An den Durchlüchtigestem Fürsten vnd Herren, Herrn Philippen, Landgraff in Hessen, Von der Fürsichtigkeyt Gottes, ein büchlin inn Latin beschribenn durch Meister Huldrich Zwinglin. Vertütschet durch Leo Jud. Matth. XI. At the end, on p. 221: Getruckt zu Zürich by Christoffel Froschouer. M.D. XXXI. 224 unnumbered octavo pages. Finsler, Zwingli Bibliographie, Nos. 94 and 95. The following English translation is based on one by Mr. Henry Preble. It was revised throughout by the editor.
The work of Zwingli On the Providence of God” is a free reproduction from memory of a sermon, delivered by Zwingli at Marburg during the Marburg Colloquy, October 1-4, 1529. As rewritten by Zwingli the sermon has become a philosophical treatise. In his philosophy he follows principally Aristotle and the Stoies. The doctrine of God, starting from the conception of the Highest Being, is developed into a cosmological argument for the Being of God. Upon this basis the discussion of the Divine Providence proceeds, culminating in the question of Divine Predestination. It is the most abstruse as well as the most penetrating Latin work of Zwingli.]
HurpnEICH ZwiNGLI TO His HicaNess PHILIP or HESSE ( Maus and peace from our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ. You ask a thing, most pious Prince, which you might
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fairly have claimed or demanded—the sermon that I delivered in your castle at Marburg. I would be as quick to give it as you to ask it, if my memory listened to my inclination. For why should not the abilities of all, who try to advance our religion by preaching or teaching, spontaneously put themselves at the service of Your Highness? For you alone strive frankly to have the infancy of religion nourished conscientiously and allowed to develop peacefully. You alone have duly considered that save God alone none duly knoweth all things; that, therefore, all things are not wisely ordered according to the dictum of one man. You alone, seeing among the servants of the Christian religion the power of rivalry and jealousy, nay, to speak with full frankness and openness, the power of error and lust of glory, take anxious care to prevent that band of followers, emulating the defects of their master, from breaking forth in their zeal into some discord or disturbance. You alone understand that if we truly hold fast to the chief point of religion, difference of opinion upon other points is not of such moment as to justify us in breaking for their sake that cord of charity which, like the red cord of the Athenian assembly, brings us together in one spirit and one mind. You alone, though fully convinced, and sure in regard to a matter as to which others still dispute somewhat unmannerly and ignorantly, by a sort of holy hypocrisy pretend to waver and be in doubt, that as a companion of the erring ones you may tear them from their error through your friendship and gentle kindness, through the protection of your name and the hope of security, when they see you steadfastly embracing the truth that has dawned, and that you may free them from fear when they behold in you a haven to which they may hasten if any danger threatens from a change of their opinion. This is indeed to be a peacemaker, this is rightly and really to know the ways of Christian peace, this is to show one’s self a pious prince.
Moreover you make yourself an example not only to the learned but to all, both peoples and princes, to be looked up to and imitated, because you alone rule your subjects with such moderation and gentleness that you alone seem to point out to πληροφορηϑείς, The Greek words which Zwingli inserts into the text we add in the notes.
T εἰρηνοποιεῖσϑαι,
the rest the way by which rulers may learn to command willing subjects, and subjects to obey just commands. This courage, fidelity and wisdom of yours, I say, young though you are, show that those who do not reverence you either have not yet seen the radiance of your glory, or, having seen, maliciously envy it. If you go on as you have begun, God who giveth the increase will make you grow, contrary to their hopes, to be a noble example of constancy and piety to the present generation and to posterity.
But now I come back to myself. If, I say, my memory could recall all that I said in word and order of arrangement, nothing would delight me more than this opportunity of complying with your wishes. Since, however, the faithful retentiveness of memory, through which perhaps a Cato or a Seneca might recover it all, has been denied me, I will do this: I will write a short, but I think substantial, summary regarding Providence, dividing it into not more than seven chapters. When you examine them I think you will admit that you have received, if not the sermon itself, at least the same material and line of argument—all in homely and plain workmanship. Do then, brave hero, meantime so cultivate goodness and the knowledge of holy things that we shall all rejoice that the Prince of Hesset 1s, according to the precept of Christ, our Saviour, as wise as a serpent and as harmless as a dove. May He long preserve you to His cause! Amen.] Ziirich, 1530.
First Chapter
Providence must exist, because the supreme good necessarily cares for and regulates all things.
[Philip of Hesse was born in 1504. The play upon words involved in “Cattorum principem” and “catum]
[serpentem” seems impossible of reproduction. iBucer wrote to Zwingli of this preface, “You slashed them [the]
[Lutherans] more than offensively in the preface to the Prince of Hesse.]
[You ought not by this ill-omened preface to have exposed to odium a work]
[so fine and worthy of immortality.” For Bucer was already treating with]
[Luther and his associates with regard to certain formulas that might]
[satisfy them and yet leave a loop-hole for the understandings of those who]
[thought differently. Zwingli was opposed to this scheme of clever compro-]
[mise. See Letter of Bucer to Zwingli, Sept. 18, 1530, ed. Schuler and]
[Schulthess, Vol. VIII, pt. 2, p. 516.]
The supreme good is not so called because it is above all goods, as if there were some goods that were good in their own nature but were surpassed by this good, just as gold surpasses the value of silver though both are valuable. It is called the supreme good because it is the only thing good by nature, and every good that can be imagined is itself really this supreme good. This Christ set forth by the words: “Why callest thou me good? There is none good but God” [Matth. 19:17]. In these words we see that God alone is good in the sense of being an absolutely and perfectly good being, and that consequently there can be nothing good which is not He, and, in short, that the things which are called good, as “all that he had made was very good,” and “every creation of God’s is good,” are good not by nature but by sharing His goodness, or rather, by derivation. That is, they are good in so far as they are from that supremely good being and in that good being and to the glory of that good being.
Now, to go to the root of the matter, it follows necessarily that what is good by nature and good in the highest degree, and whatever is good in itself, must also be true. And this the philosophers knew when they attributed at the same time the quality of truth to the good and only one. For, of course, the One must be good, they said, but cannot be good unless it is likewise true, that is, pure, genuine, clear, complete, simple and unchangeable. For all these belong to the conception of the true. For that which changes is not simple, nor complete, clear, genuine and pure. For however much we conceive the elements as simple in our imagination, they are in fact mixed. For fire could not travel unless it were set aflame by the air, and whither would water run without the air? How could it draw in and pour out again its whirlpools? How through drink fill us? Without the air the earth could not emit its vapor nor bring forth fruit, nor, finally, absorb the salt sea like a sponge, and sifting it through its internal arteries, as it were, make it come out fresh and sweet. And the air itself which is the guide and author of all motion and movement, how could it come warm and hot from the south or colder than ice from the north
[Thus e. g., Plato in his “Republic,” Bk. VI, 507, “That which imparts]
[truth to the object and knowledge to the subject is what I would have you]
[term the idea of good.”:;]
unless it were mixed with fire or water? Since, therefore, these things which we believe or assume to be simple in order to refer the origin and beginning of things to some primary cause, are in reality not simple, and are consequently subject to change, it follows that only the one supreme good is true that is, simple, pure and unalloyed, since that alone is unchangeable. And, conversely, since only that one supreme good is unchangeable, it follows that it alone is true, that is, pure, genuine and so forth. Now that which is supreme and true, simple, pure and complete, must first of all know and understand all things. For in whatever quarter it failed in understanding anything, it would not be clear and lucid, nor complete and pure, which qualities belong to the nature of the true. Secondly, that which is supreme and true, must also have power over all things. For as to the supreme, it is easy to see that it cannot be supreme unless it is first and supreme in might and power. But it will perhaps be a task to prove that what is true is also powerful over all things, except that I have already said that we are speaking of the supreme good which is by nature as true as it is good, and it is the supreme good, because whatever belongs to the nature of the good is itself that Divinity of which we are speaking and that to a supreme degree. That is, if power and strength are good, our Divinity is supremely powerful, if truth is good, it is supremely true, and so on. Thus the supreme good is supreme and indeed unlimited power, is supremely true, that is, is truth in its essence, so that there is not anywhere power and strength, no truth, simplicity, genuineness, purity, which is not from this foundation of truth, nay, is not this very truth itself.
Hence I conclude, if the Supreme Divinity is the supreme good, and truth belongs to the nature of the good, so that the supreme good cannot be such unless it is true and indeed truth itself, I conclude, I say, that the supremely true is also supreme might and power. Let us now join these three and with the understanding of faith weld together the Supreme Divinity, that is, supreme power and might, secondly the supreme good, that is, the whole sum and essence of the good, finally essential truth, that is, simplicity, purity, light, genuineness and unchangeableness.
As a result we shall see both that Providence must exist and that it cares for and regulates all things. For since it is of the
nature of supreme truth to see through all things clearly, inasmuch as that which is divinity must see all things, and since it is of the nature of supreme might to be able to do what it sees, nay, to do all things, and, finally, since it is of the nature of the supreme good, to will by its goodness to do what it clearly sees and can do, it follows that he who can do all things, must provide for all things. For, suppose that being able to do all things he should allow some things to go at random. Then either the things that go this way escape his notice, or, if nothing can be hidden from him, he abandons or turns away from the care of them out of disinclination. If anything escapes his notice, he would fail to fulfill the nature of the true and would not be the supreme good, supreme truth or truth itself, but rather, inasmuch as he did not notice this or that, would be obscurity, darkness, and ignorance. If, on the other hand, he neglects anything from disinclination, he is not the supreme good, because he turns away from the care of things created by himself, while brutes, to say nothing of man, care for their young. For it cannot be that God should create or cause to come into existence anything which before it was born He should think would be good, but which afterwards, when born, should deceive the expectation of its Maker, so that He would have to say, “I had not thought so.” For this is the mark of the foolish, not of Him who is truth and whom nothing can escape or evade, who is the light that shines upon and illumines all things, who is a limpid fountain, or a mirror overhanging all things so that everything that was or is or shall be is reflected in Him.
