ROM. 2. 14.
WE have already positively and plainly (so farre as wee conceived necessary) declared and proved the truth about the power and ability of a man by Nature to doe that which is good: now it remaineth we should antidote against those Objections that doe militate against this truth, and that indeed with much shew of reason; for never have men been more witty, then when they have undertaken to be the patrons of Nature. But Austin well called it vitreum acumen: the more it glitters, the easier it’s broken. The Heathens are very obstinate in propugning mans power. Onely sluggards need Gods help, Ignavis opus est auxilio divino, saith Seneca the Tragedian; and so the other Seneca: It is the gist of the gods that we live, but our own doing that we live well, Deorum quidem munus esse quòd vivimus, nostrum verò quòd bene sancteque vivimus: and that of Tully is very arrogant, lib. 3. de nat. deorum, Quia sibi quisque virtutem acquirit, neminem è sapientibus unquam de ea gratias Deo egisse: and (saith he) Wee are praised for our vertue; which could not be, if it were the gift of God, and not of our selves. But how different are the holy men in the Scripture, from these wise men of the world, who when they have been enabled by God to doe any good thing, have not taken the glory of it to themselves? And, as Joab did about Rabbah, when he had taken it, sent to David to come and take all the glory; so doe they say, Not I, but the grace of God, 1 Corinth. 15. […], is to be understood, which was present with mee, not which did work1 with mee.
Finst therefore they say, If so be we are not able to doe any thing towards our salvation, this is to turn men into stockes, and stones, or beasts, and so no difference between them and us. But we say, Although those similitudes the Scripture holds forth doe prove our inability for that which is good, yet they must not be made alike in all things. It’s true, to convert men, is to make children unto Abraham out of stones; yet we must not think that is therefore an universall likenesse between men and stones: For first, consider this vast dissimilitude; In stones and beasts there is no passive capacity of grace, but in man there is. We say, there is a power for grace in a mans nature; and the Papists say, there is a power: only they say it’s an active power, though remote; we say, only a passive. There is a power to be converted to God, which is not in stones or beasts: they say, there is a power to convert or turn to God; here is a great difference.
Besides, wee may consider these degrees in the creatures: 1. There is an inclination to such an act, as in the fire to burne. 2. A spontaneous inclination to some acts accompanied with sense, and sensible apprehensions, as in beasts. 3. A willing inclination accompanied with reason or judgement, and this is in man: Now, because man is thus affected, therefore God in converting, though he doth it by a potent work, yet by arguments, which we never use to horses, or brute beasts: and although man hath lost that rectitude in his will and mind, yet hee hath not lost the faculties themselves; therefore though he be theologically dead, yet hee is ethically alive, being to be wrought upon by arguments. Hence is that saying, To will is of nature, To will well of grace, To will ill of corrupt nature. Hence wee may grant those objections, that if a man had not this free-will (if you doe not extend it to good things) there could be no conversion or obedience; for grace doth not destroy, but perfect nature.
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This putteth men upon speaking and preaching contradictions:2 For so some have said, that the Calvinists; though they be Calvinists in their Doctrines, yet they are Arminians in their Uses. And they say, How incongruous is it, to tell us we can doe nothing of our selves, and then to make this use, Therefore let us seek out for the grace of Christ? But to answer, 1. This contradiction may be cast as well upon Christ and Paul: Take Christ for an instance, John 6. in that Sermon, he bade the Jewes labour for that meat that perisheth not, and yet at the same time said, None can come unto mee, except my Father draw him. Might not the Arminian say, How can these two things stand together? So John 15. our Saviour telleth them, Without him they can doe nothing, and yet at the same time he exhorteth them, to abide in him, and keep his commandements: So Paul; take two instances from him, Rom. cap. 9. & cap. 11. The Apostle there sheweth, God will have mercy on whom he will have mercy, and that it is not of him that runneth or willeth, but of God that calleth; yet he bids them that stand take heed lest they fall: and, Be not high-minded, but feare. So Phil. 2. 12, 13. Work out your salvation with feare and trembling; for it’s God that worketh in you both to will and to doe. This reason, in their sense, would quite overthrow the former. Nay (say they) it being attributed thus to God, and to man, it seemeth both doe it How this may be answered, wee shall see anon. But to make u[…] speak contradictions, because we presse a duty, and yet acknowledge Gods grace or gift to doe it, is to make a perpetuall discord between precepts and promises: For the same things which God commands us to doe, doth hee not also promise to doe for us, as, to circumcise our hearts, and, to walk in his commandements How much better is that of Austius, O man, in Gods precepts acknowledge what thou oughtest to doe, in his promises acknowledge that thou canst not doe it? But 2. we may returne upon them, that their Sermons and Prayers are contradictions; they say, they can doe it, and then they pray God they may doe it: They say, the Will may receive the grace of God, and may obey God calling; and then they pray, God would make them obey his calling; as much as to say, O Lord, make me to obey if I will.
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This evacuateth the whole nature of Gods precepts and commands:3 For, say they, Is not this to make God mock us, as if wee should bid the blind man see; or tell a dwarfe, if hee would touch the heavens with his singer, he should have so much mony? Now, to this many things are to be said: as, first, If these things were absolutely and simply impossible, that which they say would be true; but a thing may be said to be impossible three waies:
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Simply and universally, even to the power of God: and so all those things are, that imply a contradiction; and this impossibility ariseth from the nature of the thing, not from any defect in God: Yea, wee may say with one, Potentissimè hoc Deus non potest.
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There may be a thing impossible in its kind; as for Adam to reach the heavens, for a man to work above naturall causes.
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That which is possible in it self to such a subject, but becomes impossible accidentally through a mans fault. Now for a man to be commanded that, which through his own fault he becometh unable to do, is no illusion or cruelty. If a creditor require his debt of a bankrupt, who hath prodigally spent all, and made himself unable to pay, what unrighteousnesse is this? Therefore they are but odious instances, of touching the skies, of bidding blind men to see; for this Rule observe, Whatsoever is so impossible, that it is beyond a duty required, or power ever given, extra officium debitum, and potentiam unquam datam, that indeed were absurd to presse upon men. Again consider, that the commands of God doe imply if any power, then more then they will acknowledge; for they suppose a man can doe all of himself without the grace of God, and therefore indeed the old Pelagian, and the new Socinian speak more consonantly then these, that divide it between grace, and the power of man.