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THere be two parts of obedience. Vertue, and the action of Vertue. 2. Pet. 1. 5. Ad to your Faith Vertue, &c. For if these things be with you and abound, they will make you that yee shall neither be barren nor unfruitfull in the knowledge of our Lord Iesus Christ.
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This distribution is of the whole into members· for these two are in their own nature joyned together, and doe make one and the same obedience.
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Hence both vertues and their actions are set forth by the same name, and are explained also by the same definition, because they are altogether of the same nature: even as arguments of Logicke, are of the same name and nature, whether they be considered alone and by themselves, or in Axioms, and Syllogismes.
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Vertue is an habit whereby the will is inclined to doe well.
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It is called an habit, not as it is distinguished from disposition, and signifieth a confirmed and perfect constitution of mind: for such a degree of vertue is scarce granted to men, while they live heere: but generally, as it containes both a perfect and also imperfect degree of Vertue, and state of the mind.
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But it is called an habit, not onely because it is had, but also because it maketh the subject which it is in to have it selfe in a certaine manner, that is, it determines the faculty to good, which otherwise is not determined, in which sence this word is found, Hebr. 5. 14. Who by reason of habit, have their sences exercised to discerne good and evill.
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It is in the will. First, because the will is the proper subject of the Theology as it is the proper principle of life, and of morall and spirituall actions. 2. Because the will is that faculty which is properly carried unto good that is honest, Rom. 7. 19. 21. 3. Because vertue is an habit that is […] or elective, the proper, and immediate operation whereof is voluntary election. 4. Because the will doth commend the other faculties, and so Vertue doth most agree to it, that all may be directed aright. 5. Because the will is neither by it selfe, nor by reason sufficiently determined to good actions, and so it hath need of its owne and internall disposition to worke aright. 6. Because the other faculties may he compelled, and by consequence one may whether he will or no lose vertue, if it should have the proper and fixed seat, in them. 7. Because that praise is most properly due to the actions of the will, and to the operations of the other faculties, so far forth as they flow from and depend upon the will; but that it is proper to vertue to be praise-worthy, not onely the Philosophers teach, but also the Apostle, Philippians 4. 8. If there be any vertue, if any prayse. 8. Because neither the understanding can be the subject of vertue, because intellectuall habits, although they bee most perfect, yet they doe not make a man good, nor any sensitive appetite, because true vertue is found in Angels, and the soules being separated from bodies, which are void of this appetite: yet there are often in the sensitive faculties some dispositions, which cause that the will commanding aright is more easily obeyed, and in that respect they have a certaine resemblance of Vertue.
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Vertue is said to incline to God. First, that it may be distinguished from a vitious habit whereby men are inclined to evill. Rev. 7. 17. 20. 23. 2. That it may be distinguished also from those perfections of the mind, which indeed doe bring light, whereby the will may direct it selfe as well doing, but not incline it to doe right.
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Hence, First, true and solid vertues, doe alwayes make him good in whom they are: not that the very dispositions that doe inhere in us, are the grace making us first accepted with God, as the Schoolemen speake, for that pertaines to Faith; but because they are reciprocated with a good man, and goodnesse is derived from them into our actions.
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Hence also none can use vertue amisse, as being the principle of action; when notwithstanding men may, and are wont to abuse any habit of the mind.
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Therefore those vertues which are wont to be called intellectuall, have not an exact respect of vertue.
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Moreover vertue is said to incline not onely to good, but also to well doing: because the manner of action doth chiefly flow from vertue.
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But as the rule of well-doing, so also the rule of vertue is the revealed will of God, which only hath the force of a certaine rule in those things which pertain to the direction of life.
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That is a Lesbian rule of vertue which Aristotle, puts to be the judgement of prudent men: for there are never such wise men, to whose judgement wee may alwayes stand: neither if there were, they could not bee alwayes knowne or consulted with by those who exercise themselves in Vertue.
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That which is said to be right reason, if absolute rectitude be looked after, it is not else-where to be sought for then where it is, that is, in the Scriptures: neither doth it differ from the will of God revealed for the direction of our life. Psal. 119. 66. Teach me the excellency of reason and knowledge: for I believe thy precepts. But if those imperfect notions concerning that which is honest, and dishonest, be understood, which are found in the mind of man after the fall: seeing they are imperfect and very obscure, they cannot exactly informe vertue; neither indeed doe they differ any thing from the written Law of God, but in imperfection and obscurity only.
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Therefore there can be no other discipline of vertue then Divinity, which delivers the whole Will of God revealed, for the directing of our reason, will, and life.
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They that thinke otherwise, doe bring no reasons, which may move an understanding and sound man. They say the end of Divinity is the good of grace: but the end of Ethicks is a morall or civill good. As if no morall or civill good were in any respect, a good of grace and spirituall. As if the proper good, blessednesse, or end of man, were manifold, or as if that should be a vertue of a man, which doth not lead a man to his end, and chiefe good. They say that Divinity is exercised about the inward affections of men; but Ethicks about the outward manners. As if either Ethicks (which they define a prudence to governe the will and appetite) did not respect the inward affection: or that Divinity did not teach as well outward, as inward obedience.