Book One — God, Chapter 52 — Summa Contra Gentiles
[8] From the same arguments it likewise appears that the multitude of the aforementioned intelligibles cannot reside in any intellect other than the divine intellect—for example, that of a soul or an angel or intelligence. If this were true, the divine intellect would depend on a lower intellect for some operation. But this is impossible.
[9] Then, too, just as self-subsisting things are from God, so is whatever inheres in them. Hence, the divine understanding, by which God is a cause, is a prerequisite for the being of the aforementioned intelligibles in some lower intellect.
[10] It likewise follows that the divine intellect is in potency, since its intelligible objects are not joined to it.
[11] Furthermore, just as each thing has its own being, so it has its own operation. It cannot happen, then, that because some intellect is disposed for operation another intellect will perform an intellectual operation; rather, the very same intellect in which the disposition is present will do this, just as each thing is through its own essence, not through the essence of another. Therefore, by the fact that there are many intelligible objects in some secondary intellect it could not come about that the first intellect knows a multitude.
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