian Doctrine of Morals is able to draw, for the most part, only from the Duty-Doctrine of the philosophical system of Ethics.

§ 227. The separation of the two disciplinæ has also generated a perverted eclectic mode of proceeding, it having been supposed that one might, without any injurious results, proceed upon the basis of a different philosophical school, when dealing with the Christian Doctrine of Morals, from that to which reference is made when dealing with the System of Faith.

It is only necessary to have realized, in one’s own mind, the possibility of an undivided treatment of Dogmatic Theology, in order to discover that the proceeding referred to is absolutely inadmissible.

§ 228. The separate mode of treatment is the more appropriate, in proportion as the progress of the period, in relation to the developement of the dominant principle and the tension of the prevailing antagonism,¹¹ has been marked by less of actual uniformity in these two departments [Doctrine, or Faith, and Morals],—or at any rate, in proportion as there has been less of uniformity in the sequence of the scientific observation upon the actual course of events.

In regard to morality itself, we should, perhaps, have no sufficient reason for asserting that the antithesis between Protestantism and Catholicism is less developed than it is in regard to Faith; but that in our systems of Christian Morals, this antithesis has not, by a great deal, been so fully worked out as in our Dogmatics, seems to be undeniable.

§ 229. It cannot be denied that there are many elaborations of the Christian Doctrine of Morals, in which there appears but a faint glimmering of the proper type of a theological discipline, and which are but little distinguishable from philosophical systems of morals.

That this must exert a most mischievous influence upon Church-Guidance, is perfectly clear. In the case of an undivided treatment of the whole subject, it would be impossible for such a result to take place, with respect to the propositions belonging to the Doctrine of Morals, except the System of Faith were also to renounce its proper character.

§ 230. The separate treatment of these two branches of Dogmatic Theology will be the less liable to objection, in proportion to the completeness with which all that was said in §§ 196—216 [respecting the System of Doctrine in general,] is also made to apply to the Christian Doctrine of Morals, and in proportion to the care which is taken, in treating each of the two disciplinæ, to re-establish its connexion with the other by means of particular allusions.

The former part of this observation cannot be carried out into detail here. The possibility of the latter particular is evident from what was said at § 224.

§ 231. It always remains desirable that the undivided method of treatment should also, from time to time, obtain currency again.

That this should be hardly possible without occasioning the resulting mass to lose all regular form, is a thing which could happen only where one went very much into detail.

II. ECCLESIASTICAL STATISTICS.

§ 232. In the collective condition of an ecclesiastical society, we distinguish between its internal state¹² and its external relations; and in the former of these, again, between the contents which may be pointed out therein, and the form in which the society exists.

Many particulars, certainly, seem to admit of being included in the one leading division just as readily as in the other; but yet, always in a different connexion; so that the circumstance does not detract from the correctness of our classification.

§ 233. In periods when the Christian Church is not outwardly one, the problem now before us embraces all the several Church-Communities which may happen to exist.

Every one of these is then to be individually taken into consideration; and the relations of each to the rest find their place, as a matter of course, in the second half of the discipline upon which we are engaged.—But even if there were no definitive separation of individual Church-Communities from one another, still, individual portions of the Church would be found to differ so much from other portions, in regard as well to their inward character, as to their relations, that classifying divisions must be made, notwithstanding.

§ 234. The contents of any Ecclesiastical Community at a given point of time, depend upon the degree of strength and of uniformity with which the characteristic general spirit of the said Community pervades the entire mass appertaining to it.

Immediately, therefore, and in general, [they are equivalent to] the condition of its health in relation to Indifferentism and Separatism (comp. §§ 56, 57.) This, again, is discovered by looking, on the one hand, at the exponents of the developement of the System of Doctrine, regard being had to the unanimity or multifariousness of the results, and to the manner in which the Congregation is interested in this function; and on the other, at the influence of the ecclesiastical common-spirit upon the other departments of life, and especially upon the life of Divine Worship [that department of life which has to do with Divine Worship.]

§ 235. The greater the differences which exist in these respects in Church-Communities of considerable extent, the more contrary is it to the design of the discipline before us, that we should content ourselves with mere average statements.

That which is most instructive for the purposes of Church Guidance would be lost, if no comparison were instituted, with reference to the most important points which come into consideration, between those masses which are characterized by the largest amount of dissimilarity.

§ 236. The essential nature of the form under which a Church-Community exists, or, of its Constitution, depends upon the manner in which the Guidance of the Church is organized, and upon the relation of the entire body to those who take part in the Guidance of the Church, or, to the Clerus in the broader sense of the word.

The great variety of these constitutions renders it necessary to distribute them into certain principal groups; in doing which, however, care should be taken that we do not lay too much stress upon their analogy with political forms, and also that we do not, while attending to their general character, lose sight of their specific differences.

