In the former statements, certain immovable fundaments, as it were, have been examined and in consequence of those statements some reasons must be adduced by virtue of which it might appear to anyone that the quantity remaining in the sacrament of the altar is not an absolute thing really distinct from the qualities remaining with the substance of the body of Christ. and that before the consecration there preceded some quantity, which was not an absolute thing really distinct from the substance of the bread, which does not remain after the consecration by virtue of this, that the substance of the bread ceases to be.
However, I repeat through the testimony advanced in the beginning of this little work that, although I shall say nothing assertatively except that which the Roman Church teaches, I am prepared in all things to hold in check my inclination by virtue of the authority of the same church and also to believe with the heart and to confess with the lips the universal truths which the Roman Church expounds or will expound; but others to be cited only, under whatever form of words I shall have expressed them, I shall publicly set forth for the purpose of exercise and of supplying material for thought.
But before I shall approve the principal thesis, some fundaments must be premised; namely, that every thing one per se, whether substantial or accidental, having part separate from part or part outside of part, is a quantum; for every such thing is really extended. But no thing can really be extended unless it be a quantum. Therefore, whether every quantum be per se one having part outside of part or part separate from part or not, makes no difference at all; yet this seems to be understood by all, that everything per se one having part outside of part or part separate from part is truly and really a quantum and is extended.
From which it further follows that, since it may be possible for something to be a quantum without a quantity, (and every quantum is either subjectively in a quantity as if in its subject or is a subject of a quantity or is a thing not distinct from quantity; for it can not be understood in several modes that something is a quantum,) it is necessary for that quantum, which is neither subjectively in a quantity nor is a subject of a quantity, to be a thing not really distinct from quantity.
From these statements it can be gathered that everything, which is circumscribed in a place, is a quantum; for everything, which is circumscriptively in a place, is a whole in a whole place and a part in a part; for this is to be circumscribed in a place. For by virtue of this, that an angel is not a whole in a whole place and part of an angel in a part of a place; by virtue of this an angel is not in a place circumscriptively. Therefore, that, which is in a place circumscriptively, is a whole in a whole and a part in a part. But every such has part separate from part, as parts of a place are separate in situation. But that which has part separate from part is a quantum; therefore, everything per se one existing in a place circumscriptively is a quantum; and by virtue of the same it is obvious that every quantum having part separate from part is circumscriptively in a place; especially if there be some place surrounding it. For every such is in a place so that a whole is in a whole place and a part in a part, and consequently is circumscriptively in the place.
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