Suppose, in the second place, that being the supreme good, he inclines with favor towards the things he has made but is not able to regulate or help them. Then he is no longer the supreme, nor that might which has power over all things. Therefore, he isnot God. And if he is not God, he is not the supreme good nor the very truth. Suppose, finally, that he is indeed the truth which sees thoroughly into all things, but that he either cannot or will not care for the things which are objects to his knowledge. Could any one imagine such a poverty-stricken and envious yet wise being, who foreseeing. the needs of his creatures yet from lack of power and means could not establish nor help them, or, if he could, would not because of jealousy? You make God powerless, weak, infirm, as well as jealous, gloomy and cruel.
Such a being is so far from being God that under such a definition we include the evil spirit or even that blind reckless spirit the Greeks called “Ary.
I think it is now established that Providence exists and must exist, since it has been proved that the Supreme Divinity is light, sincerity, purity, simplicity, completeness, that is, truth. For since He sees all things, unless He also regulates all things, it is because of lack of power or of good intention. But since this same Divinity is both all power and in all respects good and kind, it is clear that He not only knows all things, but regulates, orders and disposes all things. Of this more at length by and by. Meantime I can easily show that the things we attribute to the Father, Son and Holy Ghost, who are yet one God and Divinity, derive their origin from this source. For in the sacred Scriptures omnipotence is attributed to the Father, grace and goodness to the Son, truth to the Holy Ghost. Yet all these we know belong to one and the same divine being,t just as here I have shown that power, goodness, and truth, though distinguished in conception and definition, are yet to be considered as one and the same supreme good.
As the Father is almighty, the Son gracious and the earnest of mercy, the Holy Ghost the spirit of truth, and all three by nature are one God, so is the Divine Being omnipotent, good and true by nature.
Second Chapter
What Providence is and how it differs from Wisdom.
Having shown, in order to make the philosophers better disposed towards us, that Providence not only exists but must exist, I have next to show what It is. For those men say that the natural and true order with problems is first to establish whether a given thing exists, then to establish the nature of the thing we have already discovered to exist. We know, then, that even in the sacred Scriptures “wisdom” and “discretion” are used interchangeably, although there is no little difference between them when the proper significance of each is carefully considered.
[Ate was the goddess of mischief and of all blind actions. T οὐσία,]
For “wisdom” is the kind of thing the philosophers call δύναμις, that is, a power or ability; “discretion” is what they call πράξις ἢ ἐνέργεια, that is, an action or performance. This will be clearer from an example.
The sense of hearing, for instance, is a power or an ability. So also is sight. But seeing and listening are actions. The sleeper possesses sight and the sense of hearing, but the act of seeing and of hearing cannot be predicated of him, for these exist only when we see or hear something. So wisdom is the energy and power of the Supreme Intelligence (which is truth, light, and purity) by which It knows all things; discretion is the effective skill in managing and regulating what It knows and sees. Thus discretion connotes rather an activity, wisdom an energy and power. But, as 1 have said, “discretion” is used for “wisdom” and vice versa, on account of their resemblance in meaning. And that no one may think what I say frivolous, I will adduce the authority of Scripture.
In Genesis 41:33, we have: “Now therefore let Pharaoh look out a man disereet and wise” and so forth, where the Hebrews have 23 and D321, nabon and hacham, and our translators, as if by agreement, render by “intelligentes” and “sapientes,” “understanding” and ‘^wise,” except Jerome, who used “sapientem” and “industrium,” “wise” and “diligent,” and we easily see that this keen judge of words put “industrium, diligent” here for “prudentem, discreet.” The Septuagint rendered the words by φρόνιμον καὶ cüverov, that is, “discreet and sagacious” or “wise.” I do not wish to thrust upon this passage a sense different from the one that belongs to it and has been accepted by the translators, but, as far as the words are concerned, I would rather say virum sapientem et prudentem, a man wise and discreet.” For there are people who have, to be sure, clearsightedness in abundance, but who are absolutely helpless in respect to forming, perfecting and carrying out any plan of action. A discreet man, then, if we wish to speak properly, is a wise man who 1s skilled and sagacious in deliberately carrying out what he sees 1s going to be expedient. And such a man was needed for the work of which Joseph was
[The term “energy” is taken from Aristotle, see his “Metaphysics,”]
[Bk. VII, chap. 2.]
speaking before the king. Diogenes was wise, as was also Heraclitus. I am inclined to doubt whether they ought to be called discreet, since they took no care to urge the things which they saw were best for mankind. But Joseph, Moses, Josiah, were discreet, for they devoted themselves with all their might to the accomplishment of what through their wisdom they saw was likely to be of service to their countrymen and religion. Thus wisdom signifies clear-sightedness especially, discretion adds to wisdom activity in carrying out a purpose. Yet although we sometimes use “discreet” for “wise,” we are hardly accustomed to use “providence” for knowledge or “wisdom,” especially when speaking of the Deity. When we hear the word “Providence,” we understand that wisdom which foresees, and having foreseen, regulates all things.
Hence, 1 define Providence thus, “Providence is the enduring and unchangeable rule over and direction of all things in the universe.” By rule I mean the power, authority and dignity of the Deity, of which I said enough before in showing how the supreme good must have power over all things. But since this power is not one of violence, troublesomeness and tyranny, and therefore hateful and unbearable, I added dignity and authority in defining “rule,” for I would show the rule of the Deity to be so conscientious, holy, acceptable, and delightful that everybody willingly obeys it, who has gotten even the merest taste of a knowledge of it. And I appended the word “direction,” both on account of the character of the sway, that none might, as I have said, suppose it to be monstrous, and on account of the abundance of things in the universe. For God does not command as men command, who, having acquired power over things, demand that all things be supplied them necessary for their care and attention to the affairs of state. He, however, freely supplies all with all things, asking nothing in return except that we shall take with gladness and gratefulness the gifts of His bounty. For since He is in need of nothing, is rich in all things, and is good and kind, nay, is the father of the things He has made, it follows that He cannot be wearied or exhausted through giving, that He rejoices in giving, that He cannot help giving. For the more and the oftener He gives, the better known His kindness becomes.
Then I said this rule and direction were enduring. Not
that I took “enduring” in the sense in which some people use it to make a distinction between “eternal,” as that which never had a beginning and never has an end, and “enduring,” as that which once had a beginning but never has an end. I took “enduring” in the sense of “eternal.” Thus this sway is eternal as far as power is concerned. For the Deity can have no beginning. ’ And after created things have come into being, the government and regulation of all things becomes also enduring. Moreover, I called the direction and regulation unchangeable for this reason, that I might show that the opinion of those who declare that man’s will is free is not altogether well grounded, and that the wisdom of the Supreme Deity is too unerring to allow the possibility that anything can happen without its notice and force it afterwards to reverse or change its design. Providence, is therefore, immovable, because the Deity is infallible and unerring, because His power is unwearying, because His goodness is uninterrupted.
Finally, I defined Providence as the rule over and direction of all things in the universe. For if anything were guided by its own power or insight, just so far would the wisdom and il power of our Deity be deficient. And if this happened, the wisdom of the Deity would not be supreme, because it would not include and comprehend all things. Nor would His might be all powerful, because there would be a might independent of its power and therefore different from it. Thus there would be a force which was not the force of the Deity, and light and intelligence which were not the wisdom of that Supreme Deity. And then, if that second light and power were said to have been created, it could not have been created except by the Deity, and if it is from the Deity, power and wisdom of its own cannot rightly be attributed to it. For it would have these by derivation from the Deity, like all created things, nay the light and power would belong to the Deity Himself. If, on the other hand, that light and power were said not to have been created, then they would be a God, and we have a multiplication of gods brought in again. For all power is either created or uncreated. If uncreated, it is Deity and God. If created, it must be the creation of that Deity. Yet this so-called created power, since all power is the power of the Deity,—for there is nothing which is not from that, in that and through that Deity, nay is not a part of
Himself,—this power is said to have been created, I say, because it is a manifestation of the general, all-embracing power in a new individual form. Moses, Paul, Plato, Seneca are witnesses. There is then, nothing which is not ruled by the Deity, nothing so high or powerful that it can avoid the sway of our Deity, nothing so lowly or humble that it is abhorrent to His care. All this will be set forth more at length and clearly in the sequel. It is enough in the present chapter to have shown that wisdom, goodness, and might, that is, to use the original terms, truth, goodness, and power, are what necessarily constitute Providence, and that Providence is the eternal and unchangeable government and direction of all things in the ’ universe.
Third Chapter
Secondary causes are not properly called causes. This is of fundamental importance for the understanding of Providence.
But that the matter may be the plainer, I will trace the origin, existence, and working of all things from the beginning. Not one of the things exposed to our senses has its origin in itself. This I will prove by the highest and the lowest, that is, by the stars and the earth. Of man I will treat separately. To come, therefore, as quickly as possible to an understanding of the truth, how could the earth, that dull thing without feeling or intelligence, create itself or from what seed could it produce itself? If it produced itself from nothing, it existed before it did exist—as that which called itself forth from nothing. But ~ if it comes from something else, it comes from it either as cause or as material. If as material, the material of the earth is different and this is either of the same kind as the present or of a different kind. If it is of the same kind, then the parent earth next to ours must also have a mother of its own, the grandmother, to wit, of ours. Then the grandmother must needs have a great grandmother, the great grandmother a great great grandmother, she a great great great grandmother and so on, until we come to that crowd of earths and worlds of which the socalled Great Alexander indignantly, if the thing be true,
lamented that he had not yet conquered one.
