14. The xiiij. Chapter. Of Felicitie in generall, and of the cheefes

The xiiij. Chapter. Of Felicitie in generall, and of the cheefest good; out of the commentaries vpon Aristotles Ethikes.

¶ Of felicitie and blessednes, looke more Part. 2. Cap. 16. Art. 26.

TOuching the name of Felicitie, all men in a maner agrée; which is manifest by the Latins, Gréekes, and Hebrues: for none of them doo contend about the name; but about the thing it selfe, and especiallie wherein the subiect or matter is to be placed, they are at great dissention, For the vulgar sort differ from the wise men; yea & if thou wilt somewhat narrowlie consider the matter, all the common sort agrée not with themselues; and wise men doo not a little differ from wise men. ¹ From this felicitie did Aristotle exclude all creatures void of reason, and this he did by vertue of the definition of felicitie; which he affirmed to be the chéefe action of mans mind, arising of the most excellent vertue. If this be so, then brute creatures shall not be partakers thereof, séeing they be not capable of such an action. Indéed it would not be denied, but that they haue in their owne nature or kind som good, proper to themselues, which to them is principall and chéefe; but yet we must not thinke that the same is blessednes, séeing it is of such a nature, as it cannot be without reason.

But before we come to the thing it selfe, I thinke it shall be good to knowe how this definition of Aristotle dooth either agrée or disagrée with the holie scriptures. ² And first, where he appointed mans worke in act to be felicitie, he decréed no otherwise than doo the holie scriptures, where it is said; Blessed are those which walke in the lawe of the Lord. Blessed is the man that feareth the Lord, and which dooth meditate in the lawe of the Lord daie and night. All these be most godlie acts and exercises for this life. But it is obiected; Blessed are they whose iniquities are forgiuen, and whose sinnes be couered. Blessed is the man to whom the Lord imputeth no sinne: which things belong not to the worke of men, but flowe from the méere liberalitie of God. Héerevnto we saie, that Aristotle vnderstood not, nor beléeued this iustification through Christ, which the holie scriptures haue reuealed vnto vs; neither doo we in the meane time speake of this felicitie: but we speake onelie of that which followeth this first blessednes, and standeth in the right dooing while we liue héere; and in the other world, in the contemplation and fruition of the sight of Gods maiestie. And yet neuerthelesse, if we will also regard the blessednes of iustification, and laie that before our eies, whereby it is applied vnto vs; then commeth the worke of faith. For we be iustified by beléeuing, although we are not iustified by the merit of that action, nor yet for the dignitie thereof are receiued into grace: but of this felicitie we doo not now treate.

And that which we doo speake of, although it be the worke of man; yet doth it not breake out from his strength, but is produced by the power of the spirit of God, and from the heauenlie maiestie. In the world to come this felicitie shall be perfect, which shall neuer be interrupted, but shall be one, and a continuall act. Whereas this blessednes of Aristotle, as his definition sheweth, may manie times betwéene whiles breake off. He would that this action, whereby a man is blessed, should flowe from a most excellent vertue. The same also doo we thinke, who shew that the actions of faithfull men are not right and acceptable vnto God, vnlesse they be the branches of faith, hope, and charitie, the which we estéeme for the chéefest vertues. We agrée with him also as touching the continuance; for we require a perseuerance while we liue héere, and in the world to come we beléeue to haue euerlasting blessednes. Onlie in this, there is a disagréement betwéene Aristotle and vs, that he requireth the good things of the world, but we affirme that they are not of necessitie héere in this world vnto a Christian to make him blessed.

2 The opinions of the philosophers concerning felicitie, may thus be distinguished; ³ so as we may saie, that some of them were notable, hauing famous patrons; but others vile and obscure, bicause they came from men of no account, and be not confirmed by strong and euident reasons. And of this kind are found health, riches, and such like, whose defenders were no notable men. To the other kind belongeth pleasure, honestie, vertue, to liue agréeable with the first gifts of nature, knowledge, &c. ⁴ These indéed are the ends, which are accounted without mixture. And there be some that haue other things ioined with them: for some men vnto vertue doo ioine pleasure; others vnto honestie ioine a fréedome from sorrowe; othersome with vertue doo ioine the accomplishment of a perfect life. Augustine against Iulianus Scyllaeus blameth that good, which is compounded with pleasure; for in that honestie is placed therein, it representeth a shew of man, the pleasure which is mingled, is a brutish thing. But he that will more fullie vnderstand of this matter, let him reade Cicero as well in his second booke De finibus, as in his Tusculans quest: and thou maist also sée, that sometimes some of them disagrée with themselues; and that which they first iudged to be the chéefest good, straightwaie they refuse it: for they which being whole, made small reckoning of health, afterward being destitute thereof, placed it in the chéefest good, which also hapneth to them that be pressed with pouertie: for such, not onlie make great account of riches, but aboue all things séeke for the same. And these, whom we haue spoken of, doo appoint some thing shat should be euident and manifest. For these things; namelie, pleasure, riches, and honors be so plaine and euident, that they are apparant, euen to the senses. Yea and Epicurus said, that he therefore thought pleasure to be the chéefest good, bicause it was the most knowen, and most euident good thing. And he said, that pleasure was no lesse knowne to be the chéefest good, than snowe to be white, or fire hot. Varro sheweth, that the number of opinions concerning this matter, was verie great, as Augustine declareth in his booke De ciuitate Dei: for he saith, that there might be reckoned two hundred fourescore and eight opinions touching felicitie.

Let vs then séeke the cause why there arose so manie and so variable opinions thereof: which therefore we saie came to passe, bicause men did not deliberate of this matter with the better part of their mind, but rather counselled with their owne affections, which as they be diuers, and doo diuerslie stir vp the affections, they inclined mens minds vnto so manifold and sundrie ends. A man may sée yoong men, which diuers waies being hot in loue, thinke themselues blessed; others make their bellie their God; some haue giuen themselues like bondslaues to the séeking of honor. There be some such also, which thinke that nothing is to be preferred aboue riches: and the libertie of the Cynicke philosophers verie well pleased Diogenes and his like. But if that reason it selfe had bin consulted withall in this matter, aboue the senses and affections, without doubt we should not haue had so manie and so contrarie opinions.

Now since there be, or may be so manie in number, to reckon all, much lesse to examine them, should be ouer-great labour. Wherefore, that we take not a superfluous matter in hand, we will in this treatise choose those things which might easilie deceiue vs, séeing a great likelihood of truth is discerned in them; ⁵ which Eustratius shewed by a verie learned similitude; ⁶ If one (saith he) sée a stock-doue, he will soone thinke he séeth a pigion, which will not happen vnto him when he séeth an eagle, séeing the same is far vnlike vnto a pigion. So we may iudge, that there be some opinions of blessednes, so far from the truth, as verie few or none can be deceiued by them: and againe, others in a maner so néere ioined vnto the truth, as it is not in all men to discerne or knowe them one from another: wherefore those that be of this sort, ought not to be passed ouer, but to diligentlie be examined.

Aristotle declareth, that men, as touching the chéefest good things, bent their opinions vnto those kinds of life, which they had determined to followe, which indéed are reckoned to be thrée; namelie, delightfull, ciuill, and contemplatiue. But if thou shalt demand the causes why one will incline to this kind of life, another to that, ⁷ manie causes may be shewed: for manie in the execution of their affaires, and ordering of their actions, doo followe the constitution of their bodie, wherein, if they be giuen to surfeting, to drunkennes, to the flesh, to excellent and good arts, to reuenging of iniuries, then they speciallie thinke themselues happie, when they haue obteined those things, wherevnto they are mooued by a certeine naturall prouocation. Others are greatlie desirous to atteine this or that thing, being brought therevnto by education; and it doth not seldome happen, that they become like vnto those men, with whom they be conuersant, and be ioined in frendship. Againe, vnto others, and those without doubt not a few, nor alwaies euill men, it is argument and cause inough for them to prosecute anie thing; bicause they regard their authoritie, which gouerne either the common wealth, or church, or schooles, or warfare. For looke what princes, graue and wise men, whose authoritie is verie great, doo choose vnto themselues as an end and thing most to be desired, that doth a great part of men take in hand and wish, according to that woorthie sentence of Plato, and of other wise men; Such as the kings and princes be, ⁸ such are their people. When England had king Edward who was a godlie prince, and giuen to good learning, ⁹ all the youth indeuoured to imitate his labours. Causes indéed these be, but yet no iust causes. We ought not to be mooued by authors, nor by examples, nor yet by the force of bodilie constitution, but by the suggestion of reason, and of the mind, and by the weight of the things themselues. But to follow Aristotles similitude, héerein the common people are like vnto bond-slaues, and brute beasts. For this séemes to be the maner of shéepe, that if the ramme, or that shéepe which goeth formost in the flocke, depart vnto anie side, they doo all followe: also bondslaues without anie iudgement or anie choise doo followe their maisters. I would speake somwhat of Sardanapalus, ¹⁰ sauing that those things which Iustine hath of him, are common vnto all men: onlie that I will shew, which they saie he had alwaies in his mouth; Eate, drinke, and plaie. But Horace in his epistles reprooueth those spéeches; Thou hast plaid enough, thou hast drunk enough, and thou hast eaten enough, it is time for thée to be gone.

In the fift booke of Tusculans questions Cicero saith, that Sardanapalus willed to be written vpon his toombe; Haec habeo, quae edi, quaeque exaturata libido Hausit, at illa iacent multa & praeclara relicta; that is, These things I onelie haue that I did eate, Delighting most to cram my panch with meate: Whereas those things that were of better kind, As I them found, I left them all behind. Cicero addeth that Aristotle said; What else wouldest thou write vpon the toombe of an oxe, not of a king? But what complaine we onelie of Sardanapalus, ¹¹ as though that Tyberius prince of the Romans were not so greatlie giuen to these delights and wantonnes, as he erected to himself euen an office of pleasures. For euen as vnto kings and magistrates, there are some which be maisters of requests, secretaries, and maisters of the horses; so would he haue a maister of the pleasures. ¹² Also Heliogabalus, whom I cannot tell whether I should call an emperour, or a monster, appointed rewards to them which could deuise strange kind of sauces, that he might the more prouoke his appetite to eating and drinking. And not onelie did the Roman monarchs sinne in this point, but also the great king of the Persians; ¹³ euen Xerxes, who appointed great rewards to the inuentors of new pleasures.

Of Pleasure, and wherein it may concur with the cheefest good, and wherein it may not.

3 Now the place serueth to speake somwhat of pleasure; and that we may not thinke that all kind of pleasure is secluded from the chéefest good, or from felicitie. For in verie déed, felicitie, whether we vnderstand it for naturall or theologicall, is either pleasure, or else is ioined therewith; so as they cannot be plucked one from another. First I will shew those things, which I haue gathered thereof out of Platos doctrine; afterward I will bréeflie comprehend what Aristotle hath of the same. Plato diuided our soule at the least into two parts; to wit, the mind, and the sense: of these parts, as the one is high and most excellent, and whereby we approch verie néere vnto God; so the other is grosse, and in a maner brutish, and by it we communicate with beasts. This distinction of the mind being put and confirmed, hée attributed vnto the mind gladnes and ioie; but vnto the sense, pleasure. But what the difference is betwéene ioie and gladnes (as me thinks I find by his opinion) I wil declare. He will haue it, that gladnes is somtimes good and commendable; but sometimes, if it shall passe the limits, he affirmeth it to be a vice, and that it is to be despised. ¹⁴ Which will appéere the more plaine, if it be defined: for it is a certeine hautines of the mind, bicause of the presentnes of some good thing: but euerie man dooth sée that gladnes is right, if we be lifted vp by reason of some present good, that is neither lesse nor more than the thing it selfe deserueth. Wherefore they be foolish, which puffe vp themselues for false good things, or be too much eleuated for the obtainment of vile and simple goods. But those men are to be detested, which reioise at wickednes committed, which thorough the corruption of iudgment séemes good vnto their minds. But on the other side, gladnes is then praised and commended, when the mind is no more merier nor puffed vp, than agréeth with the good that is gotten. And Cicero in his second booke De finibus, as he had learned of the Stoikes, comprehended naughtie gladnes vnder these words, saieng that the same is an exalting of the mind, which without reason thinks it enioieth a great good.

But I returne to Plato, who also ascribeth ioie vnto the mind; but yet so, ¹⁵ as there can no euill cleaue therevnto, bicause he defineth the same to be a pleasantnes, which floweth either from the contemplation of a wise man, or else from the actions of vertue. This pleasantnes can suffer no euill accesse: for those things which be iust, right, and as best becommeth, cannot please anie man too much. And he so commended ioie, as in his booke De pulchro, when he speaketh of heauenlie & true blessed life, he affirmeth that thereby the minds of the faithfull are nourished. And he will haue it, that the poets did cunninglie call that kind of meate Ambrosia & Nectar. But the pleasure, whereby the senses alone (as he thinketh) are replenished, is a swéet motion, which tickleth the senses. From which opinion Cicero nothing disagréeth, who in the second booke De finibus saith, that All men think this to be pleasure, which the sense receiuing is mooued, and is replenished with a certeine pleasantnes: and after a few words betwéene, hée misliked not to repeate the same. That pleasant motion, wherewith the senses is made merie, all men call in Gréeke ⟨…⟩; in Latine Voluptatem; that is pleasure. By these things which I now shew, ye must obserue this, that as well Plato, as the Stoikes, and other ancient writers iudged pleasure to be a motion or action: for afterward we shall sée what truth this may haue in it.

¹⁶ Plato thinketh, that this pleasure of the senses riseth of the infirmitie of nature: for the same if it be spent, beginneth to desire those things wherewith it iudgeth that it may be restored and renewed; & while we satisfie the want of nature, the senses are tickled and tempered with pleasantnes. And contrariwise, while nature cannot obteine those things that it hath néed of, both it languisheth, and thorough want is maruelouslie gréeued. Wherevpon the same authour in Phileto said, that pleasures are the auoiding of sorrowes, and thereof concludeth, that the pleasures of them that be sicke are greater and more vehement than of them that be in good health: for when they be greatlie tormented with gréefs, they doo excéedingly burne with the desire of medicins, I meane with the desire of all pleasures; therefore when they obteine them, they are delighted aboue measure. As we may perceiue in them which are sicke of most sharpe feuers, and be in a maner consumed with intollerable thirst, to whom when the physician giueth leaue to satisfie themselues with cold, or some other kind of drinke; it cannot be said what excéeding pleasure they take. ¹⁷ Herevnto in that place he addeth, that these grosser sort of pleasures, which belong vnto the senses, are not single but mixt; for they haue alwaies some sorrowe ioined with them: for (as we haue said) the néedines of nature bréedeth gréefs. Neither are the pleasures of this kind brought foorth anie longer, when the naturall want is satisfied: for meate liketh not them that be satisfied and haue their fill; neither is drinke welcome to them which haue droonke abundantlie. But and if it happen to be otherwise, ¹⁸ as otherwhile we sée it dooth to them which be droonkards & gluttons, there is another cause of the pleasure than naturall want; namelie an ill disposition, or else some other thing, which is not now fit time to declare, séeing we treat of naturall pleasures.

¹⁹ 4 Howbeit Aristotle put not these differences of words; but those delectations which as well belong vnto the mind or reason, as those which be of the senses he called pleasures, that is, ⟨…⟩. Yea, and in the seuenth booke the eleuenth chapter, he will that ⟨…⟩, that is, happie, is so called of ⟨…⟩, which is to reioise; and he speaketh of pleasure, which he ioineth with blessednes. Certeinlie he speaketh not of this pleasure, wherewith the sense and grosser part of the mind is possessed: for that is only ioined with the felicitie which shall be of the mind, which as I haue said, of a mingled word, is named pleasure. And perhaps Aristotle would not change the name, bicause he thought to speake as most men did, although he agréed with Plato as touching the difference of the thing. ²⁰ But yet herein they differ one from another, that Aristotle thinketh not (as Plato and the old philosophers did) that pleasure is a motion or action; but rather an affect cleauing vnto the motion or operation. Wherefore these differ after a sort, although in the subiect they agrée. And if at any time Aristotle himselfe, or any Peripatetike, called pleasure a motion; that proposition, which commonlie in the Schooles they call Identica, must be ascribed vnto them: for as it hath béene said, both the affect, and motion or action; are in subiect all one. Wherefore the generall word therof is the Predicament of qualitie, ²¹ and pleasure belongeth to the third kind thereof, and the same is called a passion; or passible qualitie. It is called in Gréeke ⟨…⟩; whereby we are swéetlie affected with the presence of some good thing agréeing with our nature. And as beautie is a qualitie which riseth of a iust and right temperature of the bodie, of wel-fauourednes, and of a comlie colour; so pleasure ariseth of a conuenient motion and action. Wherfore thus it shall be lawfull to define the same.

