¶ I knowe I am misreported, that I make God to be the author of sinne; but that is not true, as it shall plainlie appeare. But I onlie indeuour by my doctrine, to shew how the scriptures must be vnderstood, when they seeme so to affirme: Also what Augustine ment, who said, that God bendeth the wils of men aswell vnto good, as vnto euill: And in like maner, how Zuinglius & Oecolampadius, and other great learned men, professors of the Gospell, must be vnderstood, when they seeme to auouch the same.
The .xvij. Chapter. Whether God be the Author of sinne; out of the second booke of Sam. the 16. chapter, verse 22. Looke in Iud. 3, 9. and 9, 24. and 2. Sam, 2, 27. and 1. Kings. 22, 21. and In Rom. 1. 23.
IT remaineth now, that we intreate of the question; 1 Whether God be the author of sinne? For aswell the curse of Semei, 2 as the defiling of Dauids concubins, 3 may séeme at the first vew to procéed from God. For as touching the curse, Dauid him selfe said, that it came from God. And as touching the adulterie of Dauids concubins, it was spoken by Nathan vnder the person of God. Wherefore it may verie well be called in controuersie, whether God be the author of sinne. 4 And trulie there are verie manie and strong arguments of both sides: a good part of them I will recite, vnto the which all the rest may be referred. God can not trulie & rightlie be said to be the cause of sinne. Excellent is the sentence of Augustine, in his booke of 83. questions; God is not the author of anie thing, whereby a man becommeth the woorse: But no man doubteth that men are the woorse through sinne, Therfore God can not properlie be called the author of sinne. It is not likelie, that God will deforme man: artificers desire to adorne their works. Further, God him selfe generallie in the scripture professeth him selfe a reuenger of sinnes. If he be a reuenger, he is no author; for then he should punish his owne. If he were trulie the cause of sinne, he should condemne that which he made, which thing is absurd. Thirdlie it is said, that He loueth those things which he made, and hateth nothing that he hath made. But he testifieth that he did hate sinne, therefore he dooth not inforce to sinne. To hate and to loue are contrarie; wherefore both can not be spoken of one thing, at one and the selfe same time. If he hate sinne, then he loueth it not; but if so be it were of God, it should be beloued: for God loueth those things which he made. If God were the cause of sinne, he in the bringing foorth of sinne, should sinne; he that stealeth, is a théefe; he that committeth murther, is a manqueller: but far be it from God, that he should be either said to sinne, or to be a sinner. What is else to sinne, but to straie from the right end? But God is infinite, and can not be lead awaie from the end by another greater force. He is not ignorant, that he can straie from the end; for he is most wise. And that he him selfe should cause others to sinne, it séemeth to be absurd.
Let vs consider what is doone among these naturall things created by God. There be manie efficient causes; it séemeth that euerie efficient cause coueteth to make that like vnto it selfe, whereabout it worketh. Fire, if it take hold vpon wood, so worketh, as those things, wherevpon it worketh, may be made like vnto it selfe; a man dooth procreate a man. Thus in things created doo agents worke; whie shall we not saie, that in Gods dooings, his indeuour is to make like vnto him selfe; and that therefore he sinneth not? The holie scriptures teach vs the same; they bring in lawes which stirre vp good works, but sinnes at no time. If God should prouoke sinne, or would it to be doone, he should séem to be an hypocrite; he should closlie and secretlie doo another thing, than he openlie pretendeth. Ieremie spake of false prophets; 5 They ranne, but I sent them not; they prophesied, and I spake not with them; namelie, that they should speake this thing. Oseas saith; 6 Thy saluation, ô Israel, is of me, thy perdition is of thy selfe. But no man is ignorant that sinne is the cause of perdition. If perdition were of Israel, then sinne also: but saluation, and whatsoeuer goeth before saluation, is of God. If saluation and perdition, being the effects, be thus distinguished; the causes also must be distinguished, the one to be of God, and the other of man. Sin shall procéed of men, and vertues of God. More manifest is that which is written in the eight chapter of Iohn, where Christ speaking of the diuell, saith; 7 When he speaketh lies, he speaketh of his owne: if of his owne, he hath no néed to be stirred vp of another. And againe, 8 This is the condemnation of man, that light came into the world, but they loued darkenes more. Iames testifieth, 9 that God tempteth no man. But by temptation, men are prouoked vnto sin: wherefore if God were the cause of sin, it might not be said, that he tempteth not anie man. It is concupiscence whereby we be tempted, and that is not of God, but of the world.
2 In the second of Paralipomenon, the last chapter, there is a speciall place, 10 where the cause of the destruction of Ierusalem is giuen and ascribed to the sins of the people: and in such sort it is so disprooued, that God is the author of sin, as God testifieth that he would it otherwise: wherefore the cause must not be laid vpon God. He sent his prophets (saith hée) betimes in the morning, but they hardened their hart. Christ wept ouer the citie of Ierusalem; he was sorie for the ouerthrowe thereof. If the effect displeased him, much rather did the cause: he wept, bicause they so sinned, as they deserued vtter destruction. If Christ wept, who not onelie was man, but verie God also, he was displeased with sins: therefore God is not the authour of sinne. Neither can it be affirmed, that God is the cause of sin, vnlesse we will charge him with tyrannie, in that he condemneth men for their sins, bicause they haue done wickedlie, whome yet after a sort he hath led vnto wickednes. Tyrants are woont to set foorth lawes, and then to prouide cunninglie that their subiects may commit some thing against those lawes, whereby they may punish them. Moreouer, the scripture attributeth vnto God the iudgement ouer all flesh: 11 but how shall he iudge the world of sin, if he himselfe haue bin the author of sin? In the third chapter to the Romanes; 12 If our righteousnes doo set foorth the righteousnes of God, is God vniust for punishing? that it may be perceiued how absurd a thing it is, that our sins should make to the glorie of God: for if they make to the glorie of God, why doth he condemne them? If the reason be there of force, it more stronglie concludeth in this place. If God be the cause of sin, how shal he iudge the world? Also there will séeme to be in him two wils, and those one contrarie to the other: but in God there is onlie one will; if there should be more, they would be one against another, as touching one and the selfe-same thing; so that he would haue vs both not to doo, and to doo the selfe-same things. We will demand, to what purpose are so manie exhortations, persuasions, and callings to doo well, in the holie scriptures? All these things will séeme to be vaine. To what end did Christ giue warning vnto Iudas, 13 if he would be betraied of him? These spéeches may séeme to be doone as it were in game. But God dealeth grauelie and earnestlie in those things, which he dealeth with men. Also there would followe a great absurditie; for the differences betwéene good and euill, and betwéene vertue and sin, would be taken awaie. God should be appointed the authour of both; whereas he being the souereigne good, there can procéed nothing but goodnes from him. If a man should detest murther, adulterie, and incest, he would saie; it is a good work. The matter would be brought to such a passe, as good would be called euill, and euill good: yea rather there would be no difference at all betwixt them. For through the will of God, whereby he forbiddeth and commandeth anie thing, we iudge of good and euill: but by this meanes we should be void of all iudgement.
In like maner would be taken awaie the iudgements of our consciences. We reade in the epistle to the Romanes, 14 that we haue cogitations, which shall defend and accuse one another in the iudgement of the Lord. If this other opinion were true, we will gather, that we should not accuse our selues, but God the author. There is plentie of excuse for the wicked, they will saie; Wherefore néed I to repent for this thing, séeing God himselfe is the author of it? Repentance will be taken awaie, and a windowe opened vnto great mischéefes. Wherefore shall we giue thanks vnto God, bicause he hath deliuered vs from our sins? But sin was good; It had bin all one to haue lien still in sin; We will not lament our sins, but rather reioise in them, for it is the worke of God; it is méete that we should reioise for the works of God. If God himselfe be the author of sin, praise and reioising will followe; but not sorrowe. Much will be drawne awaie from the estimation of God, if he should be put the author of sin. That saieng also, which they shew, might be brought; namelie, 15 that God would haue all men to be saued. If he will haue them to be saued, he vseth good meanes; he incourageth not men to sin: for sins doo leade men to perdition. Manie more reasons might be brought, but for this time we will content our selues with these.
16 3 Let vs sée on the other part, what things they be that might affirme God to be the cause of sin. In the first chapter to the Romanes it is written; 17 that Seeing the idolaters knew God, and would not worship him as God, therefore (as méet it was) he gaue them vp vnto a reprobate sense, and vnto shamefull lusts. If he gaue them, he also prouoked and mooued them. In Exodus it is written, 18 that God had hardened and dulled the hart of Pharao, so that he would not hearken, when Moses commanded him in the name of God to let the people depart. In the sixt of Esaie, 19 He is said to blind the people, that they should not see. When we powre out our praiers before God, we desire him that he 20 Lead vs not into temptation, but that he will deliuer vs from euill. To what end should we thus praie, if these things should not sometimes be? No man intreateth, except for those things which may be, or which doo hang ouer his head, or which he feareth will come to passe. They are woont to saie, that God dooth and willeth these things, not as they be sinnes, but in respect that they be punishments to chasten him that hath sinned. But it is hard to appoint the punishment and fault to be all one thing, séeing the nature of punishment and fault is diuers. A fault ariseth from the will, whereas punishment is laid vpon vs against our will. If it be committed voluntarilie, then it is no punishment. To affirme a thing to be voluntarie, and yet vnuoluntarie, can hardlie be made to agrée. That, which is the cause of a cause, may also be called the cause of the effect: but no man doubteth but that God hath giuen vs a will, inclinations, properties and effects, whereby we are prouoked to sinne. If God be said to be the cause of these things, why dare we not saie that he is the cause of sinnes? That which remooueth the impediments, if the thing afterward happen, or the effect followe, it shall be called the cause of sinne. What dooth chéefelie let sinnes? Euen grace, and the good spirit of God: except these kéepe vs backe, we shall rush hedlong into most gréeuous crimes. Who can remooue grace, or take awaie the spirit, but onelie God which gaue them? If he remooue the lets, no doubt but he is some cause of sinnes. Also, he that ministreth an occasion of anie thing, he séemeth to be an authour thereof: although he be not the chéefest cause, if he giue an occasion he shall not faile to be called authour. God knew the hardnesse of Pharaos hart, and he knew that he being not holpen by the spirit, would be prouoked to sin. So The lawe is said to increase sinne, 21 if it be not proposed to the regenerate: for we alwaies bend our selues vnto that which we be forbidden, and couet that which we be denied. God commandeth [Pharao] to let the people go; what is this, but to offer an occasion that he might be the more hardened? We cannot denie but that God dooth minister occasions: yea, and he not onelie giueth occasions, but we can also shew commandements wherein he commandeth sinne. We haue in the historie of the kings, that Achab was a wicked prince; that God determined to punish him in battell; he would haue him brought to this by the flatteries and false persuasions of false prophets. God is brought in to talke with the spirits; Who can seduce Achab? There stept foorth an euill spirit which said; 22 I will be a lieng spirit in the mouth of the false prophets. God alloweth and commandeth it; Go thy waies, doo so. He giueth incouragement; It shall be so.
Further, we cannot denie, but that sinne is a certeine humane action: but euerie déed, as it coms in act, dependeth of the first principle of all things. God is (as the Philosophers acknowledge him) 23 Primus actus, the first agent. Vnlesse he be the vpholder, there can be no agent: wherefore sinne dependeth on God, as vpon the cause efficient. Sinnes for the most part be motions; and motions haue an order, so as the inferiour dependeth vpon the superiour: therefore the cause of sinne, so far-foorth as it is a motion, is directed vnto his owne moouer. Augustine hath certeine testimonies of this thing, and confirmeth it also by some places of the scripture. In his booke De gratia & libero arbitrio, the twelfe chapter, he saith; that There is no doubt, but that God worketh in mens minds, to make their wils incline, either to good according to his mercie, or vnto euill according to their merits; by his iudgement vndoubtedlie which sometime is open, sometime secret, but euermore iust. In the beginning of that chapter he saith; Who can but tremble at these horrible iudgements of God, whereby he worketh what he will in the harts of the wicked, yéelding to euerie one according to his deserts? And he addeth; He verelie worketh in the harts of men the motions of their will, and by them he dooth those things that he will doo, who neuertheles cannot will anie thing vniustlie. This he prooueth by the scriptures. In the first of kings we haue the historie of Roboam, 24 who harkned not to the counsell of the ancients, that he should deale mildlie with the people. But it is said, that this turning away was of the Lord, to the intent he might establish the saieng of Ahia the Silonite. Wherefore (as Augustine expoundeth it) that naughtie will was of the Lord. He alledgeth another place, out of the second booke of Chronicles, the 21. chapter. 25 God stirred vp the Philistines and Arabians against Ioram, which followed idolatrie; God was minded to punish him. Vndoubtedlie the motions of the minds in the Philistines and Arabians were wicked against Ioram, insomuch as they inuaded other mens countries, and were infected with crueltie; and yet God is said to haue stirred them vp. In the same historie of kings, 26 there is speaking of Amasias, which prouoked Ioas the king of Israel vnto battell. Yea and Ioas himselfe, 27 and also the prophet of the Lord discouraged him from the purpose; but he being carried with ambition, hearkened not vnto the godlie admonitions: which thing neuertheles came from God, who would that he should be deliuered into his hands, bicause he followed the idols of Edom.
