(1) It is to be noted too that a term always, in whatever proposition it occurs, can have personal supposition unless it is restricted to another [kind of supposition] by a voluntary [agreement] among the users, just as an equivocal term can supposit in any proposition for any of its significates unless it is restricted to a definite significate by a voluntary [agreement] among the users. But a term cannot in every proposition have simple supposition or material, but only in a [proposition] where such a term is matched with another extreme that pertains to an intention of the soul or to an utterance or an inscription.
(2) For example, in the proposition ‘A man runs’, [the term] ‘man’ cannot have simple or material supposition. For ‘to run’ does not pertain to an intention of the soul or to an utterance or inscription. But in the proposition ‘Man is a species’, since ‘species’ signifies an intention of the soul, therefore it can have simple supposition. And [in that case] the proposition has to be distinguished with respect to the third mode of equivocation,1 insofar as the subject can have simple or personal supposition. In the first sense the proposition is true, because then it is denoted that one intention of the soul, or concept, is a species, and that is true. In the second sense, the proposition is just false, because then it is denoted that some thing signified by ‘man’ is a species, and that is plainly false.
(3) In the same way ‘Man is predicated of several [things]’, ‘Risible is an attribute of man’, ‘Risible is predicated first2 of man’ have to be distinguished. They have to be distinguished both on the part of the subject and on the part of the predicate. Likewise, ‘Rational animal is the definition of man’ has to be distinguished. For if [‘rational animal’] has simple supposition, [the proposition] is true; if personal, it is false. So too for many [other] such cases. For instance, for ‘Wisdom is an attribute of God’, ‘Creative is an attribute of God’, ‘Goodness and wisdom are divine attributes’, ‘Goodness is predicated of God’, ‘Unbegottenness is a property of the Father’, and the like.3
(4) Similarly, when a term is matched [in a proposition] with some extreme that pertains to an utterance or an inscription, the proposition has to be distinguished insofar as the term can have personal or material supposition. In this way, ‘Socrates is a name’, ‘Man is a monosyllabic utterance’, ‘Paternity signifies a characteristic of the Father’ have to be distinguished. For if ‘paternity’ supposits materially, then ‘Paternity signifies a characteristic of the Father’ is true,4 because the name ‘paternity’ does signify a characteristic of the Father. But if it supposits personally, [the proposition] is false, because paternity [either] is a characteristic of the Father or else [just] is the Father himself.5 In this way too, ‘Rational animal signifies the quiddity of man’, ‘Rational signifies a part of man’, ‘White man signifies an accidental aggregate’, ‘White man is a composite term’, and so on for many [other] such cases, [all] have to be distinguished.
(5) Therefore, the following rule can be given: When a term [that is] able to have the above threefold supposition is matched with an extreme common to non-complex or complex [expressions], whether spoken or written, the term can always have material or personal supposition and such [a proposition] has to be distinguished. But when it is matched with an extreme signifying an intention of the soul, [the proposition] has to be distinguished insofar as [the subject] can have simple or personal supposition. When it is matched with an extreme common to all the above, then [the proposition] has to be distinguished insofar as [the term] can have personal, simple or material supposition. Thus ‘Man is predicated of several [things]’ has to be distinguished. For if ‘man’ has personal supposition, [the proposition] is false, because then it is denoted [by the proposition] that some thing signified by the term ‘man’ is predicated of several [things]. If [the term] has simple or material supposition, [the latter] either for an utterance or for an inscription, [then the proposition] is true, because the common intention, as well as the utterance and what is written down, is predicated of several [things].
Translation by Paul Vincent Spade, CC BY 4.0. Source: Indiana University ScholarWorks. Changes: format conversion only (PDF to Markdown; footnotes, italics and paragraph numbers kept; margin line numbers and page headers dropped).
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Footnotes
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The three modes of equivocation are given by Aristotle at Sophistic Refutations 4, 166a14–21. The third mode occurs “when words that have a simple sense taken alone have more than one meaning in combination; e.g., ‘knowing letters’. For each word, both ‘knowing’ and ‘letters’, possibly has a single meaning: but both together have more than one — either that the letters themselves have knowledge or that someone else has it of them” (Oxford translation). ↩
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This sense of “first” is derived from the Aristotelian notion of a “first subject” of an attribute. See Posterior Analytics I, 4, 73b25–74a3. ↩
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Presumably the point is that terms like ‘attribute’ (= attributum, passio) and ‘property’ (= proprium) signify universals — which for Ockham means that they signify universal concepts. ↩
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It would also be true if it supposited simply, since concepts signify too for Ockham. ↩
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The alternative is added in case you are worried about introducing a distinction into the divine simplicity by suggesting that the characteristic is something the Father has. In either case, the point is that paternity, in this sense, does not signify a characteristic of the Father. ↩