The xv. Chapter. Whether anie man can be counted happie, while he liueth in this world.
1 ARistotle in his first booke of Ethiks, disputing whither a man may be accounted happie in this life, saith; that Since vnto all men, though they liue iustlie and well, may happen the same things that hapned vnto Priamus, 2 there is left a doubt, whether anie man, while he liueth, being subiect to so manie alterations, can rightlie be called happie. And hauing secluded brute beasts and children, it séemeth for good cause to be doubted, whether any man should be accounted partaker of that blessednes: which as it might séeme, is not rashlie to be affirmed; bicause of the manifold alterations. For what sea or riuer is there, that can be tossed with so manie stormes, that can be disquieted with so manie troublesome tossings, as is the life of men, which though it be wholie well setled; one daie, or one vnfortunate night doth not alittle cast it vnder foote, yea ofttimes vtterlie bring it to naught? And not only the bodie is changed, which after a sort would be tollerable; but also the mind, whereby we now learne precepts, and now forget them; now receiue counsels, now reiect them; what within a while we decréed, we ouerthrowe; what a little before pleased vs, is now earnestlie refused. These things Eustratius considering with himselfe, and perceiuing the cause of alteration of all these things to be deriued from the bodie, saith; that Our soule, when it is ioined with it, is as if it should be let downe into a water troubled and most swiftlie running, whose whirlepooles our mind is so far vnable to resist, as it is rather most vehementlie drawne by them. By which saieng we may perceiue the great infirmitie of mans mind, wherewith he is so holden, as he is not able to rule the violent course of worldlie alterations.
Aristotle indéed might haue named the variable and inconstant state, as well of the bodie, as of the mind, but he set foorth that manifold diuersitie of things, which is perpetuallie séene in outward things. And that the thing which he said might be the more plaine, he shewed an example verie well knowne euen vnto children, which had hard the fables of the Poets, namelie Priamus the most rich king of Asia, who had abundance of posteritie, as he that was father of fiftie children, whereof seuentéene were borne to him of lawfull wiues, he had great store of fréends, he was famous in warfare. But the more that fortune flattered him continuallie all his life long, 3 the more did she at the end of his life, take all things most miserablie from him. Wherefore iustlie and for good cause doth Aristotle demand, whether anie man is to be counted happie while he liueth? And this may be called a question as touching the time; for he had before inquired of the causes of blessednes, and afterward he disputed of the matter, the subiect, or persons which should be capable thereof; and now he searcheth out, at what time a man may be blessed, or so called. Whether (saith he) shall this be attributed vnto him while he liueth, or after his death? The question hath two parts, and Aristotle treateth of either part. In the first place he dealeth with their opinion, which would haue vs to expect vntill the time of death, bicause that opinion is false, neither doth he followe the same; and he alwaies placeth the false things before the true, that those being confuted, that which is true may be the better confirmed.
The opinion séemes to be prooued by the authoritie of Solon, who was both one of the seuen wise men of all Greece, and also a famous lawmaker: for he said, That none is blessed, or ought so to be called, before his death. This sentence was spoken by him vnto the king of the Lydians, whose name was Croesus, who outragiouslie boasting of his substance, riches, 4 power of his kingdome, pleasures, and other good things which he enioied; And dooest not thou (saith he) count me happie? In speaking héereof, he séemed to glorie ouer the philosophers, who with their doctrines and sciences, in some maner of sort were in néed; whereas he hauing no philosophie, séemed vnto himselfe to be full fraught with felicitie. Solon hearing these words, repressed with a wise answere the insolencie of the proud king; No man (saith he) is happie before his death, admonishing him, in a frée philosophicall maner, that by ill fortune, all those things might be easilie taken from him, in such wise, that notwithstanding so great things, he might be cast downe to extreame calamitie. Wherein he was not deceiued; for Croesus being ouercome by Cyrus, he sawe all that euer he had, quite ouerthrowne. This sentence of this Philosopher did Ouid thus expresse; Of euerie man we must expect, the last and fatall day: Nor anie person happie call, till time of death we may.