4 We reade in the 14. chapter of Ezechiel; 28 If the prophet be deceiued, I haue seduced him; and I will stretch foorth my hand, and will smite him. He intreateth of the false prophets, which euer betwéene whiles vainlie fed the people. Ieremie saith in the fourth chapter, 29 that God deceiued the people. In the 63. chapter of Esaie the prophet complaineth; 30 Wherefore hath God so seduced the people, or made them to erre, that they should depart from him? Salomon saith in his Prouerbs; 31 Euen as the violence of waters, so is the kings hart in the hand of God. Vndoubtedlie Pharao was a king, therefore he inclined his will vnto what part he would. Nabuchadnezer was a king, therefore he inclined his will vnto which part he would. In the 104. psalme, 32 it is said of the Aegyptians, that God turned their harts, so as they hated the children of Israel: they séemed before to loue the Israelites. In the second epistle to the Thessalonians, the second chapter; 33 Bicause men cast awaie the loue of the truth, therefore God sent them strong illusions, that they might giue credit vnto lies. It is written in the eleuenth chapter of Iosua, 34 that None made peace with the children of Israel, among all the nations of the Chanaanites, saue onelie the Gabeonites. For God incouraged their hart to fight against the Israelites. And it is added, vnto what end; namelie, that they should be wéeded out by them. Assuredly, he did animate them, that they should not desire to haue peace, but rather to haue warre. Moreouer, he that would an end, séemeth to will those things, which serue vnto the end; and by the same will he would those meanes which craue an end. The physician, willing to heale a sicke man, séeth that cutting, or searing, or else a bitter potion is fit, and euen these he will vse for recouerie of health. When GOD would that a testimonie vnto the truth should be giuen by the martyrs, and that Christ should die, he also would those things that should procure this end; namelie, the vexation of the saints, and crueltie of kings and people: for it behooued to attaine vnto that end by these kind of meanes. In the prophets, especiallie in Esaie, 35 kings are said to be in the hand of God, like rods, hammers, and axes; which comparisons haue no place, if it were not vnderstood, that God mooueth the harts: for they be not mooued, vnlesse they be driuen forward. Also when God was displeased with the people of Israel, 36 he stirred vp the hart of Dauid to number that people by the poll; which thing was wicked. It is to small purpose, if thou wilt saie that in the booke of Chronicls is read, 37 that satan prouoked him: for satan can doo no more than God giueth him leaue. Whether God did it by himselfe, or by satan, thou séest that Dauid was stirred vp by the will of God, vnto that which was not lawfull. 38 They are woont to excuse this matter, that God permitteth, but not helpeth. We saie, it is not enough; for the offense is still left in our minds. God as yet séemeth after some sort to will sinne; he knoweth, that a man cannot stand by himselfe. 39 If some blind man should walke before vs, and we should sée him readie either to stumble against a stone, or to fall into a ditch; and we are present, we may helpe him, but we will not, we suffer him to go on: now when he falleth, shall not we after some sort be said to be guiltie of his fall? For thou wouldest haue him fall, if thou diddest not staie him when thou mightest.
And that which yet is more gréeuous; 40 if so be that an old impotent man were leaning vpon his staffe, and so after a sort were going, and if some man should take awaie his staffe wherevnto he leaned, although he inforced him not to fall, should he not after some sort be called the author of the fall? God taketh awaie his spirit from weake men, who without this be not able to go; dooth he not after some sort séeme to be the cause of their fall? Wherefore, that which they bring, will be a weake defense, when they saie that God forsaketh men. While we would séeme to excuse GOD, we laie as gréeuous things vnto him; to wit, that he is no more a God; and while we shun the smoke, we fall into the fire. If anie things be doone besides the will of God, whether he will or no; if there be anie effects, wherof he is not the cause: he is not then the vniuersall cause of all, nor yet God. 41 But he compelleth not to fall; the excuse will not serue. 42 Admit there be some good man of the house, whose familie behaueth it selfe verie ill: if he be reprooued, he will excuse himselfe, saieng; I bad them not, I commanded them not: that excuse shall not be counted lawfull; for he ought not to permit that which he could haue hindered. Manie times the good man of the house cannot let wicked acts, but the power of God is inuincible. There be no wils so euill and corrupt, but he can amend and make them good. Anselmus in his booke De casu diaboli, the 91. chapter; Why (saith he) doo we account it absurd, that God dooth particular actions by a naughtie will, séeing we knowe, that he maketh sundrie substances, which are brought foorth by an vnhonest action? 43 As when a child is procreated by adulterie. That adulterie is euill, no man doubteth, but that child is the creature of God. This séemeth twise to be affirmed in the Acts of the apostles. In the second chapter 44 Peter saith of Iesus the sonne of God; that The Iewes had taken him, and deliuered him to be slaine by the determinate will and counsell of God. Afterward in the fourth chapter, 45 when the church gaue thanks vnto God, it praieth on this wise; Against thy holie sonne Iesus, both Herod and Pontius Pilat, with the gentiles and people of Israel, gathered them selues togither, to doo those things that thy hand and thy counsell had determined to be doone. With these arguments, wherevnto others might be added, I will hold my selfe content.
46 5 Now that we haue set downe the reasons for ech part, there remaineth that the question it selfe be expounded. 47 I find thrée opinions; the first is to be detested, namelie of the Libertins, which saie, that God is all wholie the cause of sinne: and so saie, as they affirme, all sinnes to be excusable, and not to be reprooued, because they be the works of God: and if anie fault should be, they would laie it vpon God. This one thing they indeuour; namelie, to take awaie from all men the féeling of sinne. If anie man haue committed murther, it is not he (saie they) that hath committed it, God hath doone it. And vnlesse that a man so thinke, they saie, that he is vnperfect, and can not allow of all Gods works. What can be more wickedlie imagined? The diuell could not haue found out a readier waie to hell. Let these men go to perdition, séeing we can not mend them: let vs praie vnto God that he will take awaie these pestilent persons out of the church. 48 The second opinion is of certeine learned men, who mislike not that sense, which the scriptures appeare to haue at the first sight. They saie, that God hardeneth, that he punisheth sinnes with sinnes; and finallie, they grant him to be the cause of sinne: but they adde, that these actions, séeing they procéed from the verie corrupt nature of men, so farre foorth as they be of God, haue a respect to iustice; and that men be not excused, because they be inclined vnto these things: they laie not the blame vnto God, who dooth his part rightlie. If (saie they) it can not be comprehended by reason, how he dooth iustlie, and we vniustlie; we must referre our selues to the iudgement of the scriptures. There be manie other things, which by mans reason we can not knowe, which neuertheles we doo beléeue. The third opinion is of them, 49 which interprete all these places of the scripture by the words; He suffered, He gaue leaue, He permitted, or according to the Gréeke; He did not hinder it, and such like. So they thinke that all dangers are auoided.
6 But what my iudgement is, 50 I will not be loth to declare; afterward your owne selues shall iudge. And that the matter may be the more easilie knowen, it shall be good to examine it the more déeplie: and somewhat I will saie, of Euill, vnder which generall word, sinne is conteined. Euill is a certein priuation, 51 of good I meane; yet not of euerie good, but of such a good thing as is requisite for the perfection of euerie creature, which I saie belongeth to the perfection of the thing despoiled. 52 For if we take awaie sight from a stone, it shall haue no hurt: for that qualitie of nature is not méete for it. Euill being a priuation, can not consist without good: for it must haue a subiect. A subiect séeing it is a substance, is a good thing; wherefore euill can not be but in good: euen as blindnes is a priuation of sight, it hangeth not in the aire, but it sticketh in the eie. So may it be shewed by manie other examples. But not to depart from that which we haue in hand; sinne it selfe depriueth mans action of dutifulnes and obedience towards the word of God. These things ought to be in action; but when we sinne, action is bereft of those good things. And action, séeing it is a certeine thing, it is in his owne nature good; wherefore euill can not be but in good. Moreouer, euill is not desired for it selfe, but men doo sinne in consideration of good; for vnlesse there appeared some likenesse of good, they would not depart from goodnes. So great therefore is the power of good, as euill can not be except in good, and vnto good. Wherefore rightlie haue the wise men said, that we may grant, there is the chéefest good; but not affirme that there is the chéefest euill, which can depriue good altogither: for then it should destroie it selfe. It might haue no subiect wherin it should be, nor yet outward shew, whereby it should be desired. To speake now of euill; it is distinguished into punishment, and fault. Fault is called that which we commit against the lawe of God; punishment is that which is laid vpon vs for sinne: and that also hath a priuation of some commoditie; as when God sendeth sicknesse, sicknesse is the priuation of health, and hath place in the bodie of a liuing creature. He sendeth famine and barennesse, which is the priuation of fertilitie; and it is in the earth it selfe: this (I saie) belongeth vnto punishment. But sinne taketh place in the mind onelie: punishments doubtlesse may both be in the mind, and in the bodie. There is added a third member, which is so a punishment, as it is also sinne: as originall sinne is, so is the naturall corruption left after baptisme. These things thus concluded, I put foorth a certeine sentence or proposition to be confirmed, the which hath two parts. The first is, 53 that God is not by him selfe and properlie the cause of sinne. The second is, that there is nothing doone in the world, no not sinnes them selues, without his will, determination, and prouidence.
54 7 To prooue the question, it behoueth to confirme it as touching both parts. Let vs speake of the first; that God by him selfe is not the cause of sinne. Vnto this purpose serue the arguments in the first place. But I adde, that when good or euill are opposed, as Habit and Priuation; the habit by it selfe dooth neuer bring in priuation. Light it selfe dooth alwaies illuminate, it neuer bringeth in darknes. Wherefore if we put good and euill as contrarie priuatiues, euill shall not be of good. God is the chéefest good, let vs then put him to be the habit: wherefore by him selfe and properlie, he maketh no priuation. But I said that he is not the cause of sinne by him selfe and properlie. These words I haue added, bicause, if we will speake lesse properlie, he may be said after some sort to be either the beginning, or the cause of sinne: not indéed the proper cause; 55 but that cause, which of the philosophers is called remouing or prohibiting. I will make the matter plaine by similitudes. The sunne is altogither bright, the proper effect therof is to make light; yet after some maner it may be said to make darknes, not in that it shineth, but in that it is mooued, and departeth from one place to an other. For bodies be round, therfore when it departeth, it can not alwaies by reason of the motion, giue light to that place from whence it went, but shadowes doo come betwéene: so then after some sort it is said to make darknesse by the departure thereof; bicause bodies are so ordered, and it selfe is mooued.
So likewise it happeneth as touching some ruinous house; it is held vp by a prop, some man approching remooueth the prop, the stones and buildings through their owne weight fall downe from the top; which things haue in them selues the causes of their comming downe: yet notwithstanding, he which taketh awaie the prop, is said after a sort to cause the fall: for he remooueth the staie which letted the ruine. In like maner God, in his owne nature is good, yet in respect that he is iust, he will punish sinners; he taketh awaie his grace, and after some sort may be called the cause of those things which afterward be naughtilie doone; yet not the true cause: for that proper cause is inward, that is to wit, the naughtie will of them. But whie he sometimes taketh awaie his spirit from men, a reason may be yéelded; when they sinne, he remooueth his grace from them, not onlie to the intent he may punish, but that the excellencie of his fauour may be knowen: and to let vs vnderstand, that that which God giueth, he giueth it fréelie, and that it is not of nature. For if we should alwaies haue [his grace] and after one and the selfe same maner, as if God would not at sometime stacke his strength, we would attribute vnto our owne power the good things that we doo. But thus it is, to the intent we may acknowledge our owne infirmitie, and praie the more feruentlie for preseruation and increase of the heauenlie gift. But when the grace and fauour of God is iustlie taken awaie from vs, sinne dooth naturallie followe: neither is there néede of anie other efficient cause; I meane, there néedeth no other cause, to come from our infected and corrupt affections.
This appeareth by the similitudes alleaged, if the sunne be remooued, darknesse dooth followe; not through anie efficient cause, but by it selfe. If the habit be remooued, 56 priuation is straightwaie present of his owne accord. If one so hurteth his eie, as the sight be lost; blindnes dooth immediatlie followe: neither is it néedfull to séeke anie other thing that worketh. Which séeing the Manicheis perceiued not, they erred most shamefullie: they would not attribute the cause of euill vnto the good God; but they sawe that there were manie euils, and they iudged that euils could not be without a true cause: wherevpon they affirmed that there be two beginnings. And bicause they sawe a great power to be both in euill, & in good, they brought in two gods; one good, and an other bad. Of these we read much in Augustine. But that euill, which is sinne, commeth, if the spirit of God be taken awaie: for then man is left vnto him selfe. But whether is he so left, as God dooth no more anie thing concerning him, or his sinne? That this may be vnderstood, 57 I will declare thrée sorts of working, which we may perceiue in God towards his creatures: not that other works of his can not be shewed, but bicause these thrée doo most of all serue vnto the matter we haue in hand.
8 Some action of God is generall, 58 séeing by his prouidence he cherisheth, susteineth, and gouerneth all things in their conditions, qualities, and inclinations, as they stood at the beginning when they were created. And thus is the order of nature preserued; which thing is excellent to be knowne. We sée that heauen reteineth his owne nature: surelie it hath manie things to be maruelled at. We sée that the nature of fire is vehement, of aire is pleasant, of water is flowing: we sée also the mettals, the trées, the works of artificers, which things assuredlie be woonderfull. All these are gouerned by God; yea, and if he should withdrawe his hand from them, they would fall to nothing. Profitable doubtles is the consideration of his diuine gouernement. Oftentimes doth God exhort vs in the psalmes, to magnifie him for these works. 59 In the first to the Romanes it is written, that The Gentiles by these creatures did knowe God, and a kind of his euerlasting force, working, gouernement, and godhead, in such sort, as Aratus said; We are in verie déed the linage of God. We haue an excellent example of this worke in our selues. The soule which is not séene, is indiuisible, yet it mooueth and quickeneth the whole bodie. Euen so all creatures doo reteine their properties and inclinations.
60 9 Secondlie, another worke of God is, whereby the creatures are not onlie preserued and ruled, but doo also obeie the counsels of God. For God vseth the actions of all things, euen of men, and of euill men: he vseth them (I saie) for the establishment of his purposes. When he fauoreth his owne, he giueth them plentifull increase of fruits; the raine falleth earlie and late. But if he will of his iustice punish the wicked, nothing commeth well to passe; there is giuen a heauen of brasse, and an earth of iron: if the fruits be ripe, they perish in one night. These things must not be ascribed vnto fortune. When we knowe not the cause, we take it to be fortune; wherevpon the poet saith, A goddesse Fortune we thee call, And place thee high in heauenlie stall.