Pleasure is an affect, wherwith we are swéetlie mooued, ²² by reason of an action which procéedeth from a nature that is of good constitution, or else from an habit according to nature without impediment. For the actions both of eating, and drinking, and procreating, séeing they arise of nature, doo alwaies to him that is in health bring pleasure with them; for they be not hindred by sicknes, nor weakenes, nor yet by saturitie and fulnes. Euen so contemplations, and the actions of vertues, since they spring from an habit of the mind, they be readie and easie, and are a present good thing, which agréeth with the nature of man; & therefore haue pleasure alwaies ioined with them. Aristotle in the tenth booke of Ethiks prooueth, ²³ that pleasure is not a motion, bicause it is all whole togither, as is a vision: and pleasure hath no succession, except it be accidentallie. For if it followe actions, which haue successe, the same in like maner is prolonged, as it happeneth in eating and drinking; but if the action be momentanie, as is a vision, hearing and vnderstanding, then is all the pleasure had at once: euen as the whole vision is at once; if the vertue and power of seing be perfect, if the thing that is séene be set before the eiesight all at once, if the light going betwéene be not obscured, and a conuenient distance come betwéene. A motion is not perfect in his parts, but pleasure is whole all at once; therefore it is no motion. Motion cannot be at one moment or instant, but pleasure may. The properties of motion be swiftnes, and slownesse; and these things are not answerable to pleasure. For while a man reioiseth, he neither reioiseth the swifter, nor the slower; for if pleasure endure for an houre, it is all whole at once, while the houre lasteth.

²⁴ 5 Since we vnderstand by the definition now brought, that the power must be perfect, and the habit firme; and that the action must be without impediment, and the obiect principall and excellent: it is gathered how long pleasure can endure. It so long abideth, as the obiect and ablenes, or power of dooing doth remaine whole: for if the obiect fall from the excellencie thereof, or that the facultie be not vehement and earnestlie bent, delectation dooth not followe. Hereof it commeth, that when in working men be tired, pleasurs are oftentimes diminished. Which thing also happeneth, when anie thing is taken awaie from the excellencie of the obiect. ²⁵ It appéereth also, why new things doo so greatlie delight; bicause the mind, so soone as anie noble and excellent thing offereth it selfe to be beheld, dooth behold the same earnestlie and attentiuelie; which, after it is knowne, the mind rebateth his earnestnes, and so the pleasure ceasseth: but if anie other new thing be put in place of the former obiect, then the vnderstanding enforceth his studie againe in beholding of the same, and the pleasure returneth, and by this meanes we euer delight our selues in new things. Besides this, it is shewed héereby, that the actions which are doone before we attaine to an habit, bréed not pleasure; bicause they be not easilie and readilie doone, but with some difficultie and labour. These things are opened by that definition.

²⁶ Now must we shew what pleasure is by hir forms and kinds. Neither is it anie doubt, but that pleasures are diuided among themselues in kind, séeing actions doo differ. But pleasure (as we knowe) is the perfection of an action; and the thing which should be doone, being changed, the perfection also thereof is changed. For these be of those sort of things, which be compared one with another. Neither is anie man ignorant, that there is one prefection of a chest, another of an house, another of a plant, and another of a man. Wherefore since that actions be diuided one from another, so shall the pleasures, whereby they are performed, differ. Furthermore, they striue one against another, & one extinguisheth or letteth another; wherof it commeth that they are distinguished. That pleasure, which shall come of musicke, will take awaie that which ariseth of spéeches: and those, which be the grosser sort, doo withstand and let the delights of the vnderstanding and reason. Again, of actions some be euill, some good, and some betwéene both; whereby it is brought to passe, that the pleasures which followe them haue varietie and difference. The which also by this meanes commeth to passe, bicause the desires of actions are sundrie: for if the desires be varied, much more be the pleasures, which are more ioined with the actions, than be the desires: for desires are oftentimes plucked awaie from the worke, whereas pleasures cannot be separated from their actions. No doubt but some pleasures there be of horses, some of lions, some of beares, and therefore also there be some of men: and not onelie haue they them diuerse from other liuing creatures, but euen men themselues also haue them not alike among them. For those pleasures, which be naughtie, doo please naughtie men; and those which be honest, doo delight good men.

6 Wherefore now (as I thinke) it is sufficientlie confirmed, ²⁷ that pleasures must be distinguished. Let this then be the first distinction. Of pleasures some be pure, and some vnpure. And this diuision is taken from works and actions; so as of them some be about the obiects more seuered from matter, or more ioined with the same. Which how true it is, Galen hath verie well declared in his second booke De causis symptomatum; There are found (saith he) gréefes and pleasures in all the senses: gréefes (as he saith) come herevpon, that the senses are remooued from their owne constitution and naturall state; but pleasures come, when they returne to the same. And that this may the more plainlie appéere, he thus runneth thorough all the senses. Féeling is remooued from his owne estate, if there happen too much heate, or too much cold; or else, if it incur those things which doo strike, or gnawe, or breake, &c. hereof doo arise gréefes vnto it. Tasting is gréeued with the selfe-same things, which it dooth communicate with féeling: but as it is taste, it is offended with tasts, which be too tart, sower, sharpe, and bitter; for by these the naturall constitution thereof is disturbed, and the continuance broken off. Smelling is disturbed by the dissolution of ouer vehement vapors; for by them the continuance is broken off. Againe, hearing is put from his state, by a voice too high, or too lowe, or too great, or too swift, and also by euerie violent noise. Finallie, the sight is offended, when it happeneth vpon most bright lights and colours; for these things doo scatter and disperse the vertue therof. With all these same things the senses are gréeued, bicause through them they depart from their owne measurable and quiet state. Againe, they are delighted and take pleasure, when they are reduced to their proper & naturall state. Whereof the sight hath triall, when it turneth it selfe to a browne colour, whereby the power thereof is more gathered and knit togither into one; or else when it beholdeth pleasant colours, as gréene, golden, blue, or skie colours. The hearing delighteth in a mild and treatable voice. The smelling, when those vapours be dissolued, which with a certeine swéetnes doo strengthen and confirme the instruments of smelling. Vnto tasting are fat and swéet relishes pleasant. And though we be sicke, yet are we for a little while delighted with somewhat sharpe and sower tasts. Féeling is delighted with qualities which be temperate, soft, and somewhat warme. Thus are the senses delighted, and doo take pleasure, when they be reduced to their naturall and proper constitution.

But it is to be vnderstood, that those also may take pleasure, though they haue not bin first offended or remooued from their naturall state. For if there happen to come a pleasant colour, or delightfull sound, the sight and hearing is delighted, though it haue not bin first remooued from the constitution thereof. Galen procéedeth in those things which he said, and sheweth, that there is a degrée of greater or lesse purenes in these actions of the senses, and in pleasures; and declareth that the same standeth in the meanes that the senses vse. The sight worketh by light; hearing, by the aire; smelling, by sauour; these things be pure, and haue little of the grosser and thicker kind of matter. Those things, wherin féeling is occupied, hold the lowest place; those be grosse and terrestriall things. From thence we come to tasting; that also is exercised about waterie humors, which bée somewhat thicke. Smelling is eleuated vnto vapours, far more pure than water. Vnto hearing is the aire, and that a pure aire more néere. Lastlie, we come vnto the light, which among those things that be perceiued, is most fine, and hath a great deale of purenes. Howbeit, we are not there to rest, but after these things we come to imagination, cogitation, memorie, and vnderstanding, which are occupied about the similitudes and images of things far more pure. Wherefore by these things appeareth, that first distinction of pleasures, that one is purer, and another grosser, and out of Galen wée haue expounded the ground of the diuision.

7 After this diuision there followeth another, that some pleasures are bodilie, ²⁸ others not bodilie. Of the bodilie, thus we affirme in generall, that neither they be good, nor yet bad; as also are not the actions about meate, drinke, and carnall pleasure. But as touching the kinds and parts, we must saie, that if they excéed measure, they be euill; but if they conteine themselues within iust and due limits, they are indifferent, since that men may vse them both rightlie, that is, according to vertue, and also vnto good and laudable ends. They doo also abuse them sometimes, namelie, vpon an ill determination & corruptlie, as Catiline, when he tempered himselfe from delights and pleasures, to the intent he might destroie his countrie: but yet, if they shall be weied in their owne nature, they be rather good, according to ciuill goodnes, than euill. ²⁹ We come now to a third distinction of pleasures. There be some, wherein there is excesse; but there be others, wherein it cannot be, as it also hapneth in actions. For who did euer rightlie or iustlie more than is requisite? And so in contemplations of the truth, be it of things naturall, or mathematicall, or diuine; no man can reioice, or take pleasure of them more than is requisite; neither can he in like manner, as touching things rightlie done, and of the works of iustice. But in being angrie, in ambitious desire of promotion, in giuing, in hearing, we may excéed measure, no lesse than in eating, drinking, and procreation.

Finallie, the fourth distinction is, ³⁰ that of pleasures, some be single, and by themselues; bicause they haue no sorrowes mingled with them, nor yet be swéet, in respect they fill and restore nature, being wasted and consumed. Neither be they at one time pleasant, and at another time vnpleasant, but are euer in their owne nature to be wished and desired: and these pleasures are chéefelie those, which are perceiued in the mind; but others be mixed, namelie with sorowes, and for that cause are pleasant, bicause they refresh and renew nature decaieng, and therefore are not to be desired alwaies and at all times.

8 These things being thus determined, ³¹ let vs go in hand with the pleasures which be vnpure, bodilie, and which haue excesse, and which be mixed; and let this be the first proposition of them: If they excéed measure, they must be altogither auoided; for such doo either arise of a corrupt nature (for some men are euen by a proprietie of nature, fierce, wild, and cruell; and others be beastlie, and altogither intemperate) or else these euill actions and pleasures doo come from a vitious habit, brought in by a naughtie custome, as we sée it in drunkards, gluttons, and lasciuious men: wherefore from such shamefull and wicked causes, nothing can happen which (as we haue said) must not be auoided. Furthermore, since that pleasures of this kind, as it hath bin alreadie said, haue bin inuented to be as it were medicins vnto vs, when we suffer them to excéed measure; ³² so far is it off that they be medicins, as they are euen hurtfull vnto vs, and that in all kind of good things, and especiallie those things which come of fortune. For how manie riotous men be there, which hauing spent their great and ample patrimonies, are constreined miserablie to liue in want? I speake nothing of the goods of the bodie, séeing gluttonie and fleshlie pleasure killeth far more than the sword, or anie ordinarie sicknes, or defect of nature. Yea, and Galen in his second booke De semine wrote, that Pleasure is somtime by it selfe the cause of dissoluing the force and strength which giueth life. And there haue béene manie, which haue yéelded vp the ghost thorough too much pleasure. But & if that all abuse of things must be auoided, such kind of immoderate pleasures as these must be vtterlie shunned, séeing by this meanes they cure not the bodie, but doo excéedinglie destroie it. I let passe the goods of the mind, since nothing dooth more harme vnto wisdome, nor anie thing more weaken the right iudgement of dooing things, than these immoderate pleasures.

The reason which I haue brought, that by these grosse and immoderate pleasures, all the kinds of good things belonging to man be destroied, is written by Cicero in his booke called Hortensius, which booke is lost; yet will I reherse his words as they be recited of Augustine in his fourth booke against Iulian the 14. chapter; ³³ But are those pleasures of the bodie to be desired, which trulie and grauelie are of Plato called the allurements and baits of euils? For what destroieng (saith he) of helth, what deforming of the colour and the bodie, what foule losse, what dishonour is there, that is not called and brought foorth by pleasure? Euerie motion whereof, the greater it is, the more is it enimie vnto philosophie. For the pleasures of the bodie cannot agrée with anie great cogitation of the mind. For who is he, that when he vseth the greatest pleasure he can, is able to applie his mind to make an account, or to thinke of anie manner of thing? But who is so vnsatiable a person, that day and night, without anie intermission of time, will haue his senses so to be mooued, as they be mooued in the chéefest pleasures? What man indued with a good mind, had not rather that no pleasurs at all shuld be giuen vs of nature? Thus much said he. Vnder which sentence of his are co~prehended the hurts, which are woont to be brought in through these pleasures of the bodie, which excéed measure. But thou wilt saie, that If this reason were of force, ³⁴ it will condemne pleasures which spring of contemplation, and also that which ariseth of iust actions; bicause both the bodie is hurt by too much studie and contemplation: and that Socrates and also Aristides perished for their honestie sake. I answere, that this was accidentally; bicause Socrates lighted among euill men. Againe, that the powers of the head, which doo serue vnto cogitation, are somtimes ouermuch consumed. But some wittie fellowe will replie, that this also is accidentall, as touching the pleasures of the bodie; which in verie déed doo arise of those actions, which destroie the bodie, and our good things, which the verie pleasures by themselues would not doo. Howbeit to this we answere, that it coms not alwaies to passe, that a man perisheth for righteousnes; nor yet that contemplation dooth alwaies harme. But these grosser and mixt pleasures, so oft as they excéed the meane, it cannot be but they doo hurt: and so the hurt is not to be accounted of both alike.

9 But this of some is counted a hard matter, ³⁵ that these pleasures must be shunned, séeing pleasure by it selfe is good, & to be desired. Wherfore to auoid this, they are wont to say, that They are not pleasures indéed, but onlie séeme so to be; and although they séeme so, yet that of wise men they ought not to be accounted pleasures. Euen as those things are not said to be white, which so appeare vnto bleare eies; neither swéet or bitter, which those that are sicke doo so affirme. But me thinks it should not so be answered; bicause both Plato and Aristotle doo call them pleasures, wherevpon the definition before alledged dooth trulie agrée vnto them. Therefore would I rather saie to the argument, that pleasure indéed is of his owne nature good, and to be desired, but not to be taken of all things: euen as we desire to satisfie hunger, yet not by euerie kind of meate. Iust men also would become rich, but yet not by euerie kind of gaine; we also desire health, but yet not by euerie kind of medicine; and so we would haue pleasures, but yet not those which arise of actions that be dishonest and filthie, and which doo hurt the bodie, and all the good things which we haue. ³⁶ But séeing this kind of pleasures is both hurtfull, and to be shunned, how happeneth it that it is desired of so manie? Bicause pleasure in his owne nature hath some certeine diuine thing in it, and is desired of all men. Howbeit it coms to passe, that séeing nature in manie is not yet full perfect and confirmed, as in children, or else when men be indued with naughtie and lewd habits of mind, as be drunkards and fleshlie persons, they be deceiued, and séeke for pleasures where they ought not. Wherefore I maruell at Epicurus, which taketh his argument from children, whose nature is not yet become full perfect, neither are they indued with any vertue, & therfore may easilie be deceiued. Againe, it must be considered, that men doo perpetuallie labour, and are wearied with sundrie exercises; and therefore to be recreated and refreshed, they turne themselues to diuers pleasures; and when they cannot haue honest, pure, and simple pleasures, they will be satisfied with those grosser and hurtfull pleasures. And men haue a compounded nature, not simplie one and vnmixed; and thereof it coms, that they imbrace sundrie kinds of pleasures. Somtimes they take those which belong vnto the mind, and sometime those which be of the bodie; since that they consist as well of the mind as of the bodie. Yea, and the bodie it selfe, bicause it hath manie humors, and is indued with manie senses, therefore are we somtimes mooued to these pleasures, and sometimes to those, according as the humors stir them vp, or as the sundrie obiects doo fall into the senses. But God, since he is one and most pure, he enioieth one and the selfe-same pure and eternall pleasure.

