ROM. 2. 14.
THe Doctrine already gathered from these words is, that, The Gentiles have a law of Nature written in their hearts: Which law doth consist partly in light and knowledge of speculative principles; and partly in practice and obedience to practicall principles. So then from hence we may consider, first, Of the light of Nature, and then secondly, Of the power of Nature; and from both these we may have profitable matter, and also may confute some dangerous errours, which have poisoned too many. I shall begin therefore with the light of Nature, or Reason, and shall endeavour to shew the Necessity of it, and yet the Insufficiency of it: It is not such a starre that can lead us to Christ.
In the first place take notice, that this light of Nature may be considered in a three-fold respect:
First, As it’s a relict or remnant of the image of God: for, howsoever1 the image of God did primarily consist in righteousness and true holinesse; yet secondarily it did also comprehend the powers and faculties of the reasonable soule in the acts thereof: And this later part abideth. It is true, this light of Nature, comparatively to that of faith, is but as a glow-worme to the Sun; yet some light and irradiation it hath. God, when he made man, had so excellently wrought his owne image in him, that man could not fall, unlesse that were also destroyed; as they write of Phidias, who made Alexanders statue, yet had wrought his own picture so artificially in it, that none could break Alexanders statue, but he must also spoile Phidias his image, who was the maker of it: And thus it is in Adams fall, yet there remaineth some light still, which the Apostle calleth (Rom. 1.) Truth; he vouchsafeth that name to it, They detain the truth in unrighteousnesse. Now this moon-light or glimmering of Nature is of a three-fold use:
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For societies and publike Common-wealths, whereby they have2 made wholsome lawes. It’s wonderfull to consider, how excellent the Heathens have been therein. Thus Chrysostome, speaking how the most excellent men need the counsell of others, instanceth in Jethro’s advice to Moses, about choosing assistant officers: That great man Moses (saith he) who was so potent in words and workes, who was the friend of God, which commanded the creatures, was helped incounsell by Jethro his father-in-law, an obscure man, and a Barbarian: Although, to speak the truth, Jethro, when he gave this counsell, was not so, but had the knowledge of the true God.
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This light of nature serveth for the instigation and provocation3 of men to many good actions and duties towards God and man. Hence still observe that phrase, They detain: reason and naturall light is bound, as a prisoner, by the chaines of lusts and sinfull affections; which thing Aristotle doth fully set forth in his incontinent person, whom he describeth to have a right opinion in the generall about that which is good; yet, being too much affected to some particular pleasure or profit, by that meanes the better part is over-born: and therefore Aristotle saith, the better part of the minde did provoke to better things. This agreeth with that of Paul. And as they bound captivated practicall truths towards man, so they also imprisoned them about God. Plato had the knowledge of one God, yet he dared not to communicate it to the vulgar: Therefore (saith he) Opificem universorum neque invenire facile, neque inventum in vulgus promulgare tutum: It was not easie to finde out the Maker of the world, nor yet safe to make known to the people him, when he was found out. Here for feare of the people, he detained this truth. And Austin hath a most excellent chapter, cap. 10. lib. 6. de Civit. to shew how Seneca kept the truth in unrighteousnesse: he speaks of a Book Seneca wrote (which now is lost) against Superstitions, where he doth most freely and boldly write against the practices of their worship; but, saith Austin, He had liberty in his writing, but not in his life, Libertas affuit scribenti, non viventi. I will name some passages, because they are applicable to Popish Idolatry, as well as Paganish. They dedicate their gods in most base materialls, and call them gods, which if taking life, they should meet us on a sudden, we should judge them monsters. They doe things so unseemly grave men, so unworthy free-men, so unlike wise sound men, that no man would doubt but that they were mad, if there were but few of them, whereas now the multitude of those that are thus mad is a patronage to them; Immortales deos in materia vilissima & immobili dedicant—Numina vocant, quae si spiritu accepto subitò occurrerent, monstra haberentur—Faciunt tam indecor a honestis, tam indigna liberis, tam dissimillima sanis, ut nemo fuerit dubitaturus furere eos, si cum paucioribus furerent; nunc sanitatis patrocinium est insanientium turba. But Seneca, when he had spoken thus, and much more, in the scorn of those gods, what doth he resolve upon that his wise man shall doe in those times? Let him not religiously account of them in his minde, but feigne them in his outward acts, In animi religione non habeat, sed in actibus fingat. And again, All which things a wise man will observe, as commanded by Law, not as acceptable to God, Quae omnia sapiens ser vabit tanquam legibus jussa, non diis grata. And further, Istam ignobilem deorum turbam, quam longo aevo longa superstitio congessit, sic adorabimus, ut meminerimus cultum ejus ad morem magis pertinere quam rem. Some say, Seneca was coetaneous with Paul, and that he had Paul’s Epistles; might he not (if so) see himself described in this phrase, detaining the truth in unrighteousnesse? But how well doth Austin in the same place stigmatize him? He worshipped, what he reproved; did, what he argued against; adored, what he blamed; Colebat, quod reprehendebat; agebat, quod arguebat; quod culpabat, adorabat. And are there not many such Popish spirits, that know their superstitions and falshoods, yet, because of long custome, will not leave them? What else was the meaning of Domitianus Calderinus, when, speaking of going to Masse, he said, Eamus ad communem errorem? And so it was a speech of a disputing Sophister, Sic dico quando sum in scholis, sed, penes nos sit, aliter sentio. You see then by this, that naturall truth would encline to better actions, but it is suppressed. When I say, naturall light enclineth the heart to good, it is to be understood by way of object meerly, shewing what is to be desired, not that we have any strength naturally to what is good. If you aske why truth, apprehended by naturall light, should be lesse efficacious to alter and new-mould the heart and life, then truth received by faith (for in the Scripture we reade of wonderfull conversions; and the Heathens have but one story that they much boast of, of one Palemon (if I mistake not) who was a great drunkard, and came to deride Socrates, while he was reading his discourse to his scholars, but was so changed by that lecture, that he left off his drunkennesse: This alteration was only in the skin, and not in the vitalls. What then should be the difference?) I answer, not that one truth in it selfe is stronger then another, but the difference is in medio, or instrumento, the instrument to receive this truth. When Nature receives a truth, it’s but with a dimme eye, and a palsie-hand; but when we receive it by faith, that is accompanyed with the power and might of the holy Ghost. The influence of truth by naturall light, is like that of the Moon, waterish and weak, never able to ripen any thing; but that of faith is like the influence of the Sun, that doth heat, and soon bring to maturity.
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The last use of this naturall light is, to make men inexcusable;4 for, seeing they did not glorifie God according to their knowledge, for that they are justly condemned. This indeed is not the onely use of the light of Nature, as some say; but it is a main one, Rom. 1. 20. not that this is the end of God, in putting these principles into us, but it falleth out by our sinfulness. But how are they inexcusable, if they could not glorifie God by nature, as they ought? Some answer, the Apostle speaks of excuse in regard of knowledge: but if you understand it of power, it is true; for by our fault we are unable, and none went so farre as naturally they were able. And thus Nature is considered in the first place.