Wherefore we must not occupie our selues alonelie in a generall consideration of things of the world, 61 but we must weigh the vse wherein they serue the prouidence of God; whereas sin commeth of proper causes, I meane of our owne will, and corrupt affections, yet doth the same serue God also. A similitude; There be manie poisons in the world, 62 they haue manie and dangerous qualities; yet the physician occupieth them, and the magistrate rightlie vseth them. The physician by tempering of the poisons, healeth the sicke: the magistrate at Athens gaue poison for the taking awaie of such as were guiltie. So was Socrates compelled to drinke hemlocke. Although therefore poisons are euill, yet may the magistrate and the physician vse them well for the safetie of the common-weale, and preseruation of the sicke. Euen so God ruleth sins (which haue their proper causes corrupted) for the performing & bringing foorth of his counsels to act. I might also vse another similitude; Those things which séeme to be done of vs by chance in the world, 63 doo most of all serue the prouidence of God. For the Lord saith in the lawe, Exodus 21, and Deut. 19. 64 If two shall go togither into the groue to hew wood, & the axe flieth out of one of their hands, and he is smitten therewith that stood next him, and is slaine: this he did vnwittinglie, he shall not be guiltie of death. For God deliuered him [therevnto] and that for iust causes deliuered he him of a determinate purpose; we vnderstand it not, he knoweth it. Euen so they which offend, indéed they doo as they would, they haue determined with themselues what they will doo: but yet God vseth these actions. So by the curse of Semei, God would haue the patience of Dauid to be thoroughlie knowne vnto all men, 65 and would open his iudgements against his adulterie and murther: but this man meant to shew his hatred against Dauid. God doth that which he will, as touching those crimes which men of another purpose committed; not to the intent they might obeie the will of God, but their owne corrupt lusts.
And to returne to the testimonie now alledged. He that heweth wood, this he would doo, but the axe hitteth another man, and the hitting serueth the counsell of God. Ierome vpon the twelfe chapter of Ieremie writeth, that Nothing hapneth rashlie and without prouidence, whether it be good or euill; but that all things come to passe by the iudgment of God. Wherefore creatures be certeine instruments in the hand of God; 66 he vseth them according to his owne purpose. But yet these instruments bée not all after one sort; for some there be which haue no knowledge, nor sense, nor will, and yet neuerthelesse they doo seruice vnto God. But there be others, which perceiue, vnderstand, and will those things which they doo, and yet they doo it not alwaies of purpose to serue God: yea rather they oftentimes vnwillinglie and vnwittinglie doo that which God appointeth. Wherefore we will saie, that as well liuing creatures, as not liuing creatures; things hauing sense, and hauing no sense; Angels good and bad, and generallie all creatures be the instruments of God, which he vseth according to the consideration of his prouidence. He did vse the Assyrians, Chaldaeans, Persians, Greekes and Romanes, for punishment of the wicked Hebrues: he did vse also the diuell against Saule and against Iob. But it is further to be considered, that when God vseth creatures, especiallie the reasonable creatures, and euill creatures, such as be euill men and diuels; he doth not so vse them, as though they did nothing themselues; for euen they themselues fulfill their owne naughtines, but God vseth it [to purpose.] God dealeth not with these as with stones, which haue no sense at all; they will, they knowe, and they haue sense: and when wicked men, and the diuell doo naughtilie, and are mooued by their owne proper lust, they doo seruice vnto the prouidence of God. They perceiue doubtlesse, and will, not that their mind is such as they would serue God, for they séeke their owne. Neither are they so moued by the superior cause, as they vse not withall their owne naughtinesse.
67 10 But thou wilt saie, that If God after this maner, haue recourse as the chéefest cause vnto these actions, and that euill men as the next causes doo them, it shall be all one worke of God, of the diuell, and of naughtie men. This indéed must not be denied; but yet this worke commeth far otherwise from the superiour good cause, than from the next cause which is corrupt. This worke, as it is of the diuell, and of wicked men, is euill. It draweth infection from the wickednes of the diuell, and of naughtie men; which being euill trées, cannot bring foorth good fruit. But God, the verie best, and chéefest cause, as he concurreth with these actions, dooth them rightlie and in due order. Euen as both God and the diuell would Ierusalem to be destroied, but yet in sundrie respects; God, to the intent he might punish the obstinate; the diuell, that he might fulfill his cruell hatred against mankind. Christ was to be deliuered vnto the crosse, which also was doone; and this worke, as it procéeded from the hatred and malice of the Iewes, was euill: but the selfe-same, in as much as God, through that most holie action, would haue mercie vpon mankind, had goodnes. Wherefore it is said in the Acts of the apostles; 68 that They did those things against the Sonne of God, which his counsell and hand had determined. Yet must those things which they did against Christ, méerelie be called euill; bicause they haue both their name and nature from the next cause, although that God rightlie vsed them according to his owne prouidence. The diuell and God exercise Iob in a farre sundrie respect; also the Sabees, and other robbers spoiled his substance for the satisfieng of their owne hatred: so did the diuell. But God did it to prooue his patience, and to testifie his good will towards the godlie, by a ioifull deliuerance. Wherefore the works were all one, but the purposes were diuerse. For which cause, 69 when Iob said (The Lord hath giuen, and the Lord hath taken awaie) he praiseth God, as the chéefest cause, without whose prouidence these things were not doone, and whose prouidence vsed all things to a good end; yet dooth he not praise the robbers, and the diuell. So did Dauid also behaue himselfe; he commended not Semei, he said not that those cursings were of their owne nature good: but turned himselfe to the prouidence of God. The worke was wicked, yet in some respect it may be called the worke of God; bicause he ruled it and vsed it. Also it is said in the prophet; 70 Cursed be he that dooth the worke of the Lord negligentlie: and the worke of the Lord he calleth the affliction of the people, whereby the wicked ouerpressed them. Wherefore, the wicked can not excuse their sinnes, in respect of this vse of God: for they haue the cause of those sinnes in themselues. And euen as Gods good vse of these things excuseth not sinners, so on the other part, the naughtines of sinners dooth not contaminate the good vse and prouidence of God, who can excéedinglie well vse the things which be doone amisse.
Augustine in his Enchiridion ad Laurentium, 71 chapter.101. declareth, that It may be, that God and man would one and the same thing; 72 and that God in so willing, dooth rightlie; but that man dooth sinne, although he will those things which God willeth. He bringeth an example. The father of a wicked sonne sickeneth, the will of God by his iust iudgement is, that he should die of that disease, the vngratious child also would the same; but to the intent he may the sooner come vnto the inheritance, and be frée from the power of his father: God willeth iustlie, but the child vngodlie. And on the other side (he saith) that It may be, that a man would the thing that God would not, and yet that as well he as God willeth rightlie. Admit that the father, which is sicke, haue a good child; God would that the father should die: the child thorough an honest affection would it not, for he is desirous to haue his father liue; they will diuerslie, and yet they both will iustlie. It consisteth onelie in the purpose of the will; for thereof dependeth oftentimes goodnes and naughtines. But there ariseth a doubt; 73 If that one maner of worke depend both on God and man, and that it drawe naughtines from the infection of man, and that it hath some goodnes, in respect that God vseth it, so as nothing may escape God or his prouidence, wherfore dooth Zacharie in the first chapter complaine; 74 I was but a litle angrie with my people, but they helped forward vnto euill; that is, they passed the bounds. That which they sinne, séemeth to excéede the prouidence of God; so as they did more than God had decréed. We answere, that It must not be vnderstood, that they did more, than that thing might serue to the vse of Gods prouidence: for there can be nothing at all doone besides the will of God & his decrées, which be most firme. Augustine in the same Enchiridion ad Laurentium, 102. chapter, saith; The will of God is inuincible, how then are they said to haue excéeded? Not the bounds of the eternall decrée, ⟨…⟩ ⟨…⟩ but the iust measure of victorie. There be certeine bounds, limits, and lawes, which ought to be kept by conquerers. They excéeded that which became them, but that they could doo more than prouidence would vse, it must in no wise be granted.
11 The third kind of the works of God wée call that which is proper vnto the saincts; for thereby he most mercifullie bringeth manie things to passe in them: 75 for he reigneth, he liueth, and he worketh in vs both to will and to performe. Otherwise in nature we be certeine barren trées, we are blind, we will no good things. The iudgement is corrupted, the will and choise is corrupt in those dregs of originall sin: but God, by his spirit, fashioneth his chosen anew. We haue from the beginning a nature giuen according to the similitude of God, wherevnto should be agréeable, to will, to choose, to doo these things and those things. But in that we can not doo good of our selues, it hath procéeded of corruption: but in that we will rightlie, and doo serue God by an obedience begun, it is of the supernaturall grace of God. Wherefore the first kind of Gods works, which belongeth to the vniuersall prouidence, serueth not to the question now in hand. The second kind of working and the third belong vnto this.
12 Although therefore that God doo gouerne euen sins and euils; yet he is not properlie said to be the efficient cause. Augustine in his twelfe booke De ciuitate Dei, the seauenth chapter, speaketh verie well as concerning a naughtie will, when he saith; 76 An euill thing hath no efficient, but a deficient cause. And if anie will search out this efficient cause, it is euen like as if he would sée the darkenes with his eies, or comprehend silence with his eares: which being priuations, it is no néed that they should haue efficient causes. Yet neuertheles, they be things knowne vnto vs; for there is all one sense of things that bée contrarie. The sight séeth not other than bright things, 77 the eare heareth not other than noises, and yet by these senses we knowe euen these things; not by the vse of them, but by the priuation onlie. A naughtie will doth God vse, to the ends appointed: not bicause he is not able, vnlesse it be by these meanes, to atteine to that which he will; but so it pleased him to declare his wisedome and power, that he might shew himselfe able to doo something mediatlie [as they saie] and immediatelie: and that it maketh no matter vnto him, whether the instruments that he vseth be good or bad. Wherefore let vs séeke out what is the deficient cause of euill actions, and among the rest we shall find wicked affections and inclinations, 78 which séeing they fall awaie from the word of God, and from right reason, it is no maruell if things that be faultie, procéed there-from. These be the inward causes of sin, but they be rather deficient than efficient causes. The diuell also is said to be the cause of sin: for we reade in the booke of wisedome; By the diuell death entred into the world, 79 therefore sin also: for death is the effect of sin. But yet the diuell can not be called the proper and absolute cause of our sin: the reason is; for that such is the nature of euerie proper and perfect cause, that the same being put, the effect doth of necessitie followe. But in the diuell it is not thus; for although he sometime suggest euill things in the mind of the godlie, yet neuerthelesse sin doth not alwaie followe. For manie godlie men doo valiantlie resist him, and when sin followeth not, he can not be called the absolute and perfect cause thereof. In déed, he prouoketh men, but yet not so, that sin must of necessitie followe.
I might bring another reason. Let vs imagine that the diuell himselfe had not reuolted from God, and that man had bin created, man could yet of his owne nature haue sinned, and haue had the cause of sin in himselfe: but the suggestion of the diuell could not haue bin the cause thereof, when he was not as yet alienated from God: so that he is no perfect nor full cause of sin, but a persuading and alluring cause. We haue therefore shewed from whence sin hath his deficient cause; namelie, from our owne corruption. Yet neuertheles God doth gouerne and rule sin it selfe; he doth not idelie looke on, but he doth the part of a iudge and gouernour: and he leaueth not all things without guiding. But after what sort is he said to gouerne sin? Euen as touching time, maner, forme, and matter; 80 to wit, that it is carried sometimes rather against this man, and sometimes rather against that man. Our corruptions lie hidden within vs, but God suffereth not the same at all times to breake foorth, nor yet so long as the wicked would: he brideleth sins, and sometimes interrupteth them. Further, he bringeth to passe, that our wickednes shall rather bend vnto one part, than vnto another; 81 as the rage of Semei was more bent against Dauid, than against another man. And the prouidence of God is shewed rather at one time than at another; God directed the power of Nabuchadnezar rather against the Hebrues, than against their neighbours. 82
13 There is also a certeine other thing to bée considered of in sins, 83 when they breake foorth into act. God himselfe putteth vs in mind of some things, which in their owne nature be good: and yet bicause such things fall into the wicked, they be taken in ill part, and be occasions of sinning; so as the sins which laie hidden before, doo breake foorth. But yet these suggestions, either inward or outward, can not be properlie called the causes of sin, séeing those causes be within in men: yet may they be called occasions. But of occasions, some be giuen, and some taken; in like maner as they distinguish Scandalum, that is, an offense. 84 An offense taken, is the occasion of an offense, not on the behalfe of him that giueth it; for he dooth that which is profitable, but an ill man dooth ill interpret this: that is, an offense taken. So Christ saith of the Scribes and Phariseis; 85 Let them alone, they be blind, and leaders of the blind. The apostle taught, that men ought to doo well; if others were offended, the fault remained not in them. An offense giuen, is when we doo those things which we ought not to doo. But in God it is not so; he suggesteth some things, that of their owne nature are good, the which falling into an euill nature, become occasions of sinning.
