Besides the proposed distinction, it must be declared how quantity is an accident. When this has been shown, it will be obvious how these obtain at the same time, ‘some quantity is not a thing really distinct from substance,’ and ‘quantity is an accident.’ Whence, it must be known that, as, for instance, not every relation is an accident in the first mode; for not every relation is a thing really distinct from substance inhering in it, as many ancient Catholic doctors say and some modern Catholics agree with them.
And, indeed, not every relation is an accident in the first mode of accepting the term ‘accident,’ nor even is every relation an accident in the second mode of accepting ‘accident’; for some relatives are suitable to God according to circumstances; sometimes suitable and sometimes not suitable; but this is not possible through a change of God, but precisely through a change of a creature; and yet it is conceded that relation is an accident and that it is one category of accident.
So it can be said of quantity, that not every quantity is a thing really distinct from substance and yet that a quantity is an accident. For which it must be understood that not every quantity is a thing really distinct from a substance inhering in it; as neither is every thing having part outside of part in situation or having part separate from part a thing really distinct from a substance.
And, indeed, as ‘to have part separate from part’ is not called an accident in the first mode; so not every quantity is called an accident in the first mode; but ‘to have part separate from part’ is called an accident in the second mode. For, if something substantially the same can at first ‘have part separate from part’ and afterwards can not ‘have part separate from part’ through a proper change (as some Catholics say. And it has already been mentioned before, that the body of Christ has in a mode ‘part separate from part’; for) it is locally and circumscriptively in heaven; and the same body though not destroyed can cease to be locally and circumscriptively and can begin to be sacramentally under the species of bread. And so then it does not have part separate from part, yet the substance itself of the body of Christ is not destroyed. And so, when the same substance has at one time ‘part separate from part’ through a change of itself, at another time does not have ‘part separate from part,’ it is an accident; and yet it is not a thing always distinct and inhering in substance as if a thing really distinct from a substance; so also quantity is an accident not in the first mode, but in the second mode. For, although some quality may not now be a thing really distinct from substance; on the contrary some substance is really the same as substance, the substance itself however remaining.
This can manifestly be true, ‘no quantity is really the same as substance’; for when it is assumed that God can thus bring it to pass, that it may not have part separate from part in situation, as in a mode the body of Christ is under the species of bread; then this is true, ‘no substance is a quantity’; and some quantity is then not really the same as substance. So then this is true, ‘no substance having part separate from part’ is really the same as that substance, for it has that cause of reality. This substance is not ‘having part separate from part’ in situation; and so a substance ‘having part separate from part’ in situation can be called accident, if the term ‘accident’ is accepted in the second mode; for sometimes this is true, ‘this substance is substance having part separate from part,’ and sometimes it is not true without the corruption of that substance; although for this, that those contradictories may be successively verified, there is required a local change of that substance. So these obtain at the same time, ‘any quantity is not a thing other than a substance,’ and ‘quantity is an accident.’ For so many state, that any relation is not a thing other than a substance, and yet that relation is an accident.
And this, for these contradictories can be successively verified by virtue of a change of that substance: ‘this substance is really the same as quantity,’ ‘this substance is not really the same as quantity.’ But for the verification of such contradictories nothing is required except a local change of that substance and no other. And, therefore, it is necessary that every quantity be some absolute thing really distinct from substance; and certainly for all such, unless it should displease those loathing logic, it might be able to be briefly and easily stated that this is true, ‘quantity is not a thing really distinct from substance,’ if quantity be substituted significatively or personally; but this is true, ‘quantity is an accident,’ if quantity be substituted simply, and even if it be substituted personally; for an indefinite is verifiable for one singular. For thus John of Damascus posits in his Logic in Chapter XXXIII., that “number is an accident” and yet he posits that “number itself is things enumerated.” Whence, he says under ‘discretion’: “Number is reduced to a quantum and language is reduced into number, but we call these ‘enumerated.’” From which it is gathered that number, since it may be a quantity, is called an accident; and yet number is itself a thing enumerated. So we also say that white is an accident and yet something white is man. Thus we also say that man and white differ and yet we say that man is white. Whence, through this mode it can easily and evidently be shown that, although these two may be conceded; ‘some quantity is not a thing really distinct from substance,’ and ‘some quantity is an accident’; it is not necessary to concede that the same thing may be substance and accident. Whence all arguments, which can be offered against these, are sophistical; nor do they not have any other way of being solved except through the fallacy of equivocation; for they do not have another defect.
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