The Law Given to Adam, Considered as a Covenant

GENES. 2. 17.

I Have already handled this Text, as it containeth a law given to Adam by God, as a foveraigne Lord over him; now I shall re-assume this Text, and consider it as part of a Covenant, which God did enter into with Adam and his posterity; for these two things, a Law, and a Covenant, arise from different grounds: The Law is from God as supreme, and having absolute power, and so requiring subjection; the other ariseth from the love and goodnesse of God, whereby he doth sweeten and mollifie that power of his, and ingageth himself to reward that obedience, which were otherwise due, though God should never recompence it. The words therefore being heretofore explained, and the Text eas’d of all difficulties, I observe this Doctrine, That God did (Doctr) not only, as a Law-giver, injoys obedience unto Adam; but as a loving God, did also enter into covenant with him. And for the opening of this, you must take these Considerations:

1. That this covenant with Adam in the state of innocency, is more¹ obscurely laid down, then the covenant of grace after the fall: for afterwards you have the expresse name of the Covenant, and the solemne entring into it by both parties; but this Covenant made with Adam, must only be gathered by deduction and consequence. This Text cometh the neerest to a Covenant, because here is the threatning expressed, and so by consequent some good thing promised to obedience. We are not therefore to be so rigid, as to call for expresse places, which doe name this Covenant; for that which is necessarily and immediately drawn from Scripture, is as truly Scripture, as that which is expresly contained in it. Now there are these grounds to prove God dealt in these commandements by way of Covenant:

2. From the evil threatned, and the good promised. For, while² there is a meere command, so long it is a law onely; but when it is further confirmed by promises and threatnings, then it becomes a Covenant. And if that position be true of some, which maketh the tree of life a sacrament, then here was not onely nudum pactum, a meer covenant; but a seale also to confirme it. And certainly, being God was not bound to give Adam eternall life if he did obey, seeing he owed obedience to God under the title of a creature, it was of his meere goodnesse to become ingaged in a promise for this. I know it’s a Question by some, Whether Adam, upon his obedience, should have been translated into heaven, or confirmed onely in that naturall life, which was marvellous happy? But either way would have been by meer promise of God, not by any naturall necessity. Life must be extended as farre as death; now the death threatned was not onely a bodily death, but death in hell: why therefore should not the life promised be a life in heaven?

In the second place, another argument to confirme that God³ dealt in a Covenant with Adam is, in that his posterity becomes guilty of his sin, and so obnoxious unto the same punishment which was inflicted upon Adam in his own person. Now we must come to be thus in Adam, either by a naturall propagation, and then Adam should be no more to us then our parents, and our parents sins should be made ours as well as Adams; which is contrary to the Apostle, Rom. 5. who chargeth it still upon one man. And besides, who can say, that the righteousnesse, holinesse and happinesse, which we should have been partakers of in Adams standing, could come by a naturall necessity, but onely by the meere covenant and agreement of God? Adams repentance might then have been imputed to us, as well as his sin.

Lastly, the Apostle Rom. 5. makes all men in Adam, as the godly are in Christ: now beleevers come to receive of Christ, not from a naturall necessity, because they have that humane nature which Christ took upon him, (for so all should be saved) but by a federall agreement.

2. Let us consider in the next place, what a Covenant doth imply;⁴ first in the word, then in the thing signified. For I should deal very imperfectly, if I did not speak something of the generall nature of it, though hereafter more may be spoken of. You may therefore take notice, that there are things among men, that doe induce a publike obligation, that yet doe differ: A Law, a Covenant, and a Testament. Now a Law and a Testament, they are absolute, and doe not imply any consent of the party under them: As a Law requireth subjection, not attending unto, or expecting the consent of inferiours; and so a Testament, or a Will of man, is to bequeath such goods and legacies unto a man, not expecting a consent. Indeed sometimes such goods are bequeathed with a condition, and so a man may refuse whether he will be executor, or no; but this is accidentall to the nature of a Testament. But a Covenant, that differs from the two former, in that it doth require consent and agreement between two parties: and in Divinity, if it be between man entire and upright, it is called by some, A Covenant of friendship; if it be between God and man fallen, it is called, A Covenant of reconciliation. Hence in Covenants, that are not nuda pacta (meer Covenants) but are accompanied with some solemnities, there were stipulations added, which were done by Question and Answer: Doe you promise? I promise. Hence it is called […] and we call it Stipulation, from the Latine word, which comes from the Greek word, […], or […], which is as much as […], or […], because these words did make the Covenant valid. As for Isidorus his etymology of stipulation, à frangendis stipulis, because, when they promised or entred into an agreement, they brake a stick between them, and then joyning it together, so made a promise, and every party kept a piece, as a tally, to maintain their agreement; this is rejected by the learned Salmasius.

