On the contrary, I take one part of that substance and I ask, whether or not it is either definitively or circumscriptively in the same place in which there is another part. If so, then it has been changed locally, because it was not before in the same place. If it be not in the same place, then it is in another and consequently a whole is in a whole place and a part in a part; and consequently the whole is circumscriptively in a place, and consequently the whole is a quantum without any other thing added to it.

Whence, it much more restricts the divine power by saying that God can not preserve a thing prior without local change of it and destroy a thing posterior, which however follows according to the contrary opinion, than to posit that some quantity is substance. if it be said that that substance does not have parts except through quantity; and, therefore, when quantity is destroyed, it does not have part and consequently will not be in a place circumscriptively but only definitively.

On the contrary, this proposition does not vitiate a response; for there always follows that inconsistency, that God of His absolute power can not preserve a thing prior without local change by destroying the thing posterior. Moreover, the response embraces a falsehood; namely, that substance does not have parts except through quantity, if quantity be another thing.

First; because, if a whole substance is prior to a whole quantity and the subject of it, so a part of a substance is prior to a part of a quantity and the subject of it; therefore, parts of a substance are prior to parts of a quantity, if quantity is a thing existing subjectively in substance; therefore, substance does not have parts precisely through another thing advening to it. Moreover, that, which remains without another, is before this, but this part of substance is without that quantity; therefore, it is prior to it, and for the same reason is prior to another quantity.

If it be said that substance does not have other parts except parts which are parts of a quantity, so that these are not substances but are quantities, (on the contrary that part of a quantity is in some primary subject; therefore, either in the same primary subject in which there is another part of quantity, or in another; therefore, if in the same, that subject is not extended through quantity more than the rational soul, which is a whole in a whole body and a whole in each part; if it be in another subject, then there are distinct parts of quantity there say, wood may be divided into two parts) it is manifest; that each quantity is in some subject, and not in the same; therefore in distinct, and consequently either a new substance is caused through division or these substances, which are of these quantities, were before division; and the proposition is maintained.

In the second place, I argue thus: it is not more impossible for God to make ‘a thing having parts really distinct’ to coexist with some whole not informing so that a whole coexists with a whole and a part with a part, than to make this same thing to coexist with such a whole informing. But according to those holding this opinion in common, ‘a substance having parts really distinct coexists with a whole quantity informing so that a whole substance is under a whole quantity,’ and ‘a part of a substance is under part of a quantity’; therefore, it is possible for God to bring it to pass that a whole substance may be coexisting with the same quantity not informing and part with the whole. This having been posited, this substance is truly a quantum; for it truly has part distinct in situation from part, and a substance is not a quantum through some other quantity informing; for it is posited that no quantity of a substance may inform it, but it may only coexist with it. therefore, it is a quantum through itself; therefore, the substance itself is a certain quantity, which is the thesis.

I posit the confirmation of this ground through the statements of those holding opposite views; for according to them, whatever may be of a respect intrinsically advening, is said of a respect extrinsically advening, yet it is true; but God can make extremes without such a respect. for the respect of inherence, by which quantity inheres in a subject, is a respect extrinsically advening according to those writers; therefore, God can make these extremes without such a respect. Therefore, God may preserve this substance of stone and that quantity by destroying precisely that respect of inherence. This having been posited, still this substance will have the respect of presentiality as regards this quantity, so that a whole will be present with a whole and a part with a part. therefore, that substance has part outside of part, and consequently would be a quantum and yet without any quantity informing; therefore, the substance itself is then quantity. Those two reasons prove that substance is truly quantum through its substantial parts without any other thing advening to itself, and consequently that it itself is quantity.

From which I argue farther that there is not any other quantity except substance or quality; for that is needlessly accomplished through more which can be accomplished through fewer; but all, which can be saved through such a quantity distinct from substance and quality, can be saved without it, as is obvious inductively; therefore, such a quantity distinct from substance and quality must not be posited. It can also be proved through these two reasons, that quality is quantity; since this major premise is assumed, that God for this reason can make quality without quantity, if it be another thing, since it may no more depend on quantity than on substance. Similarly, if God can make such quantity, which they posit, without substance; for the same reason he could make quality without quantity, since quality no more depends on quantity than quality on substance. I confirm the previous arguments.

It is not more inconsistent for a substance having parts through its own self without every other thing informing it to be in a divisible place so that a whole thing may be in a whole place and parts in parts of a place, than it may be inconsistent for an indivisible thing without every thing informing it to be in a whole place and in each part. but an indivisible thing, as an angel and a rational soul, is a whole in a whole place and in each part; therefore, it is not inconsistent for a thing having parts really distinct, of such a kind is material substance and also many qualities, to be a whole in a whole place and a part in a part without every other thing advening. But if this is posited, such a thing will truly have part outside of part, and consequently will be quantum without any other thing advening to it. whence they seem to detract much from the divine power who say that God of His own absolute power can not bring it to pass that one thing may be separate from another in situation, unless He create one other thing making those things to be separate; and they seem to reject the divine omnipotence more than those who say that a substance having parts is a quantum without any other thing advening to itself and is circumscriptively in a place.