³⁷ But to those pleasures of the bodie, they that be yoong, and melancholike men are most inclined. In them, while their stature is increased, the humors are disturbed, and nature is wearied and haled; and therefore doo they flie vnto pleasures, as vnto a certeine medicine and recreation. Likewise dooth the melancholike humor disquiet and vexe melancholike persons, and suffereth them not to rest; so as they being wearie, returne to pleasures, whereby they somewhat restore and exhilerate themselues. Wherevpon it appéereth, that nature, yea God himselfe, ³⁸ did not vnprofitablie giue vnto mankind these pleasures, that the immoderate vse of them might be auoided. For by them we lead the more commodious life, and we take more willinglie in hand the necessarie labours of life, and the preseruation of mankind, and are the more readilie healed of our dailie infirmities. Moreouer, yoong men, by certeine honest and moderate pleasures, are stirred vp vnto honest duties, and excellent vertues; and by gréefes they are terrified from sinnes and wickednes. ³⁹ And Augustine addeth, that these base pleasures are certeine steps of good, and as it were a little shadowe of the nature of felicitie, and of the chéefe good, whereby we may be stirred vp to an earnest desire thereof: wherefore they be of force to awaken vs, wherein neuertheles we are not to staie, but must rather rise vp vnto better things. And that we should not dwell in these things, God is so good, that he with these kinds of pleasures hath mingled manie bitter things.

⁴⁰ As touching those pure, vnmixt, and no bodilie pleasures, and which haue no excesse, let this be the proposition. They ought not to be refused, but since they are of the better sort, they drawe not a little néere vnto the nature of the chéefest good: for they be desired; not for themselues, but for another thing. I said that they drawe néere to the nature of the chéefest good; bicause in verie déed, the chéefest good is not in pleasure, no not of this kind: for that consisteth in the most perfect action, and vnto it is pleasure ioined, as a perpetuall companion: wherefore it cannot be plucked from the chéefest good, so as it should not be comprehended in the nature thereof. We verelie grant, that the same is wished for of all men, since there is none, but desireth both to liue, and to liue well. And as to liue, is to worke; so to liue well, is to be occupied in a verie good action: wherevnto when excellent pleasure is ioined, all men wish for the same, when they wish for that whereof it is a perpetuall companion. But an excellent action it cannot be, vnlesse it be conuersant about the most noble obiect; whereof as of a fountaine our perfection dependeth. Which that it may euidentlie be perceiued, we must vnderstand, that we are made perfect by a most excellent obiect, as by the efficient cause, whereby our mind and will is carried, or is allured vnto it. Againe, we are made perfect through pleasure, which is an affect and qualitie, that is instilled into our mind. ⁴¹ But it is called into doubt by some, whether pleasure must be wished for the life sake, or life for pleasure sake. And to omit those things which may be said on the other part, that which to mée séemeth good, I thus set downe; Pleasure is desired for the life sake, not the life for pleasures sake; bicause pleasure hereof ariseth, that the action agréeth with nature, and this we both féele and knowe. Wherefore that aboue all is to be wished, to the intent that the action may be counted most perfect. Neither is anie man ignorant, that perfection is instituted for that thing sake, which dooth make it perfect, especiallie when in his owne nature it hath no stabilitie. And all men sée, that meate it selfe is better than the sauce thereof.

10 But how those things, ⁴² which Aristotle bringeth, doo agrée with the holie scriptures, we may easilie perceiue. First he saith, that this opinion, as touching the grosser sort of pleasures, is the opinion of manie, and that of the vulgar sort of men. Which also Christ taught, affirming that the waie of perdition is large, ⁴³ and manie doo go that waie. He addeth moreouer, that they which iudge this, are ⟨…⟩, that is, most burdensome. And in Esaie we knowe, that it was said to wicked Ahaz; ⁴⁴ Is it a small matter vnto you to be greeuous vnto men? Aristotle calleth them bond-slaues. And the Lord said; ⁴⁵ He that dooth sinne, is the seruant of sinne. Also Peter said; Euerie man is his seruant, ⁴⁶ of whom he is ouercome. Aristotle saith, that they choose a beastlie life. And we haue it in the Psalmes; Man, when he should be in honour, ⁴⁷ is compared vnto the brute beasts, and is made like vnto them. Also Ieremie; ⁴⁸ Euerie man neigheth at his neighbours wife. And againe in the psalme; Be ye not like horsse and mule, ⁴⁹ in whom there is no vnderstanding. They which so thinke (saith the philosopher) doo defend themselues by the authoritie of princes, which liue after the maner of Sardanapalus. Neither dooth this disagrée with the holie scriptures, wherein we read, that such in a maner were the people, as were the kings whom they had. ⁵⁰ And in Osea we reade; Such people, such priest. In the Prouerbs, the 29. chapter; When the wicked shall beare rule, transgression shall be multiplied. And in the Gospels as touching Herod, ⁵¹ when the wise men came to Ierusalem, we find that not onlie hée himselfe was troubled, but also the whole citie with him. Lastlie, it is concluded, that in these grosser sort of pleasures cannot be reposed the chéefest good. Which also the Apostle confirmeth to the Corinthians; ⁵² Meate for the bellie, and the bellie for meate, God shall destroie both the one and the other. And Christ himselfe speaking of the pleasure of procreation; ⁵³ In the regeneration they neither marrie wiues, nor are married, but they shall be like vnto the angels.

11 Aristotle disputing yet further of pleasure saith, ⁵⁴ that the same must not be counted strange from felicitie, and so prooueth it, bicause it is of those kind of good things, which belong vnto the mind, vnlesse we will saie, that stones, stocks, & mettalles reioice and be glad. Let vs first declare his generall sentence; That is pleasant to euerie man, wherevnto he is said to be, and therof is named desirous. Héereby Aristotle meant, that pleasure séemeth to be of those kind of things, which haue relation one to another. And it is no maruell, for those things which be swéet, must of necessitie be swéet to some bodie. But what he is, to whome pleasure is referred, is declared by affection, while he saith; A horsse, a shew, iust things, and vertues doo delight those men, which haue bin desirous of horsses, shewes, a iust thing, and of vertues. The maner of all Syllogismes is, that first should be brought foorth the cause in generall, and then it is woont to be applied vnto that thing wherof it is spoken. So in this matter, the generall cause is set foorth for which anie thing is pleasant and swéet vnto anie man; namelie, for bicause he loueth it. This generall cause is héere restreined vnto him that is happie, bicause he is a louer of honest and good actions, wherevpon of necessitie it followeth, that he is verie much delighted with them.

For the confirmation of that generall cause, he vseth diuers and manifold examples; and first, he alledgeth the pleasure that men haue in riding of horsses, wherewith, how fondlie and earnestlie some men are otherwhile delighted, the yong man Strepsiades in Aristophanes doth testifie. He bringeth foorth them also, which are desirous to behold shewes, vnto whome we may adde those, which giue their mind to philosophie, wine, and monie: all which men (we sée) are wonderfullie delighted, when at anie time they enioie their desires. By these examples the fourme of the argument, which the Logicians call Induction, being the maior proposition, which comprehendeth the generall cause, is plainelie confirmed and shewed, which is straitwaie applied to the matter in hand, whereas he saith, that The like reason is to be had of those causes that are of a iust thing, and of good actions, and are referred to good and happie men, to wit, that those things be loued of them, and that they reioice not a little in them. Whereof it plainelie commeth, that blessed and good men, if they either sée or heare anie to liue well and honestlie, they take great pleasure therein: but without doubt much more, while they themselues exercise themselues in iust, good, and honest actions. By these things we now vnderstand, that the life of happie men is not seuered from pleasure; and we sée, that they did not vtterlie straie from the right waie, which ioined themselues vnto this felicitie.

12 But the question is, ⁵⁵ whether all pleasures haue fellowship with felicitie, and if that all haue not, as it should séeme we must affirme, then, what pleasure shall we ioine therewith? To this we answere by distinction. Some things are pleasant in their owne nature, and by themselues; but some haue it not of their owne propertie to delight, but taketh delight by a certeine corruption or viciousnes of him that is caught therewith. Wisedome, vertues, honest actions, remembrance of good déeds, prudent gouernment of things, finding out of profitable counsels, doctrine, contemplation, and such like, are delightfull euen of their owne goodnes, which if otherwhiles they be not liked of some, that hapneth through their owne vnskilfulnes and rudenes. But on the other side, immoderate wine, gorgeous sights, surfetings and lusts, are not in their owne nature pleasant and swéete, but doo onelie delight them which of themselues bée caught by such things. It is the common sort, which hunt after things not pleasant in their owne nature, which things are diuers and in sundrie sort, & those repugnant one to another. No man doubteth, but that there is a great number of pleasures of the common sort; for there be manie minds, and euerie one hath his owne delight, which certeinlie is then not lawfull, when it passeth his bounds, and when it deteineth men too much therein, or doth stir vp and disquiet their minds. These, and other pleasures of the senses, if they hold themselues within their bounds and limits, and doo not passe them, are both naturall, and by right cannot be condemned.

And what contrarietie there is of pleasures betwéene the vulgar sort, ⁵⁶ Eustratius thus sheweth; One is delighted with salt meate, another with swéet, one with drinke somewhat bitter, another with sower, which tasts be one contrarie to another, and cannot be had togither in one and the same thing. But here a man may saie, that this also may be séene among the pleasures which ye call naturall; some are delighted in the mathematicall sciences, others in the knowledge of naturall things, some in logicke, others onlie in prudent actions.

Wherefore since there is a varietie as well here as there, this difference of contrarietie after that manner interpreted, séemes not to put a distinction betwéene pleasures, séeing it is found alike on both parts. Vnlesse thou wilt saie, there is a great varietie & multitude of vulgar pleasures, which are contraries; as swéet and sower, harsh and mild are one repugnant to another; which contrarietie is not in the honest pleasures that we haue now recited. For the mathematicall sciences are not against the knowledge of naturall things; nor logicke against prudence. But the difference is more trulie declared, if we marke the repugnancie in the appetite of one & the selfe-same man: for euen he that delighted in a thing, straightwaie hateth the same; and he that desired meate, dooth by and by loath it. Whervpon Terence said; In loue are all these faults, iniuries, suspicions of enimitie, truce, war, and peace againe. Here we sée a contrarietie of things among themselues, and against the mind. But those things are pleasant indéed, wherewith the louers of honestie are delighted: for they which giue credit to reason, and not to the senses, take counsell of the better iudge. Thou shalt moreouer perceiue those to be constant, and of one mind; and that the right things which once liked them, will neuer mislike them: neither doo they suffer the true opinion to be wroong from them. Againe, they saie all one thing with men of their owne profession: for so manie as be louers of honestie, allow the selfe-same vertues, and the same actions.

⁵⁷ 13 Finallie, this haue we learned out of the holie scriptures to concurre with Aristotle, that Paule exhorted the godlie, as being happie men, to true and perfect gladnes, when he wrote; Reioise in the Lord alwaies, and againe I saie reioise. Also in the 21. chapter of the Prouerbs; The iust man delighteth to doo iudgement. ⁵⁸ And Dauid dooth manie times stir vp the iust and godlie to gladnes, and reioising. And so true is this opinion, that euen those good actions, which by the sense of nature, and iudgement of the common sort séeme to be repelled, doo delight happie men. And therefore we read that the Apostles went awaie merie and reioising from the sight of the councell, bicause they were counted woorthie of rebukes for the name of Christ. ⁵⁹ And we knowe, that not onlie manie christians suffered death with a ioifull mind for the testimonie of their faith, but that manie Ethniks also, with great ioie and chéerefulnes, gaue their life for the libertie of their countrie.

Of Honour, that it is not the cheefest good; but wherein it concurreth with it, and wherein not.

14 Now that we haue disputed of pleasures, it followeth that we speake of honours; and for good cause are these ioined togither, séeing both of them doo accompanie actions, though after a diuers maner. For séeing that action agréeth with nature, and that we marke it, & are made glad with pleasure; euen to those actions, when they shall be good, and iust, and honest, honour is ioined. And that it may be made the plainer, which we treat of; I will speake somewhat of the nature of honour, and of those things which belong vnto the same. And first of all we will set foorth the definition thereof. ⁶⁰ Aristotle in his first booke of Rhetoriks, will haue it to be a signifieng of the opinion, which is had of a mans honestie; and that consisteth of outward signes. To make this definition perfect, I thinke good to adde therevnto the cause of the end, which since I cannot drawe from the philosophers, I will borowe of our diuinitie. We therefore testifie by manifest signes, that we iudge well of honest men, to the intent that God, the authour of all iustice and goodnes, may be honoured in them: secondlie, that the authoritie and example of them may profit others. Now doo we comprehend all the causes of honour. The forme is the signification, declaration, ⁶¹ and testimonie of our opinion touching good men. The efficient cause is touched, when we added thereto, the mans honestie: for by it are men stirred vp to iudge well. But the matter shall be in all those signes, whereby we giue a testimonie to good and iust men. And these things, since they be manifold, are mentioned in the booke of Rhetoriks now alledged; namelie, monuments, images, gouernement, verses, sepulchres, a liuing of the publike treasurie, gifts; and we may ad thereto, the vncouering of our head, the giuing of place, and rising vp to our betters, &c.

And as all these things are manie in number, so must we appoint as manie parts, forms, or kinds of honour. And the difference of them is in respect of the matter of them. And we haue also added the ends, that this testimonie of ours may redound vnto God, and that by our honours wée may make the good examples of iust men to be the more famous; or else that vnto them which behaue themselues well, there may be giuen an authoritie, and that thereby manie others may be holpen. From the sense of this definition did Augustine not much varie, ⁶² who saith, that Glorie is a iudgement of men, which haue a good opinion of [other] men. Herevnto we haue added certeine outward testimonies of this iudgement, and haue expressed vnto what men those testimonies must be giuen; that is to wit, vnto honest men, and to those which order themselues aright. But this is wanting as well in Aristotle, as in Augustine, who should be those, that should signifie their opinion. Certeinlie, those ought to be (as we gather out of the first booke of Ethiks) wise men, and such as doo knowe vs well. Quintilian yet more bréeflie, and in a certeine compendious maner, ⁶³ hath thus expounded the matter; Glorie (saith he) is the praise of good men consenting in one: where that word [of good men] may be ioined both to them that are praised, and to them that doo praise: for it behooueth them both to be good. Which to make more plaine, we will thus diuide honours; so that some of them we make to be of small importance, and but ouershadowed, which all, onelie are raised by a brute of the people: and these, since they procéed not of a sound iudgement, are neither firme, nor yet yéelded vnto them, to whom they ought to be giuen. But others (as said Quintilian ) procéed of the consent of good men; wherefore they be sound, and good men onelie are honoured with them. But we haue experience, that those former are so light and inconstant, as thou maist sée that well-néere in one daie, some are both iustified, and condemned of the people: wherefore he that likened this kind of good to a glasse, bicause it is verie brittle and fraile, straied not much from the truth.

