§ 56. Among the divine attributes usually mentioned, the Unity, Infinity, and Simplicity of God especially might conveniently come in here, as having no relation to the antithesis in the excitations of the religious consciousness; only they could not be regarded as divine attributes in the same sense as those already dealt with. 1. The attributes mentioned here are not related (as are those to be dealt with in the Second Part of this Dogmatic) to the ease or difficulty with which the consciousness of God develops in us at different moments; and so far they would belong here, if they had any dogmatic content. But this they lack because, unlike the other four, they do not issue from the relationship between the feeling of absolute dependence and the sensibly stimulated self-consciousness, nor are they statements about it. But even the three attributes here appended stand in close relationship with the four former ones, in so far at least as they negate, if only in a pictorial way, the similarity of divine and finite causality; but not even such a place can be given them in Dogmatics. There arises then only the question whether to turn these expressions out of our province, and send them back to the speculative doctrine of God, or whether there is really some meaning to be gained from them for Dogmatics. This, however, must be examined in each instance by itself, since we cannot maintain in advance that in this respect they are in the same case.
And first as to the Unity of God—strictly taken it can never be an attribute of a thing that it only exists in a definite number. It is not an attribute of the hand to be dual; but it is the attribute of a man to have two hands, and of a monkey to have four. In the same way it could be an attribute of the world to be ruled by One God only, but not of God to be One only. And so if a divine attribute is here in question, we must turn away from mere number; and in that case what we have first to insist upon is the general expression that God has no equal,1 which, of course, our language can more distinctly express by ‘uniqueness.’ And inasmuch as many similars are always of the same kind or species, the individual beings representing the existence of the species and the species the essence of the individuals, it might be said that the unity or uniqueness of God is that attribute in virtue of which there is no distinction of essence and existence. Now this as such could belong only to speculative theology. But if, on the other hand, we abstract from what in strictness must be understood by an attribute, and if we consider that the excitations of the religious consciousness are individual moments, while that upon which in those excitations we feel ourselves absolutely dependent is not objectively given, then this term ‘unity’ expresses the fact that all those excitations are meant and comprehended as indications of One, and not of many. And, indeed, if we go back to the earlier explanation of the original meaning of the expression, ‘God,’2 what is stated in the expression ‘unity of God’ is that this homogeneity (Zusammengehörigkeit) of the religious excitations is given with the same certainty as these excitations themselves. Since now it is only on the assumption of this homogeneity that concepts of divine attributes can be developed from observation of the content of religious moments, this expression, the ‘unity of God,’ is not so much a single attribute as the principle of monotheism,3 lying from the first at the foundation of all inquiry into the divine attributes, and can no more be proved than the existence of God itself. In fact an attempt to discuss this unity further or to prove it will scarcely be able altogether to escape making a distinction between the idea of God and the idea of the Supreme Being. Moreover, these attempts always occur in controversy with Polytheism4 and, indeed, proceed from the assumption that the same idea underlies both. This assumption, however, we have already discarded.
The term Infinity is likewise too negative to be a proper attribute-conception; and indeed it has been dealt with in very different ways. The customary explanation,5 ‘negation of limits,’ is most indefinite. For if one had already a description of the Supreme Being, there could be no question at all of any possibility of conceiving this as limited. But if this description is first formed by means of the term ‘infinite’ itself, we can see that all we have is a precautionary rule for the formation of ideas of divine attributes, the rule, i.e., that attributes which cannot be conceived as without limits ought not to be ascribed to God; and thus indirectly infinity becomes an attribute of all the divine attributes. Hence every discussion leads over to other attributes which partake of infinity.6 Only it is a sign that even this rule is not being properly applied to the formation of the divine attributes, if instead of taking omnipotence as the infinity of the divine productivity and omniscience as the infinity of the divine thought, one distinguishes rather between an infinity of substance and an infinity of existence; and so a distinction which has to do with the finite only is made fundamental in the description of the Divine Being. For infinite does not really mean that which has no end, but that which is in contrast to the finite, i.e. to that which is co-determined by other things. Interpreted thus the term stands in the closest connexion with the monotheistic basic rule stated above, and, under the form of a cautionary predicate, expresses the difference of the divine causality from all finitude. For already we have often seen how this formula only produces confusion if it is treated as a means of transferring to God by illimitation attributes which essentially are only attached to the finite.