This view was brought to light and exploded by the philosophers at an early date. For we should thus assent to infinite and eternal worlds. But the one which we ourselves occupy is not yet ended; how much less those which are its authors! Moreover, if they grow up in this fashion, each earth and world being born out of another one, then, as with all processes of generation, the decrepit worlds, now ready for the grave, must die, and young ones step into their places. For if they do not die, there would long ago have been infinite worlds. But I will leave this nonsense. If, on the other hand, the material from which the earth is born is of a different kind from its daughter—the so-called equivocal generation of the more recent philosophers and theologians—we are driven into the same corner as before. For there will be a different material for this material, and still another for that one, and so on till we are plunged into infinity. Nor can the earth maintain its place among the elements. For that other material takes its place which is the mother of our mother earth, nay the mother of this also, nay the great grandmother and so forth, finally no material, for there is really no material than the one.
Now I come back to the principal division. If the earth comes from another cause, it must have been created. For we have just seen that it does not come from a material cause. Therefore it must come from nothing. For what is put together from nothing so as to exist is created. For this is the definition of creation, “to be out of nothing” or “to be, not having been before, but not coming from something else as material.” Therefore, not to hurry so much as to pass by this point, the philosophers failed in eireumspection when they raised the question whether the universe was created or uncreated.t For, see-
[This is an allusion to the story found in Plutarch’s tract, “On the]
[Tranquility of the Mind,” which is as follows: “Alexander wept when he]
[heard from Anaxarchus that there was an infinite number of worlds, and]
[his friends asking him if any accident had befallen him, he returns this]
[answer: Do you not think it a matter worthy of lamentation, that, when]
[there is such a vast multitude of them, we have not yet conquered one?”]
[See Plutarch’s Morals, translated by Wm. W. Goodwin, Boston, 1871, Vol.]
[I, p. 140. TAristotle (Physics, I. 10, 8) teaches that matter is eternal or “un-]
[produced.” Plato held the same view.]
ing that those two vast subdivisions of the universe, the earth and the heavens, were without sensation and intelligence and yet maintained positions and motions of their own, they set over them an outside mover and guardian, and said that he was endowed with a mind and soul, but they did not at the same time [duly consider that this mind must be either prior to the universe or contemporary with it. If 1t was prior to the universe, then the universe has a beginning and was created. For the argument I made above about the creation of the earth always holds good. But if the mind is contemporary with the universe, who gave the mind dominion over the universe? For the universe would be just as everlasting as the mind, and we cannot conceive a thing as being subordinate unless marked by inferiority or posteriority, and so the co-eternal cannot be the lesser. For the eternal is infinite, and things which are co-eternal are beyond a doubt equally infinite. But if this mind of which we are speaking is eternal and the universe is contemporary with it, as the mind is infinite so will the universe be infinite; and how absurd this is, even sense, to say nothing of the mind, can see. But since there can be only one single thing that 1s infinite, and the universe cannot be infinite, since its parts all have to be infinite, (for however great anything is, if it consists of parts, it must be finite unless the parts also are infinite, which is again perfectly absurd—for if one part is infinite whither can another stretch its own infinity or immensity?), since the universe, IT say, consisting of parts, must be finite, it is proved that that mind which the philosophers call the original mover is the infinite we are after. And this 1s our Deity and God.
Having learned, therefore, that to have had a beginning is of the nature of the finite, and never to have had a beginning is of the nature of the infinite, that, accordingly there is only one single being that is infinite and, properly speaking, eternal, and having seen that the universe and all its parts are finite and, therefore, temporal and not eternal, the philosophers should open their eyes and see that the universe is finite and created, and not eternal. Whether it be enduring, this is not the place to diseuss, because we are seeking for the beginnings, not the endings, of things, and because the divine Scriptures satisfy the faithful upon this point, namely that the world shall pass away. Since See Matth. 24: 35.
then, to come back from the philosophers to myself, the universe had a beginning, it is evident that our mother earth is not of eternal existence nor lasting by nature, unless by autonomasia you understand nature to be the Deity of which we have been speaking, which is being and power unto all things. Nor does the earth come from itself. It must have come into being and have been produced out of nothing.
Now I ascend to the stars to investigate whether they come from themselves. The human mind, which is slower and duller in understanding things than it thinks it is, might fancy that the earth could be admitted to have been created, both because of its grossness and darkness and because of its inertness and sluggishness. For gross and impenetrable to light, dark in its depths and conscious of nothing, as it is, it simply lies there and suffers itself to be cleft and manipulated and dug and turned up. It is so inert and sluggish and incapable of moving that if air gets into its caverns and is stirred up in any way so that it has to burst forth, by which the earth is disturbed and shaken, it 15 regarded as a sign that the earth has moved. Every one is so thoroughly persuaded of its inertia, that its motion seems a miracle. Hence it may well seem unendurable that any one should deny that it had been produced or created. But the stars, whose bodies are so vast and, therefore, of such unusual force, so rapid that their motion surpasses all speed, so bright that, though so far away from us, they yet penetrate to us and blind our gaze —the stars, I say, may be imagined not to have been created, on the ground that by their movements and power things endowed with sensation suffer increase or diminution, and they seem in general of more divine and noble quality than the earth and its inhabitants.
To this reasoning we may first answer, as was done in the case of the earth and its parts, that the stars, however vast, rapid and bright their bodies are, either come from themselves or from something else. If from themselves, they either took beginning from themselves or have existed by themselves from eternity. If they took beginning from themselves, they existed before they did exist, for they brought themselves into existence. vNothing cannot beget anything. If they have existed from eternity, they are infinite, for only the infinite is eternal, infinite and eternal are convertible terms, that is, are equal or rather
actually identical. But since the stars are not infinite (for what an army of them that little organ, the eye, can take in at a glance!), it follows that they come from some one else and that some one else, the mover and author of all things, is their God and father. For though we listen to the philosophers discussing about their heavens, about spheres and circles and their powers, yet we must at last come to one only and original mover, as our starting point. This is the Deity.
Secondly, I answer the argument that appeals to the simple: that the stars have bodies quite the opposite of the earth’s, to wit, that they are rapid in motion, while it is sluggish and dull, that they are very bright while it is dark and black, no more proves that their original generation is of themselves than if one should maintain that plants are of original self-generation, because they inerease and grow, bloom, bear fruit, wither and die, while the earth does none of these, basing this argument on the ground of their superiority of endowment over the earth in power and action. For they spring from the earth and are nourished and supported by her, as nearest cause. So untrue is it that greater perfection of activity can remove the fact of creation, though the more perfect a thing is, the more it proclaims and bears witness to the perfection of its maker.
Since, then, it must be admitted that the earth and stars were produced or created, and that they and all things emanate equally from one and the same source, the next thing is to show by virtue of what power all things exist. As it is futile to believe that there are many creators of the universe, so it shows an unskilled and inexperienced mind to hold that anything can be or exist, except it have its being and existence in that and _from that which alone is. For since the first essential of things is that they exist (what and how they are comes later), existence is in the first place given them by Him who is the source and origin of all things that are. But this existence which is given to things by Him, did He get it from Himself or borrow it from some one else to give them? If He borrowed it, we meet two - difficulties, one, that created beings would then be more justly set down to the credit of that creditor from whom their existence was borrowed, that is, created being should properly be accredited to Him from whom they had really received exist- Keni.
ence, the second, that the Deity which is the origin of all things would not be the original and supreme good, and therefore would not be God. For that good from which things received their existence would be richer and more powerful, and, therefore, would also be the Deity, and this God of ours would be only by derivation or by metonymy, and not really, the Deity. And what a foolish thing to say this is, even a fool can see.
If, on the contrary, He took from Himself this existence which he gave to His works and creatures, everything that is, is in Him and through Him and a part of Him. For since there must be some one original existence, everything which has come into existence, came into it from this original. Not as though the existence of created beings were so utterly different from that of the Deity, but of the same kind, from the same source and parent. This I want understood in this way: If any one should reject our disjunction that the existence given to things must be either borrowed from something else than the Supreme Deity or derived from this Deity Himself, maintaining that this disjunction was not exhaustive because a new kind of existence might have been given to things by the Deity which He did not take from His own nor borrow from another, which new existence of the creature was different from the existence of the Deity, he shall have this answer, that there is only one thing infinite by nature. For if two different essences were declared to be infinite, no less difficulty would follow than if one maintained that light was darkness. For in whatever direction one of the infinites was stretched out and extended, there the other would have to be curtailed or removed. Now since the infinite, as a fact, is so-called just because it is infinite in essence and existence, it is clear that outside of this infinite there can be no existence. For whatever such you grant, where this outside existence is, there the infinite will not be, and, therefore, it will not be infinite. Since, therefore, there is but one infinite, nothing can exist outside of it. And from this it follows that whatever is, is in it, nay, what is and exists comes from it, and since it does not come from it in the sense that its being and existence is different from its own, it is certain that as far as being and existence are concerned, there is nothing which is not of the Deity. For it is the being of all things.
This opinion, treated rather philosophically as it has been (although why call that philosophical which is sacred and according to religion, except that some people do not hesitate to make the truth odious, attributing it to the philosophers and not noting that the truth, wherever found and by whomever brought out is from the Holy Spirit), this opinion, I say, I will support first by an example and then by Scripture.