⁶⁴ 15 But now there riseth a question, Whether honour (to speake of the same which is sincere and constant) be the good of him that dooth giue the honour, or of him to whom the honour is giuen? This did Seneca handle in his 103. epistle to Lucillus. I affirme it to be the good of them both. Without doubt it is his that is the praiser, séeing that his action is iust and right. Neither thinke I it doubtfull, that euerie good action is his good, whose action it is. Furthermore, since he, who is honoured, hath in himselfe honestie, iustice, and goodnes, whereby both good and wise men are allured and prouoked to commend him; therefore is his good also called honour: for he hath the beginning and cause thereof in himselfe. Moreouer, he himselfe reapeth fruit of that honour, when his authoritie increaseth, and he is made the abler to persuade others, what shall best béecome them, and the better to reteine them in their dutie. Thirdlie, also it is his good for this cause, that while he perceiueth good, honest, and thankfull iudges, to iudge rightlie of those things which he hath verie well doone, hée greatlie reioiseth. Wherefore I haue shewed the reason why I iudge, that honour is the good, as well of him that is praised, as of him that praiseth. And yet for this cause am I not contrarie to Aristotle, which saith, that the same is in him which dooth the honour, not in him which receiueth the honour: bicause he (as it is now brought in the definition) saith, that honour is a signifieng of a mans opinion and mind; and therefore he iudgeth rightlie, séeing as well the opinion as signification thereof procéed from him that honoureth, and rest on him, as on a certeine foundation and matter subiect therevnto. But yet I haue respect to the originall, wherevpon this opinion was raised, and this iudgement is stirred vp in the minds of the wise; and moreouer, I note the fruits of this opinion, and I sée all these things to be in the man that is praised, that is to saie, a greater authoritie & gladnes. Neither hath this my definition onlie place in honours; but it must be no otherwise estéemed of the lawfull iudgement of a iudge, and of a iust sentence, when he pronounceth the lawe. For these are the proper good things of him, which therwithall turne to his good, on whose side the matter is iudged. And no otherwise should we saie of iustice; the same without doubt is his good that is iust, but it is also good vnto him, to whom, by the same iustice, that which is due is rendered and paid. Now by these examples it plainlie appéereth, how honour is a certeine good thing, perteining as well vnto him which is had in estimation, as vnto him which did giue the same.

They doubt in like maner, ⁶⁵ whether the testimonie of one honest and wise man be sufficient vnto true and perfect honour; or rather that a signification from manie is not required. I thinke it may be said, that according to the nature of true and sincere honour, the testimonie of one wise and good man, and who knoweth vs well, is sufficient; bicause in one which is of this sort, we haue all others like vnto him: for there is one mouth and one iudgement of all wise and good men. Howbeit, to this end, that the example may be made manifest, and that the authoritie may growe and be confirmed to him that is praised, the testimonie of one man is not of force; bicause a verie great furtherance hereto is fame and good name, which things doo require the testimonies of manie. Now must this be séene, ⁶⁶ whether at anie time honour be seuered from vertues and iust déeds. Some say it is, and some say it is not. Certeinlie the more common opinion among the learned is, that honour followeth vertue, as a shadowe followeth the bodie, which similitude in my iudgement, expoundeth the question. The shadowe accompanieth the bodie, but yet not alwaies after one maner; sometime it goeth before, sometime it is vpon one side, and goeth togither, but sometime it followeth after: so the vertue of some men is had in honour, straitwaie after the beginning; of others it is not regarded, till it be increast and made perfect. Finallie, thou maist sée some, which are not honoured, till they be quite gone: for then are men woont otherwhile to perceiue, though ouer-late, how great a good they haue forgon. Which we knowe happened in old time to the prophets and apostles, and also in our times to manie most iust princes, good pastors, and godlie preachers. While there were plentie of them, they were contemned; but when they were now taken awaie, then did they stir vp an incredible desire of them. Wherefore honour dooch accompanie vertue, but not alwaies in the same step: somtime before, otherwhile togither, and oftentimes after. And besides this, the testimonie and signification of wise men is neuer wanting vnto true vertue, and iust actions, except there be a want of the wise, and such as haue séene and knowne these things.

16 Now at the length let vs come néerer to the matter, ⁶⁷ and consider yée togither with me, whether the desire of honour should be accounted among good things, or among euill things. Shall we not commend honour, séeing it is planted in vs by God and by nature; séeing God promiseth it vnto them that be his, & that not seldome; They that glorifie me (saith he) I will glorifie them? ⁶⁸ And The elders are by Paule pronounced woorthie of double honour. And therefore it séemes, ⁶⁹ that God planted this desire in mens minds, that we might be more and more stirred vp to liue well and iustlie. Neither is that common prouerbe rashlie to be reiected; Honour nourisheth arts. Againe Vertue comended increaseth. Moreouer, there is none which hath but a sparke of godlines can denie, but that all our works must be so ordered, as they may be allowed both of God and of men; namelie that men, by the séeing of them, should (as méete it is) glorifie God. Wherefore séeing honour, for the things that be well doone staieth not in vs, but redoundeth vnto God himselfe, how manie soeuer be desirous of his glorie, as we ought all to be, we may, at the least-wise for this cause, desire honour. Ouer this, ⁷⁰ who ought not to wish, but that all the brethren should not faile of dooing their dutie and office? Verelie this hath God commanded all men, that they should honour their parents, and by the same reason the magistrats. And by Paule he commandeth; In giuing honour go one before an other. Also in the first epistle to Timothie the fift chapter; Honour widowes, which be widowes indeed. In the first of Peter, the second chapter; Honour all men, loue brotherlie fellowship. And of Epaphroditus he said in the epistle to the Philipians; ⁷¹ And such as he is haue ye in honour. Such places as these be I may bring manie; but séeing these be sufficient, it appeareth that when anie man hath honour giuen him, that is woorthie of it, the commandements of God are obeied. Which thing that it may be doone, ought not they which be honest, and behaue themselues well, commend it and be glad of it, and also wish that it may be doone? Whie doo we praie; Let thy will be doone in earth, as it is in heauen?

Herevnto adde, ⁷² that in giuing honour vnto good men, we shall obteine rewards and benefits; That thou maist (saith God) liue long vpon the earth. And on the other side, in contemning of them, they procure destruction to themselues; as the children which derided the prophet Elizaeus were rent in sunder of beares. Which séeing it is thus, he loueth not his neighbour, which desireth not that he may auoid these punishments, and obteine these commodities and rewards. Wherefore euen as with the good fauour of God we may wish for due honours; so are we driuen to the very same thing by that charitie wherwith we ought to loue our neighbour. And this dooth Dauid verie well confirme in the 15. Psalme, when he spake of him which should dwell in the house of God, and in the euerlasting habitation, among other his vertues this he reckoneth; He that is lowlie in his owne eies, & glorifieth them that feare God. Therefore since without controuersie, eternall life is to be wished vnto our neighbours; this is to be wished for with most ardent praiers; that the godlie, and those which feare God may be had in honour: which is this kind of honour, namelie to haue them in estimation, to be delighted with their companie, to maintaine their good name, and chéerfullie to reléeue their necessities: all which things, since they be so coldlie doone in these daies, they which be godlie cannot choose but earnestlie sorrowe, and wish that at the length it may be doone euen as God hath commanded. Augustine in his Soliloquijs the first booke, and eleuenth chapter iudgeth, that since of honours authoritie dooth increase, and that authoritie dooth much further to induce men vnto honestie, and to driue men as well vnto true opinions, as vnto holines of life, therefore honours are to be desired. Yea, & for their sakes, whom we ought by our ministerie to helpe; if we sée our authoritie to be despised, we ought for iust & honest causes to defend the same, least in verie déed it become vnprofitable. To this belongeth that which Paul wrote vnto Timothie; Let no man despise thy youth. ⁷³

⁷⁴ And when we doo well, it doth not a little further to the confirming of vs, if we haue the commendation of good men. For euen as we are in a maner all troubled with the disease of selfe-loue, we are easilie deceiued in affaires & actions; and those things which we doo least commendablie, wée make most account of them. And bicause this doth not seldome happen, it causeth the more ignorant sort to become more doubtfull and ambiguous in their dooing, vnto the which men, honor, praise, and approbation would doo much good, if by outward signes the same were yéelded: for by these things their mind and iudgement is established. But those which be not doubtfull, nay rather be assured, that those things which they doo, be right, when they are adorned by wise and good men with a iust kind of honor, they cannot choose but excéedinglie reioise and be glad in themselues, that they haue gotten so good and iust iudges; wherefore honors doo also profit these men. Neither doo these things, which we haue said, differ from the opinion of Aristotle. For albeit he denie honor to be the chéefest good, yet doth he not exclude it from the number of good things. Touching those things, which I haue spoken of firme and perfect honor, there is nothing so agréeable, ⁷⁵ as that that shall be the chéefest, which the faithfull in the last daie of iudgement shall haue of Christ, when he shall saie vnto them; Come yee blessed of my father, &c. For that praise shall procéed from the most wise iudge, to whome all iustice is best knowne, neither can our dooings anie waie be hidden from him.

17 Wherefore I thinke it is now sufficientlie concluded, and made apparant, that the moderate desire of honors is not to be blamed: yet bicause manie doo soone ouer-reach themselues héerein, and that the place is slipperie, therefore must we declare some things, which we ought to take héed of, least in séeking for vertue, wée shamefullie fall into vices. To this must we haue a speciall regard, that euen Aristotle being an Ethnike sawe, that we desire not honor for it selfe: ⁷⁶ for this were of a meane good, to make the principall good, and to enioie those things which we ought but to vse. Let the same desire therefore tend both to the glorie of God, and to the edifieng of our brethren. Next of all let vs beware, that we take not too much care for honor; ⁷⁷ for so would the mind be soone disquieted, which when manie, who were accounted ciuill, did not auoid, they with the desire of praise became in a manner mad. We knowe with what a furie Alexander of Macedonia was carried in a manner through the world, séeking glorie without measure and reason, who at length was brought to that passe, as he thought that there were other worlds to be conquered besides this; One world sufficeth not for yong Pellaeus. With the verie which disease, Iulius Caesar being infected, set vpon his countrie, and rashlie violated the lawes and libertie thereof. So then let this desire be moderate, and let it be bounded within certeine and iust limits. And in receiuing of honors, let vs follow Augustines counsell; Neither receiue thou (saith he) all that is offered, nor yet refuse thou all: for he that reiecteth all the honor, which is yéelded vnto him, for the things that he hath rightlie and verie well done, séemes as it were to suppresse the gifts of God, and that he would not haue them acknowledged, which in verie déed is against true godlines. And on the other side, he that imbraceth whatsoeuer is offered him, doth manie times passe the limits of modestie.

And héerewithall must héed be taken, that the kind of honor, which is brought, ⁷⁸ be not greater than the dignitie of men can sustaine; which when it happeneth, must not be abidden: for thereat is God angrie, and doth seuearelie take vengeance for his honors vsurped by men. Herod was most gréeuouslie punished, ⁷⁹ when the people cried vnto him with voices not fit for a man, but such as were méet for God. And for the same fault is Domitian, Nero, and manie other most insolent Emperours iustlie condemned, which would not be woorshipped as princes, but as God. Those things which belong to God, let them be rendred vnto God; and let good men receiue humane honors rightlie and moderatelie when they be offered. Also, let there be kept a iust and right measure in obteining of honors. ⁸⁰ There is onlie one waie and meane commended, and that is by well bringing of things to effect, which the Grecians call ⁸¹ ⟨…⟩, which things hypocrits doo counterfet, and while by outward signes they indeuour to declare themselues godlie and holie, they be had in estimation of the people. But of them Christ said; ⁸² They haue receiued their reward. And there be others, which are carried so far foorth, as they buie honors, which vice without doubt is condemned by all iust lawes, and of the Latins it is called Ambitus, that is, ⁸³ Ambition: for it is a most vile thing to craue the peoples voices by great gifts. Héerof in the digests Ad legem Iuliam, de ambitu, are manie things extant. Those which were conuicted, were condemned of infamie, and also in a paiment of monie. And the punishments of this fault were manie times in the commonweale of Rome increased; for the fault did growe on without measure. Yea, and the ecclesiasticall Canons did imitate the Romane lawes. And bicause this vice grew mightilie in the church, and at this daie reigneth euerie-where, manie lawes were decréed, which are in the first cause, quest. 1. throughout the whole question: and in the fift booke of the decretals, in the title De Simonia, & in another title, that the prelats should not grant their owne places, or places of the church, ⁸⁴ for a yéerelie rent. They that sell ecclesiasticall dignities, followe Gehezi the seruant of Helizaeus, ⁸⁵ and they which buie them, are like vnto Simon Magus. Neither is only monie, but words, & euerie kind of flatterie, if they be done onlie vnto that end, to obteine ecclesiasticall honors, to be estéemed as a price. And the fathers did so persecute this vice, as against those that commit Simonie, they admitted anie sort of accusers, euen those that were infamous, dishonest persons, & harlots, and suth other sort of men, which is not suffered in the complaint of other crimes. Lastlie, must be regarded, that we vse honors well when they be gotten, ⁸⁶ which I therefore speake, bicause we may sée some euerie-where, which abuse them, to obteine power to compasse riches, and follow pleasures, vnto all which things they make the waie easie to themselues by dignities and honors, as well ciuill, as ecclesiasticall.

18 These things we thought good to be recited, ⁸⁷ as touching them which receiue honors; now must we speake a few words of them, whose part is to yéeld honor vnto others: for these also must be admonished, bicause héerein men may sin diuerslie and manifoldlie. I suppose there is none that doubteth, but they doo greatlie erre, which denie iust and méet honors to them, that well and rightlie behaue themselues, and yet we sée that there be manie such as denie this. And those men are a great deale worsse than these, which in the stead of giuing honor, doo hate them, doo diminish their deserts, be disquieted and gréeued, if they shall sée anie thing go well with them: these men without doubt are to be accounted vniust, and most vngratefull. Some indéed there be, which frankelie inough doo honour good men, but this they doo, to reape in like maner some benefit, fauour, or helpe of them: and these passe not much of the well doings of honest men, but onlie séeke their owne good; wherefore they rather sell their honor, than make it a reward of vertues. Againe wée haue knowne others, which are readie inough to giue honors vnto honest men, but in dooing thereof, vse a peruerse iudgement; for those good things which they ought to regard, they neglect, and doo greatlie estéeme those things which be of lesse value. If a man do well ouer-sée his church, bring sound doctrine, liue godlie, and sheweth euerie-where good examples, in this respect they make small account of him: but if the same man giue craftie and expert counsell to increase wealth, or shew some vnknowne thing in husbandrie, or in physicke, then they haue him in admiration, and with praises extoll him to heauen. There be also those which doo flatter, and which adorne euen foule vices with the names of vertues. Also, there be some, which in giuing of honors kéepe no meane, but either they giue them sparinglie, or else more than they should.

19 All these things, which I haue rehearsed, ⁸⁸ must be diligentlie taken héed of; which since I haue largelie enough declared, now remaineth that we shew how the doctrine of Aristotle agréeth with the holie scriptures, or else differeth from them. Indéed when he saith, that honour is not the chéefest good, he disagréeth not anie thing from the holie scriptures: for the chéefest good cannot be desired more than is méete; but in wishing for honours we must temper our desire. I would not haue you (saith the Lord to his apostles) be called Rabbi, or maisters, or fathers; ⁸⁹ but rather regard this, that ye serue one another, and that with a lowelie and moderate mind. Besides this, our sauiour would not suffer his to be defrauded of the chéefest good, seing he came purposelie to make vs happie. But he setteth vs open in a maner vnto rebukes, ⁹⁰ and he foreshewed that his children should haue contumelies doone vnto them, whom he comforteth by his owne example; Who abased himselfe, and taking vpon him the forme of a seruant, was made obedient euen to the death of the crosse. And whereas it is affirmed, that our chéefest good should be firme, proper, and not easie to be remooued, it maketh with that which Paule saith; that therefore our saluation and iustification doth consist of grace and faith, ⁹¹ but not of works, that the promise may be firme. That honours may soone be taken awaie, the holie scriptures doo testifie: for Christ said; ⁹² that No prophet is without honour, saue in his owne countrie. And we sée that the saints, hauing honour manie-times doone vnto them, are within a while after accused & caught vnto punishment. And finallie, the holie scriptures teach, that honour is of the kind of those good things, which are referred to some other thing: bicause the Lord said; Let others see your good works, ⁹³ and glorifie your father. Where we sée, that glorie and honour ought not to rest onelie in vs; but must be referred vnto diuine honours and praises.

Of certeine good things attending vpon Felicitie; namelie, riches, beautie, nobilitie, and such like: and how far men may vse them vvithout hinderance vnto Felicitie.