But because a Covenant doth thus differ from a Testament, hence hath it troubled the Learned, why the Hebrew word, which signifieth a Covenant, should be translated by the Septuagint, […], a Testament; and so the New Testament useth it in this sense: for, if it be a Covenant, how can it be a Testament, which implyeth no consent? Let us answer first to the word, and then to the matter. Therefore is a Covenant called […], a Testament, and not […] (as Aquila translates it) because this word is of a large sense, coming from […], to order and dispose: and when we say, the New or Old Testament, it is not to be taken so strictly, as we call a mans Will and Testament, though sometimes the Apostle doth, in reference to Christs death; but more largely, for Gods gracious ordering of such mercies and spirituall benefits to us, by the death of Christ: for the Covenant of grace implyeth Christs death, it being a Covenant of reconciliation. Now, because there is in the Covenant of grace something of a Covenant, and something of a Testament also, hence some do call it a Testament-Covenant, because it is of a mixt nature. The rise of the Hebrew word Berith is variously conjectured: some make it to come from a word that signifieth to eat, because of the sacrifices and feasts that were at a Covenant: some from a word that signifieth to cut, because then in the striking of the Covenant, there was a division of the beast that was killed: some from the word that signifieth to create, as also to order and dispose things by way of likenesse: some from a word that signifieth to be pure, and to choose, either because it’s by agreement, or because in Covenants they ought to deal without all fraud: but I stand not upon these things.

By this which hath been said it may appeare, that the Covenant God made with Adam, though it be truly called a Covenant; yet no wayes a Testament, because there did not intervene the death of any to procure this good for Adam. Now to all this that hath been said, there must this caution be added, That a Covenant is not so properly said to be with God and man, as between man and man: for among them consent is requisite, and doth mutually concurre to make the Covenant valid: but neither in the Covenant of Nature or Grace is this consent anteceding the validity of the Covenant required in man. Therefore if you regard the use of the word, and the application of it, it doth denote Gods decree, and will, or promise about things, whether about the irrationall creatures, or the reasonable: Such was Gods Covenant not to drown the world, and Gods Covenant with day and night; yea, Gods Covenant with Abraham did induce an obligation and tye upon Abraham to circumcise his childe. And thus it was with Adam, Gods Covenant did not depend properly upon his consent and acceptation, for he was bound to doe as God commanded, whether he would agree, or no.

That Adams consent was not necessary to make the Covenant valid, doth appeare, in that he was bound to accept what God did require. And it’s indeed disputed, Whether Adam did so much as know (and if he did not know, he could not consent) that God did indent with him as a publike person, and so all his posterity in him; although it may truly be thought, that Adam did know this precept to be to him and his posterity: for hereby his sinne is made the more hainous, in undoing himself and all his; as also, by the knowledge of this, he would be the more thankfull unto God, that should propagate such great mercies to him and his, and also be made more vigilant against falling.

3. In the next place let us consider, how God can be said to covenant,⁵ or enter into a promise with man: for it may be thought an imperfection, and hereby God may seeme to lose his right, that he cannot doe what he will. But this may be easily answered; for, if God can give good things to man, he may also promise to give them: and therefore both to give, and to promise to give, are acts of liberality and dominion, and so not repugning to the majesty of God: Nor doth God by promising to give, lose his dominion, no more then he doth by giving. It is true, a promise doth induce an obligation, and so in man it is with some imperfection; but in God it is not, because he doth not hereby become obliged to us, but to his own self: so that we have not a right of justice to the thing, because God hath promised it to us; but only God cannot deny himself nor his word, and therefore we are confident.

And so Aquinas well, Deus non est debitor, quia ad alia non ordinatur, sed omnia ad ipsum, God by covenanting and promising doth not become a debtor, because he is not to be ordered for other things, but all things for him. Hence is that saying of God, Reddit debita nulli debens, donat debita nihil pendens: And so again, Justus est, non quia reddit debitum, sed quia facit quod decet summè bonum: So that when God entreth into a covenant or promise, you must conceive of this sutably to his great majesty; you must not apprehend of it, as when two men agree that are equall, and therefore a debt of justice ariseth between them, and one may implead the other; but as a mercifull condescension on Gods part, to promise such things to us, that so we might be the more confirmed in our hope in him. Hence Durand and Ariminensis labour to prove, that Gods promises doe not induce an obligation, but denote the disposition of God to give, although their arguments exclude onely a debt of justice from God. Therefore although in the Covenant God makes with man, there is a compact of mutuall fidelity, yet there is not a reciprocall, and equall right of covenanting, because of the inequality of the Covenanters; so that the whole disposition and ordering of the Covenant with such conditions is on Gods part, and not mans: Hence it’s called Gods Covenant, and not mans.