The example is this. Take the earth, a plant, an animal, anything you. wil, except man (for of him I will treat separately, as I said), and consider the thing you have taken as regards its essence and existence, not as regards its particular substance or kind, but, as has been said, as regards its essence and existence alone; you will see that each of these exists forever. For though the animal breathe out its life, it returns into the air and as it were pays back what it had received; when it lays aside its body, it presently ceases to be an animal, but it does not cease to be. For it suffers the body which it has returned to the earth to be with her, nay to be earth until some new form is brought forth from it, which, afterwards, also loses its form, returns to the earth, and again produces something new, and this continues as long as the earth keeps the character with which it is now endowed. The earth, having once begun its existence, never loses it, for though it shall put on sometime another form, yet it will never cease to be.
Hence I believe that palingenesis,t or the doctrine of rebirth, of the Pythagoreans, was unjustly made the object of so much ridicule. They recognized its necessity, since they saw that everything that is, is from that which is existence, and must therefore always have some existence. But the others, who either philosophized rather badly or wished, by unfair distortion of their teachings, to seem to offer something new, held them up maliciously to derision, as if they had maintained that the same species endured and at the same time was constantly passing over into another. Hence that immoderate laughter] at the
[φιλοσοφικοτέρως. 1Aecording to Porphyry, Life of Pythagoras, $19, the only teachings]
[that can with certainty be attributed to Pythagoras himself were palin-]
[genesis (or metempsychosis), the periodic cycle and the kinship of all]
[living creatures. 1 cvykpototoc,]
notion of Pythagoras that he had been Euphorbus and a cock and so forth, which thing he probably did not say himself. It was more likely put maliciously into his mouth by the scoffers. So, too, their metempsychosis, migration of souls, which they did not maintain in the sense that the soul of Euphorbus passed into the soul of a cock, for that would be to change one species into another, but they meant that the ὕλη, or matter, over which the soul of Euphorbus had once ruled, after its return to the earth and after losing its previous form, might furnish material for fashioning body and infusing life into a cock, in spite of the difference in form both as far as body and as far as spirit are concerned. And this is really metempsychosis, that is, an exchange of spirit, not a transformation, a succession, not a continuance. For while he who was Euphorbus had been endowed with a soul which understood, drew inferences, and remembered, and with a body that represented the human form, it came about that after this body had crumbled in the earth, a new form of body, namely that of a cock, came forth from it after many changes. Here you have palingenesis. And this form presently received the spirit which belongs to a cock, not the soul of Euphorbus with which he had fought so heroically at Troy. Here you have metempsychosis, that is, an exchange of spirits, and a succession, not a transmutation or transformation of one form of spirit into another form while still remaining the same spirit.
Finally [they deride unjustly] Gaius Pliny who said that that which we call God was the power of nature. For being a most learned man he revolted at a multiplicity of gods and accordingly at the nomenclature involved. Hence he denied
[According to Diogenes Laertes, in his life of Pythagoras (ed. H.]
[Stephanus, 1570, p. 310) Pythagoras claimed that he was first Aethalides,]
[secondly Euphorbus, who was slain by Menelaus before Troy (Iliad, 17, 59),]
[which Pythagoras proved by recognizing the shield of Euphorbus, hung up]
[in the temple of Apollo; next Hermotimus; then Pyrrhus and lastly]
[Pythagoras. Ovid in his Metamorphoses (XV, 160ff.) represents Pytha-]
[goras as making the same claim. The story of Euphorbus changing into a]
[cock is found in Lucian’s satire on transmigration, as given in his Gallus,]
[18f; see Works of Lucian, tr. by Thomas Franklin, London, 1781, Vol.]
[III, 318ff. 1See Pliny’s Natural History, Bk. II, ch. 5: “By these considerations]
[the power of Nature is clearly proved, and is shown to be what we call God.”]
that there were gods, but he did not really deny, indeed he asserted, the existence of the Deity. For what he called nature we call the Deity. For where is that nature whose power he proclaims as so vast? Are we to suppose that, according to the habit of the atheistie philosophers, he was speaking of that nature which belongs to each thing individually? Who then could establish peace and harmony in the vast discord of things? Who prevent a chaotic confusion of all things? Especially when we see that not only men but the elements are so mutually antagonistic that, unless you harmonize them by means of some. neutral mediator, you will never sueceed in making fire and water, for instance, work together. If, then, any one believes that Pliny means by nature the natural characteristie of individual things, we shall find everything in chaos. For everything is so antagonistie to its opposite that without some outside force nothing can exist. For what Prometheus has brought fire to the euttle-fish in the depths of the sea and to the other fishes to warm their blood? It must have some kind of warmth, since it is red and flows.
Even the original elements, therefore, are by their nature ἀσπόνδια, that is, incapable of leaguing and uniting themselves together. Thus it is not this that Pliny means when he calls the power of nature what we call God. For thus no two things could unite together so that a third would result from their union, since the natures of things are so antagonistic that no one will receive a second unto it, unless compelled by some stronger outside force. He seems, therefore, to understand by nature that power which moves and unites or separates all things. And what is that but God? This most learned man saw that dull mortals are as far as possible from the truth, each one making a god of whatever he desired or hated. Hence he became disgusted with gods as a shameless and senseless invention. But he saw that there must be some power, by whose might and intelligence the universe was formed and maintained, and this power he preferred to call nature rather than the gods of whom he saw there could not be a plurality.
The earth, the stars, plants and animals, therefore, exist because they are from that and in that which always and alone exists, and this is such that if you should happen to fancy it non-existent (which is impossible), as soon as that Deity did not
exist, nothing at all would exist. All substances, all bodies, stars, earth and seas, in short, the whole structure of the universe would collapse in an instant, and be reduced to nothing.
Now I will bring in the testimony in support of this view, as I promised, having first called attention in passing to the fact that from them is proved the immortality of the thinking soul. For since things never cease to be, after they have begun to be, how could it happen that that mind should perish which is so lively, unwearying and active a substance that, following its author, it has a right to the name ἐντελέχεια, complete reality. For not even an ox or a pig perishes so completely as absolutely to cease to be. But I will come to the testimony.
When Moses asked the name of God, the answer came from heaven, “I AM THAT I AM,” and God added, “Thus shalt thou say unto the children of Israel, ‘I AM hath sent me unto you. ” These words are to be understood in the sense that the second “am” of the expression I AM THAT I AM shall have its force heightened κατ ἔμφασιν, by special emphasis. If this is not done, you have the most lifeless and empty form of speech possible, as when you say, “A man is a man,” “an animal is an animal,” and the like. For what light do they convey to the human understanding? What do they tell? The second “am” then, has this emphasis “that really am,” or, “that am the very being of all things,” as the fathers divinely inspired, have explained it before me. And this very thing is also shown by the fact that presently He calls Himself “The I exist” as it were, as the one who not only Himself exists,. but who bestows existence upon all things that exist. For if anything existed by its own powers, God would have said nothing more than if one declared himself to be the lieutenant of one who existed. He calls Himself “The I exist,” then for this reason that He both exists of Himself, and furnishes unto others the foundation and basis of being and existence, so that nothing is or exists which does not have its being and existence of Him and in Him. I should certainly shrink from coining an unheard of word, unless I saw that he really says more who calls
[Rudolf Eucken, in his Geschichte der philosophischen Terminologie,]
[p. 25, defines entelecheia as a condition of completion, a real existence and]
[activity, as over against a mere capability and potentiality. The term itself]
[is derived from Aristotle, see the latter’s Metaphysics, Bk. X, chap. 9.]
God, “Existonem,” “The I exist,” than ‘“existentem, “the Existing,” and unless this form approached more nearly the spirit of the Hebrew word 178, “Iam.” Since then “to be” and “to exist” are prior to “to live” or “to act,” nay are the basis Vof these, it follows that all that lives and acts, has its life and activity from Him and in Him, from whom and in whom it has its being and existence. Of which more clearly later.
When the apostle Paul, in writing to the Romans, had fallen into this line of reasoning, he expressed his view in the words “For of him, and through him, and in him, are all things” [Rom. 11: 36]. I know that this last phrase “in him” is given in the Greek as eis αὐτὸν, that is “in ipsum, to him” rather than “in ipso, in him,” but the divine heart of the apostle tried to proclaim thus vigorously by the more active form of speech the truth of the existence of all things in God, and not so much to say that all things were ordered unto God as in Him and with Him, that is, existed according to His power personally present and in His very might. Thus eis αὐτὸν, was used for ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ ἀντὶ ἐπ αὐτῷ, that is “in ipsum” for “in ipso” and “apud ipsum.” And this the old translator, who was by no means always asleep, saw, when he rendered the phrase by “in ipso, in him.” From God, therefore, as from a fountain source and (if one may speak so) substance matter, all things come forth into existence. Through God’s power all things exist, live, and act, nay all things are in Him, who is everywhere present, and of Him, who is the being, existence, and life of all things.
Also when beginning to preach the gospel at Athens, he says of the Deity, “God that made the world and all things therein, seeing that he is Lord of heaven and earth, dwelleth not in temples made with hands; neither is worshipped with men’s hands, as though he needed anything, seeing he giveth to all life, and breath and all things;
“And hath made of one blood all nations of men for to dwell on all the face of the earth, and hath determined the times before appointed, and the bounds of their habitation;
“That they should seek the Lord, if haply they might feel after him, and find him, though he be not far from every
[The Authorized Version has “to him.”]
one of us;
“For in him we have our being, and live, and move; as certain also of your own poets have said, For we are also his offspring.
“For as much then as we are the offspring of God, we ought not to think that the Godhead is like unto,” ete. [Acts 17: 24-28].
