§ 44. The idea of the Devil, as developed among us, is so unstable that we cannot expect anyone to be convinced of its truth; but, besides, our Church has never made doctrinal use of the idea. 1. The chief points in this idea are as follows: spiritual beings of a high degree of perfection, who lived in close relation with God, voluntarily changed from this state to a state of antagonism and rebellion against God.
Now we cannot ask anyone to accept this unless we are able to help him over a great number of difficulties. First, as to the so-called fall of the good angels: the more perfect these good angels are supposed to have been, the less possible it is to find any motive but those presupposing a fall already, e.g. arrogance and envy; 1 furthermore, if after the Fall the natural powers of the devil remained undiminished, 2 it is impossible to conceive how persistent evil could exist side by side with superlative insight. For such insight must, in the first place, have shown every conflict with God to be an entirely useless undertaking. It can only be thought to afford a momentary satisfaction even to one lacking true understanding, whereas an intelligent being, to undertake such a conflict and persevere in it, must of necessity will to be and remain unblessed. Now in speaking of such a man we say he is ‘possessed,’ because no explanation of his attitude can be derived from the subject himself. Is it not, then, still more impossible to find an explanation in the more perfect condition of the angels—by whom would they be possessed? Again, if the devil at the time of his fall lost the finest and the purest intelligence (and it is indeed the worst possible derangement to become the bitterest and most obdurate enemy of God after being His friend), then it is inconceivable, on the one hand, how through one error of the will the intelligence could be for ever lost, unless the error was already due to a lack of intelligence; and on the other hand, how could the devil, after such a loss of intelligence, be so dangerous an enemy? For nothing is easier than to contend with senseless wickedness. It is just as difficult to explain the relation of the fallen angels to other angels. For if they were all alike, and in that case no special personal motive could be felt by one group, how is it to be explained that the one group sinned and the other did not? It is certainly no less difficult if we assume that,3 prior to the fall of one group, all the angels may have been in a partially unstable state of innocence, but that one group because of one deed have been for ever judged and condemned while the other group, because of their resistance, have been for ever confirmed and established, so that henceforth they cannot fall. Lastly, with regard to the condition of the fallen angels after the Fall, it is difficult to see how the two following ideas can be held consistently: The fallen angels, already oppressed by great ills and expecting still greater, at the same time out of hatred to God and to relieve their feeling of distress, engage in active opposition to God, while yet they are unable to effect anything except by God’s will and permission,4 and thus would find far greater alleviation for their distress as well as satisfaction for their hatred of God in absolute inactivity.
Finally, can the devil and his angels be thought of as a kingdom, and thus working unanimously although only outwardly and mostly in human affairs? Now, with the limitations already outlined and generally acknowledged, such a kingdom is inconceivable unless the overlord is omniscient and therefore knows in advance what God will permit; and besides not only does the evil in one man mostly hinder the same evil in another, but in each man one evil hinders another.
- There are two ways, in particular, in which a doctrinal use might be made of this conception. The evil in man may be traced back to the prior evil in Satan and explained by it; and the devil may be represented as active in the punishment of sin. Our Confessions, however, are too cautious to base anything concerning this doctrine on so hazardous an idea. As regards the former, they only group the devil with the wicked by making him their leader,5 in which case the existence of evil in man is in no way explained by its existence in Satan, and the latter requires just as much elucidation as the former. In other passages, moreover, if evil is traced back to the temptation of Satan,6 the purpose in some of them is less to provide an explanation than a modification of the opinion that the devil was instrumental in putting quite another creature in the place of the original man. But, indeed, the fact that man allowed himself to be tempted presupposes aberration and evil, so that the explanation is seen to be no explanation at all. If, again, here and there the power and might of the devil is included under the punishment of sin, on the one hand we find that this does not have any special bearing on the deliverance of man from sin and its punishment, and we might as well speak simply of the influence of evil apart from a personal overlord of evil; on the other hand, if the power of the devil (and his greatest power lies in tempting to sin) were the result of sin, then when he accomplished his greatest act of temptation he must have been powerless—which is plainly inconsistent. Elsewhere, however, punishment too is represented as something that the devil and sinful men have in common.7 And again, the fairly frequent idea that the devil is the instrument of God in the punishment of the wicked, is inconsistent with his antagonism to the divine purpose.