Again, the preceding reasons are confirmed. It is not more inconsistent for a substance composed of some things really distinct and created to be separate in situation to be through itself without a thing added to itself in a place in a mode suitable to itself, than it is inconsistent for an indivisible substance not having parts to be in a place in a mode suitable to itself without a thing added to itself. But an angel without any thing added to itself is in a place definitively; therefore, it is not inconsistent for a substance having parts really distinct to be in a place circumscriptively without any thing added to itself. But nothing is in a place circumscriptively except a quantum; therefore, a substance can be a quantum without any thing really distinct added to it; therefore, such another quantity is needlessly posited.

Again, it is confirmed; for every thing, which is present to another thing locally, is present to itself through itself or through another intrinsic; for it has not been said that one thing is locally present to another, unless because its end is present there locally. If, therefore, the substance of a stone be present in a place, it is present in a place through itself, and consequently for the same reason parts of a substance are present in a place through themselves, and consequently the whole substance is through itself fundamentally and circumscriptively in a place; but every thing, which in itself is circumscriptively in a place, is in itself a quantum; therefore, substance in itself is quantum and consequently is quantity. The same reason can be applied concerning quality.

Again, the previous reasons are confirmed; for when some are created to make one which however can not make one, of such kind are parts of water and of air and of many others; for sometimes the same parts make one per se, sometimes not. If God can make these to be distinct in place and in situation, when they do not make one per se without any thing added to them, God can make these same to be distinct in place and in situation without any thing added to them, although they make one per se; for no reason appears why one more than the rest ought to be denied of the divine omnipotence. But God can make this air, which is here, and that air which is at Rome, to be distinct in place and in situation by destroying all the absolute accidents in them and without any quantity inhering in them; therefore, God of His absolute power can bring it to pass that those two bodies of air may be united and make one body of air, and yet that they may be distinct in place and situation without any such thing advening to them; therefore, that air will have part outside of part without a thing however added, and consequently will be a quantum without such a thing added; therefore, such an added thing is needlessly posited for this, that air may be a quantum.

The previous reasons can be confirmed in many other ways, which I pass by for the sake of brevity.

In the third place, it is principally argued thus according to the Master of the Sentences in Book IV., Distinction XII. Accidents of such a kind, taste, color, weight, and any other of the kind, are without a subject in the sacrament of the altar. But if quantity were another thing bearing those qualities, those qualities would not be without a subject, but would be in a subject; on the contrary the common dictum of the Doctors could in no mode be able to be verified, and very incorrectly, as it seems, the determination of the church that the accidents remain in the sacrament of the altar without a subject; for thus only one accident could remain without a subject, and all others would be in a subject; therefore, a quantity would not be such a distinct thing, et cetera. And so in carefully considering the Master and the text with the gloss on the De Consecratione and the statements of the Saints, there is not found a passage so apparent that by virtue of the sacrament of the altar it may be necessary to posit such another thing intermediate between substance and qualities, as is this against such an intermediate thing bearing qualities. No mention is made in all those places of an intermediate quantity nor is this term even once mentioned, nor does any passage speak of quantity, whether or not it be, except that many seem to posit that all the qualities in the sacrament of the altar are not in any subject; whence, the Master says thus in Book IV., Distinction XII., A: “Those accidents, therefore, remain,” which he enumerated before; namely, taste, weight, and any other of the kind, “subsisting per se at the celebration of the mystery,” et cetera. However, I do not intend to say that those who posit such a thing bearing such accidents, of which the Saints speak and which they seem to posit without any subject, may be heretical or erring in the faith or about the sacrament of the Eucharist; for they were permitted to explain such passages; nor are all who have uttered a falsehood to be considered in error. And as they were permitted to explain such passages of the Doctors approved by the church, so I shall be permitted not only to explain but even to refute the statements of the Saints who mutually condemn one another, and in no way were approved as if authorized by the church.

In the fourth place, I argue thus: no absolute accident is more simple than its primary and adequate subject; but, if a quantity were any thing other than substance and quality, it would be an accident. Therefore, I ask about its primary and adequate subject, whether it is matter or form or a composite. It is not a composite; for a subject would be more composite than its absolute accident, which seems false; nor is matter its own subject, because then some absolute accident would precede form in matter; nor is form its own primary subject, because then matter, if it were separated, could not be a quantum, which seems to be false.