§ 237. The delineation of the internal state is perfect in proportion to the extent of the means which it presents of estimating correctly the influence of the Constitution upon the inward condition, and of the latter upon the former.

For this stands connected with the greatest problem of Church-Guidance; and where such a reference is not made, all accounts belonging to this department remain mere dead notices, as do all statistical figures apart from intelligent combination.

§ 238. The external relations of a Church-Community,—which can only be relations to other communities,—are, on the one hand, relations to communities of a like nature, (namely, those of Christianity and of individual Christian communities, towards such as are extra-Christian, as also those of Christian communities to one another), and, on the other hand, relations to communities of a different kind,—and amongst these especially, to civil society, and to science, in the entire compass of the term.

We regard the latter as a community, for this reason, if for no other,—that all scientific communication is subject to conditions imposed by language,—and every language, surely, forms a distinct region of fellowship; so that the relations of the same Church-Community may be altogether different in different regions of language.

§ 239. Every Church-Community stands towards those with which it is in contact in a relation of communication as well as of re-action; which is capable of being diversified by gradation to the most manifold extent, from a junction of the maximum of the one with the minimum of the other, to the opposite proportion.

By contact is to be understood, not merely local contiguity, but intercourse of any kind. Reaction, moreover—even apart from all Polemics that may happen to have an outward direction—is involved, on the one hand, in the common reference [made by all parties] to the Canon, and on the other hand, in the activity which aims to promote a progressive improvement from without,—which can never be regarded as wholly wanting.

§ 240. The relation of Ecclesiastical Communities to particular wholes of knowledge fluctuates between two forms of one-sidedness: the one of these occurring, when the Church will not allow validity to any knowledge except that which she can herself appropriate for her own special purpose, and which, therefore, she can also herself bring forth; and the other, when the objective consciousness claims to have attributed to it that verity which belongs to the self-consciousness.

For, at both these points, the two communities in question exclude each other. In the middle, between the two, there lies, as a common point of approximation, a mutual active recognition. The problem is, to show clearly what position an existing relation [between two such communities] occupies, with reference to these principal points.

§ 241. The same may be said of the relation between Church and State. Only that in this case—in which formulæ of a more determinate character are developed,—we more readily perceive, on the one hand, that it is not easy for a mutual recognition to take place, without some small preponderance being given to the one side or to the other,—and, on the other hand, that Evangelical Christianity, especially, assigns definite limits to its claims.

That this is not the place for a theory with regard to the relation just mentioned, may be understood as a matter of course. Many of the topics, [Oerter, loci] however, which are here pointed out, are also treated of in what is called Church Law [Kirchenrecht]; only, as the name itself indicates, the municipal stand-point predominates in the view which is there taken of them.

§ 242. According to these its essential outlines, the department of Ecclesiastical Statistics is capable of being carried out to an unlimited extent.

Moreover, it requires, as a matter of course, perpetual renovation; inasmuch as, after the occurrence of any change, the existing elements of Church History receive accessions.

§ 243. That, amongst ourselves, theologians but too frequently restrict themselves to an acquaintance with the condition of the Evangelical Church, and indeed, merely of that part of it in which their own circle of activity is situated, is a circumstance which has a most injurious influence upon the ecclesiastical praxis.

There is nothing which contributes so much to favour a persistence in the customary and traditional, as a want of acquaintance with other, but yet kindred, states of things. And nothing gives rise to a more rugged one-sidedness, than the fear lest one should be obliged to recognise good elsewhere, which is wanting within his own circle.

§ 244. A general acquaintance with the condition of the whole of Christendom, in the leading relations here specified, and in proportion to the degree in which each part of it is connected with the circle of his own activity, is what we have to require as indispensable on the part of every Evangelical Theologian.

The obligation to become more intimately acquainted with that which is nearer and more allied,—which certainly follows from the above,—is, however, only of a subordinate character. For it is possible for the individual rightly to exercise an efficient influence upon the Church-Community to which he himself belongs, only when he works upon it as upon an organic part of the whole,—a part which has to maintain and to develope itself in its relative opposition to the other portions.

§ 245. Much yet remains to be accomplished by special labour in this department, as it respects both matter and form.

During the most recent period, it is true, a large amount of material has been provided; but it has seldom been apprehended from the right point of view. And of the more comprehensive class of works, the number is still so small as to render it impossible that the best form can yet have been discovered.

§ 246. The merely outward description of things as they are, is in relation to this discipline what Chronicle is in relation to History.

In the present state of the discipline, however, it is a merit to bring to general knowledge, even in this way, such things as are but little known, or of an irregular character. Mere topographical and onomastic, or bibliographical notices, are, of course, the least profitable thing of the kind.