20 In the definition of Felicitie, action of the mind was the generall word vnder which it was conteined; ⁹⁴ which verie well agréeth with the old writers, who diuided good things into thrée parts, ⁹⁵ and among those things gaue the principall and chéefe place vnto the goods of the mind. Wherefore, séeing felicitie is the chéefest good, it is well assigned to belong vnto the actions of the mind. That same distinction of good things, procéeded from the Academikes, and before them from Socrates, as it may appéere in Platos fift booke De legibus: albeit afterward followed the Stoikes, which onelie made one kind of good things; though Aristotle made no mention of them, bicause they flourished after his time. The goods of the mind are distinguished; ⁹⁶ for either they are referred to that which is to be vnderstood, or to that which is to be desired: vnto the former part are referred sharpenes of wit, quicknes of spirit, spéedinesse of perceiuing, fast holding in the memorie, prudence, wisedome, and also knowledges and right opinions: but as for the will and desire, all the morall vertues doo adorne. The goods of the bodie are distinguished; ⁹⁷ for some of them are dispersed ouer all the bodie, as health, strength, and beautie: for these settle not in one part of the bodie, but generallie in the whole. But there be other things which are proper vnto some of the members; namelie, swift running, vnto the féete; to the hands, strength in holding fast, in driuing in, in drawing to, and in casting from; volubilitie or readines vnto the toong, and to all the senses. Outward good things are distributed into fréends, ⁹⁸ nobilitie, honours, riches, and such like. But whie the goods of the mind haue the first place, manie reasons may be brought; but now it shall be sufficient to saie, that in good right those are the better properties, which are of a better matter that is subiect. But the argument of Aristotle may thus be gathered; Those be the chéefest good things, which belong to felicitie; ⁹⁹ But the goods of the mind be the chéefest; Iustlie therefore are they comprehended in the definition of blessednes. Wherefore, since the actions of the mind obteine the first place among the good things thereof, they are rightlie set downe to be the generall word, vnder which felicitie is conteined.

Manie there were, and those not of the vulgar sort, ¹⁰⁰ which held riches in estimation, as the chéefest good; and therefore Aristotle for two causes remooued those things from felicitie, the first is, for that they belong vnto violence; for that which is violent, hath no respect of felicitie. But that the possession and obteining of riches is a violent thing, vse and experience doth teach vs; for there is none that can get great and abundant riches, or can long kéepe them, vnlesse there be a violence, and that no small violence vsed. Another reason is, bicause they tend to profit, and are referred to another thing; wherefore the state of them is seruile. For we haue them to this end, that they may helpe vs to other things which we desire: neither would anie man estéeme them the value of an heare, vnlesse he knew them to be profitable vnto those things that he would haue. And how strange this is from the nature of the chéefe good, all they are not ignorant, which knowe that the same should be desired for it selfe sake. Verie much therefore are they deceiued, which haue riches in the greatest honor, bicause they be profitable vnto all things. This if Midas had set before his eies, he would not haue so adicted himselfe to the studie of heaping vp riches, that he was iustlie called ⟨…⟩, that is, ¹⁰¹ euen mad for the desire of gold. Neither is he alone among princes and kings to be reprooued, séeing now the greatest part of them is infected with this vice, who neuertheles might haue bin admonished, not onlie by these two reasons of Aristotle, but by manie other reasons, to set downe some moderation of their desire. ¹⁰² For it is without reason, so greatlie to estéeme that kind of good, which is externall, and in a manner perteineth nothing to the mind; but is onelie reckoned among the instruments, whereby men are holpen to doo those things which they haue purposed. Also, this kind of good doth besot men, if it happen vpon them that be vnwise: they be verie carefull to atteine vnto riches, but haue no care of their children, to whome they shall leaue them; nor yet of themselues, who should vse them. They are like vnto him, which would haue manie shooes, and in the meane time went barefoote. Besides this, the nature of riches is doubtfull, in so much as they serue no lesse to the accomplishing of lewd desires and wickednes, than of honest and iust duties.

Moreouer, if vertue be therefore not the chéefest good, bicause it may be with them which be asléepe, and which be in miserie, whom no man iudging prudentlie would call happie; how shall felicitie be attributed vnto riches, séeing they be oftentimes possessed of most miserable men; yea rather, of them which be monsters and woonderments of the world, who hate all honest arts and all vertues? Vnto honour it is denied, and that iustlie, that it should not be accounted blessednes; bicause it is not in their power which be had in honour. Which if we shall affirme, no doubt but we may iudge the same of riches; séeing the possession of them is subiect to infinit perils: they are gotten and lost well-néere in an houre. One man boasted of excéeding great riches, which his ships had brought vnto him: another hearing him, answered, that he made no account of goods which hoong on gables and winds. And that they be not the chéefe good indéed, it séems they verie well knew, which termed riches a gilted felicitie. Indéed I denie not, but that riches be good; ¹⁰³ but that they be the chéefest good, that we denie. That they be violent, & are referred to another thing, the holie scriptures in one word testifie; Make ye freends of vnrighteous Mammon. That they doo hurt the vnwise, it is said; The root of all euils is couetousnes; They which will become rich fall into snares & tentation, &c. And as for the inconstancie of them, [ Paule saith to Timothie;] Command that they trust not in the vncerteintie of riches; ¹⁰⁴ [and Christ said] This night will they fetch awaie thy soule from thee. Finallie, they are a hinderance vnto men, as in the gospell; And the yoong man being rich, ¹⁰⁵ went his waies: so as they be good things, but yet in their owne degrée.

Certeinlie this word ⟨…⟩, that is, ¹⁰⁶ doo comprehend, must be diligentlie considered of; for we easilie vnderstand thereby, that the elder fathers thought not that the abundance of outward goods belonged to the nature of felicitie: but onlie called the same a thing added for a helpe. Riches make not the nature of felicitie, they are not placed in the definition therof, they are not counted among the goods of the mind; wherein it is said, that felicitie chéefelie standeth. To what end are they then? First they are therfore added, to the intent they may further manie actions of an happie man; for neither a liberall man, nor a man of valiant courage, nor he that is honourable can doo anie thing of their owne vertue; if they want monie, if they lacke store of things, and finallie if they be néedie and poore. And moreouer, without riches, a happie man not onlie cannot helpe another man, but can be at no leisure to giue himselfe to contemplation; bicause with his trauell he must prouide for his dailie sustenance.

¹⁰⁷ 21 But some doo not allow of it, that so excellent a thing as felicitie is, should haue néed of goods far inferiour vnto it: howbeit this knot is vndoone by our distinction. In it selfe and of his owne nature it hath no néed of them: for if in it selfe it should haue néed of these things, nothing might be happie, vnlesse it abounded with these things: which must not be granted, séeing God and the angels are blessed without the small helpe of these goods. This poore lacke, which is of a corruptible and mortall man, is ioined to this felicitie. Euen as our power of vnderstanding is not able, by consideration, to doo anie thing at all, without the senses and similitudes which we contemplate: which in verie déed happeneth vnto it, not in respect it is a mind or vnderstanding: for if it were on this wise, neither God nor angels should vnderstand anie thing without senses and imagination. So then, the mind and vnderstanding require those things, not by themselues, or their owne nature; but in respect they belong vnto men. It is to be noted moreouer, that the matter which is subiect, may be vnderstood two waies: for either it representeth that matter, about which our actions are occupied; or else it is the matter wherein our mind is, namelie the bodie, to the nourishing, sustaining and féeding whereof these outward goods are in anie wise required; wherefore in these two respects felicitie hath néed of the outward good things.

Besides, we sée in arts, that manie things are doone, not onlie by the art, which is placed in the mind of the artificers, and in the members of their bodie; but by the helpe also of outward instruments. The smith vseth fire, tongs, a hammer, and an anuile: the carpenter a rule, a sawe, an axe, and such other things, and that bicause of the matter which is subiect: and so oftentimes it sufficeth not artificers to haue art, and the members of the bodie. In like maner dooth it come to passe touching felicitie; although the mind be indued with excellent vertues, and that it will and can shew foorth excellent actions, and is not destitute of bodilie power, yet hath it néed of fréends, riches, and ciuill power. By ciuill power I vnderstand honours, good will, fauours, protection, and such like. As for riches, they are diuided some into naturall, ¹⁰⁸ and some into artificiall: naturall are counted whatsoeuer things doo growe out of the earth, and which the bréed of cattell produceth: but artificiall consisteth on monie, which in verie déed was inuented, that it should be indifferent to both parties in the exchange of things. And both these kinds béeing called faculties, ¹⁰⁹ we gather by the etymologie of the word, that they are a great furtherance vnto dooing.

Aristotle, to the furtherance of a mans felicitie, required a beautifulnes of the bodie, nobilitie, store of children, and of true fréends. ¹¹⁰ Neither (as I suppose) dooth he here meane a pleasant physnomie, but that a man be not altogither deformed: and this is the meaning of ⟨…⟩, ¹¹¹ as it is in Gréeke. The reason of this saieng (as Eustratius thinketh) may be, bicause mens minds are prone to loue & estéeme them, whom they perceiue to excel other mortall men in som goodlie fourme: of which inclination moreouer ariseth, that they willinglie obeie and followe them, which are thus beautifull. And a man, hauing the minds of the people thus affected towards him, dooth vndoubtedlie helpe very much forward to the execution of excellent things: for the people bring manie things to passe, when they be mooued of their owne accord, and when they fulfill the mind of one man with an earnest loue and voluntarie good will. And therefore that king, whom God first set ouer the Israelites; ¹¹² namelie, Saule, was of so tall a stature, as he was higher than other of the Hebrues by the shoulder vpward. And of Dauid, whom he also commanded to be annointed king, it is written; that He was ruddie, and of an excellent beautie. Another thing moreouer there is, whereby men are mooued to loue them that be beautifull; bicause the beautie of the bodie is a certeine image of the mind: which mind, since aboue all things we must séeke to haue it honest and good, and that it cannot be discerned by the eie, it remaineth that the common sort followe the forme of the bodie: after which maner if they were led, which are the louers of our bodies, they should not be blamed. But at this daie there is in a maner nothing doone with moderation, but all things are wrought with vncleannes and lust.

¹¹³ Also vnto blessednes, he requireth nobilitie; bicause the people obeie and reuerence noble personages: for nobilitie is in that kind, out of which haue procéeded manie famous and excellent men: and vertues, which shined in the ancestors, are woont to be looked for in their posteritie. I knowe indéed, that some doo thinke, that nobilitie is but riches preserued of long time in some familie: but the former opinion liketh me much better. Eustratius moreouer addeth, that the noblenes of a stocke is therefore auailable vnto ciuill felicitie: for the people are woont to estéeme of new men, when they start vp, not onelie according to their present vertues or excellent acts; but according to that which they were a little before. Wherefore the former basenes, while it is considered of, dooth somewhat obscure the present glorie; which commeth so much the more to passe, as men be excéedinglie giuen vnto backbiting. ¹¹⁴ ⟨…⟩ is a doubtfull word, bicause it signifieth not so much a store of children, as it dooth their goodnes. And indéed as touching store of children, ¹¹⁵ they which abound in them, are both gratefull vnto the citie, and are feared of others: gratefull trulie they be, bicause they increase the Common-weale. Wherefore among the Romans there was a priuilege for those that had fiue or seuen children. And a yoong man of the Lacedaemonians would not rise vp vnto an ancient, who otherwise had deserued well of the Common-weale; Bicause (saith he) he leaueth not behind him, one that may rise and vncouer his head vnto me, when I shall be old. But then onlie children doo further vnto felicitie, if they shall be well instructed: for otherwise they shall be rotten impostoms and cankers; as Octauius Augustus spake of his daughter and néece, when they were vnchaste. Also Tyberius sorrowed, that he did nourish in his house for the people of Rome Caligula, a most cruell snake.

22 Furthermore, ¹¹⁶ how fréendship dooth fortifie men with excellent helps, to the leading of a good life, may be gathered sufficientlie by good writers, and by humane custome. But he is far more to be reprooued, which hath ill fréends, than he which hath corrupt children. For sometimes it may so happen, that through an ill nature, what diligence so euer be vsed in education, we cannot haue such children as we would: but there is no excuse, if we haue ill fréends; bicause we make a choise of them, and they may be forsaken. Moreouer, the losse of these (I meane of honest children and fréends) Aristotle testifieth, may be a great hinderance vnto blessednes; bicause their death cannot be without great sorrowe and mourning. And although we suffer those calamities with an indifferent mind, if we be indued with the vertue of fortitude; yet are we subiect therevnto not without detriment, which detriment no doubt dooth not a little blemish our felicitie.

Neither dooth the holie scripture disagrée touching the commendation of outward good things: for as concerning children, ¹¹⁷ they be promised of GOD; Thy children shall be like the oliue branches. And among other blessings, this is reckoned vp, that there should not be vntimelie births in Israel. ¹¹⁸ And in manie places there is promised abundance of children to them that feare him. Which selfe-same thing we may easilie knowe as touching riches. God inriched Abraham, Isaac, Iacob, and the rest of their fréends. He granted of his owne accord riches vnto Salomon, ¹¹⁹ which desired wisedome. And he would that his people, if they behaued themselues well, should so abound in riches, that they might lend vnto other nations; but not borrowe of them. Nobilitie was in such estimation with the people of God, as euerie familie would haue his owne genealogies, wherin they reckoned vp their ancestors among the heads of the tribes of the children of Israel. And the préests, which in the time of Esdras could not doo this, were remooued from their place and office. Yea, and the Euangelists Luke and Matthew rehearsed the genealogie of Christ, ¹²⁰ least he should séeme to be of an vnknowne stocke according to the flesh. Againe, the apostle in the ninth chapter to the Romans described what nobilitie the Israelites were of; ¹²¹ To whom perteineth the adoption, and the glorie, and the lawe that was giuen, and the couenant, and the seruice of God; of whom are the fathers, of whom as concerning the flesh Christ came, which is aboue all things, &c.

A beautie of the bodie I shewed before, was graunted vnto those two kings Saule and Dauid. I shewed also that the same was so requisit in the préests, as none that was lame, blind, crooke-backed, ¹²² or blemished with anie notable deformitie, might execute the roome of high préest. Moreouer, that frendship might increase among the Hebrues, God prouided speciallie by his lawes: all which, if they be narrowlie considered, doo serue verie much for the ioining of men together. Wherefore these things, which Aristotle hath rehearsed, must not be reiected; yet as touching felicitie, there must be no more ascribed to them than is méet. It is said indéed in the booke of Ecclesiastes, the tenth chapter, that Vnto monie all things are obedient. ¹²³ But that sentence is rehearsed as a common saieng of the people, not as a true saieng, but that thereby mans error might be reprooued. Naie rather, the scriptures else-where doo teach, namelie, in the 17. chapter of the Prouerbs; What doo riches profit a foole, ¹²⁴ seeing he cannot buie wisedome for himselfe? These things then being some-what narrowlie and diligentlie considered, we saie that these gifts of God are not to be contemned, séeing they further verie much to the good and right execution of manie ciuill duties belonging to blessednes; but wée must not relie altogither vpon them: yea rather, if at anie time we want these good things, the true and perfect felicitie, which we séeke for, is not for this cause taken awaie. And if we, for the name of Christ, and confession of his faith, be depriued of these things; so far is it off, that true blessednes is blemished, as it is rather made a great deale the more excellent.

First that pouertie is no let vnto vs, it appeareth, séeing not the least part of the saincts was collected of poore men. And Christ commanded the yoong man, ¹²⁵ that he should sell that which he had, and giue it to the poore; whome neuerthelesse he would without all doubt haue made happie, which in verie déed could not haue bin done [if pouertie had bin a hinderance vnto felicitie.] Yea, and Antisthenes and Crates the Theban, that they might in their philosophie be made the more happie, cast from them their monie and treasure. And the Lord promised a hundreth fold, ¹²⁶ and eternall life to them, which for his sake should lose all things which are of this kind. What shall we saie as touching nobilitie? ¹²⁷ Looke to your calling (saith Paule) not manie wise, not manie mightie, not manie noble are called, &c. Also, the lacke of children is no let, for in the 56. chapter of Esaie, the Eunuches are said to haue the better place in the house of God, not in respect they be Eunuches, or leade a single life; ¹²⁸ but in as much as they shall more diligentlie kéepe the commandements of God than other men. In like maner, if frendships faile, they exclude not men from true felicitie; séeing it commeth to passe sometime, that for the name of Christ, the godlie are become hated of all men, which neuerthelesse is not against Aristotle, séeing he writeth but of a politike or ciuill blessednes.