4. Consider why God will deale with man in a covenant way rather then in a meere absolute supreme way. There may be these Reasons:

5. That God might hereby sweeten and indeare himself to us. For,⁶ whereas he might require all obedience from us, and annihilate us at last, or at least not vouchsafe heaven and ever lasting happinesse; to shew how good and loving he is, he will reward that most bountifully, which is otherwise due to him: for God did not make man, because he needed him, but that there might be objects to whom he would communicate his love. Thou needest not my goodnesse, or, that extendeth not to thee, saith David. It’s Austins expression, The earth doth farre otherwise dry up, or swallow the water, thirsting for it, then the Sun beames, which also consume the water: the one doth it indigentiâ out of want; the other potentiâ, out of power and strength: so that Adam could not but have thankfull and loving thoughts of God, that would thus condescend.

6. Another Reason might be, to incite and incourage Adam the⁷ more to obedience. For, howsoever there was no sin in Adam, or remisnesse: yet this might serve as a meanes to preserve him in his obedience to God. And here you may see, that to do a duty, because of a reward promised, is not a slavish and unlawfull thing; for did not God deale thus with Adam? If he would obey, he should live; but if not, then he must dye. Will you say, with the Antinomian, That this was an unlawfull thing, and this was to make Adam legall, and one that was not affected with the goodnesse of God to him? It is true, if a man obey God out of love to any thing more then God, or equally with God, this is unlawfull, according to that, Minus te amat, qui tecum (Domine) aliquid amat.

7. That hereby Adams obedience might be the more willing and free.⁸ An absolute law might seeme to extort obedience, but a covenant and agreement makes it to appeare more free and willing, as if Adam would have obeyed, though there could have been no obligation upon him to doe it.

8. Consider that the nature of this Covenant was of works, and not⁹ of faith. It was not said to Adam, Beleeve, and have life eternall; but, Obey, even perfect and entire obedience. It is true indeed, there was faith of adherence and dependance upon God in his promise and word, and this faith doth not imply any imperfection of the state of the subject as sinfull, (which justifying faith doth) for it was in Christ, who in his temptations and tryalls did trust in God. And what the Old Testament calls trusting, the New calls beleeving; yea, some say, that this kind of faith shall be in heaven, viz a dependance upon God for the continuance of that happinesse which they doe enjoy. This faith therefore Adam had, but in that Covenant it was considered as a gracious act and work of the soul, not as it is now, an organ or instrument to receive and apply Christ.

With us indeed there is justifying faith and repentance, which keeps up a Christians life; as the Naturalists say, the calor innatus, and humidum radicale doe the naturall life: Faith is like the calor innatus and Repentance is like the humidum radicals; and, as the Philosopher saith, if the innate heat devoure too much the radicall moisture, or the radicall moisture too much the heat, there breed presently diseases: so it is with us, if beleeving make a man repent lesse, or repenting make a man beleeve the lesse, this turneth to a distemper.

Yet, though it were a Covenant of works, it cannot be said to be of merit. Adam though in innocency, could not merit that happinesse which God would bestow upon him: first, because the enjoying of God, in which Adams happinesse did consist, was such a good, as did farre exceed the power and ability of man. It’s an infinite good, and all that is done by us is finite. And then in the next place, Because even then Adam was not able to obey any command of God, without the help of God. Though some will not call it grace, because they suppose that onely cometh by Christ; yet all they that are orthodox do acknowledge a necessity of Gods enabling Adam to that which was good, else he would have failed. Now then, if by the help of God Adam was strengthned to do the good he did, he was so farre from meriting thereby, that indeed he was the more obliged to God.

6. God, who entred into this Covenant with him, is to be considered¹⁰ as already pleased, and a friend with him, not as a reconciled Father through Christ. Therefore here needed no Mediatour, nor comfort, because the soul could not be terrified with any sin. Here needed not one to be either medius, to take both natures; or Mediatour, to performe the offices of such an one. In this estate that speech of Luthers was true, which he denieth in ours, Dens est absolute considerandus. Adam dealt with him as absolutely considered, not relatively: with us, God without Christ is a consuming fire, and we are combustible matter, chaffe and straw: we are loathsome to God, and God terrible to us; but Adam he was Deo proximo amicus, & Paradisi colonus, as Tertullian, and therefore was in familiarity and communion with him.

