Summa Contra Gentiles, Book I. 102 chapters. Translated by Anton C. Pegis.
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Chapters
- The Office of the Wise Man
- The Author’s Intention in the Present Work
- On the Way in which Divine Truth is to be Made Known
- That the Truth about God to which the Natural Reason Reaches is Fittingly Proposed to Men for Belief
- That the Truths the Human Reason is not Able to Investigate are Fittingly Proposed to Men for Belief
- That to Give Assent to the Truths of Faith is not Foolishness Even Though They are Above Reason
- That the Truth of Reason is not Opposed to the Truth of the Christian Faith
- How the Human Reason is Related to the Truth of Faith
- The Order and Manner of Procedure in the Present Work
- The Opinion of Those Who Say that the Existence of God, Being Self-evident, Cannot be Demonstrated
- A Refutation of the Abovementioned Opinion and a Solution of the Arguments
- The Opinion of Those Who Say that the Existence of God Cannot be Demonstrated but is Held by Faith Alone
- Arguments in Proof of the Existence of God
- That to Know God We Must Use the Way of Remotion
- That God is Eternal
- That There is no Passive Potency in God
- That There is no Matter in God
- That There is no Composition in God
- That in God There is Nothing Violent or Unnatural
- That God is not a Body
- That God is His Essence
- That in God Being and Essence are the Same
- That no Accident is Found in God
- That the Divine Being Cannot 13e Determined by the Addition of Some Substantial Difference
- That God is not in Some Genus
- That God is not the Formal Being of All Things
- That God is not the Form of Any Body
- On the Divine Perfection
- On the Likeness of Creatures to God
- The Names that Can be Predicated of God
- That the Divine Perfection and the Plurality of Divine Names are not Opposed to the Divine Simplicity
- That Nothing is Predicated Univocally of God and Other Things
- That not All Names are Said of God and Creatures in a Purely Equivocal Way
- That Names Said of God and Creatures are Said Analogically
- That Many Names Said of God are not Synonyms
- How Our Intellect Forms a Proposition about God
- That God is Good
- That God is Goodness Itself
- That There Cannot be Evil in God
- That God is the Good of Every Good
- That God is the Highest Good
- That God is One
- That God is Infinite
- That God is Intelligent
- That God’s Act of U11merstaming is His Essence
- That God Understands Through Nothing Other than Through His Essence
- That God Understands Himself Perfectly
- That Primarily and Essentially God Knows Only Himself
- That God Understands Things Other than Himself
- That God Has a Proper Knowledge of All Things
- Chapters 51-52
- Chapter 52
- The Solution of the Above Difficulty
- How the Divine Essence, Being One and Simple, is the Proper Likeness of All Intelligible Objects
- That God Understands All Things Together
- That God’s Knowledge is not Habitual
- That God’s Knowledge is not Discursive
- That God Does not Understand by Composing and Dividing
- That the Truth of Enunciables is not Excluded from God
- That God is Truth
- That God is the Purest Truth
- That the Divine Truth is the First and Highest Truth
- The Arguments of Those Who Wish to Take Away the Knowledge of Singulars from God
- The Order of What is to be Said on the Divine Knowledge
- That God Knows Singulars
- That God Knows the Things that are Not
- That God Knows Future Contingent Singulars
- That God Knows the Motions of the Will
- That God Knows Infinite Things
- That God Knows Lowly Things
- That God Knows Evils
- That God Has Will
- That the Will of God is His Essence
- That the Principal Object of the Divine Will is the Divine Essence
- That in Willing Himself God Also Wills Other Things
- That God Wills Himself and Other Things by One Act of Will
- That the Multitude of the Objects of the Will is not Opposed to the Divine Simplicity
- That the Divine Will Extends to Singular Goods
- That God Wills Even the Things that are not Yet
- That His Own Being and His Own Goodness God Wills Necessarily
- That God Does not Will Other Things in a Necessary Way
- Arguments Leading to Awkward Consequences If God Does not Necessarily Will Things Other than Himself
- That God Wills Something Other than Himself with the Necessity of Supposition
- That the Will of God is not of What is in Itself Impossible
- That the Divine Will Does not Remove Contingency from Things, nor Does it Impose Absolute Necessity on Them
- That a Reason Can be Assigned to the Divine Will
- That Nothing Can be the Cause of the Divine Will
- That in God There is Free Choice
- That in God There are not the Passions of the Appetites
- That in God There are Delight and Joy, but They are not Opposed to the Divine Perfection
- That in God There is Love
- How Virtues May be Held to be in God
- That in God There are the Moral Virtues that Deal with Actions
- That in God There are Contemplative Virtues
- That God Cannot Will Evil
- That God Hates Nothing, and the Hatred of no Thing Befits Him
- That God is Living
- That God is His Life
- That the Life of God is Everlasting
- That God is Blessed
- That God is His Blessedness
- That the Perfect and Unique Blessedness of God Excels Every Other Blessedness