§ 247. A detailed inquiry into the present condition of Christianity, not proceeding from an interest in favour of the Church, nor assuming any relation to Church-Guidance,—in the event of its being also carried on without a scientific spirit, could only result in an uncritical gathering; and on the other hand, the more scientific its character, the more would it lean towards a sceptical or polemical tendency.

From the nature of the objects investigated, it is impossible that the impulse should originate from a purely scientific interest. If, therefore, the interest in favour of the cause is wanting, an interest opposed to it must be operative. A similar remark may be made with regard to Church History.

§ 248. Supposing that the religious interest is unaccompanied by a scientific spirit, the labour, instead of yielding a true result, will merely be subservient to the subjectivity of the person or his party.

For where there is the prevalence of a powerful interest, which has its origin from the self-consciousness, nothing but the scientific spirit is capable of affording security against uncritical partiality.

§ 249. The discipline which is usually called Symbolics, is merely put together out of certain elements derived from Ecclesiastical Statistics, and is capable of retiring again within the latter.

It is a collocation of that which is characteristic in the respective systems of doctrine of the Christian parties still extant; and since this cannot be presented to view after the manner of Dogmatics (comp. §§ 196, 233), with the adduction of proof in support of the [systematic] connexion, the delineation must be purely historical. The name,—which does not exactly answer to the thing, because, namely, all parties are not in possession of Symbols in the proper sense of the word,—can only be intended to affirm, that the account given follows as its authority the most classical and the most generally recognized representation of each particular mode of faith. It is necessary, however, in the discipline with which we are occupied (comp. § 234), that an account of this kind should form the basis for an exhibition of the relations of the System of Doctrine within the Community; and the difference is merely this, that the system of doctrine of a community is described, in the latter case, in connexion with the other circumstances of the community, but, in Symbolics, in connexion with the systems of doctrine of other communities,—(although we have already (comp. § 235¹³) recommended that the comparative method should be adopted for the purposes of Statistics, also).

§ 250. Biblical Dogmatics, too, approximate more closely to the method of Statistics, in the treatment of the System of Doctrine, than to Dogmatics, properly so called.

For, the method of combination we adopt is so very different; and, on the one hand, the reference [which we are able to make] to the Old Testament Canon, is, in relation to the Biblical propositions of the New Testament, but a very insufficient substitute for our reference to the New Testament Canon [in relation to Dogmatic propositions now current in the Church], and on the other hand, in the former process, [the immediate derivation of a system of Biblical Dogmatics from the New Testament], there is wanting throughout the farther developement of later times, which developement has so become a part of our conviction, that we cannot appropriate the system of Biblical Dogmatics in that manner which is essential to a strictly dogmatic treatment. The exhibition of the [systematic] connexion of the Biblical propositions in their characteristic dress is therefore, prevailingly, of a historical character. And inasmuch as every comprehensive picture (comp. 150) of a period which is posited as a unity, constitutes, strictly speaking, the Statistics of that period and that portion, Biblical Dogmatics merely form part of such a picture of the Apostolic period.

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Footnotes

1. Left to itself—that is, in so far as Christ’s outward presence was concerned. Schleiermacher never intended to deny the presence of the Spirit of Christ in and amongst the disciples; which, in truth, is just what gives to their activity its normal character.—TR. ↩

2. Freedom from every admixture of error.—TR. ↩

3. Gesinnung—disposition, habitual temper of mind, inward character.—TR. ↩

4. That is, on the principles of his Church, which he accepts as true.—Tr. ↩

5. I apprehend that Schleiermacher means to enforce the necessity of a sound and independent judgment, not merely with regard to what constitutes the legitimate use, for the purposes of exposition, of an ascertained Orientalism, but also with regard to the determination of the previous question,—whether a given expression really has this character or not.—Tr. ↩

6. Compare the note on this word at § 65.—TR. ↩

7. The reader will scarcely need to be told that the term is here employed in its general, and not in its Dogmatical acceptation.—TR. ↩

8. The word is used in its good sense. Every religious emotion, every quickening of the spiritual life, must image itself, visibly or audibly, or both, if others are to be made partakers of it.—TR. ↩

9. See the marginal note to § 65, and the text of § 152. Etymologically (though not according to prevailing usage) one might perhaps say intuition. —Tr. ↩

10. That is, it does not originate spontaneously and independently; it is in its nature purely consequential.—Tr. ↩

11. Or antithesis, if we think of the antagonism as expressed in doctrine. In German, both notions are expressed by the same word, (Gegensatz).—Tr. ↩

12. Beschaffenheit—quality, state as made up of qualities; in short, the mode of being of a thing at a given time.—Tr. ↩

13. This seems to be the reference intended. In the original, by an evident mistake it is printed § 335.—Tr. ↩