(1) Now you must know that supposition is first divided into personal, simple and material supposition.
(2) Personal supposition, in general, is that [which occurs] when a term supposits for its significate, whether that significate is (a) a thing outside the soul, whether it is (b) an utterance, or (c) an intention of the soul, whether it is (d) an inscription, or anything else imaginable. So whenever the subject or predicate of a proposition supposits for its significate in such a way that it is taken significatively, the supposition is always personal.
(3) [Here is] an example of the first case, (a): In saying ‘Every man is an animal’, ‘man’ supposits for its significates. For ‘man’ is imposed only to signify these men. For it does not properly signify anything common to them, but rather the men themselves, according to Damascene.1
(4) [Here is] an example of the second case, (b): In saying ‘Every spoken name is a part of speech’, ‘name’ supposits only for utterances. But because it is imposed to signify those utterances, therefore it supposits personally.
(5) [Here is] an example of the third case, (c): In saying ‘Every species is a universal’ or ‘Every intention of the soul is in the soul’, either subject supposits personally. For it supposits for the [things] it was imposed to signify.
(6) [Here is] an example of the fourth case, (d): In saying ‘Every written word is a word’, the subject supposits only for its significates, that is, for inscriptions. Therefore, it supposit personally.
(7) It is clear from this that those who say personal supposition occurs when a term supposits for a thing2 are not describing personal supposition sufficiently. Instead, this is the definition: that personal supposition occurs when a term supposits for its significate and [is taken] significatively.
(8) Simple supposition occurs when a term supposits for an intention of the soul, but is not taken significatively. For example, in saying ‘Man is a species’, the term ‘man’ supposits for an intention of the soul, because that intention is a species. Yet the term ‘man’ does not properly speaking signify that intention. Rather, the utterance and the intention of the soul are only signs subordinated in signifying the same [thing], in the manner explained elsewhere.3
(9) From this it is clear that those [people’s] opinion is false who say generally that simple supposition occurs when a term supposits for its significate.4 For simple supposition occurs when a term supposits for an intention of the soul that is not properly a significate of the term. For such a term signifies true things and not intentions of the soul.5
(10) Material supposition occurs when a term does not supposit significatively but supposits for an utterance or for an inscription. This is clear in ‘Man is a name’. ‘Man’ supposits for itself, and yet it does not signify itself. Likewise, in the proposition ‘Man is written’ the supposition can be material, because the term supposits for what is written.
(11) You have to know that, just as this threefold supposition belongs to a spoken utterance, so [too] can it belong to an inscribed utterance. Thus, if the four propositions ‘A man is an animal’, ‘Man is a species’, ‘Man is a monosyllabic utterance’, ‘Man is a written word’ are written down, each of them can be verified, but only for different things. For what is an animal is in no way a species or a monosyllabic utterance or a written word. Likewise, what is a species is not an animal or a monosyllabic utterance, and so on. In the last two propositions the term [‘man’] has material supposition.
(12) But [material supposition] can be subdivided, insofar as [a term in material supposition] can supposit for an utterance or for an inscription. If there were names imposed [for this purpose], supposition for an utterance and for an inscription could be distinguished [from one another] just as supposition for a significate [is distinguished from supposition] for an intention of the soul, the one of which we call personal and the other simple. But we do not have such names.
(13) Now just as such a diversity of [kinds of] supposition can belong to a spoken and a written term, so too can it belong a mental term. For an intention can supposit for what it signifies, for itself, for an utterance and for an inscription.
(14) Now you have to know that supposition is not called “personal” because it supposits for a person, or “simple” because it supposits for [something] simple, or “material” because it supposits for matter. Rather, [they are so called] for the reasons stated. Therefore, the terms ‘material’, ‘personal’, ‘simple’ are used equivocally in logic and in the other sciences. Nevertheless, they are not often used in logic except with ‘supposition’ added.
Translation by Paul Vincent Spade, CC BY 4.0. Source: Indiana University ScholarWorks. Changes: format conversion only (PDF to Markdown; footnotes, italics and paragraph numbers kept; margin line numbers and page headers dropped).
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Footnotes
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John Damascene, Dialectica, Ch. 10, PG 94, col. 571A; Latin version by Robert Grosseteste, Ch. 2, n. 8, ed. cit., p. 4. ↩
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For example, William of Sherwood. See his Introduction to Logic, Ch. 4, Kretzmann, tr., p. 107: “It is personal, however, when a word supposits what it signifies, but for a thing that is subordinate [to what it signifies], as in ‘a man is running’ (homo currit); for running is in man because of some individual (Cursus enim inest homini gratia alicuius singularis).” (Kretzmann’s insertions.) ↩
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See Ch. 1, above. The point is not well put here. It is not that both the utterance and the intention of the soul are “subordinated” signs. Rather, the former is subordinated to the latter. ↩
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For example, Walter Burley, The Longer Treatise on the Purity of the Art of Log- ic, Tract. 1: “On the Properties of Terms,” Part 1, Ch. 3, Spade tr., para. 27–41 (forthcoming). See also William of Sherwood, loc. cit.: “It is simple when a word supposits what it signifies for what it signifies (supponit significatum pro significato), as in ‘man is a species.”’ (Kretzmann’s insertion.) ↩
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Of course, some terms do signify intentions of the soul. For example, the term ‘intention of the soul’. Ockham is speaking very broadly here. ↩