The idea of Simplicity too is constantly treated as a negative—although regarded literally it is not so—either as simply negating matter of God or as excluding all idea of parts or of composition.7 As regards the former, it is pretty clear that, if God and the world are to be kept distinct, in whatever way, all matter must belong to the world. But simplicity strictly taken excludes not only materiality but also participation in everything by which we characterize the finite spirit as such; and the finite spirit can in no way be called simple in the strictest sense of the word,8 but must belong solely to the world, just as much as matter does. For the relative separation of function itself conflicts with simplicity,9 and each temporal moment of spiritual manifestation10 is just as really a result of the mutual inherence of the relatively opposed as in the case of matter, which we declare to be composite in this sense only in so far as we can develop oppositions within it. As therefore infinity on the one hand is an attribute of all the divine attributes, so simplicity, as here expounded in general and in each particular case, is the unseparated and inseparable mutual inherence of all divine attributes and activities. And as on the other hand infinity ensures that nothing shall be ascribed to God which can be thought of only as limited, so simplicity ensures that nothing shall be adopted which belongs essentially to the sphere of contrast and opposition.
Postscript to this Section.—The whole circle of divine attributes here dealt with thoroughly illustrates the characteristic feature of this First Part of Dogmatic, namely, that of being derived from the religious self-consciousness as it is presupposed in every Christian religious life-moment. This is clear for the following reasons among others. In view of the teleological character of Christianity we can conceive no completely developed moment of religious experience which does not either itself pass over into some activity or in a definite way influence activities already going on and combine with them. Every such moment must be capable of description just as well under the form of this section as under that of the first or third. So if one individual attribute of these, or all of them together, were to condition a definite religious moment, out of it it would have to be possible to derive either a sentiment or a so-called duty towards God, or at least a course of action in general or in relation to others demanded by this God-consciousness. This, however, is not the case; and no proposition in the Christian Doctrine of Morals can be based solely on the attributes dealt with here, either individually or taken together, but there are always others that go along with them. Hence even these attributes, however completely viewed together and related to each other, can in no way suffice as a description of the Divine Being. But it must be clearly understood here in advance, that whatever additional divine attributes may emerge later, those described here will always have to be thought of as inhering in the others; so that an activity which does not admit of being conceived under the form of eternal omnipotence ought not to be posited as divine.
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Footnotes
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Mosheim, Th. dogm. i. p. 241: Quando ergo dicimus Deum esse unum, negamus Deum habere socium. ↩
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Cf. § 4, 4. ↩
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It is rightly taken so in Rufinus, Expos. symb.: Deum non numero unum dicimus sed universitate. ↩
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Lactant., i. 3: Virtutis perfecta natura non potest esse nisi in eo, in quo totum est … Deus vero si perfectus est … non potest esse nisi unus ut in eo sint omnia. ↩
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Mosheim, l.c., p. 299: Infinitas itaque sic absoluta nihil aliud est, quam absentia finium in Deo. ↩
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Cf. Mosheim, ibid., and Reinhard, Dogm., § 33, 3. ↩
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The former in Reinhard, Dogm., § 33, 2. The latter in Mosheim, Th. Dogm. i. p. 243. ↩
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What the older writers called μονοειδές and ἀμερές. ↩
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The Socinians consequently were not wrong when they maintained that there is always a synthesis where there is either a connexion or union of the diverse (see Vorst., Parasceve, p. 50). But they were wrong to separate the being of God from the will of God. ↩
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Augustin., Tract. xix. 9 in Joan.: Non est Deus mutabilis spiritus … Nam ubi invenis aliter et aliter, ibi facta est quaedam mors. ↩