86 14 The matter must be made plaine by examples. Some godlie man séeth a man sinne, he commeth to him, he diligentlie warneth him to beware: that which is put in mind is good, but it happeneth into a naughtie mind, which then beginneth more and more to breake foorth into the hatred of vertue, and to waxe cruell against the godlie. This admonition was an occasion that these things should breake out into act; God suggested by the godlie man that which in nature is good, wherefore he is said to doo rightlie, for he dooth that which was his part to doo. 87 But vnto euill men, good things are made occasions of sinning, yea and of more gréeuous sinning, than if perhaps they had not béene ministred. Howbeit this is the difference betwéene God and vs; that we, while we suggest good things, are ignorant whether the partie will become the woorse; but God is not ignorant. For example; 88 God sent Moses and Aaron vnto Pharao, he commandeth that he should let his people go: this suggestion in his owne nature being good, Pharao taketh in ill part, and began to be the more cruell. If this suggestion had fallen into a godlie man, he would haue said; It is méet I should obey God: and because it is his will that I should let the people go, I will in anie wise doo it; for I can challenge no right ouer them longer than he will him selfe. But Pharao, when he heard these words, began to blaspheme, saieng; Who is this God? And he brake out into crueltie. The same will we declare by other examples and testimonies of the scriptures. Not onelie that admonition giuen vnto Pharao by Moses and Aaron is a good thing, and is applied outwardlie by God; and he which was euill, vsed the same naughtilie: but we haue the selfe-same thing in the seuenth chapter to the Romans; 89 The lawe is holie and spirituall, but it hath wrought in me concupiscence and death. The commandement of God in his owne nature is vnto life, but the filthinesse [of sinne] taketh an occasion by those things which are suggested. Neither is this doone outwardlie alone, but sometimes also God worketh it inwardlie by good cogitations: for whatsoeuer things are good, we must alwaies thinke that they be of God. Pharao, 90 which came after the death of Ioseph, began to cast thus in his mind; We must take héed that the common-weale suffer no detriment. This cogitation was good, and it procéeded from God; but it lighted into an euill mind, therefore it was wrested against the Hebrues: for he said; The people of the Hebrues will increase, and when occasion is offered, will subdue vs: wherefore let them be destroied. He set foorth an edict, that all the men children of the Hebrues should bée throwen into the riuer. The first cogitation was good, but through his naughtinesse it turned vnto euill. Nabuchadnezar said; It is not the part of a good prince to be idle, but he must exercise the power which he hath. The cogitation was good, but he turned himselfe vnto forreigne nations, and armed not his power as he ought to haue doone, against the wickednesse of his owne people. The same prince (as we read in Daniel ) being in his hall, 91 reckoned with himselfe the victories which he had, & the greatnesse of empire which he had gotten. These thoughts were good; for we should weigh with our selues the benefits of God, but they lighted into an euill mind: he straightwaie thought with himselfe, that he had established the kingdome by his owne power: therein he sinned against God. 92 Also the sonnes of Iacob weighed with themselues, that Ioseph was beloued of his parents, that he had diuine dreames put into him by God; this was a good thought, for we must behold the works of God euen in others, much more in our owne selues. If they had rightlie vsed that cogitation, they should haue giuen thanks to God, but they turned it to enuie, they deuised how to rid him awaie, and to sell him. Vndoubtedlie God, who suggesteth these good things, séeing he knoweth of the dooing of them, he dooth not there let the occasions of euils: he suffereth them to be doone; for he is at hand with his prouidence, and gouerneth them. Wherefore by Pharao he would be glorified, by Nabuchadnezar he would punish the Israelites, by the brothers selling of Ioseph, he would haue him to be honored with great benefits in Aegypt, and to féed the houshold of Iacob. 93 Semei sawe Dauid to be cast foorth, and the kingdome to be giuen vnto Absalom: he said; These be the iudgements of God. That cogitation was good, it fell into an euill mind, he abused the same, he spake contumeliouslie against Dauid, he followed his owne wrath and reuenge. 94 Absalom hauing gotten the kingdome, was put in mind that he should harken vnto the counsel of the wise, that manie eies doo sée more than one eie. The cogitation was good, but it fell into an ill mind; and he iudged that counsels, so they be profitable, though otherwise they be wicked and dishonest, should be harkened vnto. The first suggestion that was good, he vsed naughtilie: God suffered it, he would not let it, he ruled it, that the sinne of Dauid might be punished, and that the hatred of God towards sinne might be shewed. Now I thinke that the matter is euident.
95 15 But it is demanded, that Séeing God knoweth that wicked men will abuse these inward and outward motions, although they be good, wherefore dooth he suggest them? The reasons of his owne counsels are knowen to himselfe; but yet two reasons are set before vs. The first is, that his iustice may appeare the more: for to behold the iustice of God we are blind. But by making co~parison it is knowen; namelie, by vnrighteousnes, whereof in God there can be none séene: but in diuels and corrupt men we sée it. The second is, that the boldnes of men may be restraind: for manie would saie; If God should put into our minds good cogitations, we should haue a will and power to doo good things. Behold, good cogitations are giuen, the which, while they fall into a corrupt nature, except it be restrained, sinne (through our owne fault) dooth arise euen of things be they neuer so good: of occasions (I meane) taken, but not giuen. And so I vnderstand the words, 96 which Augustine hath in his booke of Grace and Frée-will; namelie, that God dooth sometime incline our wils, either vnto good or vnto euill; bicause if the things, which he suggesteth, doo light vpon good men, they are inclined vnto good; but if they fall into ill men, they are inclined vnto euill. And so I vnderstand that which he writeth against Iulianus the fift booke, and 3. chapter; that God worketh not onlie in the bodies of men, but also in their minds. So likewise I vnderstand those things which Zuinglius (of godlie memorie) a learned and constant man, 97 did sometimes write; that Men are otherwhiles by Gods prouidence prouoked to sinne: and that one and the selfe-same action commeth both from God, and from wicked men; iustlie from him, and vniustlie from them. And thus I vnderstand those places of the scriptures, 98 wherein it is said, that God gaue them vp to a reprobate sense, that He stirred them vp.
99 16 Certeinlie a permission is there, but some thing that is more ample is shewed by these effectuall spéeches. And we grant, that there is a permission; for if God would resist, these things should not be doone: therefore he permitteth; howbeit we must vnderstand, that permission is a certeine kind of will. In déed it is not the efficient will, but yet it is a kind of will. For as Augustine saith in his Enchiridion ad Laurentium; 100 God permitteth either willinglie or vnwillinglie: doubtles vnwillinglie he dooth not, for that should be with gréefe, and there should be a power greater than himselfe: if it be with his will, he permitteth; permission is a certeine kind of will. But thou demandest, that If he will it anie waie, wherefore dooth he forbid it? On the other part I would demand; If he would it not at all, how commeth it to passe that it is doone? For the will of God is inuincible. Paule saith; Who can resist his will? 101 God willeth, and that which he willeth, he willeth iustlie. They which sinne, doo will vniustlie that which they will. That same Iulianus, against whom Augustine disputeth, held, that there was a bare permission in those things; to the intent we might vnderstand, that God dooth nothing at all: and he said, that God dooth rather suffer, and that this belongeth to his patience. Augustine answereth; Not onelie to his patience, but also to his power: bicause he ruleth sinne, and thereof he worketh what he will. And he alledgeth a place vnto the Romans; If God, 102 willing to shew his wrath, and make his power manifest, did suffer with great lenitie the vessels of wrath, &c. Héereby indéed we sée, that he suffereth; but that mention is also made of his power. In the first epistle of Peter the fourth chapter, it is written; 103 Wherefore let them that suffer, according to the will of God, commit their soules vnto him. So that he attributeth the afflictions of the Christians to the will of God. But they cannot suffer, vnlesse there be a dooer. If he would the suffering, he would the dooing: for suffering procéedeth from a dooer. This will is a permission, but yet such as belongeth also vnto the will.
This did Augustine shew in his Enchiridion ad Laurentium, the 100. chapter, where he treateth vpon that place of the psalme; 104 Great are the works of God, searched out vpon all the wils of them. He followeth the Gréeke translation. The hebrue text hath, Vnto all the will of them. He writeth; that So farre as belonged to them, (he intreateth of sinners) they did that which God would not. This could they not by anie meanes bring to passe, as touching his power: for euen in this, that they did against his will, his will was wrought vpon them; therefore great are the works of the Lord. He addeth, that by a maruellous and vnspekeable means, euen that which is doone against his will, is not doone without his will: for vnlesse he suffered it, it should not be. Neither dooth he suffer it vnwillinglie, but willinglie: neither would he, being good, suffer ill to be done; but that he béeing almightie, of that euill, can make good. The will of God concurreth both to good things, and to euill; but after a sundrie maner: to euils, indirectlie: he suffereth them to be done. He suggesteth good things, but bicause they happen into euill men, sins doo insue. But as for the good things, he not onelie suggesteth them, but hée bringeth them to passe. Yet he ruleth and gouerneth sin also, that it may not rage against euerie man, neither at all times, nor beyond measure. Those euils lurke within vs, but when they breake foorth, they can not escape the prouidence of God. But good things (as I haue said) he not onlie letteth not, but he bringeth them to effect, he worketh together with vs, and hée swéetlie bendeth our will, that we may be glad to doo those things that did mislike vs.
Wherefore the respect of generall prouidence is one; the respect of vsing of things, though euill, is another; and the respect of things, which he doth in vs that be regenerate, is another. So vnderstand I, 105 that Pharao was hardened by God, and that also he hardened himselfe: for he had in himselfe the cause of obduration. But God is said to haue hardened, by reason of suggesting and gouerning: further, bicause he so ruled sin, and vsed the same to his owne glorie. And Paule saith, 106 that he raised him vp for to declare his power. So vnderstand I The vessels of wrath to be prepared vnto destruction. By what meanes? They be of themselues, of their owne naughtines, of their owne corrupt nature prone vnto sin. In like maner it may be said, that they after a sort are prepared by God; bicause through his good suggestions, wickednes breaketh foorth: and while it breaketh foorth, it is yet in the hand of God to applie the same as he will, one waie or another; for God with a good will doth that, which we doo with a most peruerse mind. Permission is a kind of will, but yet not absolutelie: for the will of God properlie is the cause of things. It is not as mans will is, wée will manie things, which we bring not to passe. What is then the cause why God would not haue sin? It is, for that sin is among those things which haue no néed of a cause efficient, but of a deficient cause. Therefore sin doth not properlie come vnder the will of God. And if that God be put as the cause, not efficient but deficient, shall we saie that God doth faile in himselfe? No; but he is said to faile, bicause he doth not hinder, nor resist, nor cause to relent. What maner of will shall this be? A will not to hinder, a will not to mollifie, a will not to illuminate.
17 Neither for all this, doth God, either by suggesting anie thing, or by not letting, constraine the will; neither can the diuell doo this. 107 For if the will should not worke of his owne accord, it were no will; but rather an vnwillingnes. It may as ill be ascribed vnto the will to be compelled, as to the fire that it should not be hot. Wherefore our nature and will being so corrupt, if the fauour of God be withdrawne; of his owne accord, and by it selfe, it inclineth to euill. The which neuertheles, from the time of his beginning was not euill: but bicause it is brought foorth of nothing, and is confirmed and susteined by the grace and power of God; if that be withdrawne which confirmeth it, straitwaie it will to worsse of his owne accord. But if mans will be not constreined to euill, neither is euill of his owne creation, but onlie is said to sin by deprauation; what shall we saie as touching the sin of the first man? In him nature was good, grace and the helpe of God was not wanting, and yet neuertheles he sinned. Héere we saie, that we must iudge one thing, as concerning the first man; and another as touching our nature, which we haue now corrupted. God bestowed vpon him manie gifts, 108 but yet he so made him, as he might stand; he might also fall. No doubt but God, if he would, might haue made him so perfect, as he could not haue sinned. Which the state of the blessed saincts doth declare; for the holie spirits in the heauenlie habitation, and we when we shall be there, shall be so confirmed, as we shall not be able to sin anie more: otherwise it would be no perfect felicitie; it should be ioined with a feare of falling. But yet he did not this vnto Adam; and whereas by his prescience or foreknowledge he knew that he would fall, he might haue kept him there-from; but he would not, but would suffer him to fall, and by his eternall decrée had Christ to be the remedie of his fall. The rest of the things concerning that state, we can not more particularlie declare, bicause we haue not the perfect knowledge thereof. Let vs returne to our owne state; the which is such, as before the renewing by Christ, we were not able to will anie good thing, but of necessitie to lie in sins, neither might we lift vp our selues: so far is it off, that we should be able to stand vpright, as it was granted vnto the first Adam.
But although God, as we said, is not properlie the cause of sin; yet must he not be drawne out of his throne, but that he also ruleth sins, and maketh a remedie for them. And this we may be assured with our selues, that there can be nothing done either of vs, or of anie creature, besides the will of God. But yet let vs not héereby excuse our sins, as though we would obeie the will of God by committing of sin. We must accuse our selues, séeing we haue the originals of sin in vs. As concerning the will of God, wée must followe that which the scripture teacheth; and we must not depart from his lawe. And when we otherwhile depart from him, we must weigh with our selues, that the motion of turning awaie from God, and of the inclination to allurements of this world, is a thing proper vnto our will being now corrupted, not as it was instituted by God. Wherefore there be deficient causes of this motion; but an efficient cause which hath God a worker together with vs, we must not seeke. Wherevpon we note in the booke of Genesis, that it is not said that darkenes was made of God; 109 The darkenes (saith he) were vppon the face of the deepe, yet God did so order them, as they should preuaile by night: they were priuations. So this motion of turning awaie from God, séeing it forsaketh, and depriueth mens actions of conuenient goodnes, a cause surelie it hath, but the same is deficient.
18 These things being declared, there remaine thrée things to be spoken of: the first shall be of the giltines of sins, or bond vnto punishment: the second of the subiect of deformitie and priuation; that is, of the act it selfe of mans will: the third is (which also is commonlie receiued) that sin is the punishment of sin; and whether vnder these thrée considerations it may be said, that sin dependeth on God. As for the first, 110 we must vnderstand, that the deformed and naughtie act, is in some respect the groundworke vnto the punishment that is due; for The reward of sin (saith the Apostle) is death: 111 and when we sin, there groweth a bond, whereby we must suffer punishment for the wickednes committed. That giltinesse is said to arise through the iustice of God, in consideration that he will yéeld to euerie one that which belongeth vnto him: but the bond ariseth not, except that sin be or haue bin; so as by sinning we giue a iust occasion of the bond vnto punishment. Wherefore, if by sin we vnderstand the giltines and the bond, we doubt not but these things are of God, as of the efficient cause. Howbeit, these things ought not properlie to be called sin, séeing they belong vnto iustice, yet sometimes they are so called; as when we saie, that God doth remit, blot out, and forgiue our sins: for he bringeth not to passe that they be not, nor haue not bin (and vndoubtedlie there remaine euill motions in vs) but the bond of suffering punishment, for the wickednes committed, is taken awaie, which (as we haue said) belongeth vnto iustice, and is a good thing.