Similarly, dimensions precede form without limits in matter according to the commentator; therefore, for the same reason dimensions are limited at first in matter. That reason is valid, as I think, if this opinion hold which rejects this entity distinct from matter and form, which some posit.

In the fifth place, I argue thus: according to the philosopher in the Categories, substance alone is susceptive of contraries; but quantity is not a substance according to those writers, and yet it is susceptive of contraries, which is contrary to Aristotle.

In the sixth place, it is argued thus: when a thing becomes rare from dense, I ask whether or not there is there another new quantity; but it is precisely the same quantity numerically; if it is new there, then any preceding quantity is corrupted, which seems false. If a part be new; I ask about the subject of that quantity, for it is necessary that there be a whole rarefied substance or a part of it; not the whole because then the two quantities would be at the same time, which they deny who think thus. If a part, the same argument follows, or that an accident might travel from subject into subject, as would be able to be clearly shown; but it is omitted for the sake of brevity. If it be the same quantity, then it coexists in a larger place now than before without the variation of an absolute; but this inconsistency is posited of substance; therefore, such a quantity distinct from quality and substance is needlessly posited.

Therefore, I say by virtue of those reasons and many other reasons, physical as well as theological, that quantity is not a thing really distinct from substance and quality, but any quantity is really the same as substance, and any quantity is really the same as quality; whence, quantity is not, unless ‘a thing having part outside of part and having part separate from another in situation,’ or ‘a thing existing circumscriptively in a place,’ if it be something surrounding itself. And because some substance in itself fundamentally, although causally by God or other extrinsic causes, has part outside of part; it is not necessary to posit another thing bearing one part outside of another part. But the extrinsic causes of a thing, say, efficient and final, are sufficient to produce things diverse, one in one situation and another in another, without any intermediate thing between them; therefore, the substance itself is a quantum without any other thing connected with itself or made at the same time with it.

And as I say of substance, so I say proportionately of any corporeal thing. Nor does that opinion in any way detract from the sacrament of the altar; but it avoids many difficulties respecting the sacrament of the altar, as will be obvious in replying and in objecting.

And, therefore, although some modern writers, stimulated perhaps by envy, would censure that opinion as if erroneous not by arguments but by detractions; yet the ancient Doctors, although they could not understand it, did not, however, repudiate it as heretical respecting faith or character, whose reasons I intend to cite and to explain. Whence, a certain Doctor arguing against this opinion says thus. This opinion is contrary to the philosopher, who in the Categories distinguishes quantity from substance and quality. It is also contrary to the common opinion of the Doctors. It is also contrary to experience; and when a corporeal substance is condensed without conversion of anything into itself, it is effected of a less quantity without the loss of any part. It is also contrary to reason, for in diverse subjects differing in species a quantity the same in species seems to be able to be; for the length, or breadth, or depth in a handful of air is not other than that in a handful of water. That they, however, say that the quantity of a quality really differs from the quantity of a substance and that it itself is really the same as quality, is contrary to authority and reason. For the philosopher in the sixth book of the Physics says that “quality is not quantity except through accident,” which would not be true if it were properly called quantity. It is argued through the reasons thus: it is naturally impossible for a body, which is a quantity, to be at the same time with another body which is a quantity; but quality is at the same time with substance; therefore, from the previous opinion it follows that this is impossible, that two thicknesses or even many more are naturally at the same time; because for whatever reason whiteness would have its proper quantity, for the same reason taste would have its own, and coldness or frigidity its own, and humidity and dryness, and so of others; and so not only will the quantity of substance and the quantity of quality be at the same time, but there would also be at the same time the thicknesses of several qualities; therefore, it is obvious that the opinion cited above implies many inconsistencies. These are the reasons of that Doctor, which are more apparent than others. But besides these I add others; first, because the substance of the bread is not transubstantiated into the quantity of the body of Christ but only into the substance of the body of Christ. But if substance could be quantity, it would have been truly transubstantiated into quantity. It is confirmed; for the quantity of the body of Christ is not in the sacrament of the altar by the power of conversion but only concomitantly. But if the substance of the body of Christ were a quantity, the quantity of the body of Christ would truly be there by the power of conversion. Moreover, some argue: if substance is quantity, then since the substance of the bread may not remain in the sacrament of the altar; therefore, a quantity is not there, which is contrary to sense and contrary to the reality of the sacrament. Other reasons can be adduced; but, because the solution of these could be made clear from the explanations of those already offered, I, therefore, pass them by.

