From the previous arguments it can easily be seen that it is not contrary to experience to posit that quantity is not a thing other than substance and quality; for, when substance is divided without the loss of a part, it is not more necessary for quantity than for substance to be destroyed. For quantity, as substance, can be thus divided without the loss of part; for whenever wood is divided, it is not necessary for any absolute thing to be destroyed.
It is also possible that a substance, which at first is of a greater quantity, may become that of a smaller without the corruption of any absolute thing; which is obvious in the condensation of a thing. For when anything is condensed, it is inconsistent to posit that the whole preceding quantity may be corrupted; therefore, it is necessary that some preceding quantity may remain, or therefore, the whole remains without the newness of any part; and then a thing becomes a smaller quantity without the corruption of any absolute thing, and consequently by virtue of this it is not necessary for quantity to be distinguished from substance; or the preceding quantity remains so, however, that some part of the preceding quantity may be corrupted, which can not stand. Because if any part of a preceding quantity be corrupted, I take that part of a substance which was at first the primary subject of that quantity or of that part of the quantity; and I ask whether it now remains without quantity, which can not be granted; for then a substance or part of a substance, which was before a quantum, would naturally not become a quantum, if it itself remains, which is false and impossible; or it is the subject of some part of a quantity, and then even of a new part, which can not be granted; for there is no greater reason that one part of a condensed may take on a new quantity than another; and so it is necessary that either a whole substance according to any part of itself or according to nature take on a new quantity, or is the subject of some pre-existing thing, which can not obtain; for then some part of a quantity would pass from subject into subject, which is impossible through nature, although God could be able to do this; but God administers things that He may allow them to control their own proper movements.
Therefore, according to all the previous statements it remains that, when some thing is condensed and becomes a smaller quantity, no absolute thing is lost or corrupted; but the same thing, which was at first a greater quantity, is afterwards a smaller quantity without the entire corruption of an absolute thing through this, that parts of the same thing were before more separate in situation than now. And so it is evidently obvious that by virtue of such an experience it is not necessary to posit that quantity is an absolute thing other than quality and substance.
On the contrary, by virtue of experience it is necessary to posit that quantity is not another absolute thing bearing qualities and really distinct from substance, of whose substance some part or the whole may be destroyed, when some substance may be a quantity smaller than before. For it is obvious through experience that sometimes some thing becomes a less quantity, although no part of whiteness or of taste or of another like quality may be lost. If this is admitted, I ask whether or not each preceding part remains now as before. If you say that each part of the preceding quantity remains, it is necessary to concede that, when a thing becomes a smaller quantity, no part of the quantity is lost, which is the proposition.
But if you say that some part of the preceding quantity is lost or corrupted, and it is manifest that there is no greater reason that one part is corrupted than another; therefore, the whole is corrupted, which is inconsistent.
Similarly I ask whether the entire preceding quantity be corrupted or only a part. Since, at the destruction of a primary and immediate subject, there may follow a destruction of an accident existing in that, it follows that either the whole whiteness or a part of it is corrupted whenever any thing is condensed. And similarly it is necessary to concede this of taste and of any sensible quality, which is contrary to experience; and so it is contrary to experience to say that whenever any substance is condensed or becomes a smaller quantity, some absolute thing bearing qualities may be destroyed. And, indeed, it is in harmony with experience that, when any substance becomes a smaller quantity through condensation or through another mode without the loss of any part of a substance, no absolute thing bearing qualities is corrupted, neither as regards itself as a whole nor as regards its parts; as it is in agreement with experience that then many qualities neither as regards themselves as wholes nor as regards their parts are destroyed or lost. And indeed that substance does not become a smaller quantity through the destruction of any absolute accident, but through this, that parts of that substance are now less separate in situation than before; and in the same mode the parts of extended qualities in this substance are now less separate than before without the destruction or loss of any absolute accident at all.
And if you ask in what way substance is now a quantity smaller than before, if it has lost no thing, it must be said that this is by virtue of an active cause which, as it can move some thing locally, so it possible for parts reciprocally to approach which were before more separate. And, therefore, for this thing to be a smaller quantity now than before, is not other than for the parts of that thing to be less separate locally or in situation now than before.
Nor is any thing required for these except parts, which are separate, and an agent effectively causing them to be separate, together with a final cause. On the contrary, it appears wonderful that a single cheap created thing might be able to distend those parts of a substance; and yet the omnipotence of God might not be able to make the very same parts of a species to be separate, unless He should join one such thing distinct from them.
← Chapter XXXVI That the Previous Opinion Ought Not to Be Rejected as Heretical · Contents · Chapter XXXVIII How All Lengths Are of the Same Species, and How Some Differ in →