Next, and in a manner resembling this, the theory also of Heracleitus which had been already contained in the exposition of that of Protagoras, is attacked independently, and upon such grounds that it is shown, that, according to this theory, strictly taken, neither a predicate could be found and adapted to a subject, nor a subject to a predicate, because even during the finding and the fitting, every thing ceases to be what it was, and thus, whatever resembles a knowledge or an enunciation is destroyed². Hence an immediate though suppressed consequence brings us very close to the conclusion which Plato had in view, which is, that the subject of these untenable fluent operations is itself an untenable fluent; in which sense, as regards the immediate alterations of the body, Plato had already admitted the existence of simple and undeceiving perception. After this, lastly, the expression of the same idea, attributed immediately to Theætetus, is especially contradicted, and now we have notices pointing chiefly to that, whereby and wherein true knowledge is alone to be discovered; for Socrates shows how perception itself, properly considered, points to operations in nature and origin entirely separate from it, and how, provided only we begin with securing the notion of being, it thus becomes at once manifest, that perception on no possible supposition can attain to being, and that truth therefore must necessarily be sought beyond and without its range.

Thus, then, the dialogue is advanced as far in reference to the theories hitherto tested as is possible under the conditions of the indirect process adopted, and now takes another turn in order to consider more closely the discovery last made. In such a manner, however, that here also all that necessarily belongs to the indirect exposition is abstracted from ideas, and even being and the discovery made of the immediate activity of the mind are brought back into the sphere of the senses, and into that of the individual and particular; for it is only in this sense that conception (δόξα) is always spoken of in what follows. For with reference to the inquiry into the nature of knowledge, a new principle is set up affirming that it is right conception, and it is examined whether knowledge can lie within this more narrowly limited sphere. This investigation produces first of all, a laborious attempt to define the sphere of false conception, and from this, and simultaneously with it, that of true knowledge; an attempt which Socrates declares at the end of it to be unsatisfactory, because false conception at last must still rest upon an incomprehensible mistaking of knowledge, whence he concludes that the latter must be found before the former. Hence too, there grows a very important consequence, though as before, not expressly drawn, that it is impossible that pure knowledge should lie within the same sphere as error, and that truth or falsehood cannot be predicated of the former, but only possession or non-possession. After this attempt then, that principle is itself very shortly dispatched by the distinction set up and generally recognised, and which, by means of the example chosen, again refers to the practical and the Gorgias—the distinction between true conception to be mediately attained, and knowledge at all times and in all things immediate.

This, again, paves the way to the last attempt here made to grasp the nature of knowledge, starting with the assumption, that it is right³ conception combined with reasonable explanation. And here again by far the largest space is occupied by an accurately considered, though only incidental, investigation as to an assumed opposition, not however tenable throughout, in the relations of the simple and compound to knowledge in the sense assumed; and then again the principle itself is very soon dispatched according to the two significations given of reasonable explanation, which Plato especially distinguishes, inasmuch as the refutation of the last is also good at the same time for the first.