As regards the first argument of that Doctor, I say that that opinion is in no mode contrary to the philosopher either in the Categories or elsewhere. And when he says that in the Categories he distinguishes quantity from substance and quality, I reply that the philosopher does not intend to distinguish between substance, quantity and quality; as if they be absolute things really distinct from one another. But he intends to distinguish between those categories which signify things, not indeed distinct things but the same things although in diverse modes, which are not modes, unless grammatical or logical modes; and indeed although this category ‘quantity’ may be really distinct, if it be a thing in mind different from other categories, of which distinction a statement was made elsewhere; yet it does not signify another thing one per se, unless that thing be a substance or a quality; and so the distinction of categories, of which the philosopher speaks, obtains at the same time with this, that quantity may not be a thing other than substance and quality; as according to him ‘place’ and ‘surface’ are not really distinguished, and yet they are distinct species of quantity. For that there may be distinct species of quantity is obvious through the philosopher in the Categories. That these species do not imply quantities distinct from a part of a thing, is obvious; since there would then be two continuous quantities at the same time in situation and in place, neither of which would be created to inform another.

Similarly, according to the philosopher in the Categories in the chapter on ‘quality’; the same is in diverse categories; therefore, categories sometimes signify the same thing; therefore, notwithstanding that quantity and substance and quality may be distinct categories, yet some of them have been able to signify the same thing, and so it is possible to agree with the philosopher that quantity is not an absolute thing other than substance and quality, as resemblance and white are in diverse categories, whether per se or through reduction; for the present I do not care, and yet they signify some thing the same.

Quite similarly I speak of ‘number’ which signifies no thing one per se, unless that which is under some species other than that under this common (species) ‘number’; as was proved elsewhere; and yet they are different species. Similarly, ‘ternary’ and ‘quaternary’ are distinct species, and yet no thing one per se is signified through ‘ternary,’ but that it is or can be of the same species with another thing signified through ‘quaternary,’ or conversely. And, indeed, as was stated before, only a diversity of modes of signification suffices to distinguish one concept from another; not that no thing may be signified absolutely through one, but that it may be signified by another. So also it is obvious from these two ‘homo’ and ‘homines’; for it is impossible to grant any thing signified through one that may not be signified through the rest; yet this is false, ‘man is species.’ So the identity of significators through some species or genera obtains with the distinction of species and of genera; and, as was frequently proved, genera or species are not, unless concepts or names.

As regards the second point; since it is said that that opinion is contrary to the common opinion of the Doctors, I reply that, if it be understood through the Doctors approved by the Roman Church, it is not true. On the contrary, this can be proved through no passage of any Doctor approved by the Roman Church. And if there be found any high-sounding passage of such a Doctor, this must be sufficiently explained. Nor is it inconsistent to explain their statements, since many statements even of the Sacred Page may also be in need of exposition; for many are not true according to a property of common speech, but are most true according to the sense which we ought to have.

Whence, such propositions which the Saviour uttered: “I am the true vine and my Father is the husbandman,” “My doctrine is not mine,” and many of a like kind, are not true according to the propriety of common speech; as the blessed Augustine says in a certain Homily on John: “Although in the sense in which they were spoken and in which they ought to be accepted, they may be most true.” And as many passages of Sacred Scripture must be explained, so the passages of the Doctors approved by the Roman Church declaring that quantity may be a thing other than substance and quality must also be explained. But if through the Doctors they may understand the modern Doctors who mutually censure each other publicly and privately and even in their writings, I concede; but it is not inconsistent to contradict them; for nothing, which they say, must be accepted, except that which they can prove through clear reason or through the authority of Sacred Scripture or through a decree of the church or through the Doctors approved by the church.

And, therefore, since they can prove in none of the preceding modes that quantity is a thing other than substance and quality, although some sophistications may be able to be adduced for this; I, therefore, do not hold it as an inconsistency to refute them in this part; for by what reason they themselves mutually censure one another, and the latter reprove the former, I can refute them, when they have for their support nothing but sophisms or passages wrongly understood; nor do I think that I ought to be limited to those contrary to the dictate of reason.

On the contrary, I consider it dangerous and rash to wish to limit any one to the holding captive of his ability and to the believing of something which reason dictates to him to be false, unless it may be able to be drawn from Sacred Scripture or from a decree of the Roman Church or from the statements of the approved Doctors. Such is not this, ‘quantity is an absolute thing other than substance and quality’; whence, I assert this, that no passage of any philosopher, nor any natural reason, which I have ever heard or read, moves me to believe that quantity is an absolute thing other than substance and quality more than to believe that flesh is a thing other than God and creature. Yet if it may be able to be proved that it may be from the mind of some Saint or Doctor approved by the church, whom it is not permitted to refute; for his sake I wish to hold in check my ability and to concede that there may be a thing other than substance and quality.

As regards the third, I say that it is not contrary to experience, but rather consonant with experience; whence, if he should not have another reason, except that experience which he adduces, I would concede that quantity is not such a thing as they themselves imagine.

