(10) The first [alternative] cannot be granted, because I ask how those [two] men, who are substances, are distinguished. Either (i) the one is a part of the other, or (ii) they are certain wholes [that are] in themselves wholly distinct, or (iii) something is a part of both [of them], even though not everything that is a part of the one is a part of the other. The first and second [alternatives] cannot be granted, as is plainly clear. Neither can the third [alternative] be said, because since a physical man is composed only of matter and form, it would have to be the case that either matter or form would not be a part of the other of those [two] men. And in that case the one of them, that is, the metaphysical [man] or the physical one, would be only matter or only form, which is absurd.

(11) It does no good to say that the metaphysician considers man in one way, and the natural [philosopher] in another, and for this reason man considered by the metaphysician is distinguished from man considered by the natural [philosopher]. For even if that were the case, it would not follow from this that one man would be a metaphysical [man] and another a physical [man]. Rather, it would follow that there would be only a different consideration of the same man. If Sortes⁷ sees Plato clearly and Socrates [does so] obscurely, [then] even though the one’s vision is different from the other’s, nevertheless the seen Plato is not different. So [too], even though the natural [philosopher’s] and the metaphysician’s consideration of man are different, nevertheless the man considered is not different. So, therefore, there is not one thing that is a physical man and another that is a metaphysical man.

(12) Neither can it be said that the concept or utterance is different.⁸ For the concept will either be a definition or a part of a definition or something predicable of man. And it is clear that whichever [alternative] is given, it is beside the point.⁹

(13) From all of this, it is established that definitions can be distinct even though the defined is the same. Yet, granted that the definitions are distinct, nevertheless those definitions signify the same, and whatever is signified by the one, or by part of the one, is signified by the other, or by part of the other, even though the parts differ in [their] mode of signifying because some part of the one [definition] is in another case than [is the corresponding] part of the other.

(14) Now you have to know that, even though the defined taken significatively is predicated of whatever the definition taken significatively is predicated of, and conversely, and even though a hypothetical proposition made up of the definition and the defined is necessary, and even [a proposition] about the possible or [a proposition] equivalent to such [a proposition] — for example, ‘If it is a man, it is a rational animal’ is necessary, and conversely, and likewise ‘Every man can be a rational animal’ (taking the subject for what can be a man) [is necessary], and conversely — nevertheless no such¹⁰ affirmative merely assertoric proposition merely about the present is necessary. Thus, ‘A man is a rational animal’ is simply contingent, as is ‘A man is a substance composed of a body and an intellective soul’. This is because if no man existed, each such [proposition] would be false. Nevertheless Aristotle, who claims that ‘A man is an animal’, [and] ‘An ass is an animal’ are necessary,¹¹ would maintain that such [propositions] are necessary.

(15) From the above it can be gathered that the definition is not the same as the defined. For, according to everyone, the definition is a discourse, either mental or spoken or written. Consequently, it is not really the same as the thing, or with one word.¹² Nevertheless, a definition signifies the same [things] as [does] the defined. Those who speak correctly understand it in this sense when they say that a definition and the defined are really the same — that is, they signify the same.

(16) Now you have to know that there is no definition, taken strictly in this sense, except of a substance only (as the thing expressed by the definition). Therefore, taking ‘defined’ for the name convertible with the definition, there is such a definition only of names, not of verbs or of the other parts of speech.

(17) A nominal definition, on the other hand, is an expression that reveals explicitly what is conveyed by a word. For example, someone who wants to teach [someone] else what the name ‘white’ signifies says that it signifies the same as [does] the expression ‘something having a whiteness’. There can be this [kind of] definition not only for names of which ‘to be’ can be truly verified in reality,¹³ but also [for names] of [things] of which such predication is impossible. Thus ‘vacuum’, ‘non-being’, ‘impossible’, ‘infinite’, [and] ‘goat-stag’ have definitions. That is, there correspond to these names certain expressions that signify the same [things] that these words [do].