Wonderfully ingenious, when we consider these particular grand divisions one with another, is the uniformity of execution in the structure of the whole and of the particular parts. To begin with what comes last: how limited in comparison with the beginning appears at the end the sphere within which knowledge is still sought, though not found; and how near at last is what proceeds merely from sensuous impression, independent of ideas, brought to a deceptive similarity with knowledge, though it can never exalt itself to a level with it. It may be said that these three transitions from mere perception, as it is here represented, to right conception generally, and from this to such conception as is full and clear enough to furnish a reasonable explanation, give us a graduated scale for the simplest, and so to speak, the rudest up to the most refined view of common consciousness, so that it is rejected with all its pretensions to knowledge, and a question is at last started which manifestly points to the necessity of an opposite principle, but at the same time the sphere within which that lower consciousness is true is assigned to it throughout, and the element of right which it contains is conceded to it and defined, which even the terms themselves imply in which those untenable pretensions are stated. For we are by no means to believe that what is gained in the several parts of the dialogue by the production of objections which Socrates afterwards either allows to drop or to be refuted by Theætetus, or by investigations which with reference to the immediate subject of the dialogue are only incidental, we are not to believe that all this is intended to fall to the ground and come to nothing. So far from it, that all this matter is assuredly to be preserved and used: but better opportunities for noticing this in detail will occur in the notes on the particular passages. Again, each of the several parts is constructed precisely in the same manner. The Protagorean principle, for example, is more finely worked out at every fresh addition to the dialogue, and is at last confronted by the question as to opinions about time future held in time present. In like manner conception itself is continually more pointedly disengaged from perception, especially with reference to arithmetic, when every reader will certainly recollect the Platonic principle which Plato’s disciples certainly did not forget, I mean that Geometry is a thing distinct from pure knowledge generally, and that the rank of the highest science does not belong to it. In like manner the idea of false conception is rid by the interposition of that of exchanged conception⁴, of the rude form under which it was commonly and sophistically discussed. At last, however, the whole explanation given of knowledge is made to fall to pieces by the question, how even that true conception which is recognised most generally and authentically as right, can be knowledge. The same thing happens at last to the notion of the reasonable explanation which is taken up quite from the most idiomatic usage of the Greek language, and exhibited in its various gradations, but is nevertheless as regards the proper object of the dialogue rejected by the question, how it is possible that the conception of distinguishing quality can be wanting in conception generally, or the knowledge of that distinguishing quality explain knowledge generally⁵. In this manner, in short, every particular investigation fully and seriously pursued is most suddenly at the conclusion regularly ridiculed away, and thus we may say that the last conclusion of all suddenly turns to ridicule the subject of the whole dialogue, as far, that is, as the question was directed to the explanation of knowledge, although as is natural from the difference in the time and the age of the author, this ridicule is not so triumphantly proclaimed as in the Prothagoras; a comparison which must strike every one, as in fact the question as to the explicability of knowledge is the same theoretically as that of the communicability of virtue is practically.

The same uniformity is discoverable in yet another point of view. For almost in every discussion of any particular question in this dialogue a digression occurs in which immediate and distinct reference is made to the true and right, though these subjects nowhere come out in the discussions themselves. And thus also an extensive digression is introduced into the main dialogue itself, containing its share of these allusions; but which, as regards the immediate progress of the dialogue, seems to be an extremely capricious interruption, not less violently brought in, and no better kept within rule and rein, than that so justly censured in the Phædrus. I speak of the whole passage preceding the last refutation of the Protagorean principle where the distinction between the tyros in philosophy and those in rhetoric and similar arts is pointed out, and the divine, the true and the good, come out in the full relief of their peculiar nature as perfectly opposed to the narrow sphere of the personal. And indeed this digression seems purposely placed soon after the beginning, that at all events the attentive reader may have a clear point by means of which he may find his way among the complicated mazes of the dialogue.

By these digressions then, the Theætetus connects itself immediately and, among the earlier dialogues is almost solitary in so doing, with the Parmenides as a continuation of it, although from an opposite point of view. And scarcely any other allusions to earlier works occur in what belongs to the essential matter of the dialogue. These digressions, however, are remarkable; for instance, the way in which not only the Eleatic doctrine is opposed to the Ionian, but also Parmenides to the other Eleatics, can scarcely be otherwise understood except as intending to imply that the others, especially Melissus who is particularly named, appeared to Plato to deviate as far from the truth as the Ionians, to whom however in comparison with those who would grasp every thing with their hands, he ascribes a truly philosophical tendency. For if, as he expresses himself, the Ionians moved even the immovable, so, probably, the Eleatics were for reducing even the untenable to rest, and Parmenides alone by his hypothesis of an opposition between the intelligible and apparent, of which we may regret that only rough outlines and particular traces have come down to us, appeared to have found, or at least to have divined the right road, although even to his doctrine Plato has objections to make in a subsequent dialogue. Even in what Plato here says about Parmenides we may easily detect the inclination to consider the doctrine of that philosopher more thoroughly at a future opportunity, in short an announcement of what he afterwards carried into effect in the Sophist. At the same time however it contains an almost tacit exposure of Zeno, who is by no means excepted from among those whom Socrates considers undeserving of much notice, and a hint implying how little any one should venture to make Parmenides the object of his satire, and how difficult it was to penetrate to the real meaning of his doctrine. Both refer manifestly enough to the dialogue of that name, and to a variety of misapprehensions in the understanding of it which from these allusions may be easily surmised. So again, without any particular mention of the philosopher, several of the antitheses discussed in the Parmenides reappear elsewhere in this dialogue, in part accompanied by elucidations of what is there barely stated as briefly as possible, so that the position of the Theætetus between the Parmenides and Sophist is thus in every way justified. And moreover, besides these that are contained in the general plan, there occur in detail several allusions to the Gorgias, and among these too, individually considered, those which presuppose the Gorgias have a great advantage over those which look as if the Theætetus ought to be placed before it.

