The Whole Theology of the Law of Nature

ROM. 2. 14, 15.

BEfore I handle the other places of Scripture that are brought by the Antinomians against the Law, it is my intent, for better methods sake, and your more sound instruction, to handle the whole Theology of the Law of God in the severall distributions of it, and that positively, controversally, and practically; and I shall begin first with the law of Nature, that God hath imprinted in us, and consider of this two waies: 1. As it is a meere law; and secondly, As it was a covenant of works made with Adam: And then in time I shall speak of the Morall Law given Moses, which is the proper subject of these controversies.

The Text I have read is a golden Mine, and deserveth diligent digging and searching into: Therefore, for the better understanding of these words, let us answer these Questions:

1. Who are meant by the Gentiles here? It is ordinarily known,¹ that the Jewes did call all those Gentiles that were not Jewes, by way of contempt; as the Greeks and Romans called all other nations Barbarians. Hence sometimes in the Scripture the word is applyed to wicked men, though Jewes: as, Psal. 2. Why doe the heathen rage? It may be interpreted of the Pharisees resisting Christ. Indeed, the Jewes will not confesse, that the word […] Gentes, is any where applyed to them: but this is very false, for Genes. 17. Abraham is there said to be the father of many nations, ([…] Gentes:) therefore they must either deny themselves to be Abraham’s seed, or else acknowledge this word belonging to them. But generally it signifieth those that had not the Lawes of Moses, nor did live by them. Therefore Gal. 2. 14. […], to live like a Gentile, is, not to observe the Lawes of Moses: and in this sense it is to be taken here; for the Apostles scope is to make good that great charge upon all mankinde, both Jew and Gentile, that naturally they are wholly in sin; and God, being no accepter of persons, will destroy the one as well as the other. And whereas it might be thought very hard to deale thus with the Gentile, because no law was delivered unto him, as unto the Jew, the Apostle answereth that Objection in this place. But grant it be understood of such Gentiles, then there is a greater Question whether it be meant of the Gentiles abiding so, or the Gentiles converted and turned beleevers; for, that the Apostle speaks of such, most of the Latine Interpreters, both ancient and modern, doe affirme: and so the Greek Father, Chrysostome, and Estius, a learned Papist, doe think there are so many arguments for it, that it’s certaine. I confesse, they bring many probable reasons; but I will not trouble you with them: this seemeth a strong argument against them, because the Apostle speaks of such who are without a law, and a law to themselves, which could not be true of Gentiles converted: we take the Apostle therefore to speak of Gentiles abiding so; but in this sense there is also a dangerous exposition and a sound one. The poysonous interpretation is of the Pelagians, who understand the law written in their hearts, in the same sense as it is used, Jerem. 33. even such a fulfilling of the law which will attaine to salvation; and this they hold the Heathens by the law and help of nature did sufficiently: But this is to overthrow the doctrine of Grace and Christ. Therefore the sound interpretation is of the Gentiles indeed, but yet to understand the law written in their hearts, onely of those relicts of naturall reason and conscience, which was in the Heathens, as is to be proved anon.

The 2d. Question is easily answered, How they are said to be² without a law; to wit, without a written law, as the Jewes had; so that we may say, they had a law without a law; a law written, but not declared.

The 3d. Question, In what sense they are said to doe the things of³ the law, and that by nature. To doe the things of the law is not meant universally of all the Heathens, for the Apostle shewed how most of them lived in the Chapter before: nor secondly universally in regard of the matter contained in the law, but some externall acts, as Aristides and Socrates, with others. And here it’s disputed, Whether a meere Heathen can doe any work morally good? But wee answer, No: for every action ought to have a supernaturall end, viz. the glory of God, which they did not aime at; therefore we do refuse that distinction of a morall good,⁴ and theologicall, because every morall good ought to be theologicall: they may do that good matter of the law, though not well. And as for the manner how, by nature; those Interpreters that understand this Text of Gentiles beleevers, say, Nature is not here opposed to Grace, but to the law written by Moses; and therefore make it nature enabled by grace: but this is shewed to be improbable. By nature therefore we may understand that naturall⁵ light of conscience, whereby they judged and performed some externall acts, though these were done by the help of God.

The next Question is, How this Law is said to be written in their hearts? You must not, with Austine, compare this place with that gracious promise in Jeremy, of God writing his law in the hearts of his people. There is therefore a two-fold writing in the⁶ hearts of men; the first, of knowledge and judgement, whereby they apprehend what is good and bad: the second is in the will and affections, by giving a propensity and delight, with some measure of strength, to do this upon good grounds. This later is spoken of by the Prophet in the covenant of Grace, and the former is to be understood here, as will appeare, if you compare this with Chap. 1. 19.

