(1) Now that we have treated certain matters that seemed irrelevant to our principal concern,1 but necessary nevertheless, we shall return to our plan and treat of another mode of concrete and abstract names. Some of what was said above2 can be made clear on the basis of this [mode].
(2) For there are certain abstract names, or there can be at the pleasure of those who institute [words],3 that equivalently include some syncategoremata or some adverbial or other determinations, in such a way the abstract [form] is equivalent in signifying to the concrete [form], or to another term taken with some syncategorema or some other word or words. For users can, if they want, use one word in place of several. For example, in place of the whole ‘every man’, I could use the word ‘a’, and in place of the whole ‘only man’, I could use the consonant ‘b’, and so on. If this were done, it would be possible that a concrete [term] and the [corresponding] abstract [term] would not supposit for distinct things or signify distinct things, and yet it would be false to predicate the one of the other, and something would be predicated of the one and not of the other. For if the abstract [term] ‘humanity’ were equivalent in signifying to the whole ‘man insofar as he is a man’ or ‘man inasmuch as he is a man’, [then] ‘A man runs’ would be true, and ‘A humanity runs’ [would be] false, just as ‘A man insofar as he is a man runs’ is false. Likewise, if the name ‘humanity’ were equivalent to the whole ‘man necessarily’, so that the word ‘humanity’ were put in place of the whole ‘man necessarily’, [then] ‘A humanity is a man’ would be false, just as ‘A man necessarily is a man’ is false. For no man is necessarily a man, but only contingently.4 In the same way, ‘A humanity is white’ is false, just as ‘A man necessarily is white’ is false.
(3) In this way, whenever one wishes, he can keep it so that a concrete [term] and [its corresponding] abstract [term] do not signify distinct things or supposit for distinct things, and nevertheless that it is simply false to predicate the one of the other, and that something is predicated of the one that is not predicated of the other. So some [people]5 could say that quantity is not a thing distinct from substance and quality, and yet each of ‘A substance is a quantity’ [and] ‘A quality is a quantity’ is false. For if the name ‘quantity’ were equivalent in signifying to the whole [expression] ‘necessarily a quantum as long as it remains in the natural world’, or something like that, [then] ‘A substance is a quantity’ would be false, even when maintaining the [above] opinion, just as ‘A substance necessarily is a quantum as long as it remains in the natural world’ is false. What is said about this example can be said about many others [too], both in divine matters and in the case of creatures.
(4) For in some such way one could keep it so that the divine essence and understanding and will are in no way distinguished in God, and [yet] ‘God understands by [his] intellect’ would be true and ‘God understands by [his] will’ [would be] false. Likewise, it could be said that the soul is in no way distinguished from the intellect and the will, and yet ‘The understanding understands’ would be true and ‘The will understands’ would not. And so on for many other cases.
(5) Thus, in such cases I think there is more a verbal difficulty that depends on logic [for its solution] than [there is] a real [difficulty]. For this reason, those who know no logic have uselessly filled up innumerable volumes concerning such matters, making a difficulty where there is none, and forsaking the difficulty they ought to be investigating.
(6) But notice that, even though in common speech such abstract [terms] equivalent in signifying to many such words rarely or never have [any] place, nevertheless in the sayings of the philosophers and saints, familiar abstract [terms] are frequently found to be taken in this way. Thus, Avicenna, Metaphysics V,6 takes [the term ‘horsehood’] like this when he says, “Horsehood is nothing other than horsehood only; for by itself it is neither one nor many, neither existing in these sensibles nor in the soul.” He meant nothing else than that ‘horse’ is not defined by ‘one’ or by ‘many’, or by ‘being in the soul’ or by ‘being in external reality’, so that none of these [expressions] occurs in its definition. And so he meant that the name ‘horsehood’, as he was then using it, would be equivalent in signifying to many words, whether they are uttered all together or with a verb and copula in between. Thus, he did not mean that horsehood would be some thing, and nevertheless that this thing would not really be one or many, neither actually7 outside the soul nor in the soul. For that is impossible and absurd. Rather he meant that nothing like that8 occurs in its definition. That this is what he meant is clear enough to anyone who looks at his words. Thus, he says,9