Whence, when a corporeal substance is condensed, I ask whether any part or no part of a quantity is lost. If no part, now then condensation can be saved; then for the same reason, although substance may be quantity and no part of substance may be lost, condensation will have been saved. But if some part of quantity is lost, I ask about the primary and adequate subject of the quantity itself, whether it remains without any quantity, which is contrary to experience, or whether it has any quantity, and then whether new or pre-existing. It does not have a new quantity, because for the same reason another part would have a new quantity, since there may be no greater reason for one than for another; and consequently the whole substance would utterly lose the whole pre-existing quantity and would acquire a new quantity, which is contrary to experience. Nor does it have a pre-existing (quantity), since then an accident would change from subject into subject, which is not consonant with experience.

And so it is obvious that in no way is it contrary to experience to say, that quantity is not a thing other than substance and quality.

Therefore, a reply is made to that experience and by conceding that, when corporeal substance is condensed, it itself is effected of a smaller quantity without the loss of any of its part; but not without local motion of all of its parts.

Whence, through this alone, that all the parts are so moved locally that they may occupy a smaller place now than before and one part may be less separate from another now than before, the whole substance is condensed, and otherwise a substance is not to be condensed. And this is that which the philosopher says in the Categories, that “that is dense whose parts lie closer together,” which is not to be understood of the parts between which there is not an intermediate; for those can not as regards themselves as wholes lie closer together; but it must be understood of the parts between which there are intermediate parts, for those parts lie closer together in a dense body than they did in the same body when it was rare. And from this itself, that all such parts lie closer together whether they may be under another thing or not; they in themselves lie closer together, and that body is more dense now than before.

Whence, I do not see that condensation and rarefication may be able conveniently to be saved, except by positing that quantity is not a thing other than substance and quality, and through that mode is easily saved. And if it be said that the whole substance remains after condensation (but the whole quantity does not remain; for, if the whole could remain, it follows that it has as much quantity as there was before); then, that preceding quantity was not itself substance. It must be said that those who perfectly understand logic clearly see that all such are sophistic, for such consequences inferring one of the past from two of the present are not valid; as frequently two of the past or of the future do not infer one of the present, and frequently even one of the past and one of the present do not infer one of the present. But it would take too long to tell how it must be argued from such; therefore, I pass on from this. And I say that this consequence is not valid: ‘the whole substance remains’ and ‘so much quantity does not remain’; therefore, ‘so much quantity was not in that whole substance.’ And quite similarly such consequences are not valid: ‘that foot of quantity does not remain’ and ‘this substance remains’; therefore, ‘that substance will not be of the quantity of a foot’; nor does it infer more; therefore, that substance was other than a quantity of a foot. And as it is said of these, so proportionately must it be said of all of like kind, which are considered demonstrations by many.

Whence, as it does not follow: ‘making happy is not.’ It may be posited that ‘God may make no one happy,’ ‘God is’; therefore, ‘God was not making happy.’ Similarly, it does not follow: ‘the dead is not,’ ‘Christ is’; therefore, ‘Christ is not dead.’ So it does not follow: ‘so much quantity is not,’ ‘substance is’; therefore, ‘substance was not so much quantity.’ And so it evidently is obvious that, although such premises may not infer that of the present, yet they do not infer that of the past. Nor does it refer quantum to a mode, whether the terms ‘abstracts’ or ‘concretes’ be accepted.

And as it is said of these, so proportionately of those of a ‘possible’; for frequently two of a ‘possible,’ and even one of an ‘actual’ and another of a ‘possible,’ do not infer one negative of an ‘actual,’ although they may infer one of a ‘possible’; and, therefore, such modes of arguing are not valid. This is possible, ‘this likeness is not,’ while this appears true, ‘this whiteness is’; therefore, ‘this whiteness is not this likeness’; although that follows from a ‘possible’; therefore, it is possible for ‘this whiteness not to be this likeness.’ It does not follow: it is possible for ‘this whiteness not to be this likeness’; therefore, ‘this whiteness’ and ‘this likeness’ are not the same thing. So it does not follow: ‘it is possible for God not to be creating’; therefore, ‘God’ and ‘creating’ are not the same thing. But it certainly correctly follows that this is possible, ‘God and creating are not the same’; and this is true.

Quite similarly is it in the proposition, that because that substance can remain, although this may not be true, ‘the whole quantity is’; yet from this it does not follow that this may be true, ‘this substance’ and ‘so much quantity’ are not the same thing; but it follows that it may be possible; and this is true.

And if it be said that this is possible, ‘this substance’ and ‘this quantity’ are not the same thing, if the substance remains; by virtue of the same reason I say that this is fully possible, ‘this substance’ and ‘this quantity’ are not the same thing, so that it can be true, while this appears true, ‘this substance is’; but it can not be true, while this appears true, ‘this quantity is.’ Whence, this will then be true by virtue of that cause of reality, ‘this quantity is not,’ which follows from this, ‘this substance is not quantum,’ which is possible.

