§ 54. In the conception of the divine Omnipotence two ideas are contained: first, that the entire system of Nature, comprehending all times and spaces, is founded upon divine causality, which as eternal and omnipresent is in contrast to all finite causality; and second, that the divine causality, as affirmed in our feeling of absolute dependence, is completely presented in the totality of finite being, and consequently everything for which there is a causality in God happens and becomes real. 1. Since the natural order is naught but the twofold mutually determined sum of the finite causing and the finite caused, the first part of our proposition first of all implies that each finite given as such, in virtue of its foundation in the divine omnipotence, effects everything which the causality implanted in it makes it capable of effecting in the sphere of universal causality. It is, however, equally implied that every effect within the natural order is also, in virtue of its being ordained by the divine causality, the pure result of all the causes within the natural order, according to the measure in which it stands in relation with each of them. As now everything that we can regard as a separate thing for itself within the totality of finite being must be ‘cause’ as well as effect, there is never anything of any kind which can begin to be an object of the divine causality, though previously—hence somehow independent of God and opposed to Him—in existence. Rather on such a view (whether it be that the activity of the divine omnipotence as such begins in this way, or that by such opposition its activity is interrupted, whether seldom or often matters not), the foundation feeling of religion would thereby be destroyed. If this is not the immediate result, it at once appears when we extend our self-consciousness to cover the whole of finite being and so represent that object also; for then there would no longer be absolute dependence but only partial dependence.
Further, since divine omnipotence can only be conceived as eternal and omnipresent, it is inadmissible to suppose that at any time anything should begin to be through omnipotence; on the contrary, through omnipotence everything is already posited which comes into existence through finite causes, in time and space. Similarly, because a thing can be recognized as having happened through finite causation, it is not on this account the less posited through the divine omnipotence, nor is that which cannot be traced to finite causation the more on that account to be referred to divine omnipotence. Thus the divine omnipotence can never in any way enter as a supplement (so to speak) to the natural causes in their sphere; for then it must like them work temporally and spatially; and at one time working so, and then again not so, it would not be self-identical and so would be neither eternal nor omnipresent. Rather everything is and becomes altogether by means of the natural order, so that each takes place through all and all wholly through the divine omnipotence, so that all indivisibly exists through One.
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The second part of our proposition rests upon the fact that in our sphere we only come to the idea of the divine omnipotence through the conception of the feeling of absolute dependence, and we lack any point of connexion for making demands upon the divine causality which extend beyond the natural order embraced by this feeling. As against this it seems as though it might be said that what we call ‘all’ consists of the actual and the potential, and omnipotence must therefore embrace both of these; but that if it presents itself completely and exhaustively in the totality of finite being, then it includes only the actual but not also the potential. But how little the difference between actual and potential can exist for God will appear very clearly, if we only notice in what cases we ourselves chiefly apply it. We conceive, in the first place, much to be possible in a thing by virtue of the general conception of the species to which it belongs, which is not actual, however, because excluded by its special character; whilst in the case of other individuals of the same species other determinations, possible in virtue of the idea of the species, remain excluded for the same reason. Here, however, something appears to us as possible only because we find that the particularity of the individual is a problem we are never fully in a position to solve. But with regard to God such a distinction between the general and the individual is not applicable; in Him the species exists originally as the sum-total of its individual existences, and these in turn are given and established together with their place in the species, so that what does not hereby become actual, is also, so far as He is concerned, not potential. In the same way, we say that much is possible by virtue of the nature of a thing (when we take together its determinations by its species and as an individual being), which yet does not become actual because it is hindered by the position of the thing in the sphere of general interaction. We rightly make this distinction and attribute truth, as in the former case, to that which is thought of in this way as being possible, because it is only by this indirect method that we pass from the unfruitful sphere of abstractions and put together a view of the conditioned development of individual existence. On the other hand, if we could have taken into account for each point the influence of the whole system of interaction, we should then have had to say that what was not actual was also not possible within the system of nature. In God, however, the one is not separated from the other, that which exists for itself having one ground and the system of interaction another, but both these are grounded with and through each other, so that in relation to Him only that is possible which has its foundation in both equally. But every case which has any validity for us, may be reduced under one of these heads. The idea of a potentiality outside the sum of the actual1 has no validity even for our minds; for not only does the religious self-consciousness not lead us to such a point, but, in addition, however we arrived at it, we should then have to accept a self-limitation of the divine omnipotence which can never be given in experience. Nor can we conceive any ground for such a self-limitation, unless that which is thought of as potential could enter into existence, not as an increase, but only in some way or other as a diminution of the actual, whereby the whole assumption is destroyed.2
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Since in relation to God no distinction between the potential and the actual can be allowed, it is easy to pass judgment on the popular explanation of God’s omnipotence, which has often been adopted even in scientific discussions, namely, that it is the attribute in virtue of which God is able to effect all that is possible, or all which contains no contradiction in itself. If, of course, contradiction is taken realiter and that is called contradictory which can find no place in the whole of existence, this is perfectly correct; for all the compossible is certainly produced by the divine omnipotence. Objection might still be made to the one point of saying that, in virtue of omnipotence, God can effect, not does effect, everything; for thereby a distinction is made between ‘can’ and ‘will,’ and the explanation comes near to another, namely, that omnipotence is the attribute by which God can do what He will. There is, however, as little distinction between ‘can’ and ‘will’ in God, as between the actual and the possible.3 For whichever is greater than the other, the will or the ability, there is always a limitation, which can only be done away with if both be made equal in range. Moreover the very separation of each in itself, as though, that is, ability were a different condition from will, is an imperfection. For should I think of an ability without will, the will must proceed from an individual impulse, and so also always from a caused impulse; and should I think of a will without ability, the ability cannot be grounded in the inner power, but must be given from without. And if, since in God there is no willing through individual impulses, and no ability given from without, waxing and waning, the two in God cannot be separated even in thought, so also, since ‘can’ and ‘will’ together are necessarily doing, neither willing and doing are to be separated, nor ‘can’ and ‘do,’ but the entire omnipotence is, undivided and unabbreviated, the omnipotence that does and effects all. But it is useless to say anything further on this view on account of its inevitable separation between ‘can’ and ‘will.’4
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With the misunderstanding just exposed there are connected many distinctions within the divine omnipotence, as well as divisions of it, given currency especially by the scholastics, which can be ruled out without loss. To these belongs, in the first place, the contrast between a mediate and immediate, or absolute and ordered, exercise of the divine omnipotence, i.e. between cases when it acts without or with intermediary causes. Now when individual effects are referred some only to the former and some only to the latter, the distinction is false. For everything which happens in time and space has its determinations in the totality of that which is outside it in space and before it in time, however much they may be hidden, and so far come under the ordered power; and if some, to the exclusion of others, be referred back to the immediate power, the whole order of nature would be abrogated. If, however, we think not of the individual but of the world itself as the effect of the divine omnipotence, we have no choice but to recur to its immediate exercise. Hence in so far as we can apply the idea of creation in detail, we apply at the same time and equally the idea of the absolute exercise of omnipotence; but in so far as we use the idea (rightly understood) of concurrence or preservation,5 in this aspect of it, everything is referred to the ordered exercise of power which establishes the dependence of each individual on the totality of existence eternally, and for the maintenance of the general interaction makes use of the forces of individual things. There is no point, however, which we can relate only to the absolute (which by way of stricter contrast we ought to call not ‘unordered’ but ‘ordering ‘) exercise of omnipotence and not to the ordered exercise and conversely.