By these words Paul fortifies and strengthens what was said above, so that it is superfluous to say more, except that I would not omit to state that in the sentence, For in him we have our being, and live, and move,” the order of the words in the Acts is not as I give it. It is a Hebrew hysteron proteron, and the word for being, which naturally belongs first, is there put last.
Since Jerome and others (as I have shown in my Isaiah) often correct inconveniences of this kind by restoring the natural order, I have allowed myself to think it proper to do as the case demands. Nor does man alone have his being, and live, and move in God; all the things that are, have their being, and live and move in Him. Nor of man alone did Paul speak when he said: In him we have our being, and live, and move;” he spoke by synecdoche of all created things. For since man alone among the creatures that have sensation is endowed with intellect and speech, he alone of all speaks as a sort of patron and champion.
But man is not alone the offspring of God; all creatures are so, though one differs from another in nobility and freedom. They are by birth of God and in God, and the nobler any one is, the more it proclaims the divine glory and power. Do not the ereatures of the species of rodents proclaim the wisdom and providence of the Godhead? “The hedgehog when with its spines he most cleverly carries a large quantity of fruit to its dwelling place, by rolling over the fruit and planting its spines in it. Alpine rats or marmots, which we now call the mountain rats, station one of their number upon an elevation, that, as they run about intent upon their work, no sudden danger may fall upon them without his timely ery of warning, while meantime the rest of the band carry off the softest hay from all around. And since they have no wagons, they turn themselves into wagons by turns, one lying upon his back and holding It inverts the natural order of words.
fast with all his feet the hay loaded upon his stomach and chest, while another seizes by the tail his comrade thus transformed into a wagon, and drags him with the plunder to their dwelling place to enable them to sleep through the inclemency of the harsh winter season. The squirrel, dragging a broad bit of wood to the shore by its mouth, uses it as a boat to cross the water, hoisting its bushy tail, and being thus driven by the favoring breeze, needs no other sail.
What word, what speech, pray can proclaim the divine wisdom as well as these creatures which are among almost the humblest of living things? And do not things without sensation bear witness that the might, goodness and lifegiving power of the Godhead are ever present with them? The earth that nourishes all things forgets the wounds inflicted by hoe and plow, and refuses not to furnish rich provision; the dew and rain so rouse and fill and replenish all the streams which by their increase stay fhe ravages of drought that, by the wondrous growth of all vegetation, they bear witness to the presence of the divine power and life. The mountains, dull, clumsy, lifeless mass that they are, hold fast and strengthen the earth as bones do the flesh; they bar the way to passage or make it difficult; though heavier than the surface of the earth, they rest upon it and sink not in; do they not proclaim the invincible power of the Godhead, and the solidity and vastness of His grandeur?
In all these things, then, not less than that of man, we discover the presence of the divine power by which they have their being, and live, and move. Christ Himself declares that the hairs of our head are numbered, nay that not even sparrows, two of which are sold for a farthing, fall to the ground without the knowledge of the Deity [Mt. 10: 29, 30]. By this we learn that even the things which we call fortuitous or accidental are not fortuitous or random happenings, but are all effected by the order and regulation of the Deity. His mind is not degraded by attention to lowly things, but His goodness and perfection are made plain by His seorning nothing that He has made, and by the absolute wisdom and power with which He works, seeing all things, watching over all things, loving all things, and that without toil and reasoning. -
οὖρος. (c a
T ἀναίσϑητα.
If I bring in testimony from outside the Scriptures, I shall not be utterly dismayed at carping criticism on the part of any one who has not yet learned that writings are properly called sacred when they proclaim the thought of the holy, pure, eternal and infallible mind. If, then, you find in Plato or Pythagoras what you scent as flowing from the fountain of the divine mind, this is not to be disregarded because a mortal embraced it in his records, but all the more must we press on to communion with the Deity, that we may see the light of truth more and more clearly, as we find that men who did not venture to profess the religion of the one God, yet had it in them. This is from the Deity wherever one is, even though one dwells among the beasts.
I am, therefore, especially glad to place here Seneca’s words about Plato’s views, because all that I have said and all that I am going to say in this book is derived from one source, namely from the nature and character of the Supreme Deity. This δε source Plato also tasted, and Seneca drank from it. These are his words on ideas in the sixty-sixth letter to Lucilius: “God has within Himself these patterns of all things and comprehends in His mind the harmonies and measures of the totality of things that are to be carried out. He is filled with these forms which Plato calls ideas”—imperishable, unchangeable, not subject to decay and therefore, though men die, humanity itself (or the idea of man) according to which man is moulded, lasts on, and though men toil and perish it suffers no changes.
Accordingly there are, as Plato says, five kinds of causes,t that of which, that by which, that in which, that according to which, and that on account of which, finally we have the result of all these. “Thus, in the case of a statue (since we were speaking of this), that of which [it is made] is bronze, that by which is the sculptor, that in which is the form which is adapted to the material, the model is the pattern, imitated by the artist, that on aecount of which is the purpose of the maker, and finally,
[The 65th letter in the edition of Otto Hense, Leipzig, 1914, p. 205. See]
[English translation in Loeb’s Classical Library: Seneca, Ad Lucilium Epis-]
[tolae Morales, Vol. I, p. 449. iThe four categories as established by Aristotle, plus the “idea” ot]
[Plato. The five causes are the material, the artist, the form, the model]
[and the purpose.]
the result of all these is the statue itself. The universe also as Plato says, possesses all these elements. The maker here is God, that from which is matter, the form is the shape and arrangement of the visible universe, the model that according to which God made this great and beautiful work, and the purpose that on account of which He made it. Do you ask what God’s purpose is? It is goodness. So at all events Plato says. What was God’s reason for making the universe? He is good, what He has made is good, and no good person is ever grudging of anything that is good.”
And a little later, referring all things to one cause, he says: “But we are now searching for the original and general cause. This must be simple, inasmuch as matter is simple. We ask, what is the cause? It is surely creative reason, that is, God. For indeed, those to which you referred are not several independent causes; they all hinge on one alone and that will be the creative cause. Do you maintain that form is a cause? This is only what the artist stamps upon his work; it is part of a cause, but not the cause. Neither is model a cause, but a necessary tool of the cause. A model is as necessary to the artist as the chisel and the file; without these art can make no progress. But for all that, these things are neither parts of art nor the cause of it. “Then,” perhaps you will say, “the purpose of the artist, that on account of which he undertakes to create something, is the cause. True it is a cause, but not the efficient cause. It is an accessory cause. Of such there are a vast number, but we are discussing the general cause. In making that other statement, that the whole universe, the completed work 15 a cause, they [Plato and Aristotle] did not display their usual penetration. For there is a great difference between a work and the cause of a work.”
And somewhat further on he justifies and recommends in the following fashion the consideration both of the original and only real cause and of the condition and order of the universe. “Do you forbid me to contemplate the universe? Do you compel me to withdraw from the whole, and restrict me to a part? May I not ask what are the beginnings of things, who fashioned things, who separated the general mass wrapped up in dull matter? May I not inquire who is the Master-Builder of this universe, how its vast bulk was brought under law and
order, who gathered together the scattered atoms, who separated the disordered elements and assigned an outward form to elements that lay in one vast shapelessness. Or, whence all this light was shed? And whether it be fire or something brighter than fire? Am I not to ask these questions? Must I not know the heights whence I descended? Whether I am to see this world but once or to be born many times? Whither I am to go hence? What abode awaits my soul, when freed from the laws of human slavery?
“Do you forbid me to have a share in the heaven, that is, do you bid me live with my head bent down? I am greater [above such existence] and born for greater destiny than to be the bondman of my body, and I look upon this body as a chain which shackles my freedom. Therefore, I present it as a shield against the blows of fortune, and shall suffer no wound to penetrate to my soul. For my body is the only part that can suffer injury in me. In this vulnerable dwelling, exposed to peril, my soul lives free. Never shall this flesh drive me into fear nor into any pretence unworthy of a good man. Never shall I lie in order to honor this poor body. When it seems proper I shall sever my connection with it. At present, while we are bound together, our alliance shall not be one of equality. The soul shall bring all quarrels before its own tribunal. Contempt of the body is sure freedom.
“To return to our subject; this freedom will be greatly helped by the contemplation of which we were just speaking. Verily all things are of matter and of God. God controls matter, which encompasses Him, and follows Him as its guide and leader. d That which creates, in other words, God, is more powerful and precious than matter which is acted upon by God. The soul occupies in man the place that God occupies in this universe. What matter is there, the body is in us. Let, therefore, the inferior serve the higher,” etc.
Thus speaks Seneca, that unparalleled cultivator of the soul among the Gentiles, not only eloquently but religiously, in regard to the condition and government of the universe. And here we must note that he does not assign matter to God like clay to a sculptor, as if matter existed or had its being through itself, and God then applied a moulding hand to it as a thing already existing. For this divine soul [Seneca] had no diffi-
culty in mounting to the height of understanding that the matter of the universe, that is, the visible world (for even the sacred writers often use the term “‘visible” instead of “sensible” or natural”) must have been made in order to be matter.
He does not, therefore, deny that matter was created out of nothing, matter which the mouth of God calls w^ [tohi] and 2 [bohü], and the poets of the heathen call chaos, before form was given to things made of it, but that after the world began to be, and the matter of the universe was first made and became visible, the hand of God was laid upon His creation in activity and skill, and thence forward is constantly laid upon dt creating all things and governing them when created. Thus “he declares that the Deity manipulates, performs, sets in motion, keeps in operation all that takes place with the matter of the universe rather than makes matter, as a thing originating of itself, equally with God the cause of the Universe.