The last Question is, How they declare this Law written in their⁷ hearts? And that is first externally, two waies: 1. By making good and wholesome lawes to govern men by; and 2. By their practice, at least of some of them, according to those lawes: And secondly internally, by their consciences, in the comfort or feare they had there.

Observat. There is a law of Nature written in mens hearts. And if this be not abolished, but that a beleever is bound to follow the direction and obligation of it, how can the Antinomian think that the Morall Law, in respect of the mandatory power of it, ceaseth? Now, because I intend a methodicall Tractate of the severall kindes of Gods Law, you might expect I should say much about Lawes in generall; but because many have written large Volumes, especially the School-men, and it cannot be denyed but that good rationall matter is delivered by them; yet, because it would not be so pertinent to my scope, I forbeare. I will not therefore examine the Etymology of the words that signifie a Law; whether Lex in the Latine come of legendo because it was written to be read (though that be not alwaies necessary;) or of ligando, because a law binds to obedience; or of deligendo, because it selects some precepts: nor concerning […] in the Greek, whether it come of […], which is improbable; or of […], because it distributes to every one that which is right: neither the Hebrew word […], which some make to come of […], to instruct and teach; others of the word […], that signifieth a disposition, or compiling of things together as lawes use to be. In the next place, I will not trouble you with the definition of a law, whether it be an act, or habit, or the soul it selfe: onely this is good to take notice of, against a fundamentall errour of the Antinomian, about a law in generall; for they conceive it impossible but that the damning act of a law must be where the commanding act of a law is, and this is frequently urged (as I shewed the last time:) Therefore observe, that there are only two things goe to the essence of a law, (I speak not of externall causes) and that is, first, Direction, secondly, Obligation: 1. Direction, therefore a law is a rule; hence the law of God is compared to a light. And, Prov. 20. 27. there is a notable expression of the law of Nature, It’s a candle of the Lord, searching the inwards of the belly. So it is observed, that the Chaldee word for a law, is as much as light. The second essentiall constitute of a law is, Obligation, for therein lyeth the essence of a sinne, that it breaketh this law, which supposeth the obligatory force of it. In the next place there are two Consequents of the Law which are ad bene esse, that the Law may be the better obeyed; and this indeed turneth the law into a covenant, which is another notion upon it, as afterwards is to be shewn. Now as for the sanction of the law by way of a promise, that is a meere free thing; God, by reason of that dominion which he had over man, might have commanded his obedience, and yet never have made a promise of eternall life unto him. And as for the other consequent act of the law, to curse, and punish, this is but an accidentall act, and not necessary to a law; for it cometh in upon supposition of trangression: and therefore, as we may say of a Magistrate, He was a just and compleat Magistrate for his time, though he put forth no punitive justice, if there be no malefactors offending; so it is about a law, a law is a compleat law oblieging, though it do not actually curse: as in the confirmed Angels, it never had any more then obligatory, and mandatory acts upon them; for that they were under a law is plaine, because otherwise they could not have sinned, for where there is no law, there is no transgression. If therefore the Antinomian were rectified (Rom. 4. 15) in this principle, which is very true and plain, he would quickly be satisfied: but of this more in another place. But wee come to the particulars of the doctrine, the pressing of which will serve much against the Antinomian. Therefore, for the better understanding of this Law of Nature, consider these particulars:

1. The nature of it in which it doth consist, and that is in those common notions and maximes, which are ingraffed in all mens⁸ hearts: and these are some of them speculative, that there is a God; and some practicall, that good is to be imbraced, and evill to be avoided: and therefore Aquinas saith well, that what principles of Sciences are in things of demonstration, the same are these rules of nature in practicals: therefore we cannot give any reasons of them; but, as the Sun manifests it selfe by its owne light, so doe these. Hence Chrysostome observeth well, that God, forbidding murder, and other sins, giveth no reason of it, because it’s naturall: but, speaking of the seventh day, why that in particular was to be observed, he giveth a reason, because on the seventh day the Lord rested, not but that the seventh day is morall, (as some have denyed.) but because it’s not morall naturall, onely morall positive, as the Learned shew.