19 Secondlie, let vs consider of the subiect it selfe, 112 vnto which the deformitie of sin doth cleaue; and of this, if we speake as the thing is, we shall not be afraid to saie, that God is the cause, séeing the action it selfe is a certeine naturall thing. And whatsoeuer is, in respect that it hath a being, is brought foorth, not by creatures alone, but by God: 113 for All things (saith the scripture) were made by him. This vniuersall particle comprehendeth all things, whatsoeuer they be, by what meanes so euer they be, and how far foorth so euer they be. 114 Augustine in his booke De moribus monachorum, about the beginning saith; that The catholike church beléeueth, that God is the author of all natures and substances. What he vnderstandeth by nature, he declared a little before, by these words; Nature is nothing else, but that which is vnderstood to bée some certeine thing in his kind. Wherefore as we now, by a new name, of that which is Esse, to be, doo call essence, which manie times also wée name substance; so they in old time, which had not those names, 115 in stead of essence and substance, called it nature. Séeing therefore the motions of our minds be certeine things, there is no doubt but after this maner they depend of God. God assuredlie worketh as the highest cause; the creatures worke together with him. Wherefore Anshelmus in his booke De casu diaboli, wrote, that Euen the euill willing of the diuell, so farfoorth as it is to will, dependeth on God. And the thing it selfe is not wicked, but in respect that he himselfe doth naughtilie will it. And that the same act is something, héereby it appeareth; bicause it is in the generall word or predicament of action: 116 wherefore as it is something, it is of God, and is a creature. Yea and Augustine in his ninth booke De trinitate, and tenth chapter, said, that The accidents of the mind are better than the accidents of the bodie; by reason of the worthines of the subiect. Wherefore the forme or beautie, as it is in the mind, is more excellent, than as it is outwardlie found in the bodie. Also the soule it selfe, being a soule, how ill soeuer it be, is yet more noble than anie bodie. Séeing therefore the déeds of the mind (wherevnto afterward, through our owne fault, there cleaueth priuation) so farfoorth as they be things, are not brought foorth without God.
Anshelmus in the place aboue cited, saith, that God himselfe is the bringer foorth of things, and that not alonelie of substantiall things, but also of accidentall, vniuersall, and particular things, yea, and of the euill motions of the will: for the power of God is infinite. Wherefore there is nothing can be brought foorth whatsoeuer it be, but is vnder his action; for if anie thing could escape the same, then should it not be infinite, then should it not fill all things? neither might our will breake out into act, vnlesse that high supreme will wrought together with vs. Augustine in his treatise De vera religione, the 34. chapter, writeth thus; that The verie being it selfe, be it neuer so little, is good; for the chéefest being, is the chéefest good. And a little after hée saith; The chéefest beautie is the chéefest good, the least beautie is the least good, yet is it good. So as, if that action, which we speake of, doo by anie meanes perteine to the being, it is of some goodnes. Wherefore, if we dispute of sinne, wée must distinguish it, and we must sée what is therein of the positiue, as they reason in the schooles: and the first subiect it selfe must be considered; and on the other part, to sée what defect and priuation cleaueth therevnto. But in the verie same priuation, since we sée a defect, the deficient cause thereof must be sought, and not the efficient cause. But that which is there found positiue, hath néed of an efficient cause; and the summe of all efficient causes is God.
20 But here ariseth no small doubt. There be certeine sinnes, 117 called sinnes of omission [or negligence,] and there séemeth not to be grounded the verie act and worke of will, wherevnto either defect or priuation should cleaue; howbeit whatsoeuer is there, it séemeth to be priuation. A man is said to omit his dutie, bicause hée dooth not that which he ought to doo. As for example; If a man loue not his neighbour, if one come not to the congregation to heare the word of the Lord, and to participate the sacraments; here in this sinne, there séemeth onelie a priuation to be, without anie certeine act, wherevpon this should be grounded. Some answer, that euen in this place also, we are to séeke a nature or action, a worke or a thing, that is the groundworke vnto priuation: and they saie, that it is the will which maketh defect. For euen that same sinning will, as it is a nature, is kept in his order by God; but not in respect that it sinneth. This saieng may be borne withall. But in searching the matter more narrowlie, it séemeth otherwise vnto me; and I sée euen in those sins of omission, that there is an act. For the same omitting of our dutie, is sometimes doone by contemplation; and then that corrupt person hath a will not to loue his neighbour, hath a will not to go to the holie assemblie.
Wherefore we sée here, that the act of will, and that same action thereof, which is the action of nature, dooth depend of God; deformitie and priuation dooth not so. But sometime they be omitted, bicause a man dooth not thinke of those things, I meane not, of a contempt. Héere, saie I, that although there be no action there of that kind, yet is there an other, which contendeth with right reason. He is not mindfull of the holie congregation, bicause he will walke about for his pleasure, or else vse some pastime; and those actions be aduersaries to right working. Or if that be no action at that instant, yet was it a little before. For example; Ouer night he would féed like a glutton, afterward he could not rise earlie to be present in the holie congregation. Wherefore in the sinnes of omission, we shall find an action, either proper to that kind; or else an other striuing with the good motion of the will, either which is then presentlie reteined, or else that went before.
21 God then is the cause of all things; 118 and inferior things, according to their owne nature, receiue the moouing of the first cause. Wherefore, if sinne be drawen, it is drawen by the nature of the second causes. I will make the matter plaine by a similitude; 119 In liuing creatures we haue that power which hath his name locall motion, and it mooueth beasts either to walke or to runne; and those creatures are mooued according as they receiue their moouing from that locall motiue power: but if a legge be defectiue, be out of ioint, or crooked, that motion hath halting in that course ioined therewith; but that halting, as it is a moouing, commeth from the moouing power of the soule; as it is faultie and lame, it dependeth of the faultines of the leg which was broken. And thus it is as touching that continuall moouing, wherewith God stirreth his creatures. There is indéed a common influence, and it is receiued in things according to the qualitie of them: so the subiect of deformitie or priuation is of God; and the moouing of God sometime passeth through the mind corrupted, whervpon the fault of the action is not of God, but is drawen from the next cause. But what it is that God there dooth, and how he gouerneth that deformitie, is declared before: now we treate of the act which breaketh foorth from our will. Wherefore it is rightlie said, that the priuation of righteousnesse followeth not the worke of our will, and the motion thereof, so farre foorth as it is in the kind of nature, but as it is in the kind of moouing.
Augustine in his seuenth booke De ciuitate Dei, the 30. chapter saith; that God dooth so gouerne his creatures, as he permitteth them to exercise and worke togither with him their owne proper motions. For God dealeth not alone, but (as I said before) the wicked men, and the diuell also doo vse their naughtie endeuor in working. But when we saie, 120 that the act it selfe (which afterward through our owne fault is euill) is brought foorth by the chéefest cause, that is by God; and by vs, that is, by our will: how shall we vnderstand this? Whether that God doo it wholie, or we wholie? Or whether it be partlie from him, and partlie from vs? And héere we drawe this producement to the verie act of our will. We answere; If consideration of the whole be referred vnto the cause, we must speake after one sort; if it be referred vnto the effect, after an other sort. If the whole be referred to the cause, so that we vnderstand our will to be the whole cause of the action, that it be able by it selfe to worke without God, it is not true: for vnlesse God would assent thervnto, it should not be able to bring foorth action. So God, although by his absolute power he might performe the worke it selfe by him selfe, yet as the course of things is, he will not deale alone, but will haue the creature to be a doer togither with him: by this meanes are neither the will nor yet God, said to be the whole cause. But if it be referred to the effect it selfe, God and the will are the full cause; for God and the will make the whole effect, although they be ioined togither in action. I will shew the thing by an example; For bringing foorth of an action, 121 we haue a will and an vnderstanding, and our will maketh the whole effect, and our vnderstanding is the cause of the whole effect; but the one is nigh, the other further off. 122 And so is it of the will and of God; the will dooth all, and God dooth all; but one is the first cause, and the other is the second.
22 As touching the third point, the sinne which followeth is sometimes said to be a punishment of the sinne that went before; 123 and so God is said to punish sinnes with sinnes. Then if the sinnes, which followe, be weighed as they be punishments, they after a sort be attributed vnto God; not that God dooth instill new naughtines, or that he driueth men directlie vnto sinning; but when he hath withdrawne his gifts, then dooth sinne followe, whereby the mind is destroied. And those destructions, & those wounds of minds, as they be punishments, they come vnto vs by iust desart. Hereof we reade in the first chapter to the Romans; 124 that God gaue them vp vnto a reprobate sense, as we haue declared before. And that sinne hath the respect of punishment, insomuch as it corrupteth nature, it is manifest. Augustine saith, and it is vsuallie receiued; Thou hast commanded Lord, and trulie so it is, that euery sinne is the punishment of him that sinneth. This also doo the Ethniks acknowledge, Horace saith; The Sicill tyrants yet could neuer find, Than enuie, greater torment of the mind. Those euill affections doo drie vp the bones, ma⟨…⟩e féeble the strength, & doo afflict the minds; yet this is iustlie doone: for God is iust and righteous in all his waies. But if we be depriued of grace, we haue deserued the same.
23 Wherefore we conclude this question of ours, 125 and saie; that, To speake properlie and plainelie, God is not the authour of sinne; neither would he sinne to be. And yet is not God said to be the vnperfecter, or the weaker; bicause he cannot make sinne: for that is not imperfection and impotencie, but perfection. These things cannot God doo, bicause he is the chéefe good, and the chéefe perfection: naie rather, he establisheth lawes against sins, he crieth out against them, and he punisheth them. And maruell not, when I said that God cannot properlie will sinne; for then might he turne away men from himselfe, then should he denie himselfe to be God. Paule saith vnto Timothie; 126 God cannot denie himselfe. By which reason Barnard in his little booke De praecepto & dispensatione was mooued to saie, 127 that God can vndoo somewhat of the precepts in the second table, but not of the first table. Of the second he did relinquish some thing, as when he willeth Abraham to kill his sonne; 128 so likewise while he commanded the children of Israel that they should carrie awaie other mens goods: but whatsoeuer things be of the first table can not he remitted. If God would not be looued and worshipped, he should denie his owne selfe. If he be the chéefest good, should we not looue and worship him? And some alledge this reason; that The good things which belong vnto our neighbours, be particular; and God can take awaie any priuate good thing, to put a greater in place. But those things which apperteine to the worshipping of him, haue respect to the vniuersall good, and therefore cannot be taken awaie. 129 Augustine in his booke which is intituled Confutatio catholica quorundam sibi falsò impositorum, the third chapter saith; Whatsoeuer is condemned in anie man, is far from the author of nature. In the same place; That opinion is to be detested, which holdeth God to be the author of any naughtie déed, or of anie naughtie will.
24 Now haue we generallie declared the proper causes of sinne; 130 but to shew them particularlie, we saie that the cause of sinne is mans will, his vnderstanding, his depraued sense, his licentious appetite, the shew of good which offereth it selfe (for nothing is desired of vs, but in respect of some good.) Herewithall the corruption remaining of originall sinne, from thence as out of a standing puddle, doo alwaies breath out euil affections. A cause also is our owne infirmitie & ignorance, also the suggestion of the diuell and of naughtie men; who neuertheles are able to preuaile no further than God dooth giue them leaue. There be ill examples also, sinne it selfe is the cause of sinne; for som prodigall men stealeth for the satisfieng of his lust. Wherefore séeing there be so manie true causes of sinne, we must not make God to be author, to the intent we may excuse our selues. Now it may appéere, that the wicked opinion of the Libertines must be condemned, who excuse all maner of sinnes. They which make God to be the cause of euill, but yet not so as we should be excused, séeme not well to expound this question. In like manner is it of them, which allow but of a bare permission.
First therefore (to gather all into few words) we haue said, 131 that God is not properlie the authour of sinne; secondlie that God, when he will, dooth iustlie withdrawe from vs his grace, which should be the hinderance of sinne. Moreouer, we haue shewed that God dooth so gouerne sins by his prouidence, as they shall not rage anie further than he permitteth; and in no otherwise than may be expedient for his prouidence. We haue declared that God dooth somtimes suggest both inwardlie and outwardlie, such things as in their owne nature be good; but if they fall into corrupt men, they become occasions taken and not giuen of sinnes. Also that God dooth not let, but permit sinnes; and that the same permission is not altogither without the will of God. Further, that séeing sinne is a falling awaie and priuation, it hath no néed of an efficient, but of a deficient cause. Further, that our motion of turning awaie from God, is proper vnto our will, as it is corrupted, not as it was instituted by God. We said also, that the guiltines dependeth on God; and then, that the action which is the subiect of deformitie, commeth as well from God as from vs, in the kind of the cause. And we shewed, that sinnes are punished with sinnes. And last of all, we reckoned vp the true causes of sinnes.
