EXPLICATION OF THE CONSCIOUSNESS OF SIN
§ 65. The propositions to be enunciated here must all harmonize with those of the same type in our First Part; but they must also have regard to the propositions of the Second Aspect, which explicate the consciousness of grace, these last being meanwhile held in reserve.
-
Any attempt to consider the fact of sin purely by itself is at once confronted by an apparent antinomy. Thus were we from our point of view to regard every arrestment of the God-consciousness that takes place merely as the act of man, then, as being a turning away from God, it would be in contradiction with the disposition to the God-consciousness which is present in man as a vital impulse, and is here assumed as such. Equal difficulty would appear to lie in the necessity of the actual existence of sin being consistent with divine omnipotence, since man’s turning from God must like all else be ordained by God; for of course man even in the state of sin is involved in the natural order, and it is only in virtue of his position within that order—with the entire range of which the divine causality is co-extensive—that sin can develop in him at all. Again, if there are divine attributes related to sin, indeed, but not in the way of giving it persistence and confirmation, how should even that, which from its very nature ought not to continue, have come into being in association with all that owes its being to the eternally omniscient divine omnipotence? Finally, if sin exists only where there is a powerlessness of the God-consciousness, and if it develops in man in consequence of impressions received from the totality of finite existence, how could this fail to abrogate what we laid down as the original perfection of man and the perfection of the world in relation to him?
-
Although this antinomy can be only apparent (the two sets of propositions alike having their source in our immediate self-consciousness, which as the truth of our being cannot be in contradiction with itself), yet it follows from this relationship that we are here face to face with a large number of difficulties. For if we are too readily disposed to exclude sin from the range of our absolute dependence on God, we inevitably verge upon Manichæism; while if we seek to reconcile it with the original perfection of man, we shall hardly avoid Pelagianism. It may, in fact, be said that in the development of the Church’s doctrine there has been an almost constant wavering between these antagonistic positions. Nevertheless, though this wavering cannot now be brought to rest, and though no formula can be found which would not be felt by some to lean more towards the latter extreme, and by others towards the former, yet in a general way, at least, the second part of our proposition is as well adapted to smooth out the difficulties as the first part of necessity raises them. Thus since in our statements about sin we are to keep in view those still to be made about grace, we may regard sin on the one hand as simply that which would not be unless redemption was to be; or on the other as that which, as it is to disappear, can disappear only through redemption. In the first case we obviate any seemingly inevitable risk of approximating to Manichæism; in the second we can scarcely, except by wantonness, fall into Pelagianism. If, however, the danger indicated is not perpetually to recur in consequence of our having to refer to the terms recognized by the Church, we must claim the right to interpret these terms in such a way as most adequately to secure ourselves against the danger, or else, should they not lend themselves to this, to replace them by others. In order to attain at least to an approximate solution of our problem we must have recourse to one or other of these alternatives under all the three forms.
← Second Part. The Facts of the Religious Self-Consciousness as Determined by the · Contents · First Aspect, First Section. Sin as a State of Man →