The xiiij. Chapter. Of Felicitie in generall, and of the cheefest good; out of the commentaries vpon Aristotles Ethikes.
¶ Of felicitie and blessednes, looke more Part. 2. Cap. 16. Art. 26.
TOuching the name of Felicitie, all men in a maner agrée; which is manifest by the Latins, Gréekes, and Hebrues: for none of them doo contend about the name; but about the thing it selfe, and especiallie wherein the subiect or matter is to be placed, they are at great dissention, For the vulgar sort differ from the wise men; yea & if thou wilt somewhat narrowlie consider the matter, all the common sort agrée not with themselues; and wise men doo not a little differ from wise men. 1 From this felicitie did Aristotle exclude all creatures void of reason, and this he did by vertue of the definition of felicitie; which he affirmed to be the chéefe action of mans mind, arising of the most excellent vertue. If this be so, then brute creatures shall not be partakers thereof, séeing they be not capable of such an action. Indéed it would not be denied, but that they haue in their owne nature or kind som good, proper to themselues, which to them is principall and chéefe; but yet we must not thinke that the same is blessednes, séeing it is of such a nature, as it cannot be without reason.
But before we come to the thing it selfe, I thinke it shall be good to knowe how this definition of Aristotle dooth either agrée or disagrée with the holie scriptures. 2 And first, where he appointed mans worke in act to be felicitie, he decréed no otherwise than doo the holie scriptures, where it is said; Blessed are those which walke in the lawe of the Lord. Blessed is the man that feareth the Lord, and which dooth meditate in the lawe of the Lord daie and night. All these be most godlie acts and exercises for this life. But it is obiected; Blessed are they whose iniquities are forgiuen, and whose sinnes be couered. Blessed is the man to whom the Lord imputeth no sinne: which things belong not to the worke of men, but flowe from the méere liberalitie of God. Héerevnto we saie, that Aristotle vnderstood not, nor beléeued this iustification through Christ, which the holie scriptures haue reuealed vnto vs; neither doo we in the meane time speake of this felicitie: but we speake onelie of that which followeth this first blessednes, and standeth in the right dooing while we liue héere; and in the other world, in the contemplation and fruition of the sight of Gods maiestie. And yet neuerthelesse, if we will also regard the blessednes of iustification, and laie that before our eies, whereby it is applied vnto vs; then commeth the worke of faith. For we be iustified by beléeuing, although we are not iustified by the merit of that action, nor yet for the dignitie thereof are receiued into grace: but of this felicitie we doo not now treate.
And that which we doo speake of, although it be the worke of man; yet doth it not breake out from his strength, but is produced by the power of the spirit of God, and from the heauenlie maiestie. In the world to come this felicitie shall be perfect, which shall neuer be interrupted, but shall be one, and a continuall act. Whereas this blessednes of Aristotle, as his definition sheweth, may manie times betwéene whiles breake off. He would that this action, whereby a man is blessed, should flowe from a most excellent vertue. The same also doo we thinke, who shew that the actions of faithfull men are not right and acceptable vnto God, vnlesse they be the branches of faith, hope, and charitie, the which we estéeme for the chéefest vertues. We agrée with him also as touching the continuance; for we require a perseuerance while we liue héere, and in the world to come we beléeue to haue euerlasting blessednes. Onlie in this, there is a disagréement betwéene Aristotle and vs, that he requireth the good things of the world, but we affirme that they are not of necessitie héere in this world vnto a Christian to make him blessed.
2 The opinions of the philosophers concerning felicitie, may thus be distinguished; 3 so as we may saie, that some of them were notable, hauing famous patrons; but others vile and obscure, bicause they came from men of no account, and be not confirmed by strong and euident reasons. And of this kind are found health, riches, and such like, whose defenders were no notable men. To the other kind belongeth pleasure, honestie, vertue, to liue agréeable with the first gifts of nature, knowledge, &c. 4 These indéed are the ends, which are accounted without mixture. And there be some that haue other things ioined with them: for some men vnto vertue doo ioine pleasure; others vnto honestie ioine a fréedome from sorrowe; othersome with vertue doo ioine the accomplishment of a perfect life. Augustine against Iulianus Scyllaeus blameth that good, which is compounded with pleasure; for in that honestie is placed therein, it representeth a shew of man, the pleasure which is mingled, is a brutish thing. But he that will more fullie vnderstand of this matter, let him reade Cicero as well in his second booke De finibus, as in his Tusculans quest: and thou maist also sée, that sometimes some of them disagrée with themselues; and that which they first iudged to be the chéefest good, straightwaie they refuse it: for they which being whole, made small reckoning of health, afterward being destitute thereof, placed it in the chéefest good, which also hapneth to them that be pressed with pouertie: for such, not onlie make great account of riches, but aboue all things séeke for the same. And these, whom we haue spoken of, doo appoint some thing shat should be euident and manifest. For these things; namelie, pleasure, riches, and honors be so plaine and euident, that they are apparant, euen to the senses. Yea and Epicurus said, that he therefore thought pleasure to be the chéefest good, bicause it was the most knowen, and most euident good thing. And he said, that pleasure was no lesse knowne to be the chéefest good, than snowe to be white, or fire hot. Varro sheweth, that the number of opinions concerning this matter, was verie great, as Augustine declareth in his booke De ciuitate Dei: for he saith, that there might be reckoned two hundred fourescore and eight opinions touching felicitie.