We differ from Roman Catholics, as I have said, more in our view of historical facts than in principles; but in saying this, I am speaking, not of their actual system, nor of their actual mode of defending it, but of their professions, professions which in their mouths are mere professions, while they are truths in ours. The principles, professed by both parties, are at once the foundation of our own theology, and what is called an argumentum ad hominem against theirs. They profess to appeal to primitive Christianity; we honestly take their ground, as holding it ourselves; but when the controversy grows animated, and descends into details, they suddenly leave it and desire to finish the dispute on some other field. In like manner in their teaching and acting, they begin as if in the name of all the Fathers at once, but will be found in the sequel to prove, instruct, and enjoin simply in their own name. Our differences from them, considered not in theory but in fact, are in no sense matters of detail and questions of degree. In truth, there is a tenet in their theology which assumes quite a new position in relation to the rest, when we pass from the abstract and quiescent theory to the practical workings of the system. The infallibility of the existing Church is then found to be its first principle, whereas, before, it was a necessary, but a secondary doctrine. Whatever principles they profess in theory, resembling, or coincident with our own, yet when they come to particulars, when they have to prove this or that article of their creed, they supersede the appeal to Scripture and Antiquity by putting forward the infallibility of the Church, thus solving the whole question, by a summary and final interpretation both of Antiquity and of Scripture 1.
This is what takes place in the actual course of the controversy. At the same time it is obvious that, while they are as yet but engaged in tracing out their elementary principles, and recommending them to our notice, they cannot assign to this influential doctrine the same sovereign place in their system. It cannot be taken for granted as a first principle in the controversy; if so, nothing remains to be proved, and the controversy is at an end, for every doctrine is contained in it by implication, and no doctrine but might as fairly be assumed as a first principle also. Accordingly, in order to make a show of proving it, its advocates must necessarily fall back upon some more intelligible doctrine; and that is, the authority of Antiquity, to which they boldly appeal, as I described in my last Lecture. It follows that there is a striking dissimilarity, or even inconsistency between their system as quiescent, and as in action, in its abstract principles, and its reasonings and discussions on particular points. In the Creed of Pope Pius not a word is said expressly about the Church’s infallibility; it forms no Article of faith there. Her interpretation, indeed, of Scripture is recognized as authoritative; but so also is the “unanimous consent of Fathers.” But when we put aside the creeds and professions of our opponents for their actual teaching and disputing, they will be found to care very little for the Fathers, whether as primitive or as concordant; they believe the existing Church to be infallible, and if ancient belief is at variance with it, which of course they do not allow, but if it is, then Antiquity must be mistaken; that is all 2. Thus Romanism, which even in its abstract system, must be considered a perversion or distortion of the truth, is in its actual and public manifestation a far more serious error. It is then a disproportionate or monstrous development of a theory in itself extravagant. I propose now to give some illustration of it, thus considered, viz. to show that in fact it substitutes the authority of the Church for that of Antiquity 3.
2.
First, let us understand what is meant by saying that Antiquity is of authority in religious questions. Both the Roman school and ourselves maintain as follows:—That whatever doctrine the primitive ages unanimously attest, whether by consent of Fathers, or by Councils, or by the events of history, or by controversies, or in whatever way, whatever may fairly and reasonably be considered to be the universal belief of those ages, is to be received as coming from the Apostles. This Canon, as it may be called, rests upon the principle, which we act on daily, that what many independent and competent witnesses guarantee, is true. The concordant testimony of the Church Catholic to certain doctrines, such as the Incarnation, is an argument in its behalf the same in kind as that for the being of a God, derived from the belief of all nations in an intelligent Providence. If it be asked, why we do not argue in this way from the existing as well as from the ancient Church, we answer that Christendom now differs from itself in all points except those in which it is already known to have agreed of old; so that we cannot make use of it if we would. So far, then, as it can be used, it is but a confirmation of Antiquity, though a valuable one. Besides, the greater is the interval between a given age and that of the Apostles, and the more intimate the connexion and influence of country with country, the less can the separate branches of the Church be considered as independent witnesses. In the Roman controversy, then, the witness of a later age would seldom come up to the notion of a Catholic Tradition, inasmuch as the various parts of Christendom either would not agree together, or when they did, would not be distinct witnesses. Thus Ancient Consent is, practically, the only, or main kind of Tradition which now remains to us 4.