132 25 But now hereafter we will examine the former reasons alleadged. They which denied God to be the cause of sinne, as we also saie, vsed these reasons. In the first, Augustine said in the 83. booke of questions, quest. 3. A man is not made the woorse, by hauing a wise man to be author: neither is he therefore [the woorse] by hauing God to be author. I grant it; for man became not the woorse, in respect that God gaue a lawe; for by his lawe, he commanded not euill: neither is man become the woorse, as touching the naturall act which God bringeth foorth; but he beco~meth the worse by reason of his backsliding, whereof we our selues haue deficient causes in our selues. Wherefore the diuell, wicked men, our owne sensualitie, and especiallie the corruption of our owne will doo make vs the woorse. And so it is granted that we are not made the woorse by God or by man. The second reason; 133 Fulgentius saith, that God is no reuenger of the things, whereof he himselfe is the author. We grant the argument; God dooth not reuenge that act, as it is a naturall thing, as it dependeth of him; neither [dooth he reuenge] his own gouernment which he vseth, but the naughtines which procéedeth from vs, and which commeth from our owne selues. The third reason; God hateth not those things which he maketh, but he hateth sinne. 134 The reason is firme. But the doubt is, that if he verelie hate sinne, whie he dooth not forbid it, séeing he may.
135 Scarselie can humane reason discerne Gods perfect hatred against sinne, séeing he taketh not the same quite awaie. Doubtles it is a difficult thing. Howbeit it commeth oftentimes to passe, that some thing which displeaseth, is, for some good end and purpose, not taken awaie; wherof there are plentie of examples in the state of mans life. There happeneth some man to be diseased in the bodie, 136 whereby the corruption breaking out, there ariseth a gréeuous sore in some member; notwithstanding that this be verie painefull vnto him, yet bicause he knoweth that it will turne to the benefite of his bodie, he suffereth the paine, neither dooth he stop the sore. Also among the good corne there springeth vp cockle and darnell; it displeaseth, yet are they not quite rid awaie, bicause men stand in feare, least the corne should be plucked vp. So might we saie of God, he hath his ends; namelie, that not onlie his goodnes, but also his righteousnes may be declared: and therfore he hateth sinnes; yet not so, but that he will accomplish by them such an end as he hath prescribed.
Other arguments; If he did make sinne, 137 he should be a sinner; and if he would induce vs to sinne, he should doo against his owne nature: for naturall things working, indeuour to make that which they doo, like vnto themselues. These arguments be firme. Neither is the action of God and working togither of the creature, that is, of mans will, so to be affirmed, as if we our selues applie not our owne lewdnes. 138 God might séeme to deale hypocriticallie, if he should on the one part command good things; and on the other part should will sinne. I answere, that the argument would be of efficacie, if it might be said that God powreth in new lewdnes: but in that he gouerneth sinne, he worketh nothing against his lawe. Moreouer, we must distinguish as touching the will of God, what respect it hath towards the commandements, and towards men. 139 The commandements written we saie are the will of God, for they expresse his nature and propertie: but if we marke how the will of God is towards men, and doo saie, that God would equallie further all men to the kéeping of his commandements, and that he giueth his grace equallie vnto all men, this must not so be allowed: for God hath his elect, & hath others also whom by his iust iudgement he ouerskippeth, and leaueth to sinne and destruction. The Lord saith; 140 I will haue mercie vpon whom I will haue mercie: that is, Vpon whomsoeuer it liketh me, I will haue mercie. But they saie that Men haue frée will, whereby they be able to kéepe the lawe of GOD, if they will themselues; and that there is no difference to be put in the helpe of God and grace, which is not giuen to all men after one sort. But I affirme that there is frée will in God, he is frée in his election, and in distributing of his graces: but his fréedome dependeth not of vs, who shall verelie be frée, if the sonne will make vs frée.
Wherefore in the lawe or commandements, God sheweth what his propertie is, and what he iudgeth to be right: but as touching the fauour, wherwith he fauoureth particular men, to kéepe those commandements, the question is otherwise. It was said, in the second of Chronicles; God rose vp earlie, 141 and sent his prophets vnto them, wherefore he is no cause of sinne. It is most true; 142 God did so; but yet those suggestions, which in their owne nature are good, fell into men, which were naughtie of nature; who through their owne lewdnes were made the woorse by those admonitions: for by their owne fault they were stirred vp to sinne. God gaue that warning, to the end he might spare his people; and the warnings were such, as being receiued, they brought pardon with them. But yet we must not saie, that it was the determination of God to saue them wholie at that time; for he vpon iust cause did withdrawe his grace from them, and they of themselues, neither could nor would obeie the admonitions of the prophets. The sonne of God wept for the destruction of Ierusalem: 143 144 and this happened for sinne; wherefore God will not that sinnes should be. I grant, that sinnes are not doone properlie by the will of God. Why then did he wéepe? He was now our neighbour, and the euils of his neighbours could not choose but make him sorrowfull: also he knew that sinne was against the will of God, although he were not ignorant that it could not be doone without his will.
145 26 It is written in the prophet Osea; Thy perdition commeth of thy selfe, ô Israel, but thy saluation commeth of me. 146 The sentence is most true: for séeing that sinnes procéed from our selues, as from the proper causes, perdition also is of our selues. The guiltines or bond to abide the punishment, may be said to come from God: but that (as we said before) is not properlie called sinne, but belongeth vnto righteousnes. 147 Iohn the eight; The diuell, when he speaketh a lie, 148 speaketh of his owne. It is most true; God instilleth not malice into him, but yet he is woont to vse his falshood, euén as he dooth other things. 149 We read in Ieremie; They ran, and I sent them not. 150 In that place there is no speaking of the prouidence of God, but of the lewd dealing of false prophets, which feined themselues to haue receiued the word from GOD, their owne conscience bearing them record that God spake not vnto them. They said, that they had drempt dreames, and they vainelie babled that God had reuealed some things vnto them, when as neuertheles they lied, and knew that they did lie. Wherefore no reproches ought to be laid against God for this matter, as though it should not be lawfull vnto him by his prouidence to vse their lies.
This is the condemnation of them, 151 that light came into the world; 152 but men loued darkenes more than light: wherfore God is not the cause, but they which loued darkenes. We grant the argument; The will of man, of his owne proper naughtines, hath in it the motion of turning awaie from light to darkenes. It was said; that God tempteth no man: 153 but if he were the cause of sin, he should tempt men. 154 As touching that place, vnderstand it after this maner. It is not there spoken of euerie kind of temptation, 155 otherwise the word should not be true. For God somtime tempteth his people, not that his owne knowledge may be augmented, but that men may knowe him; and that others also may sée how great things God hath wrought in them, and what grace he hath bestowed vpon them. Also there is a certeine kind of temptation to be desired: as in the psalme Dauid saith; Tempt Lord or prooue me, 156 examine my reines and my hart. Neither must we forget that which we affirmed; namelie, that God dooth somtimes suggest inwardlie and outwardlie, things which in nature be good, and are receiued according to the disposition of men; neither must these kinds of temptations be remooued from God. But Iames speaketh of inward lusting, whereby properlie are suggested euill things, which prouoke vs to doo against the lawe of God. Neither dooth such lusting depend on God, except so far foorth as he dooth not resist it: euen as also he dooth not alwaies hinder the diuell.
It was added; 157 that God might séeme to deale tyrannicallie: whereto we answer, That he dooth not properlie stir vp men vnto sinne; but yet he vseth the sinnes of wicked men, and also guideth them, least they should passe beyond their bounds. It is added; 158 How should he iudge the world? For if he were authour of sinne, he should iudge himselfe. 159 We saie that God shall iustlie iudge the world: for what wickednes soeuer men doo, they doo it against the lawe of God, they doo it willinglie, and of their owne accord, not by constraint: and The spirit of God shall reprooue the world of iudgement, of sinne, &c. Besides this it was inferred, 160 that by this meanes it would followe, that there be wils in God one repugnant to another. We answer, that in GOD, as concerning his nature, there is but one absolute and onelie will, which is the essence and nature of God: but yet, 161 if we consider moreouer the sundrie obiects, it may be called manifold. In respect of his commandements it is iust, good, and one onelie: but in respect of men, some it promoteth, and other some it iustlie depriueth of Gods fauour. But they be no repugnant wils, bicause they be not occupied about one thing. Certeinlie such things as be repugnant, it behooueth that they be referred to the selfe-same subiect. A father hath two sonnes; his will is, that the one should attend vnto learning, and the other not. But be there two wils of the father? No forsooth; it is but one, and he dooth rightlie, so he doo it vpon good consideration.
162 Moreouer Iames, in the fourth chapter saith; Ye say, We will go into such a citie: ye ought rather to saie; If God will, we will doo this or that thing. Wherefore the will of God is, not onelie as touching the lawe and commandements; but it is also concerning those things, which be dailie doone of men. And that will belongeth not to the commandements: for these things are not conteined in the decalog, and they after a sort be things indifferent. Verie well did Augustine write in his Enchiridion vnto Laurence, in the 102. chapter; The omnipotent God, whether through his mercie he haue pittie vpon whom he will; or through his iudgement shall iudge whom he will; dooth nothing vniustlie: neither dooth he otherwise than with his will. Afterward it was said; If he should be a cause of sinne, to what end tend so manie warnings, and so manie obtestations of his, 163 by the sonne of God, by the prophets and apostles? We saie, that these things are not doone in vaine; naie rather, they bring profit and vtilitie. 164 First they which admonish, rebuke, and exhort, do obeie the commandements of God, who would this to be doone. But thou wilt saie; It will not profit me, the euent must be committed vnto God. Further, these things doo profit the saints, which are predestinated; though it appéere not presentlie, yet in some case they haue their fruit: doubtles they make the vngodlie the lesse excusable. Of this matter reade in the booke of Augustine De correctione & gratia; for these things were also obiected to him.
165 27 It was argued, that If the matter should be on this wise, all difference betwéene good and euill would be taken awaie; all things without exception should be the works of God, as the Libertines doo saie. We grant, that if God were verelie the cause of sinnes, the Libertines should saie rightlie, but their opinion is detestable. 166 The iudgement of consciences would be taken awaie, inward accusations, and repentance would be dispatched, a windowe would be opened vnto mischéefes, giuing of thanks would be withdrawne; for we would delight in sinne, and a great deale of the estimation of God would be lost. All these things be most true, but they make not against vs; for we affirme not God to be trulie the cause of sinne. Lastlie was brought foorth, that God would haue all men to be saued: 167 if he will this, he vseth good meanes, not euill; therefore he is not the cause of sinne. We most plainelie confesse, that God is not properlie the cause of sin: but yet out of this place I affirme with Augustine in his Enchiridion the 103. chapter, 168 that the sentence must not be so absolutelie vnderstood, as though there were not some, which God would not haue to be saued. This sentence (saith he) is thus ment; God hath his elect among euerie state & condition of men; so in this respect, he accepteth not the person. He calleth kings and priuate men, bond men & frée men, man and woman. And excellentlie well dooth this interpretatio~ agrée with the place of Paule. He had commanded to praie for princes: but some man might haue thought, that the condition of them was such, as saluation should be repugnant therewith. In no wise (saith he,) God hath his elect among euerie kind of men.
The like reason he bringeth there, out of the 23. chapter of Matthew; 169 Yee tyth mint and rue, & euerie herbe; that is, all kinds of herbs that are among you, not which be in India and Europe: for how could they tyth herbes of all the world? From which opinion disagréed not he that was author of the booke De vocatione gentium, which they attribute vnto Ambrose. For he saith, that God hath his generalitie; 170 wherfore he iudgeth that this generall proposition must so be restrained, as if it were said, that God would haue them to be saued, which belong vnto his flocke and number: euen as, when it is said; All shall be taught of God: And againe; 171 All flesh shall see the saluation of God. An other waie, whereby Augustine vnderstandeth this place, is euen there also; We vnderstand (saith he) that none shall be saued, but such as God will haue to be saued. As if thou shouldest saie; A Grammarian is at the citie of Tigurie, which teacheth grammar vnto all: he saith not, all the citizens, but that there is none which is taught grammar, whom he teacheth not.
And so likewise he vnderstandeth [that place,] He lightneth euerie one that commeth into this world; that is, 172 How manie soeuer be lightened, are lightened by this word. But that he would all men absolutelie to be saued, he saith it is not true. For in the eleuenth of Matthew it is written; Wo be to thee Chorazin, 173 Wo be to thee Bethsaida: for if the miracles that were doone in the citie of Tyre and Sidon, had beene doone in you, they had long agoe repented of their wickednes in sackcloth and ashes. Christ would not shew foorth the power of miracles among them, who (he said) would haue repented, if they had béene shewed foorth. And he addeth; Expound it which waie ye will, so we be not compelled to beléeue that God omnipotent would haue some thing to be doone, and is not doone: when as the truth speaketh, that All things, 174 whatsoeuer he would haue doone in heauen and earth, he hath doone: & surelie what he would not, that hath he not doon. And thus much touching the arguments made vnto the 1. part.
175 28 Now let vs take their arguments, which affirme God to be the cause of euill. In the first to the Romans it is said, that God gaue them vp to a reprobate sense. The interpretation is easie; he gaue them vp to the desires of their owne hart, as afterward he himselfe expoundeth it: wherefore these desires were first euill. What did God? Verelie he permitted them to obeie their owne naughtie desires; he himselfe did not euill, but, in leauing them destitute of his grace, foorthwith wicked desires tooke place in them; priuation of it selfe followed: howbeit God vsed their naughtie desires to the performance of his iustice, 176 namelie, in punishing of them. 177 Of the hardening of Pharaos hart, it is sufficientlie declared before. In the sixt chapter of Esaie, 178 when God saith by the prophet; Blind thou the hart of this people, 179 that they hearing may not heare, and seeing may not vnderstand, &c. This is two waies to be expounded. Ierom for interpreting of these words, taketh a place out of the 11. chapter to the Romans, where it is said of the Ethnikes and Hebrues; The Gentils were in times past vnbeleeuers, 180 when ye did beleeue, but now they haue obteined mercie, through your vnbeleefe. While the Gentils beléeued not, the Iewes séemed to haue the true worship: & on the other side, when preaching was afterward offered vnto them, and they beléeued not, the apostles forsaking them, turned to the Gentils: and so they were to become vnbeléeuers, to the end that the Gentils might be admitted vnto grace. Thus did God vse the incredulitie of the Iewes, and therefore he added; 181 that God did shut vp all vnder vnbeleefe, that he might haue mercie vpon all. Wherfore that same blinding of the vnbeléeuers was, 182 to doo seruice to the prouidence of God, which the prophet foresheweth.