Another argument will be set forth later. And if it be said further that it is impossible to pass from a contradictory to a contradictory without entire newness, (if, therefore, this be at first true, ‘that substance is of so much quantity’ and afterwards it be false;) there is need that there be some newness or at least a destruction of something old. It must be said that it is not true; but sometimes local motion alone suffices, through which it is not necessary for something to be acquired or destroyed nor yet something old, say, a place always remaining.

On the contrary; as is shown elsewhere, a place surrounding a movable body can remain and this either in a whole or in a part. And, therefore, in the proposition regarding this, that the substance itself may be of a larger quantity or a larger quantity now than before as in rarefaction, or a smaller quantity now than before as in condensation, only local motion of all the parts of this substance suffices without entire newness of any imaginable thing whatever and without entire destruction of any thing old whatever.

As regards the fourth point; when it is said that that opinion is contrary to reason, it must be said that it is not, but is consonant with reason, as was shown before. And when it is said that in diverse substances differing in species it seems to be a quantity the same in species, it must be said that any quantity, which is not quality which is in substances diverse in species, differs in species; whence every quantity of fire, which is not a quality, differs in species from every quantity of air which is not a quality; and indeed I concede that the length of fire, and similarly the depth and the width, differ in species. And yet notwithstanding this, that the same most particular species could be predicated of them, although not ‘in quid’ and ‘per se’ in the first mode. Whence, two men and two horses differ in species, and yet ‘binarius,’ which is a most particular species, is applied to them. Whence, as it is not inconsistent that the same may be in diverse categories, so it is not inconsistent that the same may be in diverse species of one category, and yet they are in one most particular species of another category; and, therefore, it is not inconsistent that the same may be simply in diverse species of substance, and yet that they may be in the same most particular species of quantity. And whenever it is so, then that most particular species is not predicated of them ‘in quid’ and ‘per se’ in the first mode, and many passages concerning ‘genera’ as well as concerning ‘species’ speak of them with respect to those of which they are predicated ‘in quid’ and ‘per se’ in the first mode; yet there are many of no proper noun of any thing nor of a pronoun signifying some thing which are predicated ‘in quid’ and ‘per se’ in the first mode. Indeed, according to the intention of the philosopher relative to that which is replied in diverse modes to the question raised concerning an individual of a substance, as regards this diverse categories are accepted, as was said elsewhere; and indeed that is false which some say, that each category has a proper thing of which it is predicated ‘in quid.’

As regards the fifth point; I say that quantity, which is quality, is really distinguished from quantity, which is at least some substance; say, any such, as color, heat, cold, and any other of the kind; although this may not be true of figure and of any such. And when it is said that quality according to the philosopher is not a quantum except through accident, I say that through all such propositions in the Categories and in the book of the Physics and elsewhere, “substance is not a quantum except through accident,” and so of quality. Finite and infinite do not combine with a substance or a quality or through accident and anything else of the kind. It means nothing other than that that predicable ‘quantum’ is not predicated of substance and quality except through accident and not per se in the first mode. Whence, such is not per se in the first mode; neither by strictly nor freely accepting per se in the first mode: ‘substance is quantum,’ ‘quality is quantum,’ ‘man is quantum,’ ‘man is long,’ ‘whiteness is wide,’ and any other of the kind; since this however holds that quantity may not be a thing different from quality and substance. So ‘God’ and ‘creating’ are not distinct things, and yet this is not per se, ‘creating is immortal’; as this, ‘God is immortal.’ Similarly, finite or infinite per se in the second or the first mode is applied to quantum and not to substance or quality. And so it appears, since those substantives and predicables, ‘quantity,’ ‘substance,’ ‘quality,’ are distinct; since this however holds that they do not signify distinct things, and through that mode the reply must be made to many passages.

As regards the last point of that Doctor, I say that in speaking of bodies of diverse grounds of which one was created to be in the form of another, or of which each was created to be in the form of a third, it is not inconsistent for two bodies to exist naturally in the same place; and accident and subject are so constituted; so also are constituted diverse accidents which are created to inform the same subject; so also whiteness and sweetness in milk are constituted; and, therefore, it ought to be conceded according to the virtue of common speech that several bodies can be at the same time, that is, that several things existing circumscriptively in this place, and each one of which has part outside of part, are at the same time; yet it is inconsistent that two bodies of the same ground (each of which may be completely in a genus or in some species of a substance, or that two bodies of diverse grounds, neither of which was created to be in the form of another nor both (in the form) of a third), may be at the same time; and of such bodies Aristotle speaks and other authors who say that two bodies can not be at the same time.