Of contemplation, and what Felicitie is therein.

23 Eustratius in expounding of Aristotle, (who in the tenth booke of his Ethiks affirmeth contemplation to be the chéefest perfection of our felicitie) saith, that There be some which are not men exercised in ciuill and politike administration, but altogether giuen to contemplation, and these separate themselues from domesticall and ciuill cares, and do flie from companie and societie; yea, and they studie all that they can, to be seuered euen from their owne flesh, whereof it coms to passe, that to the obteining of felicitie, there néedeth not (as Aristotle would) the goods of the mind, for the teaching, counselling, and ruling of others; nor the goods of the bodie, for defending of their countrie; nor yet the goods of fortune, for reléeuing, succouring, and helping of the poore: and that onlie it is inough to applie the mind to vnderstanding and contemplation. And he saith, that these men haue a hard felicitie, bicause they be as it were at war with nature, not séeking in déed to destroie the bodie or flesh; but prouide this, that those things may be no impediment to their contemplation. And therefore, since this is a more priuate life, it néedeth not manie things. But he saith, that Aristotle spake not of these men, which he testified when he saith, that By nature a man is ciuill: and they which are of this sort, vnlesse they minister to their elders and parents those things which be necessarie, and also vnto their posteritie, wife, frends, and citizens, they haue a maimed and vnperfect felicitie, although they be furnished with manie good things. And the diminishing of their felicitie is either more or lesse, according as they shall more or lesse want those good things which we haue recited. It belongeth therefore vnto a happie man, to haue a care of all those things, which I haue recited; which if he may commodiouslie doo, he hath inough, and may be content; otherwise he shall not be counted happie.

These things I thought good to rehearse out of the doctrine of Eustratius; to whose opinion I subscribe not. For in that he will haue anie man so to liue alone, that he should giue himselfe onlie to contemplation, and be hidden from the companie of other men, forsaking the duties of charitie, and other vertues toward them, is both against philosophie and diuinitie. For the philosophers crie out generallie, that men are not borne to themselues; and declare that it is mans nature to helpe others, and in like manner to be holpen of others. Moreouer, there wants no testimonies of the holie scriptures, whereby such a kind of life is condemned. ¹²⁹ Paule said; that None ought to seeke their owne, but that all should be doone to the edification of our neighbours. And God commanded in the lawe, that the parents should be honored; which precept in verie déed commandeth the maintenance of them. And the parents are commanded, ¹³⁰ that they should diligentlie and earnestlie instruct their children. Neither are there lawes wanting of wedlocke, o⟨…⟩ defending and preseruing of fréends, and of the poore. Yea and Paule vnto Timothie said; He that hath cast awaie the care of his owne, ¹³¹ and especiallie of his owne houshold, hath denied his faith, & is woorse than an infidel. Wherfore it is not lawfull for anie man to choose to himselfe so solitarie a life, as he will set apart the care of other men. True indéed it is, that Aristotle treateth seuerallie of ciuill life and function, & also of life contemplatiue; but yet not for this purpose, that any man should wholie addict himselfe to one of these liues: but to the intent, that whosoeuer aspireth to felicitie, may knowe, that he is not able to obteine the same, except in an excellent sort he be partaker of both these estates of life.

¹³² Two properties doubtlesse there be of our nature; for nature it selfe hath made vs both men of vnderstanding and ciuill. Wherefore in our actions we must answere to both conditions; namelie, that when they happen vnto vs in our actions, we may execute them as we ought, and according to vertue. Againe, that when anie leisure serueth vs, or that by anie chance we are let from dooing of things, then we to be occupied with great pleasure in the contemplation of diuine and humane things; that so these actions, which in kind séeme to be diuers, may helpe one another. For if a man be exercised in morall and ciuill vertues, in gouerning of a familie & common-weale, to the intent he may haue the more readie and quiet mind in the helping and succoring of his fréends, it so coms to passe, that he returneth the more apt to contemplation. And on the other side, when anie man, by reason of his leisure, shall be in earnest contemplation of diuine and humane things, he is afterward thought to be much the readier to doo other affairs. This we knowe did Tullie, Cato, Pompeius, Lucullus, and such like singular men among the Ethniks. And we read in the holie scriptures, that Christ our sauiour did somtimes withdrawe himselfe vnto the mountaines, and woods, that he might praie and meditate of diuine things; but within awhile he returned to the people, and was all manner of waies a helpe vnto mankind. The verie same thing did Iohn Baptist, Elias, and other the prophets. Yea, and the same Iesus our Lord first taught his apostles in the wildernes; afterward he sent them out into Iudaea, to preach & to heale them that were sicke. So then let there be two kinds of life, but yet not in such sort, that anie man should perpetuallie be addicted to anie one of them.

That vertue is not the cheefest good; and wherein the same agreeth with it.

24 Among some of the philosophers vertue was taken to be the chéefest good, ¹³³ which Aristotle refelled on this wise; It behooueth that the chéefe good be perfect, But vertue is not perfect, Therefore it must not be counted the chéefest good. The maior proposition appéereth: for if it be not a perfect chéefe good, our desire resteth not therein, but will desire moreouer some other chéefe good. The minor proposition; namelie, that vertue is not perfect, is prooued; bicause it is an habit, that is, a power not in act: & it may oftentimes be in the subiect without the action therof, as a thing that manie waies may be stopped; as by sléepe, & by taking awaie of the occasion, if matter be wanting, and when afflictions, sicknes, and misfortunes doo disquiet vs. This opinion, which placeth the chéefest good in vertue it selfe, is of all other that we haue hertofore recited most néere vnto truth, and therefore it hath had great and graue patrones. But how it draweth néere vnto the truth, hereby we easilie gather; that there is none more certeine nor surer preparation vnto felicitie than vertue: for from the habit of vertue procéedeth that action, which is affirmed by Aristotle to be verie felicitie: vertue therefore is the néerest power or facultie vnto felicitie. ¹³⁴ But whie the same cannot be the chéefest good, & felicitie it selfe, it is cause inough, that it is referred vnto a further end. For to what purpose doo we procure vnto our selues the habits of vertues, but that we may the more easilie and redilie doo well? Wherefore, since that vertue is directed vnto action, action shall be better and more to be desired than it.

I am not ignorant, ¹³⁵ that they which are woont to hold with the Stoiks, haue béene accustomed to obiect against the Peripatetikes, saieng that they, while they appoint vertue to be the chéefest good, doo not vnderstand it, as it is in the power, and lieth without act; but doo take the same as it is ioined with hir action: & so laugh Aristotle to scorne, which obiected not against them, but an idle vertue, and seuered from right action. This answer at the first sight séemes vnto some to be iust, and likelie to be true: but if the thing be more narrowlie considered, and that we shall more diligentlie looke into the same, it is rather a shift, than a true dissoluing of the argument; bicause whether they will or no, action, and vertue, from whence it procéedeth, are distinguished [one from another:] for they be conteined in sundrie Predicaments, and are manie times seuered one from another. For vertue, when it is an habit, belongeth vnto qualitie; but the act which it worketh, is comprehended vnder the Predicament of action. But how they be seuered one from another, I thinke no man that diligentlie considereth the matter, is ignorant: for he which is indued with knowledge or wisedome, dooth neither contemplate alwaies, nor yet is alwaies occupied about those things which he knoweth. Wherevpon it commeth to passe, that they which comprehend two for one, and distinguish them not, doo easilie swarue from the marke, wherevnto they should haue an aime; and in stead of an absolute and perfect doctrine, doo followe that which is confused and not plaine. This Aristotle perceiuing distinguished and seuered one of them from another, and when he séeth that one of them is referred to the other, he denieth that that which tendeth to another end can be the chéefe: which reason of his opinion is so euident, as I thinke nothing can be more manifest than the same. But they which cannot confute the reason, doo returne the argument vpon Aristotle himselfe, who denieth that felicitie is therefore placed in vertue, bicause vertue may easilie & manie waies be hindered.

¹³⁶ If this argument (saie they) like thée so well, neither canst thou indéed defend the most perfect action to be the chéefest good; bicause the same also is as manie waies subiect to impediments, as thou didst obiect against vertue. For he which sléepeth dooth not contemplate; neither can he doo the same, which is vexed with gréeuous torments; and he cannot endure anie perils, which liueth in quiet & peaceable commonweales. Wherefore thou that saiest that vertue, for these causes, is not the chéefest good; thou shalt also saie, that the most perfect action must not be accounted for felicitie. A shew indéed of truth this hath, which is obiected, but it maketh no matter at all; bicause the Peripatetikes will easilie grant, that the same most perfect action, which they saie is felicitie, is not continued so as it cannot be broken off; but so long as it is, they would not grant it to be no felicitie, and much lesse will they yéeld that the same is referred to a better end. Both which things cannot be said of the habit which is vertue. For the same, as it is in a man that sléepeth, or is vexed with most painfull gréefes, can neither he called felicitie, nor yet can make him blessed in whose mind it is: for the habit may remaine, when the action is taken awaie; but an action being let from breaking foorth, neither is it, nor yet remaineth it. And besides this, an habit, while it yet remaineth hindered, who séeth not that it is still referred vnto action, when as it inclineth the mind and desire therevnto. Moreouer, that should be accounted our felicitie, which approcheth most néere vnto the diuine felicitie; but God, séeing he is not onelie perfect, but euen perfection it selfe, hath felicitie in act, not in power; in verie déed, not in habit; therfore our felicitie also shall be an action: which notwithstanding is requisite to be lesse than the blessednes of God, which therefore happeneth; bicause his act cannot faile him, but ours is verie oftentimes broken off.

25 After those things, ¹³⁷ which we haue now spoken, must their cauill also be confuted, which laugh at the argument, brought as touching the impediments, whereby the action of vertue is repressed, that it cannot be effectuall. Ye feigne (saie they) that the worke of vertues perteineth to the bodie; but it is not so: bicause the whole action of vertue is in the soule, and therein it standeth full and whole: the goods of the bodie, or instruments of fortune belong nothing thervnto. And without doubt, a poore man may be liberall, by wishing to giue vnto them to whom he thinketh méete to be giuen. Againe, in the middest of torments, and in the verie flames themselues, feare dooth shine the more, and becommeth more glorious. According to which opinion Seneca vnto Lucillus, the seuentie epistle writeth manie things, and among others saith; Vertue hath also place in the bed: ouercome thou thy sicknes with a valiant courage, bicause, if others that be present, shall perceiue thée to be couragious, great, and vpright in torments, they will woonder at the brightnes of thy vertue; and thou, whilest thou art so vexed, shalt rightlie instruct them, and thorough vertue shalt not onelie helpe thy selfe verie much, but them also. What maner of things these be, now will we more narrowlie consider. They declare, that the action of vertue is whole, full, and perfect in the mind: that we denie. For if we shall declare the nature of an habit, the same is nothing else, than a qualitie brought in by long exercise, by the benefite whereof the powers of the mind and bodie are made more readie and fit to occupie themselues. Neither dooth vertue in the mind alone expresse hir action. They which saie that vertue dooth beare rule in eating, drinking, fleshlie desire, and such like; those also will saie, that the action of that vertue is expressed in the bodie also, not in the soule onlie. So it may be lawfull to saie, as touching fortitude, liberalitie, and manie other vertues; to shew that the bodie and goods of fortune were not giuen by God vnto mankind. Howbeit, these men perhaps persuade themselues, that the nature of man is fulfilled, and made perfect in the soule onelie: which how far it is from the truth, your selues without me may perceiue.

A poore man (say they) may be liberall, while he desireth to giue vnto them, to whom he thinketh it méet to be giuen. But I would faine learne of these Stoiks, whether they that be indued with vertue, and being hindered, doo desire to worke by it; for what cause they desire this? Doo they it not for blessednes sake? This if they shall denie, they will declare themselues to be vnwise in desiring of those things which they refer not vnto the chéefest good. But if they will grant, that they wish those works for felicitie sake, it shall be lawfull to saie that felicitie is perfectlie gotten, not in vertue, but in action. I will easilie grant, that vertue shineth, and is more glorious in the midst of flames, and in most cruell torments; and him that with a valiant courage suffereth these things, I will extoll with praises among good and wise men; but yet so, as I will denie him, in the meane time, to inioie whole and perfect felicitie. He shall verie well by his example instruct and teach others, yet shall he not perfectlie and all maner of waies be blessed. These things be so verie true, as euen they, which professe the Stoicall discipline, must whether they will or no yéeld vnto this opinion. For Cicero in his fift booke of Tusculane questions, at the beginning saith; If vertue be not of such strength, that it can defend it selfe, I feare me least we are not so much to leane to the hope of a blessed life, vpon confidence of vertue, as it may séeme that we haue more néed to praie for it. Verelie I my selfe, when I consider those chances, wherein fortune hath excéedinglie exercised me, I begin to mistrust this opinion, and otherwhiles also stand in great feare of mans weakenes and frailtie. For I feare least that when nature gaue vnto vs weake bodies, and with them ioined vncurable diseases, and intollerable gréefs; it also gaue minds agréeable to the gréefs of the bodies, and seuerallie intangled with the vexations and troubles therof. But herein I reforme my selfe, that I iudge of the strength of vertue according to other mens nicenes, and peraduenture according to mine owne, not according to vertue it selfe, &c. How he doubted, and in a manner became of this opinion, he plainelie expressed in these words: and it maketh no matter, that he saith he reformed himselfe, bicause that is vncerteine: and, he addeth this word Peraduenture, which is a token of doubting.

Moreouer, what is so certeine, as that Cicero himselfe in his fourth booke De finibus disputed against Cato, who had before in the third booke extolled the opinion of Zeno and the Stoiks to the heauens? Yea and the Stoiks as in vertue alone they boasted, that they were blessed, ¹³⁸ yet did they not repose themselus in that alone; but called the powers of the bodie, the purenes of the senses, dignities, riches and such like ⟨…⟩; that is, Things comming naturallie without anie other beginning: which Cicero calleth Things produced, promoted, principall, aduanced aboue other. With the sense of which words if we would vrge the Stoiks, we shall say, that they attribute more vnto this kind of things, than the Peripatetiks; as they which doo name those things principall, and aboue others; whereas the Peripatetiks call them indéed good things, but yet of the lowest degrée, and which are not of much account, being compared with iust and honest things; and therefore, as the time serues, to be contemned, and not much to be desired. I knowe indéed that the Stoiks doo call these things principall and chéefe, while they be compared with their contraries; not when they be compared with vertues: but yet by these their new and made words they attribute verie much to this order of things, when they call these things, Commodities, things to be preferred, & of chéefe regard; and their contraries ⟨…⟩: as who should saie Discommodities, and things reiected. Wherefore, though the Stoiks would contend with the Peripatetiks in talke, yet in reason and in the thing it selfe they agrée with them. The Stoiks delight in a magnificall kind of speach, and onlie in words bring in an vnsensiblenes of passion, which when they come afterward to the matter, all men féele by experience, that it is quite differing from our senses, and from our tried customs, and also verie far from the strength of our humane nature.

26 And I doo not thinke, that I should lightlie passe ouer those things, which I cited a little before, out of the fift booke of Tusculane questions; If (saith Cicero ) vertue had not helpe inough in it selfe, that then we must make our praiers for the same. What is this we heare? As though if vertue were sufficient in it selfe, is there nothing then to be wished for, or to be desired of God; as if we had all things consisting in our own selues? Shall Tullie on this wise, in making more of vertue than is requisit, take awaie godlines, which is the chéefe vertue of all others, by abolishing the inuocatio~ of God? Trulie euen thus did the Stoiks thinke. ¹³⁹ For Seneca writeth, that Iupiter can doo no more than a good man. Wherefore the Stoiks vsed no lesse magnificall kind of speach, than their doctrine was altogither differing from religion. Which I doo not therefore saie, as though I endeuoured to pronounce Aristotles opinion to be godlie and religious; but to giue warning, that the Stoiks are not so to be estéemed, ¹⁴⁰ as though in praising of their vertues, they drew verie néere (as some thinke) vnto the christian doctrine. Yet will I beare more in this behalfe with the Stoikes, than with the Epicures; bicause they speake in a maner alwaies that which is agréeable to their owne opinion, whereas the Epicures manie times affirme things not agréeable to their owne rules. Bicause Epicurus accounteth gréefe for the chéefest euill, he also placeth pleasure of the bodie, or voidnes of sorrowe to be the chéefest good. If he be tormented, or descend into Phalaris bull, and tell me how swéete this is, as he boasteth that His wise man will saie, without doubt he shall speake most inconstantlie, and such things as no maner of waie accord in themselues.