But, although there was not that ordered administration and working of the three Persons in this Covenant of works, yet all these did work in it. Hence the second Person, though not as incarnated, or to be incarnated; yet he with the Father did cause all righteousnesse in Adam: and so the holy Ghost, he was the worker of holinesse in Adam, though not as the holy Spirit of Christ purchased by his death for his Church, yet as the third Person; so that it is an unlikely assertion which one maintains, That the Trinity was not revealed in this Covenant to Adam: so that this sheweth a vast difference between that Covenant in innocency, and this of grace. What ado is here for the troubled soul to have any good thoughts of God, to have any faith in him as reconciled? but then Adam had no fear, nor doubt about it.

7. This Covenant did suppose in Adam a power, being assisted by¹¹ God, to keep it; and therefore that which is now impossible to us, wa[…] possible to him. And certainly, if there had been a necessity to sin, it would have been either from his nature, or from the devill: Not from his nature, for then he would have excused himself by this, when he endeavoured to clear himself. But Tertullian speaks wittily, Nunquam figulo suo dixit, Non prudenter definxisti me, rudis admodum haereticus fuit, non obaudiit, non tamen blasphemavit, creatorem, lib. 2. ad Mar. cap. 2. Nor could any necessity arise from the devill, whose temptations cannot reach beyond a moral swasion. Therefore our Divines doe well argue, that if God did not work in our conversion beyond a morall swasion, he should no further cause a work good, then Satan doth evil.

Nor could this necessity be of God, who made him good and righteous: nor would God subtract his gifts from him before he sinned, seeing his fall was the cause of his defection, not Gods deserting of him the cause of his fall. Therefore, although God did not give Adam such an help, that de facto would hinder hi[…] fall, yet he gave him so much, that might and ought to prevents it. And upon this ground it is, that we answer all those cavills, why God doth command of us that which is impossible for us to doe: for the things commanded are not impossible in themselves, but, when required of Adam, he had power to keep them; but he sinned away that power from himself and us. Neither is God bound, as the Arminians fancy, to give every one power to beleeve and repent, because Adam in innocency had not ability to doe these; for he had them eminently and virtually, though not formally: But more of these things in the Covenant of grace.

Use 1. To admire with thankfulnesse Gods way of dealing with us his creatures, that he condescends to a promise-way, to a covenant-way. There is no naturall or Morall necessity that God should doe thus. We are his, and he might require an obedience, without any covenanting: but yet, to shew his love and goodnesse, he condescends to this way. Beloved, not onely we corrupted, and our duties, might be rejected; not onely we in our persons might be abashed, but had we all that innocency and purity which did once adorn our nature, yet even then were we unprofitable to God, and it was Gods goodnesse to receive it, and to reward it. Was then eternall life and happinesse a meere gift of God to Adam for his obedience and love? what a free and meere gift then is salvation and eternall life to thee? If Adam were not to put any trust in his duties, if he could not challenge God for a reward; how then shall we relye upon our performances, that are so full of sin?

Use 2. Further to admire Gods exceeding grace to us, that doth not hold us to this Covenant still. That was a Covenant which did admit of no repentance: though Adam and Eve had torn and rent their hearts out, yet there was no hope or way for them, till the Covenant of grace was revealed. Beloved, our condition might have been so, that no teares, no repentance could have helped us: the way to salvation might have been as impossible, as to the damned angels. To be under the Covenant of works, is as wofull, as the poore malefactour condemned to death by the Judge, according to the law, he falls then upon his knees, Good my lord spare me, it shall be a warning to me, I have a wife and small children, O spare me: But, saith the Judge, I cannot spare you, the Law condemnes you: So it is here, though man cry and roare, yet you cannot be spared, here is no promise or grace for you.

Footnotes

1. The covenant with Adam before the fall more obscurely laid down, then the covenant off grace after the fall. ↩

2. That God dealt with Adam by way of Covenant, appeares, 1. From evil threatned, and good promised. ↩

3. 2. Because his posterity becomes guilty of his sin, and obnoxious to his punishment.
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4. A Covenant implies Gods decree, will, or promise to, & concerning his creatures, whether rationall, or irrationall. ↩

5. God enters into Covenant with man by way of condescension, & makes promises unto him to confirme him in his hope and confidence in him. ↩

6. God deales with man by way of covenant, not of power, 1. To indeare himself unto him. ↩

7. 2. To incite man to more obedience.
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8. 3. To make this obedience more willing and free.
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9. The Covenant God made with Adam was of works, not of faith. ↩

10. God, entring into Covenant with Adam, must be looked upon as one already pleased with him, not as a reconciled Father through Christ. ↩

11. Gods Covenant did suppose a power and possibility in Adam to keep it. ↩