And, secondly, we must also note that man also was created from matter and is a type of the whole universe, so that as that is ruled and regulated by God, so is he by the soul, not by a soul that is different from God or exists of itself, but one which is subject to and dependent upon God, is inspired, fostered, ruled, and fed by God, consisting of the Spirit of God. Of this later.
Supported, then, by divine oracles on all sides (for whatever is true, holy, and infallible is divine. God alone is true. Hence he who speaks the truth, speaks from God, and he who in this way climbs with his understanding from the things visible to the contemplation of the unseen God, does a thing, according to the testimony of Paul [Acts 17: 24ff.], worthy of God and himself, useful and not without divine illumination. I venture, therefore, to call a thing borrowed from the heathen divine, if only it is holy, religious, and irrefutable. For it must come from God, whatever the quarter from which it comes directly to us) —supported thus, I say, by divine oracles, we must admit that there is only one true cause of all things. Other things are not truly eauses any more than the representative of a potentate is truly the potentate, or than the chisel or hammer of the artificer is the cause of a drinking cup, the beast of burden of husbandry. Who would attribute to the representative the name of his prince, to the chisel the making of the cup, to the ox the plowing See e. g., Ovid in his Metamorphoses, Bk. I, 3.
of the field? Although we are in the habit of saying, “The king’s legate demanded satisfaction,” yet the action is not the legate’s but the king’s. And though the silversmith himself sometimes attributes the work of a platter to the hammer, saying, “This platter is the work of this hammer,” yet the hammer is not truly and properly the cause, but the silversmith. So the farmer calls his ox the tiller of many acres, when he says, “That ox plowed this great field, however much the plowing was done by the plow.” Yet the farmer himself is the author of the whole business of husbandry, for he reared the ox for it, trained him and guided him, and bought the plow to which equally with the ox is attributed what does not rightly belong to it. The plow breaks up the earth, we say. If it did, husbandry would go back to the blacksmith, nay to the anvil itself as its source.
It is established, therefore, that secondary causes are not τὰν properly called causes, though I have always determined not to fight obstinately about words, provided agreement as to the truth of the matter is attained. For we often use words in a somewhat varied sense on different occasions and from different considerations. Thus we even speak of a man who has conferred some great benefit as a god, not because we wish to designate him by the name of God, but though God is the only effective force, and He alone can do and does do all things, yet when we have received a blessing from a man, we speak of him by hyperbole as a god, either from a feeling that God has blessed us through him or because he has benefited us as God is wont to do.
Whatever means and instruments, therefore, are called causes, are not properly so called, but by metonymy, that is, derivatively from that one first cause of all that is. It is the same thing as when what is attributed to an angel does not belong to the angel, but to God who sent the angel. Hence the constant assertion in Exodus that Moses saw God in person and face to face, while in the same place the sight of God is declared impossible to mortal eye.t What then? Did he see God or did he not? As far as form goes, he saw the angel, not God, except so far as He is in the angel and in every created thing.
[ka ὑπερβολήν. 1Compare Ex. 33: 11 with 33: 20.]
But as far as authority and real cause are concerned, he saw God. Hence Paul says [Gal. 3:19] that the law was given into the hand of the mediator Moses by the angels, that is, the angels were the deputies and officers in charge, while in Exodus the law is said to have been given to Moses by God in person talking in a friendly way with Moses after human fashion. It 1s for the same reason that we assign to the sun and the stars things that belong to God alone. For He is in the stars themselves, nay, the stars, being of Him and in Him, have not J their own essence, power, and activity, but God’s. n They are, therefore, instruments by which the power of the Godhead shows its active presence. For it was for this that He created things, that He might use them for the mutual benefit of each other, so that that wonderful example of the divine wisdom, man, might everywhere contemplate the Deity, and in all things and in himself still more closely perceive God existing, living and working, as he gazed upon His power and activity and nature in all the things that are or take place.
Thence it comes that to man is ascribed what belongs only to God alone. Thus remission of sins is credited to the apostles, though God alone remits sins, and the apostles themselves preach that pardon for sins is given only through Christ. For the Godhead was present in them, and illumined their minds so that they could clearly see the truth. He gave courage to their hearts, so that they boldly proclaimed the truth they had seen, and so kindled the souls of the hearers that they absorbed straightway by the Spirit and fed upon the teaching of the Spirit.
Do we not see here that the apostle and the word which he uses for the setting forth of the truth are instruments, not causes, and that the one cause, by which even the apostle exists and preaches, is the Deity? And to put it briefly, the ground does not bring forth, nor the water nourish, nor the air fructify, nor the fire warm, nor the sun itself, but rather that power which is the origin of all things, their life and strength, uses the earth as the instrument wherewith to produce and create. And since created things are preserved by food, that power feeds and gives them to drink by water, quickens, fills and increases them by air, purifies, beautifies, refines and perfects them by fire οὐ ϑάλπει wo πῦρ.
and sun. For unless that power had appointed these instruments for this purpose, that is, had made and fashioned them in order to use them for this work, what would they be but useless and the refuse of other things?
Furthermore, since they are lifeless by nature, and yet through them and from them the divine bounty supplies nourishment unto all living things, it is clear thatthey are more properly called instruments than causes, 7 For there can be but one cause. For, as the origin of all things is one, so must the cause be one. And because things minister unto each other, and all unto man, although the power of God could by its very life and presence, without the aid of the aforesaid means, support and nourish man and all his dominion (for he was set over all the things that are on the earth or in the sea or the air, to govern them), as indeed it did support Moses forty days without food, it is clear that/all these things by which we are nourished and supported are instruments of the divine working, not causes. For even some philosophers have been reluctant to admit matter into the realm of causes, as a thing that does nothing active, but suffers itself to be manipulated, and receives upon itself the blows of the worker. And we, knowing that matter and all power flow from one source, see that it is an unassailable fact that all working, fashioning, and preserving are from that source, and that the things which are nearer and accordingly better known to us, cannot really be causes, though we call them so, but are instruments of the one actual cause. Thus when we look upon the fostering earth pouring forth her grain, the tree its fruit, the sun its light and warmth, we see the hand of God at work just as when a kind father puts a cherry into his little boy’s palm. It is the kindly power of the Deity that giveth all things; the earth, the tree, the sun, and the rest are the stalk and branches which hold that bounty and supply it to us.
But it is now time to summarize and then continue. In this entire chapter I have been aiming to prove that since all things have their being, existence, life, movement and activity from One and in One, that One 1s the only real cause of all things, and those nearer things which we call causes, are not properly causes, but the agents and instruments with which the ἄσιτον.
eternal mind works, and in which it manifests itself to be enjoyed.
From this conclusion we learn in brief that nothing happens by chance or at random, however much philosophers and theologians dispute that point, for that chief Intelligence has numbered the hairs of our heads. Nay, even though we pass by the authority of Scripture, it yet must be that that Intelligence which is the beginning and the origin of all light and all knowledge and is Itself wisdom and light, knows all things. For, otherwise, however insignificant the thing which It did not know, It would not be chief and supreme, since It would not know all things.
And we also learn that that Intelligence must regulate, care for, and manage all things. For if It did not care for what Τὸ saw, this would happen either from jealousy or from lack of power. But, since It is good and almighty, It cannot help caring for, regulating, and ordering all things. Nothing, therefore, - ean happen by chance. This conclusion is so certain and secure that whoever denies Providence in all things, by the same statement denies the existence of God. For if there is a God (as there is; I am only arguing against atheists, that is, those who do not believe in a God), it is He who sees all things, cares for and regulates all things, puts and keeps all things in operation. On the other hand, if anything takes place by chance and at random, if anything exists of its own right and independently of the direction of the Deity, then everything is at random and drifts along by chance, and accordingly all the wisdom, thought and reason of all intelligent beings is empty and vain. For if anything exists, lives, and moves beyond the jurisdiction of the Deity, man can with equal right be said to be beyond God’s jurisdiction. Therefore, intelligence, reason, thought will count for nothing. All things will be at their own sweet will, so that everything will obey chance and fortune, and nothing intelligence, reason and thought. Thus there will simply be no Deity. And how godless and wicked it is even to imagine this, is sufficiently shown by the contemplation of the universe, where whatever you gaze upon is so incomplete and small and feeble that it cannot come from itself. Thus, since the universe must come from something else, we are brought, whether we will or no, to the one and only source of all things, from which every-
thing runs forth as if from the starting place of a race course. But now I come to man.
Fourth Chapter
Regarding man and why the law was given to him when all things are directed by Divine Providence.
Abdallah, the Mohammedan, said that man is the most wonderful of all the things seen upon the stage of the world. If any one should ask me, I should answer that he is the most peculiar and most wonderful of creatures, and more wonderful than the beauty of the angels. Just as if you compare a cock and a steer, though you will find the steer more imposing, yet you will never be tired of wondering at the royal adornment of the cock, his splendid courage, his proud gait, his indefatigable watchfulness, his eminent characteristics of leader and commander, ruling as he does over a vast brood of hens. So the angel is of noble substance, to wit, a pure spirit, but if you consider man beside him how will you not be struck at this being both heavenly and earthly? In all the hosts of spirits you will not find one clothed with an earthly and visible body, (unless it happens to be put on for a little while and laid aside), and in all the vast multitude of animals of all sorts you will find none in which an intelligent mind acts as ruler and director.