2. The difference of its being in Adam and in us. This is necessary⁹ to observe; for it was perfectly implanted in Adams heart, but we have onely some fragments, and a meere shadow of it left in us. The whole Law of Nature, as it was perfectly instructing us the will of God, was then communicated to him: and howsoever God, for good reasons hereafter to be mentioned, did give, besides that law of Nature, a positive law to try his obedience; yet the other cannot be denyed to be in him, seeing he was made after Gods image, in righteousnesse, and holinesse, and otherwise Adam had been destitute of the light of reason, and without a conscience. Therefore it’s a most impudent thing in Socinus, to deny that Adam had any such law or precept, and that hee could not lye, or commit any other sin though hee would; for, it may not be doubted, but that if Adam had told a lye, or the like, it had been a sin, as well as to eate of the forbidden¹⁰ fruit.

3. The naturall impression of it in us. We have it by nature; it’s not a superadded work of God to put this into us. This assertion is much opposed by Flaccus Illyricus, who, out of his vehement desire to aggravate originall sin in us, and to shew how destitute we are of the image of God, doth labour to shew, that those common notions and dictates of conscience are infused de novo into us, and that wee have none of these by nature in us. And a godly man, in his Book of Temptations, holdeth the same opinion. Illyricus indeed hath many probable arguments for his opinion, but he goeth upon a false supposition, that the Apostle his scope is, to compare a Gentile supposed onely to doe the Law, and not asserted to doe it, before a Jew who was an hearer of the Law, but not a doer of it: therefore, to debase the Jew, he saith, the Apostle speaketh conditionally, to this purpose, If an Heathen should keep the Law, though he be not circumcised, yet he would be preferred before you; not (saith he) that the Apostle meaneth assertively and positively that any such doe: and therefore presseth the word […], which is a particle of the Subjunctive Mood, and is equivalent to […], If the Gentiles, &c. But his supposition is false; for the Apostle’s scope is, to shew that the Gentile hath no excuse if God condemne him, because hee hath a law in himselfe: as appeareth, verse 12. As for the other consideration of […], though Erasmus render it [cum fecerint;] yet that particle is applied to the Indicative Mood, as well as the Subjunctive. It cannot therefore be true, which hee saith, that the Apostle speaketh such great things of men by nature, that if they were true, it would necessarily justifie all Pelagianisme. I shall not speak of his many arguments against naturall principles and knowledge of a God; for he doth in effect at last yeeld to it.

4. The extent of it. And here it’s very hard to measure out the bounds of the law of Nature; for, some have judged that to be condemned by the law of Nature, which others have thought the law of Nature approveth: so true is that of Tertullian, Legem Naturae opiniones suas vocant, They call their opinions the law of Nature. There are foure waies of bounding this law.

5. Some make it those generall things, wherein man and beast agree;¹¹ as, defence of it self, and desire of life: but by this meanes, that of naturall honesty and righteousnesse would be excluded; for, a beast is not capable of any sin, or obligation by a law. And howsoever that be much disputed upon, Why God would have the beast killed that killed a man; yet, to omit the thoughts of many about it, that was not because a beast could be tyed by a law: but God, to shew the horridnesse of the fact, would have the very instrument punished.

6. Some bound it by the custome of Nations, that is, jus Gentium; but that is so diversified, that a sin with some was a vertue with others.

7. Some doe bind it by reason in every man: but this is very uncertaine, and one mans reason is contrary to anothers, and one mans conscience is larger then anothers; even as it is with measures in divers countries, though they have the same name, as a bushell, &c. yet they are different in quantity, one is larger then another.

Lastly, Others bound it by the will of God, declared and manifested first to Noah in seven precepts, and afterwards to Moses in the ten Commandements: but these extend the law of Nature not onely to first principles, but conclusions also deduced from thence.

5. The obligation of it, when the law of Nature doth bind: And¹² that is from God the authour of it, God onely is under no law. Every beleever, though justified by Christ, is under the Morall Law of Moses, as also the law of Nature: but now this law of Nature doth not so properly bind, as it’s mans reason or conscience, as that it is the Vicegerent of God, or a command from him: and thus Cain by the law of Nature found a tye upon him not to sin, and guilt because he did sin in murdering his brother, although there was no Morall Law as yet given. It is true, indeed, our Divines doe well reprove the Papists, for calling all that time from Adam to Moses, a state, or law of Nature: and this the Papists doe, that therefore to offer sacrifice unto God may be proved from the law of Nature; whereas those sacrifices, being done in faith, had the word of God, otherwise we were bound still to offer Lambs or Kids to God, which they deny.

