(1) We still have to discuss another mode of concrete and abstract names. Thus, there are certain abstract [names] that only supposit for many [things] taken together, although the concrete [forms] can be verified for one [thing] alone. For example, ‘people’ and ‘popular’, ‘plebs’1 and ‘plebeian’ are related [in this way]. Even though any man can be plebeian and popular, nevertheless no man can be the plebs or [be] the people. Those2 who maintain that number is not a thing other than the numbered things should include among such names all the abstract and concrete names of numbers, if any concrete and abstract [forms] are found among such [names]. Thus, according to such a view, it should be granted that men are a number, and many animals are a number, and that angles are ternary or quaternary, and so on — unless perhaps they want to deny such a predication by saying that such terms are equivalent in signifying to many words, in the way stated in the preceding chapter.
(2) Let all this suffice about concrete and abstract [names], even though perhaps other modes of concrete and abstract names could be given. And let no one reproach me if I pass over some [things] in the present work, because I do not promise that I shall discuss all [things], and [so] leave nothing for the diligent to investigate. Rather, I am going to run through some brief matters for the usefulness of simple [people].
Translation by Paul Vincent Spade, CC BY 4.0. Source: Indiana University ScholarWorks. Changes: format conversion only (PDF to Markdown; footnotes, italics and paragraph numbers kept; margin line numbers and page headers dropped).
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