Let these words so glorious and woorthie of memorie be left vnto the Stoiks, which so boast of their vertues, as they thinke that a wise man indued with them, shall neuer bée without happines. Neither can they persuade their mind, that séeing felicitie dooth euermore accompanie vertues, it will then forsake them, and that it will staie vpon the threshold, wherein they enter into the prison; as though it may not be lawfull for it to enter into a sorrowfull place, nor (as said Theophrastus ) to ascend vpon the rocke or whéele of torment. Theophrastus, no doubt, was far wiser than Epicurus. For he which sawe, that by the Peripatetiks doctrine, was required vnto ciuill felicitie, whereof we now intreate, both the goods of the bodie, and the goods externall; the verie same man vnderstood, how vnpossible it was, that euen the wisest man should be blessed in torments & miserie. But Epicurus, who was delighted with such a chéefe good, as we haue now declared, will speake things neither méete nor agréeable to his purpose, while he speaketh so magnificallie, and vseth such glorious sentences. But yet this is no maruell; for he contemned Logike, which is the right meanes of disputing: but of this thing we haue spoken enough.

¹⁴¹ 26 Let vs now sée what the holie scriptures saie herevnto: trulie they make no mention of vertues, when they shew the felicitie of man. In the psalme, wherin is rehearsed the opinion of the common sort, which thought him to be happie that hath abundance, and who is replenished with infinite store of the goods of this world; we are otherwise persuaded by the voice of God. ¹⁴² For it is added; Blessed is the people whose God is the Lord. Here an act is shewed, not a power; ¹⁴³ Blessed is the man that feareth the Lord; ¹⁴⁴ blessed is the man that walketh in the lawe of the Lord. Further, that euen the good habits of the mind may be somtime idle and vnprofitable, hereby it is euident; ¹⁴⁵ that Paule warneth vs to take héed, that we receiue not the grace of God in vaine. And Paule aduiseth Timothie, To stir vp the gifts of God, which were in him, by laieng on of hands by authoritie of the eldership. Séeing then the gifts of the spirit, which are more excellent than morall vertues, are referred vnto action, that others may be holpen and instructed, (otherwise we should not become the better for them) this must be iudged much truer, and more certeine as touching humane vertues. Where it is said of Aristotle, that Calamities and miseries doo let, that men cannot be counted happie; if this should be considered by it selfe, ¹⁴⁶ as it is said without anie distinction, it agréeth not with the holie scriptures. For they which suffer for Christ, are in great penurie, and are troubled with gréeuous punishments; yet doo they enioie that blessednes, which in this life is possible to be atteined vnto: ¹⁴⁷ bicause their sinnes are not imputed vnto them, and their soule and bodie are then excéedinglie renewed toward the attainment of eternall life. Howbeit, séeing the felicitie of this life is not yet full, but begun; therefore we will grant it, that the saints, which be so afflicted, are not in perfect and absolute blessednes; séeing they looke shortlie to haue the same, wherein they shall féele none of these miseries. For the oracles of God saie; ¹⁴⁸ God shall wipe awaie all teares from the eies of his saints, neither shall there be mourning nor lamentation anie more: for these former things are parted awaie. Wherfore we saie with Aristotle, that betwéene perfect and full felicitie, and miseries and calamities there is no agréement, which neuertheles disagréeth not with that felicitie, which we haue here begun.

And Paule sawe the displeasures of this life to be so repugnant vnto perfect blessednes, and that they could not abide togither, as he said vnto the Corinthians; If the dead rise not againe, ¹⁴⁹ we are more vnhappie than all men. And if that Christ pronounced them blessed, which mourne, and which suffer persecution for his name; ¹⁵⁰ that must not so be vnderstood, as though we should be blessed, bicause we wéepe, and sigh, and suffer persecution; but bicause we wait for better things hereafter, and are saued by hope. Neither doo I denie, but that in the middest of the troubles of the flesh, God will giue maruellous comforts to them that be his: which I persuade my selfe passeth all the delights of ciuill happines. Yet commeth it not to passe thereby, that perfect felicitie is ioined with these calamities. After this maner did Paule comfort the soldiers of Christ; ¹⁵¹ The things (saith he) which we suffer in this life, are not equall and of like value with those things, which at length shall be reuealed in vs, when we reigne together with Christ. But Aristotle was constreined to iudge as he said, bicause he was ignorant of the blessednes to come, and sawe that the ciuill happines, which he treated of, was obscured and diminished by aduersities and afflictions. And vnto him were vnknowne those heauenlie comforts, which God, aboue the power of nature, bringeth to the confessors of the truth, euen in the verie torments. Wherefore, if as touching this matter, the Stoiks séeme somewhat to disagrée from vs, this they did vnaduisedlie; séeing they also knew nothing of the life to come, neither had they euer triall of the consolations of God in the midst of miseries and death.

Of the causes of Felicitie.

27 Now that we haue largelie inough disputed as touching the nature of felicitie, we will inquire of the cause therof. Aristotle reckoneth vp fiue causes, which may be gathered into two; for either they be inward, or outward. They are reckoned inward, bicause discipline, custome, and exercise doo procéed from vs. But the outward causes are thought to be God and fortune. ¹⁵² Betwéene custome and exercise this is the difference, that custome is referred vnto vertues, which are bred by often and continuall actions. But exercises and labours are to be applied to a sure obteining and kéeping of riches, honour, and health; in which things manie (as it hath bin said) haue placed felicitie. And first as touching discipline, it belongeth vnto them, which haue thought that vertues are learned by applieng of doctrines. Wherefore if there be néed of discipline, it must be learned; if of custome, we must not desist from honest actions; if it be ascribed to exercise, there must of necessitie be no labour spared; if it be expected of God, he must be praied vnto; but if of fortune, since we are able to doo nothing concerning it, all must wholie bée committed vnto the same. The Stoiks, and especiallie Epictetus, distinguish all things which are found either to be in vs, or not to be within vs. By those things that are in vs, they vnderstand the things which we can rule by our counsell, and obteine by our strength: and those things that are said to be not within vs, are the same that we haue not in our power; as nobilitie, health, and riches.

Whether God be the cause of felicitie, Aristotle in his first booke of his Ethiks speaketh verie ambiguouslie, ¹⁵³ & bringeth a conditionall proposition, but absolues not the argument. If anie gift (saith he) be of God, felicitie shall be giuen of him. And he sheweth a reason of the conclusion, bicause the same hath the chéefest place among all humane things. But to the making vp of the argument, there may be added a double minor proposition: that the felicitie of the godlie, and ours is all one; But manie things are giuen vnto men by God, therefore must felicitie be expected from him. And that manie things are giuen vnto men by God, we doubt nothing at all, who doo also extoll his prouidence in euerie thing: and since from him, as from the chéefe good, and fountaine of goodnes, is deriued whatsoeuer is good, we doo not once imagine, that this doth flowe without his pleasure, will, and election. ¹⁵⁴ But there bée some, and those indéed Peripatetiks, which doo déeme far otherwise of the prouidence of God: for they thinke that his prouidence, as touching particular things, stretcheth not lower than the moone; bicause so far, all things are done constantlie, and in singular order. But, as touching the things which are beneath the moone, they make prouidence to be onlie of generall things, not of particular. Wherfore they should take this for the minor propositio~; But no gifts are distributed by God vnto men, neither therfore is felicitie giuen. And they saie, that gifts are not giuen by God vnto men, not bicause they acknowledge him not to be the first efficient cause, from whence all good things doo arise; but they take the word of giuing or bestowing from election, will, and frée choise. The good things, which we haue, and felicitie, they will grant doo depend of God, and of the motion of the heauen, and that they cannot otherwise be had; but they thinke that those be not giuen by him, by a certeine distribution which he considereth of, or which he giueth by a frée disposition. For they thinke that God dealeth necessarilie, and by a naturall impulsion.

Wherefore we must note, that Aristotle in the place aboue mentioned, neither affirmeth nor denieth that felicitie is giuen of God. He affirmeth it not, bicause he saith, that this worke belongeth to another treatise; namelie, to the metaphysicks, or treatise of supernaturall things, wherein is treated of the prouidence of God, without which doctrine, this question can not be defined. Neither yet doth he denie felicitie to be giuen of God, least he should fall into an absurditie. For it séemes to be contrarie to reason, that the rest of the gifts should be giuen by God, and felicitie not to be giuen by him. Wherefore he teacheth it vnder a condition, namelie, If other things be had from God, felicitie likewise doth procéed from him: but he affirmeth nothing at all. But I sée not how fitlie he putteth ouer this treatise to another place; for if this definition doo depend of prouidence, might he not in the meane time haue borowed so much of his metaphysicall treatise, as should haue béene sufficient for the explaning of his mind? This he did as touching the soule, and tooke from his treatise of natural things so much as serued vnto morall doctrine, and saith, that The soule as we shall shortlie sée, hath diuers parts. So likewise might he here haue written of this, although he had not here purposelie prooued it, but taken it from some other treatise; that God by his prouidence dooth giue manie gifts vnto men; than the which gifts séeing felicitie is far more excellent, it is méet that the same also should belong vnto it. Howbeit, dissembling this, he passed it ouer, and saith it belonged to an other treatise. But I beséech you, what more conuenient place had there béene, séeing in that booke he was to treate of maners and vertues, the vnderstanding whereof dependeth altogither of the knowledge of felicitie? Now was it time to affirme thereof simplie, that he might no lesse haue expected the same of God, than other gifts. Now then, when he speaketh on this wise, he séemeth to shunne the hatred of vngodlines, but deserued no praise for a plaine and sincere confession. If he had ment well and honestlie, he should not haue vsed these ambiguities. But what should he haue doone? He could not by philosophie know any thing of the will of God towards men; for whatsoeuer we knowe thereof, we are all wholie beholding for it vnto the holie scriptures, and especiallie to the gospell.

28 When Aristotle had after a sort denied, that felicitie commeth from God, in that he would not confesse it; this neuertheles he granteth, that it is a thing most diuine, that is, most perfect, which also God inioieth. For he, although not as men be, yet after a certeine maner of his owne, is blessed. here Eustratius added [of his owne] that God dooth giue felicitie, but not without the meanes which we haue rehearsed, I meane learning, ¹⁵⁵ custome and exercise. And vndoubtedlie, there be certeine things giuen vnto vs by God, without anie labour or indeuour of vs. For when did euer anie man labour that he might be borne wittie, noble, or of a sound bodie, or of a perfect complexion? Assuredlie no man. As for other things, God so giueth them, as we should atteine vnto them by certeine means. Howbeit this must be dilligentlie considered, that if we will thinke well and godlie of the matter, euen the verie meanes are giuen vnto vs by GOD himselfe: for no man shall be mooued to receiue sound doctrine, nor to take in hand a good custome nor a profitable exercise, ¹⁵⁶ vnlesse he be stirred vp by God. If felicitie haue those thrée things, for causes and certeine principles, it may soone be common vnto manie; except those which haue not their senses perfect, which be féeble, and borne lame, and for that cause cannot atteine vnto felicitie. For there be some, which be borne fooles, and of an ill temperature of the bodie; and therefore they which be deafe, dumbe, or which be ouercome with great gréefes & weakenes, cannot learne good arts and litterature, neither are they fit for exercises; nor yet to procure vnto themselues good manners. And doctrine is not admitted for morall vertues sake; but bicause of the faculties & sciences which be contemplatiue, in which things for the most part felicitie dooth consist. And bicause it is said, that felicitie is common vnto manie; hearers & readers be incouraged to thinke, that if they fall from it, it must be imputed to their own default which would not learne and accustome themselues to good actions, and painfull exercises.

From felicitie he in like manner exempted children; bicause they, in respect of their age, ¹⁵⁷ which in them is verie yoong and tender, cannot execute that action to all intents and purposes. But the reason which he maketh, why they cannot be blessed, let vs examine it as it is produced by Aristotle; There is néed (saith he) vnto felicitie, both vertue, and a perfect life. Touching life, there is no controuersie; bicause as one swalowe maketh not the spring time, so one day maketh not a man happie. Wherefore, if one should become happie, it is requisite that his age be lengthened, and his time produced. There is also required a perfect vertue; for vnlesse it shall take déepe roote, it will soone slip awaie, as hauing small fastening. Bréefelie, Aristotle will that a happie man should be in such a state, as he cannot easilie be remooued therefrom; whervnto all men sée, that a full age and perfect vertue is requisite. This opinion pleased the Pelagians, which placed righteousnes, and the kingdome of heauen in the power of men. Also it pleased the schoolmen; for as the Pelagians denied grace, & said that nature dooth suffice: so these men likewise affirming grace in bare name, haue in verie déed quite taken it awaie, as they which haue made the same common and open to all men, as though it were in euerie man, either to receiue it, or to put it from him. And when they be asked who dooth giue grace to them, which accept it, in such sort as they both desire it, and receiue it, when it is offered to them; they flie vnto frée will: and of all these is Pighius the standerd-bearer.

Wherefore, if either thou aske of Aristotle, or of them; Since felicitie is thus common, as ye say, how coms it to passe, that so few obteine the same? Bicause few (saie they) will learne, few will labour, few will accustome themselues to honest and good exercises. But we will here note a generall and a certeine proposition; To euerie nature or kind there is a purposed end, the which all that be comprehended in it may atteine. And surelie, that which Aristotle answered, as touching them that haue not their perfect senses, be lame, and féeble, why they cannot be partakers of felicitie; namelie, bicause of their naturall defect; that proposition may be vnderstood, when the powers shall be perfect: so doo we answer, that men cannot now by themselues be perfect, bicause nature was corrupted euen from the beginning, and that we haue not the powers as well of the mind, as of the bodie perfect. So that now, when we heare these things, let vs thinke that we heare Aristotle, not Paule, or Christ. Here haue we thrée things that are spoken of felicitie; It is a diuine thing, ¹⁵⁸ it may be obtained by the thrée principall things, which he haue alreadie rehearsed, and it is common in a maner to all men.

29 There remaineth fortune, which Aristotle remooueth from the causes of felicitie; bicause it is thought vnwoorthie that it should be admitted to open so excellent a gift vnto men. But before I shew the reason brought by Aristotle, ¹⁵⁹ I will indeuour to declare what fortune is. As it is written in the second booke of naturall philosophie; It is an accidentall cause, and then it commeth in place, when anie thing is ioined to anie man, which is author of the effect following; vnto the producing of which effect, that which is ioined therevnto, worketh nothing, but onlie giueth sometimes an occasion; and the effect may well come to passe without it. This is made plaine by a similitude; If a man, by reason of an ague, become temperate, we will saie that this fell out by fortune: for temperance commeth of the will as of hir own proper cause, which will bridleth the affection of lust. The ague might haue bin the occasion whereby this came to passe, but the cause it could not be. And bicause these things, to wit, the will of temperate gouernement, and the ague, méete by fortune in one and the same man; therefore doth temperance spring by fortune from the ague. But it appeareth plainelie inough, that the feauer is not by it selfe the cause of the temperance; otherwise, all that be gréeued with a feauer, would become temperate. According to this maner of speaking must the sentence of Paule be examined and vnderstood; ¹⁶⁰ Knowledge puffeth vp. Pride, which immediatelie preferreth our owne things aboue other mens, procéedeth from the will; héereby we become vaine and puffed vp. And bicause knowledge giueth an occasion vnto some that this is done, therefore knowledge is said to puffe vp, but yet by fortune; bicause in one selfe man, are ioined together by chance these two things, to wit, the desire of passing and excelling others, and also some knowledge of things. And as these things be ioined together at all aduentures; so doth vaine puffing vp procéed by fortune from knowledge. Also it hapneth, that when vnto that effect, which we desire by it selfe, and by our owne aduise, another effect by chance is ioined therewith; then the same commeth of fortune, not purposelie, whereas we in verie déed sought for another thing. As otherwhile it hapneth vnto them that be diggers, that they in labouring doo finde treasure, when as they onlie intended the trimming of their vines and trées: this I saie happeneth by fortune, when as the digger sought for another matter: neither is the digging the proper and true cause of finding out the treasure; for if a man should affirme this, he must of necessitie auouch, that all diggers doo finde treasures. Adde moreouer, that all the effects of fortune doo verie seldome come to passe, and that contrariwise than falleth out in the true and proper causes, which verie seldome are hindred from bringing foorth their effects. Which things being so, it appeareth, and that manifestlie, that fortune is repugnant to reason and counsell. ¹⁶¹ Wherefore it is not méete to attribute vnto it, that it bringeth foorth felicitie. And so Aristotle concludeth, that séeing felicitie is better deriued from the causes before mentioned, than from fortune, it is méete that wée should determine it so to be; bicause it ought to be in the best maner that it can.