Another interpretation there may be, and that more commodious. Gods mind was, that Esaie should be sent to preach; but least hée might be discoraged afterward, when he should sée their obstinacie, and that they were offended at the word, God telleth him before, that the same would come to passe. The word of God of it selfe hath not this, but he iustlie withdrew his spirit and grace from them. This word of thine (saith he) will be an occasion taken, through which they shall become more blind, & be turned awaie from me. This must be vnderstood as touching the greater part; for there were som good men among them. Vnto this end it is declared, that this should come to passe, that they by perishing, might make manifest the iustice of God; who of his iust iudgement would make this their blindnes to doo him seruice. But that the blindnes came of God, we must not vnderstand it otherwise, than as touching outward things; for he offered them his word by Esaie.
29 Another place; 183 Lead vs not into temptation. It is so spoken, as though God dooth lead some into temptation, and by that meanes is the cause of sinne. This sentence of the Lord Augustine in his booke De natura & gratia, the 58. chapter interpreteth; To the intent we may resist the diuell, we praie that the diuell may flie from vs, when we saie; Lead vs not into temptation. Therefore also are we warned, as it were by a grand capteine exhorting souldiers, and saieng; Watch and praie, 184 least ye enter into temptation. Wherefore Augustine in that place referreth these things vnto the temptation of the diuell, who is able to bring nothing to passe further than God will giue leaue. And in the 67. chapter of the same booke he addeth; Two maner of waies we prouide against the diseases of the bodie; namelie, that either they may not happen at all; or else if they doo come, that we may quicklie be deliuered of them. Thus when we saie, Lead vs not into temptation, we desire that God may turne awaie sinne, that it happen not: but if we haue fallen, and committed sinne, we praie him that he will remit and forgiue it. The same author against the two epistles of Pelagius, in the fourth booke and ninth chapter, by the testimonie of Cyprian writeth, when it is said; Lead vs not into temptation, that we be warned of our infirmitie and weakenes. For it is said by the Lord; Watch and praie, least ye enter into temptation: the reason is added; For the spirit is readie, but the flesh is weake: let vs not be insolentlie puffed vp. In this place, temptation is ascribed to the flesh, and to weakenes; so as God is excluded from being author.
In his booke De bono perseuerantiae, and sixt chapter, he saith, that Cyprian bringeth in that particle in these words; Suffer vs not to be led into temptation: for he séeth that the diuell can doo no more than God hath giuen him leaue to doo. And God, as touching his owne people, bringeth to passe, that he shall not preuaile: but as touching the wicked, if he haue the ouer hand, God cannot be blamed; vnles he will saie he is to be blamed, for that he hindered not, and that he ruleth euils, and vseth them according to his prouidence. Here we obiected, 185 that it can hardlie be, that the punishment and the fault should be all one. For it is called sinne, in that it is voluntarie; but punishment is alwaies laid vpon men against their wils. And how agréeth it, 186 that voluntarie and not voluntarie should be all one? We answer, that we may consider our will as touching sinne two manner of waies; one waie, as sinne procéedeth from thence, and is brought to effect by meanes of the same, and in that respect it is called a voluntarie thing; an other waie, sinne is considered as it is in the mind or will, and deformeth it, and after this sort it cannot be voluntarie: for no euill men would haue their mind to be polluted, wounded, or destroied. Wherefore sinne, as it is brought foorth from the will, being the effectuall cause, is voluntarie; but as it bringeth in blemish or deformitie, it is doone against the will: for we would be all perfect. 187 It was added; God is the cause of the cause of sinne, therefore also the cause of sinne. By what things doo we sinne? By the will and affections, the which God hath brought foorth; therfore he is also the cause of the last effect. We answer, that sinne dependeth not of the will and affections, as they were made by God; but as they are now corrupted: I shewed an example before of halting.
30 Besides we said, that God remooueth his grace and holie spirit, 188 which doo hinder sins, and therefore, &c. This we grant, but we adde, that he dooth iustlie remooue his spirit. Indéed the remoouing of that which letteth is a cause; but yet that is not the proper cause: for there doo also rest in vs inward causes of euill. He giueth occasions; It is true, he suggesteth both outwardlie and inwardlie, 189 but yet good things; the which, men through their owne lewdnes doo vse amisse. But he not onlie giueth occasions, but he also gaue out his commandements. 190 He said vnto the diuell; 191 Go foorth, doo this: hereof will I note a few things. The prophet, by the figure Prosopopoeia, dooth as it were bring in God to sit vpon a seate like a iudge: he would that Achab should be slaine, he séeketh who shall deceiue him. Wherevnto tendeth this inquisition? It putteth vs in mind, that this should else-where be sought; bicause it is not in the nature of God, to deceiue. The end is there set foorth by his iustice; he willeth that Achab should now be slaine. Diuers waies are deuised, this spirit shewed one waie, and that spirit another waie: to the intent we may vnderstand, that the prouidence of God hath innumerable waies, whereby he can punish men.
Those waies were there propounded, but not put in practise; bicause the prouidence of God was not minded to vse them. A spirit stept foorth, who said; I will deceiue him. Hereby it is gathered, that diuels are prompt and redie to deceiue; and when they doo deceiue, it is of their owne dooing. In the meane time we be taught, that those spirits be able to doo no more than God dooth giue them leaue: and in respect that he will vse them, they be executioners [appointed] of God. Wherefore God said; Go foorth: this is the imperatiue mood. If we respect the end, it was to slaie and punish Achab. But this leaue was giuen, to the intent that the diuell should exercise his naughtie will, and deceiue. And God vsed the sinne of the diuell, and would not hinder his worke, nor yet let Achab, but that he should beléeue the false prophets. Augustine, in his booke of the 83. questions, quest 53. noted thrée things; The first is, that that which God did against Achab, he did it by iudgement; secondlie, that he did it by an angell, and not by himselfe; thirdlie, he saith not by euerie maner of angell, but by an euill angell; readie of his owne nature to deceiue.
It was said, that sinne is a motion, 192 and a certeine action, and that the first moouer is God: nothing is concluded, but that the subiect of sinne, that is, the act it selfe, hath will to be the néerest cause, and also God himselfe, in respect it is a naturall thing. The saieng of Augustine De gratia & libero arbitrio the 21. chapter, is expounded of the inclination vnto good by himselfe, and vnto euill indirectlie. Also the dealing of Roboam, 193 and the stirring vp of the Philistines, and that Amazias would not harken vnto the warnings of the king of Israels prophet, apperteineth to the iustice of God: God was minded to punish them. 194 As touching the words of Ahia the Silonite, for performing wherof, &c. These things were not doone, bicause they were foretold; but foretold, bicause God foresawe that they should be. And to the end that they might so be, he appointed them for punishments of the wicked; and he knew how he would vse them, and his reasons were allowed of God. It is written in the 14. chapter of Ezechiel; 195 If the prophet be deceiued, 196 it is I that haue seduced him. Here haue we nothing else, but that the sinne of the false prophet may be two waies considered. As it procéedeth from the will of an ill prophet, so it displeaseth God; and therefore he said he would punish it: but if afterward the vse of it should be weighed, that God by such seducing would be reuenged of the people, then he did iustlie withdrawe his grace from them further, he vsed that seducement, which properlie and by it selfe may not be ascribed to God.
31 There was brought a place out of the 21 chapter of the prouerbs, where it is said; 197 that The hart of the king is in the hand of God, and he inclineth the same which waie soeuer he will. The proposition is generall; Which waie soeuer he will, he inclineth the same. Here is no exception; therefore as well vnto good things, as vnto euill things. In the twelfe of Iob, 198 it is said; that God dooth take a waie the harts of them that be rulers of the earth, and that he maketh them stagger like droonken men. And how these things must be vnderstood of inclination, I haue declared. Wherefore I vnderstand this sentence of Salomon no otherwise, than those words of saint Augustine, in his booke De gratia & libero arbitrio; to wit, that he inclineth our wils vnto good or euill, according to his good pleasure. 199 Another argument was out of the 105. psalme, 200 where it is said; God turned their hart, so as they hated them. What maner of turning that is, which he made in their harts, Augustine dooth teach verie well in the same place; it was no good hart that GOD made euill. But such is the goodnes of God, that he vseth both angels and men; and when they be euill, he piketh good things out of them. He increased the Israelites with children and with wealth; these things were good: wherfore God, by dooing good vnto the Hebrues, turned the hart of the Aegyptians vnto hatred; for hatred ariseth through other mens felicitie. Wherefore God turned their hart, which naturallie was euill, vnto a hatred against the Hebrues; not by making of their hart euill. Ye sée therefore that I feined not, when I said that God suggesteth either inwardlie or outwardlie, such things as in their owne nature be good; but through our fault doo come occasions of sinning, but yet occasions taken, not giuen. And the occasions which be offered, be not the furthest remooued causes, as is the firre trée hewen vpon mount Pelion; but they be immediate occasions, which stir vp our desires: euen as the Hebrues happines was the immediate occasion, why the Aegyptians enuied them.
201 Esaie the 63. chapter; Wherefore hast thou made vs to erre, 202 Lord? Which saieng Ierom interpreteth of Gods louing kindnes. God did not straitwaie punish their sinnes; wherefore they began to contemne his iudgements: God did suggest this his mercie in them, which was good; but through their fault, it was drawne to contempt. They may also be the words of the wicked, which cast vpon God the cause of their sinnes. Or else the godlie, when they thinke themselues, by the iust iudgement of God, to be forsaken of his grace; and afterward, they acknowledging their sinnes, speake after such a sort: doubtles not in blaming of God, but in maruelling at his iudgements. But howsoeuer thou vnderstand it, God is exempted from the fault. 203 It is written in the fourth of Ieremie; Thou, 204 ô Lord, hast seduced thy people. Ierom answereth, saieng; Those things, which were now spoken, séemed vnto the prophet to be repugnant to the other words, which were spoken in the third chapter before: where God declared vnto him, 205 that Ierusalem should be called the seate of God, and that all the heathen should flocke about it. But now God said, that The hart of the king, & of the princes should quaile, the preests and people should be astonished: and therefore the prophet cried; Thou saiedst, we shall haue peace, but behold the sword. But the times (saith Ierom ) must be distinguished; for those things, which were first spoken, were to be fulfilled after the captiuitie of Babylon: and that calamitie, which was shewed of afterward, was euen at the doores.
32 Iosua saith, 206 that God hardened the harts of those nations of the Canaanites, 207 that they should not make peace with Israel; bicause God was minded to cast them out before his people: and therefore he séemeth to be the cause of sinne. We answer with Augustine, 208 out of the eight chapter, De gratia & praedestinatione: it is also intituled The booke De voluntate Dei; What is it to harden? That he will not mollifie: What is it to blinden? That he will not illuminate: what is it to inforce or reiect? That he will not call. Which he speaketh, not of the generall calling; but of that which is effectuall; God powreth not in new hardnes, which is not in the hart. Wherefore it may be said, that God hardened those nations; bicause he would not make them relent, whereby they might haue made peace with the Hebrues: neuertheles, they were alreadie to be destroied, by reason of their owne sinnes. But it is further obiected, that no creature is appointed to perdition. God created not man, to the intent he would cast him off. And Ierom vpon the prophet Abacuk, the second chapter is alledged; Although that the soule, by reason of the naughtines thereof, be made an habitation for the Chaldaeans; yet by nature it is the tabernacle of God. And no creature indued with reason is herevnto made, that it should be an habitation of the diuell. Indéed these words dooth Ierom speake. But if thou vnderstand him absolutelie, he is against the scripture, which speaketh otherwise. It saith, 209 that The potter hath power of one lumpe, to make one vessell to honour, and another to dishonour. And it is said of Pharao; To this purpose haue I raised thee, that I might shew foorth my power. God suffereth the vessels, prepared vnto destruction, to the intent he may make his power manifest. It is also said by Salomon in the 16. of Prouerbs; 210 that The vngodlie man is made for the daie of wrath. In the epistle of Iude, 211 there is mention of certeine men, which were before ordeined to this iudgement, or to this condemnation.
But true it is, that this decrée of God, before it be put in execution, hath iust cause of condemning any man. For sinnes are committed in the meane time, for the which they that should be condemned, are condemned: yet is it the decrée of God, that he calleth them not effectuallie; and surelie that decrée is iust. But as touching Ierom himselfe, I answere; that the reasonable creature is not made, to the end he should be compelled to sinne; for he sinneth through his owne fault: yet it is in the decrée of God, not to hinder that fault of his. I answere further with Zuinglius, 212 in his little booke De prouidentia Dei, the sixt chapter; [Hereof] it would followe, that God dooth procure theft, and such other things. He saith; procéed yet further, and thou maist saie, that this is doone for the declaration of his iustice. Then we sée, to what end the reasonable creature is made; euen that on the one side the goodnes of God, and on the other side his seueritie may be declared. What wise man is there, that would ordeine a thing to anie such end, as he knew he could not atteine vnto? God fore-knoweth all things, he knoweth that the wicked shall be dammed; it shall not therefore be said, that he maketh those to saluation which shall be condemned.