6. The perpetuity of this obligation. This Law can never be abrogated.¹³ And herein we may demand of the Antinomian, Whether the law of Nature doe bind a beleever, or no? Whether he be bound to obey the dictates of his naturall conscience? Suppose a beleever hath his naturall conscience dictating to him, This sin he may not doe; is he not obliged hereunto not onely from the matter (for that he grants,) but as it is a law and command of God implanted in his soule? I know there is a difference between the law of Nature, and the ten Commandements, as may be shewed hereafter; but yet they agree in this, that they are a rule immutable, and of perpetuall obligation. Therefore think not, that because he dyed to free you from the curse of the Law, that therefore you are freed from the obedience unto the law naturall, or delivered by Moses. To deny this, is to deny that a beleever is bound to obey the sure dictates of a naturall conscience. I know we are not alwayes bound to follow what conscience suggests, for that is obscured and darkened; but I speak of those dictates which are naturally known.

Other particulars, as, The insufficiency of it to direct in worship, as also, to save men, I do put off, and make application of what hath been delivered.

Use 1. Of Instruction, against the Antinomian, who must needs overthrow the directive and obligative force of the law of Nature, as well as that of Moses; Doth not even Nature teach you (saith the Apostle?) Now if a man may not care for Moses teaching, need he care for Nature teaching? It is true (I told you) sometimes they grant the Law to be a rule, but then afterwards they speak such things as are absolutely inconsistent with it.

There were some (as Wendelinus reports) Swencfeldians, that held a man was never truly mortified, till he had put out all sense of conscience for sinne; if his conscience troubled him, that was his imperfection, he was not mortified enough. I should doe the Antinomians wrong, if I should say, they deliver such things in their books; but let them consider, whether some of their Positions will not carry them neere such a dangerous rock: For, if the Law have nothing to doe with me in respect of the mandatory part of it, then if I be troubled for the breach of it, it is my weaknesse, because I am not enough in Christ.

Use 2. Of Reproofe, to those who live against this Law. Sins that are against the Law of Nature do most terrifie. How many live in such sins that the law of Nature condemneth? Doth not Nature condemne lying, couzening in your trades, lusts, and uncleannesse? How many Trades-men are there that need not a Paul? Even Tully in his Book of Offices will condemne their lying, sophisticate wares, and unlawfull gain. It’s much how farre they saw this way. Sinnes against naturall conscience are called Crying sinnes; and, though men have repented of them, yet how long is it ere faith can still their cry? Have not many Heathens been faithfull and just in their dealings? It’s true, that man hath not godlinesse, who hath only naturall honesty; therefore there are many spirituall sinnes that he never humbleth himself for: as Paul saith, he knew not the motions of his heart to be sinne. Hence men are to be exhorted to get further light, and more tendernesse then a naturall conscience can ever attain unto. Neverthelesse, if men so live, as if they had not this Law in their hearts, they are the more inexcusable: Are there not men who call themselves Christians, that yet the very Heathens will condemne at that great day?

Use 3. Why it is so hard to beleeve in the Lord Christ; because here is nothing of nature in it, it’s all supernaturall. The Papists say, we make an easie way to heaven; for, let a man be never so great a sinner, yet if he doe but beleeve, all is well. Now the people of God, sensible of their sin, find nothing harder for, it’s in the law of Nature they should not lye, or steale, but that they should beleeve in Christ for pardon, when labouring under their offences, here nature doth not help at all. I acknowledge it’s a dispute among Divines, Whether in that law implanted in Adams heart, there was not also a power to beleeve in Christ, when revealed? But of that hereafter; but the orthodox deny, that he had explicite justifying faith, for that was repugnant to the condition he was in. But the thing I intend is, to shew how supernaturall and hidden the way of beleeving is. No marvell therefore if it be made such a peculiar work of the Spirit, to convince of this sinne.

Footnotes

1. Who meant by Gentiles. ↩

2. How the Gentiles are said to be without a Law. ↩

3. How said to do the things of the Law by nature. ↩

4. The distinction of Morall and Theologicall good rejected. ↩

5. What is here meant by Nature. ↩

6. A two-fold writing of the Law in mens hearts, and which here meant. ↩

7. The law written in mens hearts two waies. ↩

8. The Law of Nature consists in those common notions which are ingraffed in all mens hearts. ↩

9. Some fragments onely of this Law left in us. ↩

10. Those common notions, in which this law consists, are in us by nature. ↩

11. Foure bounds of the law of Nature. ↩

12. The obligation of the law of Nature is from God. ↩

13. The obligation of the law of nature is perpetual and immutable. ↩