As regards other arguments. As regards the first; when it is said that the substance of the bread is not transubstantiated into the quantity of the body of Christ but only into the substance of the body of Christ, it must be said that according to the virtue of common speech this must be conceded, ‘the substance of the bread is transubstantiated into the quantity of the body of Christ’; nor is the opposite of that found in the Bible nor in the statements of the Saints nor in the canonical law, nor in any authorized book; although it may be found in the writings of some who are censured by many Catholics and religious writers. I do not say that they censure them as heretics, but as those holding false opinions; whence, the subtle Doctor censures very much the profane and sacred writer and all, in whose writings is found the opposite of that, as regards many opinions. Many Catholic Doctors also censure the subtle Doctor in many conclusions; and, indeed, although a conclusion the opposite of these may be found, it need not make much difference; for no one is bound to accept their authority, although thanks must be rendered to them, for this reason that, when they have made false statements, they have stimulated our abilities, and they have rather given to us occasions for finding the truth. I say, therefore, that this must really be conceded, ‘the substance of the bread is transubstantiated into the body of Christ which is in heaven.’ Similarly, this must be conceded according to the virtue of common speech, ‘the substance of the bread is transubstantiated into the body of Christ which is in heaven locally.’ In the same mode I say in confirmation that this must be conceded according to the virtue of common speech, ‘the quantity of the body of Christ is in the sacrament of the altar by the power of conversion’; as according to the virtue of common speech this must be conceded, ‘the body of Christ existing in heaven is in the sacrament of the altar by the power of conversion’; and precisely the opposite is not found in any authorized writer. But yet no matter how much each of those may be true according to the virtue of common speech and according to fact, yet according to the virtue of common speech both can be false; while this appears true, ‘the substance of the body of Christ is in the sacrament of the altar by the power of conversion’; but not except in one case, say, if the substance of the body of Christ should exist nowhere circumscriptively. Whence, it does not seem to involve a contradiction, that, when the transubstantiation into the body of Christ has been accomplished and the body of Christ remains there under the species of bread, God could make the body of Christ to be nowhere locally or circumscriptively. When this has been done, the priest might be able to celebrate, and then this would be true according to the virtue of common speech, ‘the substance of the body of Christ is under the species of bread by the power of transubstantiation’; and then this would be false, ‘the quantity of the body of Christ is under the species of that bread,’ and this by virtue of a false implication; for it would be implied that the substance of the body of Christ would be a quantum, which would not be true; for nothing is a quantum except that whose part is outside of part and whose part is separate from part. But, since the body of Christ could be nowhere locally, never could it be able in that mode to be assigned that one part could be separate from another part; but wherever it would be, one part would be in the same situation as another; and then this would be true, ‘the body of Christ is nowhere circumscriptively’; and for the same reason this would be true, ‘the body of Christ is nowhere a quantum’; and consequently this would be false, ‘the body of Christ is a quantity’; and so by virtue of a false implication this would be false, ‘the quantity of the body of Christ is in the sacrament of the altar.’ And so he who would desire to excuse those who say that the quantity of the body of Christ is not in the sacrament of the altar by the power of conversion, could say that they say this, because that consequence is not valid; namely, ‘the substance of the body of Christ is in the sacrament of the altar by the power of conversion’; therefore, the quantity of the body of Christ is in the sacrament of the altar by the power of conversion; for the antecedent can be true, while the consequent appears false. But this can not happen unless the substance of the body of Christ nowhere have part separate from part.

And if it be said contrary to this that, wherever the quantity of the body of Christ is by the power of conversion, there the body of Christ is a quantity or a quantum by the power of conversion. If, therefore, the quantity of the body of Christ be in the sacrament of the altar by the power of conversion, the body of Christ is a quantum or quantity in the sacrament of the altar. But every quantum is circumscriptively in a place; therefore, the body of Christ is circumscriptively in a place in the sacrament of the altar, which is heretical; for it could not then be in the whole host and in each part of the host. It must be said that that argument alone would be able to move a Catholic to hold that quantity is not a thing other than substance and quality, and would be able to be formulated thus: wherever any thing has another thing created to designate it, it is true to say that the thing there is such; as when a body has whiteness, it is true to say that the body there is white; and so is it of all. If, therefore, the quantity of the body of Christ be a thing other than the substance of the body of Christ, it is not separate from that quantity; for then those holding this opinion thus say, that the quantity of the body of Christ is there, although concomitantly; but whenever there is some quantum there, it truly has part outside of part and part separate from part; for whenever a definition corresponds to something, the defined corresponds there to the same. Therefore, since this may be a definition of quantity or of quantum, ‘to have part outside of part’; if the body of Christ in the sacrament of the altar be a quantum either concomitantly or in another mode, it is necessary that the body of Christ there be ‘having part outside of part, separate from part,’ which is manifestly false and perilous, and it does not seem at all safe to concede that the body of Christ may be a quantum here. And indeed I say that it must be conceded according to the virtue of common speech that the body of Christ is not a quantum in the sacrament of the altar. As according to the virtue of common speech it must be conceded that the body of Christ in the sacrament does not have part outside of part, although the body of Christ may have part outside of part in heaven, and consequently may be a quantum in heaven. And if it be said that this is contradictory to a prior statement, (for it was said that this is true, ‘the quantity of the body of Christ is in the sacrament of the altar’; from which it follows that the body of Christ is a quantum or a quantity in the sacrament of the altar, which was just denied;) it must be stated that this is simply true, ‘the quantity of the body of Christ is in the sacrament of the altar.’ But the former does not infer that; therefore, the body of Christ is a quantum in the sacrament of the altar; as this is true according to the virtue of speech, ‘the body of Christ existing locally in heaven is in the sacrament of the altar’; and yet this is false, ‘the body of Christ is locally existent in the sacrament of the altar.’