Thus we easily infer that God, the creator of the universe, made man not only that there might be an image and copy of Himself, but that from among the creatures made from the earth there might be one to enjoy God through fellowship and friend-
[This quotation is taken most likely from the opening sentence of]
[Giovanni Pico della Mirandola’s remarkable oration on the dignity of man,]
[with which he planned to open the great disputation at Rome, to which]
[he had challenged all scholars: “Legi, patres colendissimi, in Arabum]
[monumentis interrogatum Abdalam Sarracenum; quod in hae quasi]
[mundana scaena admirandum maxime spectaretur, nihil spectari homine]
[admirabilius respondisse;” i. e., “I have read, Most Reverend Fathers, in the]
[monuments of the Arabs, that Abdalla, the Sarracen, having been asked]
[what could be seen on this earthly stage that was most to be wondered at,]
[answered that nothing could be seen more wonderful than man.” Prof.]
[George L. Burr, of Cornell University located this quotation. For the]
[passage quoted see Pici Mirandulae opera movissime revisa, Argentorati,]
[1504, fol. 840; also in Opera omnia Pici Mirandulae Concordiaeque comitis,]
[Basileae [1572], p. 313.]
ship here, through possession and most intimate contact in the hereafter. Also that He might foreshadow in a sense that intercourse with the world into which He was going to enter through His Son. For how could we have been more clearly brought to the understanding of the incarnation of the Son of God than through seeing from the beginning an intelligent spirit planted in a dull body? And His wisdom was to shine forth in this creation like that of the artificer (I cannot recall his name) in the shield of Achilles. He made the strength of that wonderful work so depend upon a little bolt, displaying his own image, that he who loosened that scattered the whole shield apart. So he who should take man out of the world, would bereave, debase and defile all the visible universe. For take man away; will there be any one of all the creatures of sense to enjoy God, to know Him, to have intercourse with Him?
Man is, therefore, to the world what God is to man. God is the lord and director of the human mind; man is the lord of the world. All that we see was made for him and his good. Take him away from them, and have you not left all things bereft like the widow and orphan? Whom will the sun warm, for whom the fructifying zephyrs and breezes blow? For the brutes? Whose advantage will the brutes serve? For whom has the earth spread out its broad expanse? There will be no one who understands how he ought to make use of things.
It was necessary, then, that this lord and master of such a vast realm should have in him something from that realm over which he was to be set, and it was also necessary that he should be endowed with some surpassing endowment, by which he could conquer and break the rebellious spirit of things. He was, therefore, given a body as he was marked out to be the chief of all bodily beings, and he was also given a soul, as he alone of all bodily creatures was to have kinship and fellowship with God and all other spiritual beings—a body and a soul, two most. widely different things. For what differs more widely from the clearness and light of the mind and intelligence than the dull inactivity of the earth and the body? But when the great Master Workman was going to insert a soul into this clay, see how He softened and shaped it in order not to dishonor a worthy guest through an unworthy dwelling. The lion had come forth He had Hephaistos in mind, see Iliad, XVIII, 478-608.
with hairy breast and terrible teeth and claws, the bear had crept forth shaggy in all his body and powerful of paw, the stag had leaped forth with branching horns, with shaggy hair, and having his foot fortified with an invincible hoof, and all the rest had their own peculiar armaments of spikes, spears and shields. But how remote from all roughness, O Lord, does the human body appear!
Some regard this as a misfortune; I think it a mark and omen of happiness. For since he was born to enjoy God and all created things, it was fitting that he should be adapted to gentleness, peace and friendship. Hence this coarse earth of which man is made had to be softened rather carefully in order not to produce sharp claws and fierce teeth, and scales or iron-like hide to lead to stubbornness and force. Therefore this abode of the celestial soul was made pliant and smooth and clean on all sides. Other creatures drop down on four feet, this body of ours stands upon two, that man’s gaze might be fastened more directly upon that heaven of which he aims to become heir. But why go on? The beauty and loveliness of the human body is indescribable if you compare it with other living beings.
Nevertheless, though the human body has been created in such form and a heavenly mind has been entrusted to it, yet each part preserves its own nature and character. The mind loves the truth and, therefore, worships the Deity, from whose substance it derives its kinship. It aims for justice and integrity. The body inclines to its native clay, and follows the nature of the flesh. Thus if you wish to compare man with something, he would seem like nothing so much as a lump of muddy earth plunged into a very clear, pure brook. The stream which had flowed with limpid waters now becomes clouded and we cannot even hope for the former clearness as long as the lump of earth stays immersed in it.
So it is with man. His mind is a clear, limpid stream, flowing forth from the Godhead itself. Hence it is so eager for truth and right and so devoted to them that if you could consider it apart from the dull mass of the body, as the angels are, you would detect nothing base, disturbing, or defiling in it. The body is clay, taken from the earth, and when you attach this to the soul it is like letting a wild boar into a liquid spring. Thus what the soul by itself would see clearly and would follow readily
and without hesitation, it now sees dimly, on account of the grossness of the clay being like a mist upon it, and is held bound by the weight of that clay as by fetters, so that it can no more pursue the perfect course than Tantalus could seize his fruit. Hence that sort of internal war in which the mind and the body are engaged against each other. When the mind begins to contemplate God, to talk and commune with Him about the things it has in common with Him, suddenly the flesh, fashioned from clay, draws it back. “Fool,” it cries, “Where are you going? There is no Deity; much less one that cares for our affairs.” Thus each part of man constantly looks back upon its origin. The mind yearns for light, purity and goodness, inasmuch as its nature is light, its substance pure and devoted to the right, seeing that it derives its origin from the Godhead; the body inclines to idleness, laziness, darkness and dullness, as it is lazy and indolent by nature, and without reason and intelligence, seeing that it consists of earth.
Hence it is that neither part ever carries off so fortunate a victory that the conquered part does not constantly rebel. For if the spirit gains the upper hand, does not the flesh rebel, however sternly it sees its king and commander hold destruction over its head? For who distributes his goods among the poor for God’s sake, without the flesh sometimes repeating: “So you will eome out distinguished, so you will make for yourself a name, so you will be able to aim at the presidency or some other office?” And though it is fair to suppose from the skill and watchfulness of some people that they forthwith overcome and throw down the enemy stealing in by this sort of scaling ladder, yet the flesh does not lay down its boldness, but struggles none the less obstinately and mixes some disturbing element in with good beginnings, so that its persistency is like a woman’s obstinaey. But however much the flesh refuses to listen to any counsel but what the belly dictates, whenever it succeeds in getting the ascendency over the spirit, yet the nobler and kindlier spirit never ceases to warn, advise or dissuade as occasion offers. For it is certain that that phenomenal drunkard Torquatus did not so drown himself in drink, nor Heliogabalus bury himself in ostrich’s brains, nor Nero so shamelessly indulge himself with harlots, matrons, and lewd men, nor Dionysius or Phalaris so savagely drink human blood, nor dread Hannibal so ruthlessly
lay waste cities and fields and districts, provinces and kingdoms, without each one of them and their likes, worn out at last with indulgence, saying to himself, “But who art thou? What now? Where wilt thou stop? Are not these men? Why art thou now sad? How bloodless and feeble thou art! What will happen if each man goes on doing to others according to his own caprice?”’
The soul is never so kept under that it forgets itself forever, it is never so down-trodden by the arrogant tyranny of the flesh as not to give warning however late. On the contrary the spirit is like a gentle father following his children with the utmost faithfulness and indulgence. Hence also, to come back to the subject, the flesh not only growls at the spirit, but in a spirit of pretence and mockery copies its works. By uprightness and purity of life, the soul admonishes us, the favor of the Deity is to be won; by white raiment, says the flesh. The spirit gives up its dwelling place, the blood namely, for the sake of its lord, the flesh declares that the purple mantle in which it wraps itself is sufficient. The mind sighs for God and expects all things from His bounty, not from its own deserts; the flesh, even though it thunders and roars, announces that all things are due to itself. Hence, to reach the conclusion more quickly, there arises so much superstition, hypocrisy, and deceit. For _ the flesh imitates the spirit like an ape.
Here arise for us two very great questions. First, why, then, did God ereate man so unhappy a being, who is never at peace with himself? Second, why is the spirit given over to everlasting torment when it is overcome and kept under by the flesh, though the flesh is just as much a part of man as the spirit, and he received both from God the Creator Himself?
To the first question Paul would answer, may not the potter make different kinds of vessels from the same lump [Rom. 9:21]? Has God not the right to join spirit and clay? Man can mould clay into varied forms, but he cannot give them breath and make them live. Unless God could make a living being from the dull, senseless matter, He would be no way superior to any artisan. But as it is, when He makes earth not only living but also intelligent and attentive to the divine (let both body and soul ever keep their peculiar characteristics, provided the nature of each is treated separately), He shows how
He is above the skill and wisdom of all. Oh, the depth of the wisdom and bounty of God! Oh, on the other hand, how ignorant and inexperienced in things we poor mortals are, who, asking why God created man in his present condition, have not vet learned that this question is suggested by the flesh, which does not only demand an account of the spirit, which is bound by a certain weight and check, but ventures to demand even of God the reason of His actions! Why madest Thou me so? Yet no mortal knows the sources of any art or science so well as not to be ignorant of some things that belong to it, and nothing that we see is so gross and coarse and big that we can give a reason for its formation in detail.