(18) It follows from this that, taking ‘definition’ in this sense, sometimes it is impossible to predicate the definition of the defined by means of the verb ‘is’, when both [the definition and the defined] are taken significatively. Thus, ‘A chimera is an animal composed of a goat and an ox’ (let that be its definition¹⁴) is impossible. This [is so] because of an impossible implication, namely, [the one] by which it is implied [by this proposition] that something is composed of a goat and an ox. Nevertheless, the proposition “‘Chimera” and “animal composed of a goat and an ox” signify the same [things]’, in which the terms supposit materially, is true. By the first [proposition] speakers generally understand this second one, even though properly speaking it is another [proposition entirely]. Thus, just as, according to Priscian, one word is often put for another, as he illustrates in Constructions I,¹⁵ so [too] one expression is often put for another. Nevertheless, the conditional made up of such a defined and [its] definition is true. For ‘If something is a chimera, it is composed of a man and a lion’,¹⁶ and conversely, is true.

(19) Now not only names can be defined by such a [nominal] definition, but also all the parts of speech can be defined in this way — namely, verbs, conjunctions, etc. Adverbs like ‘where’, ‘when’, ‘as many’, [as well as] conjunctions and such are defined in this way. In that case, the definition should not be predicated of the defined by means of the verb ‘is’ when both [the definition and the defined] are taken significatively. Rather the whole [expression] ‘to signify the same’, or something like that, should be verified of those [terms] taken materially, or else another expression should be verified of [the defined] when it is taken materially, by saying [for example] ‘Where is an interrogative adverb of place’, ‘When is an interrogative adverb of time’, and so on.

Translation by Paul Vincent Spade, CC BY 4.0. Source: Indiana University ScholarWorks. Changes: format conversion only (PDF to Markdown; footnotes, italics and paragraph numbers kept; margin line numbers and page headers dropped).

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Footnotes

1. In the preceding chapters, Ockham discussed the terms ‘universal’ and ‘singular’ (Chs. 14–17), the five Porphyrian “predicables” in general (Ch. 18), and then each of the five in turn: ‘individual’ (Ch. 19), ‘genus’ (Ch. 20), ‘species’ (Chs. 21–22, Ch. 22 is on the comparison of genus to species), ‘difference’ (Ch. 23), ‘property’ (Ch. 24). and ‘accident’ (Ch. 25). ↩

2. ‘real definition’ = definitio exprimens quid rei = “definition expressing what the thing is.” See n. 149 below. ↩

3. ‘nominal definition’ = definitio exprimens quid nominis = “definition expressing what the name means.” On this notion, see Ch. 10, above. ↩

4. These are both in the genitive in Latin. ↩

5. ‘sensitive’. That is, having sensation. ↩

6. That is, each part of the definition has an extension that includes more than the defined, but the combination of all the parts exactly fits the defined. On such definitions, see Aristotle, Posterior Analytics II, 13, 96a24–b14. It is not clear to me that this really constitutes a third kind of real definition. ↩

7. ‘Sortes’. This is the usual mediaeval form for ‘Socrates’. But in the present example, “Sortes” and “Socrates” and plainly meant to be two different people. ↩

8. Alternative (b) in para. 9, above. ↩

9. The same argument is meant to apply to utterances. ↩

10. That is, put together out of the definition and the defined. ↩

11. See, for example, Aristotle, Prior Analytics I, 15, 34b16–17: “For of necessity man [is an] animal.” For Aristotle, of course, the world is eternal, and species like man and ass are not contingent things. ↩

12. That is, the term defined. ↩

13. That is, for names of things that really exist. ↩

14. No one seems to have been completely sure just what a chimera was supposed to be. Various definitions like the one here are found in the literature. See, for instance, the definition at the end of this chapter. ↩

15. Priscian, Institutiones grammaticae, XVII, c. 23, nn. 168–172 (ed. A. Keil, II, pp. 89–94). ↩

16. See n. 160 above. ↩