In two other respects, moreover, these two counterparts especially resemble one another. One of these points of similarity is, that in both dialogues a variety of perfectly similar matter occurs incidentally. Thus also in the Theætetus important passages from the defence of Socrates are brought up, and as it were commented upon. For Plato expatiates in a peculiar manner, and one which almost warrants the conclusion that he must on some occasion have exposed a weak side in this respect, upon the extremely natural and very pardonable ignorance of a philosopher in all civil matters and usages. More skilful persons may decide whether this is to refer to that apology, or to passages in some other writings of his, or to some fact of which traces still survived. Moreover we find in several passages a manifest defence, partly of his indirect mode of speculation in general, as in the explanation of Socrates’ midwife practice, partly directed against a variety of objections which must have been made to his writings, and likewise censure of the form and method in which many of his opponents probably endeavoured to confute him. Thus for example, he constantly repeats here as well as in the Gorgias, that in philosophical matters apparent consequences are not to be made the grounds of confutation, and particularly lays down the conditions under which, in the dialogue, a position of the opponent can be regarded as confuted. So that, these vivid expressions which recur so frequently in the course of the two dialogues rightly considered, we shall remark a concealed and gradually gathering indignation, which afterwards strives to vent itself thoroughly in the Euthydemus. Secondly, the two dialogues have even in their philosophical bearing some polemics in common with one another, quite of a different kind from what we meet with at an earlier period against the Sophists. For, as in the Gorgias, the philosopher especially confuted under the person of Callicles is manifestly Aristippus, in whose system the principle that nothing is naturally just, but only becomes so by capricious establishment, occupied an important place, so also the first half generally of this dialogue Aristippus is the person especially in view. That Aristippus took the impressions of the senses to be certain knowledge, that he did not notwithstanding deny the possibility of a progress towards greater perfection in knowledge, and the existence of a distinction between the philosopher and other men, we learn from all the sources of information we possess; and this furnishes us with a key to explain how and why it happens that Plato represented this doctrine as Protagorean though supported by Socrates, and we find Aristippus especially denoted by those who did not indeed follow the doctrine of Protagoras exclusively, but still ended with the principle that there is nothing just by nature; we find him with his propensity for good living represented in that long digression as one of those who do not occupy themselves with philosophy in the proper way, and some perhaps may even think fit to view that exposition of the Socratic midwifery as at the same time a protestation that that philosophy was in no way learnt from Socrates. In short, a multitude of allusions discover themselves as soon as ever we take these polemics into consideration. Every one however must also certainly admire the art with which they are interwoven with the whole, so completely without detracting from the universality of its purely scientific bearing, so that the reader, with the exception of very particular allusions which do not interfere with the progress of the whole, and which every one may easily be content to take as embellishments without thinking to find in them any thing particular, may understand the whole without having been aware of those allusions. The second half gives great occasion to suspect the presence in it of similar polemics against Antisthenes of whom we know, though only, I regret to say, in the most general way, that he maintained the principle of the impossibility of contradicting successfully any position whatever. These polemics appear to begin in this dialogue at the commencement of the section about false conception, and are elsewhere concluded under more definite and extended views. The character of this opponent and what we know of his relations to Plato make it probable that much has reference to him which appears to be defence against unscientific and rude attack. There may yet be much besides of a polemical character which it is now almost impossible to decypher, with the exception perhaps of a few scattered traces. What is said of the followers of Heraclitus is particularly strange, and it may be doubtful whether others than themselves are meant under their name, or actually themselves; in which case it is scarcely possible to avoid thinking of Plato having sojourned in Ionia, probably on that great journey, when, according to some accounts, he wished to penetrate even into Persia.