One reason, whereby Aristotle prooueth fortune to be no cause of felicitie is this; The chéefest good ought not to be referred vnto a vile and abiect cause; Felicitie is the chéefest good, & fortune is but vile among the causes; Wherefore blessednes ought not to be reduced vnto fortune, being a cause lesse woorthie than others. And hereof dependeth the force of this argument: for although a noble cause doo otherwhile bring foorth a vile effect (as we knowe that the sunne dooth not onelie bréed a man, but also frogs, fleas, and flies) yet excellent effects cannot procéed but of noble causes. Here we sée, that by euident and most manifest words Aristotle excludeth fortune, as he that would not number the same among the causes of felicitie, and taketh propositions as well out of his booke of naturall philosophie, as also out of his metaphysicks: the verie which certeinlie he might haue doone, in affirming God to be the cause of mans blessednes. So that he excludeth from this number both God and fortune: GOD, as ouer-woorthie and too high; but fortune, as an vnwoorthie and a more vile cause. For it is a most inconstant thing, and hath no substantiall ground-worke: which neuertheles is so excluded, as it can doo nothing about the nature and substance of felicitie; and yet vndoubtedlie it can doo somewhat about those good things which helpe vnto felicitie, & be the instruments therof. But if it be of power, concerning riches, and honours, and such like, which (as it hath béene said) doo not a little further vnto felicitie; why doo they denie them to be the cause thereof? We grant indéed, that these things doo accomplish, and doo seruice vnto felicitie, and doo such seruice, as it may not be without them; but we denie that it dooth properlie cause the same. For it so fareth not, that as the lacke of these things may hinder blessednes; so if they be present, they can performe and bring the same to passe. For thou shalt sée manie men that be noble, rich, strong, and in honours, who neuertheles being wicked, thou wilt not call happie. Which assuredlie should not come to passe, if these things were by themselues causes of happines. But if these kinds of good things be taken awaie from honest and wise men, they suffer them not to be happie, although (as it hath béene said) those things themselues are not the causes of blessednes. But if thou demand, whether the good things of the bodie doo also come from fortune? I may easilie denie it; bicause fortune is affirmed to be one of those causes, which rarelie and seldome comes in action: for scarselie within a hundred yéere it happeneth, that a digger of vine trées, or a ploughman chanceth vpon a treasure. But it is verie often giuen vnto men euen fro~ their birth, to haue a good constitution of their bodie, & haue giuen them sound members, and sufficient strength to accomplish their actions.

30 Another argument is alleged, which is much stronger, and that is taken from the definition of blessednes. And the sense is; bicause felicitie is an action, and that no smal action of the mind, it ought not to be expected of fortune: for the nature of minds and of vertues is otherwise, than it is of fortune. But he saith not absolutelie, that blessednes is an action of the mind; but he added, that it is a certeine kind of action, that is to wit, a most absolute and most perfect action; bicause it procéedeth from a most excellent vertue. Hereof dependeth the force of the argument, that neither the mind of man, nor vertue doo anie action by fortune. He againe confirmeth felicitie not to be of fortune; bicause he said at the beginning, that the end of ciuill facultie is the chéefest good; but no man doubteth, but that the same facultie worketh not by chance, or by fortune. And he prooueth, that therefore the chéefe end of man belongeth vnto that facultie, bicause therein ciuill vertue dooth verie much labour, to the end it may make good citizens. Wherefore, if it vse diligence, it cannot be said to deale by fortune. For counsell, industrie, and diligence are altogither repugnant vnto fortune: for the ciuill art endeuoureth to make good citizens, and to be of excellent conditions, & singular qualities; first by making of good lawes, afterward by giuing of honours and rewards to the kéepers and faithfull obseruers of them; and on the other side, by punishing, and kéeping vnder those which doo transgresse them.

Let vs now bréefelie examine these things by the holie scriptures, ¹⁶² how much they agrée with them, or how much they dissent from them. Aristotle speaketh doubtfullie of God, whether he be the authour of felicitie or no. But we constantlie affirme that he is; I will (saith God vnto Abraham) be thine exceeding great reward. ¹⁶³ And least we should suspect that this is naturallie true, but not at the will and election of God himselfe, there followeth there the making of a couenant, wherby he chose to himselfe a certeine people; and he couenanted that he would be the God of those that beléeue. And Moses, who verie well vnderstood, that felicitie consisteth herein, that God might be vnderstood and séene, desired this of God, when he said; Shew me thy face, ¹⁶⁴ which also he obteined. And Dauid sang; ¹⁶⁵ Pleasures are at thy right hand for euermore. And Christ our sauiour, who is our God; ¹⁶⁶ Come (saith he) vnto me all that labour and are heauie loden, and I will refresh you. And he said speaking of his shéepe; They heare my voice, ¹⁶⁷ & I giue them eternall life. Let this be a full persuasion to euerie one of vs, that our felicitie is to be expected and desired of God himselfe. As for the exercises, customes, and doctrines which Aristotle mentioneth, in our opinion also must not be contemned; naie rather they are commanded vs in euerie place of the scriptures: yet not so, that they should be the causes of our felicitie. ¹⁶⁸ For we be fréelie iustified, not of works; and eternall life is granted fréelie vnto vs.

But there be certeine means, whereby God dooth lead vs vnto him, and to the felicitie which we desire: and these means we haue from God himselfe. Wherefore it was vpon good cause said by Paule; ¹⁶⁹ It is God which giueth vnto vs both to will and to performe. But as for fortune much lesse than Aristotle did, doo we commit blessednes therevnto; as we that thinke, that all our dooings are gouerned by the counsell and will of God, so as without his will, not so much as one heare can fall from our head. ¹⁷⁰ And we thinke this of all other to be most false, which is commonlie said of the Ethniks, that Euerie wise man frameth to himselfe his owne fortune. Aristotle denieth that children can be happie, but we on the other side affirme them to be happie, séeing Christ said; Suffer them to come vnto me, ¹⁷¹ & he imbraced them with great fauour, & with singular clemencie. We know indéed, that they as yet cannot be workers of excellent actions, but yet by Christ both originall sin is forgiuen them, and a waie vnto eternall life is opened to them. Neither doo we grant vnto him, that they can not be called happie, which are afflicted with great mischances; since it may be, that they which are trulie blessed, doo suffer gréeuous things for the name of Christ: neither doo those hard and horrible things, which they indure, ouerthrowe that blessednes, which we men may haue while wée liue héere.

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Footnotes

1. The matter or subiect of felicitie. The definition of felicitie. ↩

2. How Aristotles definition agreeth with the holie scriptures. Psal. 118. and 127. 1. Psal. 111, 1. and 127, 1. Psal. 1, 2. Psal. 32, 1. Iohn. 2. ↩

3. Sundrie opinions of the philosophers as touching felicitie. ↩

4. Simple ends and conioined ends. ↩

5. Eustratius. ↩

6. A similitude. ↩

7. Why men doo seeke diuers kinds of life. ↩

8. Such princes, such people. ↩

9. Godlie king Edward the sixt. ↩

10. Sardanapalus. ↩

11. Tyberius. ↩

12. Heliogabalus. ↩

13. Xerxes. ↩

14. A definition of gladnes. ↩

15. Ioie defined. ↩

16. Whence pleasure doth spring. ↩

17. The pleasures of the senses are mixt. ↩

18. Naturall necessitie being satisfied, pleasure seaseth. ↩

19. How the name of pleasure is vnderstood by Aristotle. ↩

20. Wherein Aristotle and Plato differ concerning pleasure. ↩

21. The generall word of pleasure. ↩

22. The definition of pleasure. ↩

23. That pleasure is no motion. ↩

24. How long pleasure may continue. ↩

25. Whie new things so greatlie delight. ↩

26. That pleasure differeth in kind. ↩

27. The first diuision of pleasures. ↩

28. The second diuision of pleasures. ↩

29. The third distinction of pleasurs. ↩

30. The fourth distinction of pleasures. ↩

31. What pleasures must be auoided and why. ↩

32. How greatlie the grosser pleasurs hurt vs. ↩

33. Cicero his words as touching the euils which rise of pleasures. ↩

34. Whether the pleasures that arise of contemplation or iust actions do hurt. ↩

35. Whether the pleasures which must be shunned be verie pleasures. ↩

36. Whie these kind of-pleasures which hurt and are to be shunned are desired of manie. ↩

37. Who be most inclined to the pleasures of the bodie ↩

38. Why these pleasures were giuen by God vnto men. ↩

39. Augustine. ↩

40. What pleasures are not to be auoided, and why. ↩

41. Whether pleasure for life, or life for pleasure is to bee wished. ↩

42. How Aristotles opinion agreeth with the scriptures. ↩

43. Matt. 7, 13. ↩

44. Esaie. 7, 13. ↩

45. Iohn. 8, 34, ↩

46. 2. Pet. 2, 19.
    ↩

47. Psal. 48, 12. ↩

48. Ierem. 5, 8. ↩

49. Psal. 32, 10. ↩

50. Osea. 4, 9. ↩

51. Matt. 2, 3. ↩

52. 1. Cor. 6, 13.
    ↩

53. Matt. 22, 30. ↩

54. That pleasure is not strange from felicitie. ↩

55. Whether all pleasures haue felowship with felicitie. ↩

56. The contrarietie of pleasures betweene the vulgar sort. ↩

57. How these things concurre with the holie scriptures. Phili. 4, 4. ↩

58. verse, 15. ↩

59. Acts. 5, 41. ↩

60. The definition of honour. ↩

61. The causes of honour. ↩

62. Augustins definition of glorie. ↩

63. Quintilians definition of glorie. ↩

64. Whether honour be his that giueth the honour, or of him that is honoured. ↩

65. Whether one good mans testimonie be sufficient vnto perfect honour. ↩

66. Whether honour be alwaies ioined with iust deeds. ↩

67. Whether there should be a desire of honour in good or euill men. ↩

68. 1. King. 2, 30
    ↩
69. 1. Tim. 5, 17.
    ↩

70. We obeie Gods commandements, when we honor anie man woorthie thereof. Rom. 12, 10. verse. 3. verse. 17. ↩

71. Phili. 2, 29. ↩

72. In honouring of the good, we obteine rewards, and by contemning, punishments. Exo. 20, 12. ↩

73. 1. Tim. 1, 12.
    ↩

74. Wherein honors profit them that doo well. ↩

75. That the faithfull in the daie of iudgement shall haue the cheefest good. Matt. 25, 34. ↩

76. That honor for it selfe sake must not be desired. ↩

77. That wee must not be too carefull for honor. ↩

78. That the honor be not greater than the worthines of the person. ↩

79. Acts. 12, 23. ↩

80. The right waie to come by honors. ↩

81. That is to saie, vertuous actions. ↩

82. Matth, 6, 2. ↩

83. Ambition. ↩

84. Simonie. ↩

85. 4. King. 4, 12.
    ↩

86. That honors gotten must be wel vsed. ↩

87. The dutie of them that doo giue honor. ↩

88. How these things agree with the holie scriptures. ↩

89. Matth. 23, 8. ↩

90. Luke. 21. Mat. 6, & 10 Iohn. 16. Mark. 13. Phil. 2, 7. ↩

91. Rom. 4, 16. ↩

92. Matt. 13, 57. Marke. 6, 4. ↩

93. Matth. 5, 16. ↩

94. A distinction of good things. ↩

95. The goods of the mind. ↩

96. A distinction of the goods of the mind. ↩

97. The good things of the bodie distinguished. ↩

98. Outward good things distinguished. ↩

99. A resolution ↩

100. Riches are remooued from felicitie. ↩

101. ⟨…⟩. ↩

102. Reasons why riches be not the cheefe good. ↩

103. The scriptures testifie that riches be violent. Luke. 16, 9. 1. Tim. 6, 20. ↩

104. 1. Tim. 6, 9. Luk. 12, 20.
     ↩

105. Matt. 19, 21. ↩

106. That outward goods belong not to the nature of felicitie. ↩

107. Whether felicitie haue need of the inferiour good things. ↩

108. Riches naturall and artificiall. ↩

109. Of riches Looke more part. 3. chap 11. Art. 15. ↩

110. Beautie required to felicitie. ↩

111. ⟨…⟩. ↩

112. 1. Sam. 10, verse. 23.
     ↩

113. Nobilitie required to felicitie. ↩

114. ⟨…⟩. ↩

115. Store of good children required to felicitie. ↩

116. What helpe true friends bring to felicitie. ↩

117. What the holie scriptures teach touching outward good things Psal. 127, 4. ↩

118. Genesis. 22, vers. 17, &c. & 2. Kin. 2, 4 ↩

119. 1. Kin. 3, 13.
     ↩

120. Matth. 1. Luke. 3. ↩

121. Rom. 9, 4. ↩

122. Leui. 21, 18, 19, &c. ↩

123. Eccl. 10, 18. ↩

124. Prou. 17, 16. ↩

125. Matt. 19, 21. ↩

126. Matt. 19, 29. ↩

127. 1. Cor. 1, 26.
     ↩

128. Esaie. 56, 4. ↩

129. 1. Cor. 10, verse 24.
     ↩

130. Exo. 20, 12. ↩

131. 1. Tim. 5, 8.
     ↩

132. Two properties of our nature. ↩

133. That vertue is not the cheefest good. ↩

134. Why vertue is not the cheefest good. ↩

135. An obiection of the Stoiks. ↩

136. Another obiection. ↩

137. Another obiection, that the action of vertue is onlie in the mind, ↩

138. That the Stoiks reposed not themselues in vertue alone. ↩

139. That the Stoiks opinion is far from religion. ↩

140. That the Stoiks are more to be borne withall, than the Epicures. ↩

141. What the holie scriptures teach hereof. Psal. 49, 6. ↩

142. Psal. 32, 12. ↩

143. Psal. 112, 1. ↩

144. Psal. 119, 1. ↩

145. That good habits may be vnprofitable. 2. Cor. 6, 1. 1. Tim. 4, 14 ↩

146. Whether calamities doo hinder men from happines. ↩

147. Psal. 32, 1. ↩

148. Esaie. 25, 8. Apoc. 21, 4. ↩

149. 1. Cor. 15, ver. 13, & 19
     ↩

150. Matth. 5, 4. vers. 4, & 10. ↩

151. Rom. 8, 18. ↩

152. The difference betweene custome and exercise. ↩

153. Whether felicitie be of God. ↩

154. The opinion of the Peripatetiks as touching prouidence. ↩

155. How God dooth giue some things without a meane and some by meanes. ↩

156. That felicitie is common vnto manie. ↩

157. Children excluded from felicitie by Aristotle. ↩

158. Three things spoken of felicitie. ↩

159. A plaine declaratio~ what fortune is. ↩

160. 1. Cor. 8, 1.
     ↩

161. That fortune is not the cause of felicitie. ↩

162. How these things agree with the holie scriptures. ↩

163. Gen. 15, 1. ↩

164. Exo. 33, 13. ↩

165. Psal. 15, 12. ↩

166. Mat. 11, 28. ↩

167. Ioh. 10, 28. ↩

168. Rom. 3, 24. ↩

169. Phil. 2. 13. ↩

170. Luke. 21, 18. ↩

171. Mar. 10, 14. ↩