Since the former conclusion has been shown, as if uniform, some special conclusions must now be proved; one of which is, that all the qualities remaining in the sacrament of the altar are not one subject of one quantity by virtue of which all those qualities may be called quanta. Just as a man is called white because he is the subject of whiteness, or fire is called hot because it is the subject of heat; for no accident one numerically can be one per se in a primary as if in an immediate subject in something which is one only through aggregation, so that that whole accident may be in any one of them and may not be one part of an accident in one of them and another part in another; which I say in order to refute one sophistical cavil; for some say that sometimes it happens that, when some wood is placed in water so that one part may be in the air and the other in the air or outside of the water, the part existing in the water is converted into stone and the other part remains wood as before. When this has been accomplished, they say that any quantity existing in a whole is one numerically and yet the subject is not one per se, since one part may be stone and the other wood. And so any accident one numerically could be in one subject which is one only through aggregation. But this sophistical cavil, whether it contain the truth or not, is excluded through this which is accepted, that an accident one numerically can not be in something one through aggregation, so however that one part of that accident may not be in one of them and another in another. For in the instance advanced one part of that quantity is placed subjectively in one of those aggregations and another part in another. Therefore, it is obvious that an instance can not be found contrary to the proposition asserting that no accident one numerically can be in something one through aggregation only, and yet that one part may not be in one of them and another in another. But it is manifest that these qualities remaining in the sacrament of the altar, if they be one, are not one except through aggregation. And it is manifest that one part of that quantity is not subjectively in one of those qualities and another in another. Therefore, it follows that all those qualities are not the subject of a quantity one numerically by virtue of which they are called quanta.
Again, no accident one numerically can be successively in diverse primary subjects through the action of a natural cause. But I consider a primary subject not that which is a subject of some accident through a part, as a man is called the subject of whiteness, because a hand or foot is the subject of whiteness. But I consider that a primary subject which is the subject of some accident, and no part of it is the primary and adequate subject of it. And if a primary subject is thus accepted, it is manifest that no accident one numerically can be naturally in diverse primary subjects.
If this is conceded, one part of those qualities may be removed, as it is obvious to sense that it can be done. Then I ask whether or not the same quantity remains, which was before. If so, then it follows that a quantity the same numerically is at first subjectively in this whole aggregation of prior qualities and afterwards is not in that, since it does not remain, and yet is in something; therefore, it is in another, and consequently is in several successively.
If a quantity the same numerically does not remain; therefore, when whiteness has been destroyed, any one of the other qualities might change its quantity, which seems absurd.
Furthermore, if this quantity is one in that aggregation, either it is a whole in a whole and a whole part in any part of them or a whole in a whole and one part in one of them and another part in another of them. The first can not be conceded; for then an accident the same numerically would be at the same time in several subjects, which is false. Nor can the second be conceded; for no part of that quantity can be accepted which may have more regard for one quality than for another, since those qualities may in no mode be separate locally.
From the previous statements it is gathered that, since an accident may be counted according to the enumeration of subjects, the qualities can not be distinct unless the quantities were distinct, if any one of them be the subject of a quantity.
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