Historical testimonies upon which to determine the time of the composition of the dialogue are not to be found, with the exception of what follows immediately from the allusions to all those circumstances, that the schools of Plato as well as of most of the other Socratic philosophers had been already formed. Not much can be built upon the mention of the battle at Corinth in which Theætetus had been wounded; the most to be inferred from it would be only what is also certain upon other grounds, that the dialogue cannot have been written before the middle of the ninety-sixth olympiad. We should however by no means be warranted in concluding that the fight thus mentioned is the same which Xenophon notices in the fourth book of his Hellenics; on the contrary we might easily find just as much reason for thinking of less important events which may have taken place subsequently, when Iphicrates had the command in that quarter. We have however every reason for considering as historical, both the character of Theætetus and what is said of him, though not the literal words of the conversation held. Suidas mentions him in two characters, as a scholar of Socrates and a hearer of Plato; we see clearly that both notices refer to the same person: he also mentions him as a philosopher and mathematician, and knows that he taught at a later period in Heracleia.

So Proclus also mentions him among celebrated mathematicians. Hence it may easily be inferred that from the school of Socrates, as far as this expression may be allowed, he passed into that of Plato, and is very properly represented as quite young at the death of Socrates. From this point of view, that is a striking description which is sketched with so much fondness and put by Plato into the mouth partly of Euclides, partly of Theodorus. For what philosopher would not have been glad to possess and immortalize a young friend like this. What Theætetus here produces about the square root has very much the appearance of having been at that time something new, but whether it was a discovery of Theætetus himself, or one of Plato’s with which he ornaments his pupil, I cannot take upon myself to decide. With regard to Theodorus it is not necessary to say anything, as he is sufficiently known, and the only question which could be a subject of curiosity, namely, why he is found in this place particularly, and why Socrates is so urgent with him to unite in conducting the dialogue, cannot be satisfactorily answered out of the dialogue itself. Meanwhile the more probable the fact is of his visit to Athens, the less probable the account becomes that Plato went expressly to Cyrene to learn his science from him there.

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Footnotes

1. See Theaetet. p. 178. A. “Ἔτι τοίνυν ἐνθένδε ἂν μᾶλλον πῶς τις ὁμολογήσειε ταῦτα ταῦτα, εἰ περὶ παντὸς τις τοῦ εἴδους ἐρωτῷη, ἐν ᾧ καὶ τὸ ὠφέλιμον τυγχάνει ὄν. ἔστι δέ που καὶ περὶ τὸν μέλλοντα χρόνον. ὅταν γὰρ νομοθετῶμεθα, &c. ↩

2. P. 182. D. Εἴπερ δὲ λέγοντος ὑπεξέρχεται, ἄτε δὴ ῥέον.—Τὸ δ’, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐφάνη, εἰ πάντα κινεῖται, πᾶσα ἀπόκρισις, περὶ ὅτου ἂν τις ἀποκρίνηται, ὁμοίως ὀρθὴ εἶναι, οὕτω τ’ ἔχειν φάναι καὶ μὴ φύντως, εἰ δὲ βούλει, γίγνεσθαι, ἵνα μὴ στήσωμεν αὐτοὺς τῷ λόγῳ. ↩

3. P. 201. D. Τὴν μὲν μετὰ λόγου ἀληθῆ δόξαν ἐπιστήμην εἶναι, τὴν δὲ ἄλογον ἐκτὸς ἐπιστήμης· καὶ ὧν μὲν μὴ ἐστι λόγος, οὐκ ἐπιστητὰ εἶναι, οὕτωσὶ καὶ ὀνομάζων, ἃ δ’ ἔχει, ἐπιστητά. ↩

4. Ἀλλοδοξίαν τινα οὖσαν ψευδῆ φαμὲν εἶναι δόξαν, ὅταν τις τι τῶν ὄντων ἄλλο αὖ τῶν ὄντων, ἀνταλλαξάμενος τῇ διανοίᾳ, φῇ εἶναι. οὕτω γὰρ ἂν μὲν ἀεὶ δοξάζει, ἕτερον δὲ ἀνθ’ ἑτέρου, καὶ ἁμαρτάνων οὐκ ἐσκόπει ἱκανῶς ἂν καλοῖτο ψευδῆ δοξάζων. ↩

5. Διαφορότητος. ↩