1 Tim. 1. 9.
WE are at this time to demolish one of the strongest holds that the Adversary hath: For, it may be supposed, that the eighth verse cannot be so much against them, as the ninth is for them: therefore Austin observeth well, The Apostle (saith he) joyning two things, as it were contrary, together, doth monere & movere, both admonish and provoke the Reader to finde out the true answer to this question, how both of them can be true. We must therefore say to these places, as Moses did to the two Israelites fighting, Why fall you out, seeing you are brethren? Austin improveth the objection thus, If the Law be good, when used lawfully, and none but the righteous man can use it lawfully, how then should it not be but to him, who onely can make the true use of it? Therefore, for the better understanding of these words, let us consider, who they are that are said to know: and secondly, what is said to be knowne.
The subject knowing is here in this Verse in the singular number, in the Verse before in the plurall: it’s therefore doubted, whether this be affirmed of the same persons or no. Some Expositors thinke those in the eighth, and these in the ninth, are the same, and that the Apostle doth change the number from the plurall to the singular; which is very frequent in Scripture: as, Galat. 6. 1. Others (as Salmeron) make a mysticall reason in the changing, Because (saith he) there are but few that know the Law is not made for the righteous, therefore he speaketh in the singular number. There is a second kind of Interpreters, and they do not make this spoken of the same, but understand this word, as a qualification of him that doth rightly use the Law: Thus, The Law is good, if a man use it lawfully; and he useth it lawfully, that knoweth it’s not made for the righteous. Which of these interpretations you take is not much materiall: onely this is good to observe, that the Apostle, using these words, We know, and Knowing, doth imply, what understanding all Christians ought to have in the nature of the Law.
Secondly, let us consider, what Law he here speaks of. Some have understood it of the ceremoniall Law, because of Christs death that was to be abolished, and because all the ceremonies of the Law were convictions of sinnes, and hand-writings against those that used them: But this cannot be; for circumcision was commanded to Abraham a righteous man, and so to all the godly under the Old Testament: and the persons, who are opposed to the righteous man, are such, who transgresse the Morall Law. Others, that do understand it of the Morall Law, apply it to the repetition and renovation of it by Moses: for, the Law being at first made to Adam upon his fall, wickednesse by degrees did arise to such an height, that the Law was added because of transgressions, as Paul speaketh: But we may understand it of the Morall Law generally; onely take notice of this, that the Apostle doth not here undertake a theologicall handling of the use of the Law, (for that he doth in other places) but he brings it in as a generall sentence to be accommodated to his particular meaning concerning the righteous man here. We must not interpret it of one absolutely righteous, but one that is so quoad conatum and desiderium; for the people of God are called righteous, because of the righteousnesse that is in them, although they be not justified by it. The Antinomian and Papist doe both concurre in this errour, though upon different grounds, that our righteousness and works are perfect, and therefore do apply those places; A people without spot or wrinkle, &c. to the people of God in this life, and that not onely in justification, but in sanctification also. As (saith the Antinomian) in a dark dungeon, when the doore is opened, and the sun-light come in, though that be dark in it self, yet it is made all light by the sun: Or, As water in a red glasse, though that be not red, yet, by reason of the glasse, it lookes all red: so though we be filthy in our selves, yet all that God seeth in us looks as Christs, not onely in Justification, but Sanctification. This is to be confuted hereafter.
Thirdly, let us take notice how the Antinomian explaineth this place, and what he meanes by this Text. The old Antinomian, Islebius Agricola, states the question thus: Whether the Law be to a righteous man as a teacher, ruler, commander, and requirer of obedience actively: Or, Whether the righteous man doth indeed the works of the Law, but that is passivè; the Law is wrought by him, but the Law doth not work on him. So then, the question is not, Whether the things of the Law be done, (for they say the righteous man is active to the Law, and not that to him) but, Whether, when these things are done, they are done by a godly man, admonished, instructed, and commanded by the Law of God: And this they deny. As for the later Antinomian, he speaketh very uncertainly, and inconsistently: Sometimes he grants the Law is a Rule, but very hardly and seldome; then presently kicketh all down again: For, saith he, it cannot be conceived that it should rule, but also it should reigne; and therefore think it impossible, that one act of the Law should be without the other. The damnatory power of the Law is inseparable from it: Can you put your conscience under the mandatory power, and yet keep it from the damnatory? (Assertion of Grace page 33. Again, the same Author, page 31.) If it be true that the Law cannot condemne, it is no more a Law, saith Luther. I say not that you have dealt as uncourteously with the Law, as did that King with Davids servants, who cut off their garments by the midst: but you have done worse, for even, *Joab-*like, under friendly words, you have destroyed the life and soule of the Law. You can as well take your Appendices from the Law, as you terme them, and yet let it remain a true Law; as you can take the brains and heart of a man, and yet leave him a man still. By this it appeareth, that if the Law doth not curse a man, neither can it command a man, according to their opinion. The same Author again, pag. 5. He dare not trust a beleever to walk without his keeper [the Law,] as if he judged no otherwise of him then of a malefactor in Newgate, who would kill and rob if his Jaylor were not with him: Thus they are onely kept within the compasse of the Law, but are not keepers of it. Yet, at another time, the same Author calls it a slander, to say, that they deny the Law. Now, who can reconcile these contradictions? Nor is this shufling and uncertainty any new thing; for the old and first Antinomian did many times promise amendment, and yet afterwards fell to his errour again; after that he condemned his errour, and recanted his errour in a publike Auditory, and printed his revocation, yet, when Luther was dead, hee relapsed into that errour: so hard a thing it is to get poison out, when it’s once swallowed downe.