The elephant is an immense creature. Though you see its trunk and tusks and consider their use, yet you do not know why God fashioned them thus for those uses. The wild boar has tusks projecting on both sides and a snout, and uses these. God might, then, have made an elephant like a boar, you say. He might, I answer, but the boar was not destined to be an elephant. And He was pleased to show variety in making many creatures, that man also might be pleased. The boar plunges either tusk without distinction into any kind of food; the elephant uses only one of his tusks to dig up the roots which he feeds upon, and keeps the point of the other intact for battle. Why did the Deity bestow this care upon him? What is the object, when not only men kill each other with steel, but even elephants go about with their sharp pointed instrument with which to extinguish the life both of each other and of men? Here surely we must call a halt. It so pleased Him to whom whatever pleases Him is lawful and whom nothing pleases which is not good and holy and just. Man, therefore, was made after the fashion that pleased God, and that will please all who are endowed with power of reason and intelligence. All things have their own order and class. Here the spotted leopard, there the savage tiger, here the helpful ox, there the intelligent horse. Here the rapacious eagle threatens, there the crafty vulture hangs over its prey. Here the merry nightingale, there the tuneful blackbird sings. Here the one-eyed tunny-fish swims, there the happy dolphin leaps. Here the idle mussel opens its mouth, there the band of polypi lay their fangs and cleverly tear off the mussel’s flesh. But who could enumerate all the
species of creatures, when there come forth daily new ones not seen before or at least forgotten, so that man has not had time from the creation of the world to acquire a knowledge of all of them? Man, therefore, stands first in the company and circle of all creation, having in common with the immortal existences reason and a soul, in common with mortals, earthly life and a body. The Deity willed to make him so, and for Him to have so willed it is enough. So much for the first question.
To the second, why, when sin is due to the allurements or the impetuous nature of the flesh, is the soul damned? I answer briefly, because the law is sinned against. For the law is enacted that transgression be not committed, and where there is no law, there is no transgression. They cannot offend against the law, to whom no law is given. This is shown by experience. Dogs tear each other to pieces, but they are not brought to trial for assault. Wolves plunder, but no one demands restitution of them. Storks and eagles cast off the inefficient among their young, but no one charges them with cruelty of treatment. The stallion openly covers all the mares of a neighborhood, but no one brings him up for adultery. And all this is simply because they have no law. But since a law has been given unto man, and he offends against the law, he is properly punished as the law orders. Man, therefore, is damned, because he has resisted the law and rashly stirred up rebellion against it.
But now a more serious question arises, namely, why then did God give man a law against which he can offend? Why did He not rather suffer him to live without the law, like the other living creatures, especially when all things are ordered by Divine Providence and accomplished by the power of the same? Before 1 answer this question, I want to consider what a law is. Some define it sometimes, starting from its form, as when Paul says, “The law is spiritual” [Rom. 7:14], sometimes from its purpose, as when Paul says, “By the law comes knowledge of sin” [Rom. 3: 20], that is, the law is the indicator of sin, and when Chrysippus in “De legibus et senatus consultis et longa
[Zwingli’s quotation is from the Corpus Juris Civilis, the Code of]
[Justinian, see Digest, lib. I, cap. 3, entitled: De legibus senatusque con-]
[sultis et longa consuetudine.” It reads as follows: “Marcianus, in his first]
[book of the Institutions, also Demosthenes, and also the philosopher of the]
[highest Stoic wisdom, Chrysippus, thus began his book, which he wrote]
consuetudine,” i. e., “On the Laws and the Decrees of the Senate and Ancient Custom,” defines law thus, “Law is the knowledge of things divine and human,” 4. e., “Law leads us to learn things divine and human,” yet no one has defined it from the point of view of its material substance—what the law really and in essence 1s.
This fountainhead of law (with your permission) I will open up, and define the divine law thus:—The law is the divine order, expressing His nature and will. If one wishes to put it more concisely he may say, the law is the constant will of God, though I want to set forth the former that the latter also may be made plain. Thus I touch first upon the source, in referring the law to the Deity, and secondly upon its nature, in calling it an order. I wish order, however, to be taken in a wide sense, so that it shall include what is forbidden as well as what is prescribed. Finally we see what the law is in essence, namely the will and nature of the Deity, so that when we hear the law, we know what God wills and that He is Himself of the nature of that which he shows us. And this is so true that even in those erudest laws, Thou shalt not kill, Thou shalt not steal, Thou shalt not commit adultery, we learn that God’s nature is such that He hates violence, injustice and wrong. For unless His nature were such, He would expose Himself to the charge of duplicity in ordering one thing and wishing another. Therefore it is evident that since the law is the order of God, it 1s the expression of His will, and since it is His will, He also gives His approval to that which He enjoins upon us, and this is what the second definition has in view. Hence it is clear that at our time some persons of the first importance, as they think, have spoken without sufficient cireumspection about the law in saying that the law is only to terrify, damn, and deliver over to torments. In reality, the law does not do that at all, but, on the contrary, sets forth the will and nature of the Deity. And what can be
[Regarding the Law’: The law is the king of all things divine and human.]
[He must of necessity be the patron of the good and bad, as well as their]
[ruler and leader” In Mommsen’s edition of the Corpus, Digest, p. 5. It]
[is possible that Zwingli had another reading in his edition of the Corpus,]
[in place of the word “king,” on which his word “notitia,” or “knowledge,”]
[is based. The editor owes the identification of this quotation to the kind-]
[ness of Prof. George L. Burr, of Cornell University. He means Luther.]
compared with that? If a king or emperor entrusts his views, plans, and nature to a councillor or commander, how that official leaps and exults for joy! When God by the promulgation of the law discloses His will and nature to us, do we venture to make light of it?
Paul used such commonplace sayings more clearly and more discreetly. In Romans he carefully avoids using such strong commonplace sayings as the law damns,” “the law sentences to hell.” In general his effort is to preach the sanctity of the law, calling it now “spiritual” and again “good,” as when he says, “Was then that which is good made death unto me?” “God forbid,” he says. “But sin, that it might appear sin,” that is, that it might be recognized as sin, “worketh death in me by that which is good” (that is, by the law which he calls that “which is good here), “that (thus) sin” (which of course was not yet recognized since the law was not known), “by commandment might become exceeding sinful,” (that is, that the magnitude and monstrousness of sin might be made plain) [Rom. 7:12]. See how well he guards against making the law detested, as he would do if he assigned damnation and death to it. I do not mean by this that I consider it irreverent to use commonplace sayings of that kind on occasion. But since there are some persons who claim for themselves alone the right to explain divine Seripture, although one sees them both in the passage quoted and in many other passages stumble like children from sheer ignorance of rhetoric, which nevertheless they avowedly arrogate to themselves, I would like to direct their attention to modesty and to themselves—to modesty, that they may cease to seem to despise the law, which is the everlasting will of God, to themselves, that they may learn that they are men, whose characteristic it is to err, be ignorant, stumble, be deceived and deluded. For these things happen to them as well as to others.
There are, moreover, in the argument of Paul above mentioned most charming figures of speech and personifications, as when sin is made a geometer and measurer, the law a plumb-line, or again when sin is made exceeding sinful or a sinner, like a thief caught in the very act, or as when we are said to be delivered from the law, when the law can no more be abolished or cease to be (I am speaking of the spiritual law, not the law of ceremonials) than can God Himself,—when we are delivered not
from the law but from damnation, which is rightly due to us for our contempt of the law. And when he presently calls the law “spiritual,” he shows clearly that the law cannot in any way be abolished. These figures, being either not recognized or neglected, force those great men either to leap over things that they have undertaken to expound, or to babble out something obscure, ambiguous, and high sounding, to hide their ignorance, so that you may not understand that they do not themselves understand what they are talking about. Forms of expression like, “the law damns,” “the law convicts of sin,” are true only in the same way that one may say it is true, if any one should bring a light into an assembly of deformed people and they should cry, “Do not bring a lamp. It will make us all deformed.” A light certainly cannot make them deformed, but it makes their deformity visible. So the law does not damn, but human vileness is brought forth by the agency of the law. The law, there- fore, is light. If it is light, it is the mind, intelligence, and will of God. Thus, then, to come back to my purpose, I think I have sufficiently expounded and supported my definition of the law. Now I will add a few illustrations and exceptions as an exposition of the above statement. Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind, and with all thy strength” [Deut. 6:15]. These words directed to man are a law by which he first learns that our God and Lord is to be loved above all things, and that because of His natural goodness peculiar to Him. What knowledge can be nobler or more useful to the mind of man than this? What more welcome message than that God announces Himself as that which is to be cherished and loved above all things? When, therefore, He presents Himself to be loved, it is certain that He Himself also loves. For unless He loved us, why, pray, should He disclose Himself to us?
We learn, therefore, from this law in the second place, not only that it is God whom we ought to love above all things, but also that He by His nature loves not only man but all His creatures. For unless He loved them, He would not create them, sustain them, live and work in them. Only there is this distinction that what God loves He loves as a father. For He has no one above Him to look up to with wonder and reverence. But we love Him as our Creator and Father. Hence it follows—and
that belongs to the exception—that what is law to us is not law to God. For who should make a law for Him who is the Highest, or who should enlighten Him who is the Light? What is law to us is, therefore, nature and character to Him. When He commands, “Thou shalt love me only,” we learn first that He loves not in consequence of the law, which none can impose upon Him, but by His nature and character. Secondly we learn that we also ought duly to love Him. “Thus He is above the law, we are under the law; He is the love which is commanded of us. Now I will add another illustration by which the above will be more clearly explained, and this exception that God is not under the law will become more evident. When it is commanded, Thou shalt not kill” (the killing of men, not of beasts, is forbidden thereby), we learn first that God loves justice and abhors violence, we learn secondly that it is right for us to refrain from violence, following His example. Then, when He slays according to His will, He is no murderer, because He is not under the law, and not being under the law He does not sin. “But what is law to us,” some one says, you said was nature to Him. If, therefore, by nature He killeth not, He is on the same footing as they who kill not because of the prohibition of the law. If He does kill, though He does not offend against the law, He yet seems to act inconsistently with His nature. For if what is law to us is nature to Him, you will have to admit either that He contradiets Himself when He kills or that murder is not contrary to His will, or if He is not inconsistent with Himself nor in contravention of the law and yet kills, then killing does not infringe upon the law.”
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