Similarly, this is true, ‘the body of Christ existing in a place is in the sacrament of the altar’; for nothing else is designated through that except that for which it substitutes this, ‘the whole body of Christ existing circumscriptively in a place,’ which is not unless the body of Christ is in the sacrament of the altar, which is true; and yet this is false, ‘the body of Christ is circumscriptively existent in a place in the sacrament of the altar.’

Similarly, this is true, ‘the body of Christ having part outside of part is in the sacrament of the altar.’ In the same way, notwithstanding that this may be true, ‘the quantity of the body of Christ is in the sacrament of the altar’; yet this is false according to a property of common speech, ‘the body of Christ is a quantum in the sacrament of the altar’; and so, although the quantity of the body of Christ be truly there, yet the body of Christ is not a quantity there; as, although the body of Christ having part separate in situation from part may be there, yet it does not there have part separate from part.

And that reply is confirmed; for, whenever some are convertibles, of whatever one term is predicated the rest is also assumed significatively; and similarly of whatever one term is predicated, the rest also. But those are convertibles: ‘a continuous and permanent quantum’ and ‘having part separate in situation from part,’ and conversely; therefore, of whatever one is said, the rest also. If therefore, this be true, ‘the body of Christ is in the sacrament of the altar having part separate in situation from part,’ which is manifestly false; for no part is separate in situation from another in the sacrament of the altar; therefore, this is false according to a property of common speech, ‘the substance of the body of Christ is a continuous and permanent quantum in the sacrament of the altar.’

Therefore, I say that the body of Christ is not a quantum there; for it does not have there part separate from part; but in heaven, as elsewhere, it has part separate in situation from part, so in heaven it is a quantum. If only the quantity of the body of Christ were another thing, there would truly be a quantity there; namely, in the sacrament of the altar; and consequently the body of Christ would truly be a quantum there, and consequently would truly have there part separate from part, and consequently would not be a whole under a whole host and a whole under each part.

As to the other; when it is said that, if the substance of the body of Christ were a quantity, then the quantity could not remain in the sacrament of the altar; so the substance of the bread does not remain there.

It must be said that that argument ought not to be advanced here, unless because some maliciously provoke some frank statements contrary to the opinion; as if that opinion could posit, that every quantity would be substance; and they indeed maliciously propose this proposition, ‘substance is quantity’ and withdraw this, ‘quality is quantity,’ that they may grant through this an opportunity for the unlearned who pay no attention to the preceding opinion to understand and to posit this, ‘every quantity is a substance’; and by virtue of a defect in the arguments they carefully strive to enlist some simple minded folk against the opinion.

Therefore, I say as regards the argument, that it is too stupid; for it does not follow, ‘substance is quantity,’ and substance ceases to be there; then some quantity does not remain there, as substance does not remain there; as it does not follow, ‘substance is an entity’; therefore, no entity remains there; as a pre-existing substance does not remain there.

Whence, I say that one pre-existing quantity remains in the sacrament of the altar; but quantity does not remain there, which is substance or which was substance; but one quantity remains there, which is quality; for quantity remains there, which is not a thing other than whiteness.

Similarly, a quantity remains there which is not a thing other than taste, and so of other quantities. And I say with the Doctors approved by the church, that color, taste, weight, that is, gravity, and some qualities of a like kind, remain there; none of which is a thing other than a quantity subsisting per se in situation outside of every subject by divine power; none of which is subjectively in another; but each one exists outside of a subject through the divine power, and they are preserved at the same time in the same place and situation through the divine power; and indeed there remains there one quantity having part separate from part, which never was nor ever will be substance, but is simply a thing other than substance. And these arguments concerning that matter may suffice for the present, for I shall elsewhere treat at length of it.

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