213 An other argument was; If God would the end, he also would the meanes to come by that end. I grant; for he would that the patience of martyrs should be, therefore he would that persecutions should be. He would vndoubtedlie, but not after one maner; for that which is good, he would for it selfe sake: the persecutions which be doone by tyrants, he would after a sort, that is, for some other consideration; he would suffer them, not hinder them; he would vse those things. Where I saie, that he would those things after a sort, it must not bée inferred, that therefore he would them falselie, or like a subtill sophister. Iohn saith; He that is borne of God dooth not sinne; that is to saie, against the holie ghost, and without repentance. And séeing such a one dooth some waie sinne, it must not be said, that he dooth sinne sophisticallie and falselie; for there is no such consequent: for he sinneth in verie déed, and not sophisticallie and falselie. In like manner, the lawe of it selfe is holie; and yet after a sort, it is the cause of wrath and damnation: but yet not falselie nor sophisticallie; for so Paule himselfe speaketh, and that trulie. Wherefore it followeth not, that God would after a sort, therefore he would that thing falselie and sophisticallie. 214 But if God would those things, which be vnto an end; and sinnes after a sort, bicause he hath determined not to let them, and is minded to vse them: then his will being immutable, there shall followe an vnauoidable necessitie. I answere, that there shall be a necessitie, but no constraint; and if our will be forsaken by the grace of God, it is in the necessitie of sinning.
Verelie, the prouidence of God, as touching his decrées, is as the iron & the adamant. For Zacharie as touching the chariots and empires, 215 which should succéed after him; They went (saith he) through mountaines of iron. The decrées of God are most stedfast. And Christ said; 216 Those whom my father hath giuen me, none can plucke out of my hands. Yet there is somwhat, that may séeme to withstand this saieng. It is written in the 68. psalme; 217 Let them be wiped out of the booke of the liuing: wherefore if they be wiped out, who were written in before, the will séemeth not to be constant. Read Augustine vpon that place; A man commonlie saith, Quod scripsi scripsi; What I haue written, that haue I written: and will God wipe out that which he hath written? How then are they said to be wiped out? The kind of spéech is according to the hope of them. In verie déed, they were not registred, but they thought themselues to be registred. But there be some, which refer blindnesse and hardening of harts to foreknowledge onelie. Howbeit, there is not a bare prescience of these things, but there is a certeine will of God, whereby God cannot foreknowe things to come, vnlesse they be such as shall come to passe. And those things that shall be, or be, cannot come to passe, or be, vnlesse that God, with some kind of will, will haue them to be, or to come to passe. Wherefore there is some will of God that preceadeth fore-knowledge: he hath a will, not to let things; and he hath a will to vse them according to his predestinated counsels.
33 An other argument; 218 These tyrants Nabuchadnezar, Senacherib, and others, 219 were in the hand of God, as a staffe and rod; and therefore God séemeth to be the cause of sinne. Indéed it is true that they were as a rod; and when they had executed their office, they were throwne into the fire: yet were they not without sense and perceiuing, but were mooued forward by their owne naughtie will, and therefore are iustlie punished. For there is two kinds of instruments, as I declared before. Howbeit this is no beguiling; that God will vse these things, & yet command that they shall not be doone. These men doo them of a naughtie will, but God vseth their naughtines. Men also can vse well the naughtie actions of their aduersaries, and manie times they doo vse them without anie craftie dealing, euen to the intent they may take héed to themselues, and may shew patience. Sometime God vseth sinnes, to punish the sinners themselues: yea rather, he vseth them so alwaies, for bicause sinne is alwaies a punishment of the sinner. And otherwhile he vseth them for the punishment of others.
An other argument was; 220 that God put into the hart of Dauid to number the people. Indéed, 221 the scripture speaketh after this maner. These kind of spéeches we heare not in the poets, but in the word of God: Plato might banish poets out of his common weale, but we may not driue out scriptures, which speake on this wise. But how these things must be vnderstood, I haue declared before. God withdrew his helpe from Dauid, he hindered him not; he would vse that worke for punishing of the people. But it is obiected; If God withdrawe his grace, hée dooth it iustlie. I grant it, yet notwithstanding he dooth the same: further, he vseth the diuell also. 222 In the booke of Chronicles it is said, that the diuell set on Dauid; therefore God also did it, insomuch as he gaue the diuell leaue. But they obiect against that, which we haue oftentimes spoken; namelie, that grace being remooued from vs, sinne dooth créepe on of it selfe, séeing our owne will, of it selfe inclineth vnto it, euen as darknes dooth naturallie come, after the light is gon. God (saie they) is euen as the sunne, bicause his light shineth in euerie place; but there be men, which conueigh themselues into corners; but if his lightening be in euerie place, into what corners should men go where that light is not? The diuine scripture saith otherwise: for it saith of him that abused the talent; 223 Take it awaie from him, &c. Dauid praieth; Take not awaie thine holie spirit from me: wherefore God ment to vse the sinne of Dauid for punishment of the people. And Aeschylus the tragicall poet, is by some vniustlie accused, who saith; that God, if he will destroie and take awaie anie, he giueth the causes and occasions, séeing the scripture so speaketh, which can speake against the lawes of Plato, but not against the lawes of God. 224 For it saith, that the sonnes of Helie did not hearken to their father, bicause the will of God was to destroie them: 225 and that Roboam would not giue eare vnto the elders, bicause the turning awaie was of God.
It was said, that If the matter should be thus, 226 then God should not be the cause of all things, if he be not the cause of sinnes. It followeth not; for although God be not the cause of sinne, yet he gouerneth the sinnes, which be committed, he vseth them, and maketh the verie ground-worke, so farre foorth as it is a naturall thing. But it behooueth (saie they) that sinne be voluntarie. If we speake of actuall sinnes, it is true; but of originall sinne, it is not true. Also the first motions which be sinnes, are not voluntarie. 227 And Barnard in his treatise of frée will, setteth downe certeine degrées of mans nature. Men that be blessed in the heauenlie habitation cannot sinne; it was in Adam, not to haue sinned: after sinne committed, we cannot choose but sinne. So be the damned, so be the reprobate and wicked. But the godlie & regenerate are able not to giue place vnto sinne, and bring to passe that sinne shall not altogither reigne in them; and this they haue of the spirit of God. Whereby it appéereth by this distinction, that the sinne of the damned is of necessitie; 228 and yet sinne neuertheles. For although it be a thing of necessitie, yet it is voluntarie; but not so voluntarie, as we be able of our selues to make choise of the other part, which is contrarie therevnto: for we cannot haue the choise on the other part, but through the same spirit of God. 229 Sinnes are iustlie punished, but there is no respect had what thou art able or not able, but whether that which thou dooest, be doone against the lawe of God or no.
And God dooth iniurie vnto no man. Wherfore this obiection is not of force, if we respect God. If one sée a blind man to be falling, & dooth not stretch foorth his hand to helpe him, or setteth him not vp againe, it séemeth to be crueltie: 230 God séeth a man readie to fall, he putteth not foorth his hand, it séemeth to be crueltie. In whom? In men; bicause the lawe is prescribed vnto them: GOD is not subiect to these lawes. 231 This answer maketh Zuinglius in his booke De prouidentia, and in his booke De falsa & vera religione, where he intreateth of merit. And although God bestowe not so large gifts vpon the reprobate, as he dooth vpon others; yet he giueth them manie things. The preaching of the Gospell is set foorth vnto them, manie other things giueth he vnto all men, although he hath not mercie vpon all vnto saluation: God may doo with his owne what he will. These, thou saiest, reiect his mercie. Ierom saith vpon Ionas; God is mercifull and pitifull of nature, readie to saue those by his mercie, whom he cannot by his iustice; but we cast awaie his mercie, which is offered. I grant it, insomuch as it is offered vs by generall preaching: neuerthelesse, God dooth not change their wils; that he can doo this, who denieth? If he will not, it is vpon iust cause that he will not. Augustine De bono perseuerantiae, the fourth chapter, saith; that In one and the selfe-same thing, we sée a difference of Gods iudgement; and in diuerse things we sée one iudgement. There were two twins in the wombe of Rebecca, before they had doone either good or euill, yet is said; I haue loued Iacob, and hated Esau. Some laboured in the vineyard a whole daie, others laboured but one houre onelie, and yet receiued all one reward.
As for the instance of the goodman of the house, whose sonnes and seruants doo offend; 232 I (saith he) inforce them not. The goodman of the house is rightlie accused, bicause he hath a lawe: but God hath no lawe prescribed vnto him, he himselfe hath prescribed to himselfe, that he will doo nothing vniustlie: but his will is the chéefe rule of iustice. God forsaketh the reprobats, and is also forsaken by them, and he dooth rightlie. But in that he leaueth such as leaue him, that is testified in the second booke of Chronicles, the 15. chapter. The prophet Azarias, the sonne of Obed, 233 saith vnto king Amazias; Seeing that ye forsake him, he will forsake you. God is euerie where by his essence and his power, but in those that are his, by fauour, grace, and readie helpe. He leaueth not the wicked in the two former sorts, 234 but in the third. There was alledged the sentence of Anshelme De casu diaboli; If God (saith he) by a dishonest worke, such as is adulterie, doo bring foorth a child; why cannot that will of God, by a naughtie will bring it foorth as it is a naturall thing? We grant that the subiect may be brought foorth of God; but afterward it behooueth to consider the defect in it selfe.
235 34 It is read in the acts, that they came togither against Christ, to doo whatsoeuer the hand and counsell of God had decréed; and that Christ was deliuered by the determined counsell of God. Touching the death of Christ, the will of God hath another meaning towards Christ, than it hath towards the Iewes. As touching Christ, God would that he should beare the crosse, according to obedience and charitie, bicause he is our redemption; and the diuine nature brought to passe in him, that he did beare it. The the Iewes should deale so cruellie, God permitted them; but in that permission there was a will, not to hinder their naughtie will, that he might vse the same, and that redemption might followe. By this it appéereth, that he could haue letted it, if he would; Could not my father (saith Iesus) giue me eleuen legions of angels to fight for me? 236 He vsed that sinne to redéeme vs. Manie good things were offered by God vnto the Iewes; such were the prechings, miracles, and reprehensions which he vsed, but through their default, they were taken in the woorse part: wherefore they are left euen in the necessitie of sinning.
237 Where shall now be frée will? It is lost. Augustine in the thirtie chapter of his Enchiridion to Laurence saith, that After man had sinned, he lost himselfe, and his fréewill also: he saith so twise in that chapter, and else-where also; and we haue it in the second booke of Sentences the 25. distinction. But Barnard saith, that it is not lost. 238 These fathers disagrée not if they be rightlie vnderstood; for Augustine taketh frée will for frée power of choosing things contrarie, this or that. And while we be not regenerated, we cannot trulie doo acceptable things vnto God, vnlesse we be restored by the sonne of God; bicause frée will, as touching those things dooth not remaine in vs. Whereas Barnard saith, that frée will remaineth, what is his meaning? He meaneth, that although men sinne, they are not compelled, they haue a consent, they are willing: and such frée will remaineth. And he himselfe expounds himselfe, when he setteth downe thrée sorts of libertie. He hath frée will, 239 from compulsion; from sinne, when his will is regenerate; from miserie, when he shall come into the kingdome of heauen. We haue no fréedome from miserie in this life, fro~ necessitie we haue; by necessitie, he meaneth compulsion. This appéereth out of Barnard, for he placeth a fréedome of will in God; he of necessitie is good, and yet this taketh not awaie his frée will. The angels, and holie men in the heauenlie countrie cannot sinne, yet they haue a frée will. Also he granteth a fréedome vnto the diuell, and damned soules; and yet they cannot be good: but the euill which they will, they will it of their owne accord, not that they be able to doo the contrarie.
The same author saith; It is grace which preserueth, and frée will which is perserued. By what meanes? It taketh health willinglie, that is, it assenteth, it consenteth: but he saith not that it consenteth of it selfe, naie rather he alledgeth the place of Paule; 240 that We cannot of our selues thinke a good thought, much lesse giue our consent thereto: And; 241 God worketh in vs to will and to performe. God (saith he) without vs, setteth before vs good cogitations, by preuenting vs; afterward he changeth the will: he changeth (saith he) the affection, that the same being changed, the consent may followe. Wherfore he saith; that God dooth foure things in vs; first, he stirreth vp, by sending in good cogitations; secondlie, he healeth, that is, he changeth the will; thirdlie he confirmeth, that is, he leadeth to the act; fourthlie, he preserueth, that we may not féele the want, that we may perseuere, and that the good worke may be accomplished.
35 To be bréefe, we also affirme that God, as concerning sinne, is (as Epiphanius saith) ⟨…⟩, that is, cléere from the cause of all sinne; bicause properlie, he is not the cause, and yet he sléepeth not. This word also signifieth vnblameable. God cannot be drawne into lawe by vs; what he dooth, he dooth iustlie. And for our part we adde, that it is a generall opinion, and must still be reteined in the church; that There is nothing doone in the world, 242 be it good or bad, without Gods prouidence. Humane actions cannot passe out of the bounds of Gods prouidence, séeing All the heares of our head are numbered. If sparrowes, being small séelie birds, of the least estimation, doo not light on the ground without the will of God; what shall we saie of mans dooings, the which so far excell? Diuine prouidence hath an excéeding great scope; albeit it deale not all after a sort towards good things, and towards bad; yet are they not doone without the prouidence of God, which is Gods diuine will, whereby things be mightilie and verie well gouerned, and directed to their owne proper ends. Neither ought it to be anie offense vnto vs, that he leaueth some euils in the world; for although they be against particular natures, yet they be auailable for common commoditie. If all euils were taken awaie, we should be destitute of manie good things: wherfore it is said, that There would be no life of lions, if there were no slaughter of shéepe, wherewith the lions be fed: neither would there be patience of martyrs, vnlesse the crueltie of tyrants were permitted by God.
243 That which Plato writeth in the second booke De Republica, 244 séemeth to be against this doctrine of ours: he saith, that God is author but of few things vnto men, bicause there be manie euils amongst men, and God is the cause of none of them: whereby he séemeth to streighten the prouidence of GOD into a narrowe roome. If he meane the cause effectuall, and speake of sinnes, we doo grant it: and yet in the meane time prouidence is not in a profound sléepe. But Plato in the same place hath, that, which must not be granted generallie of the godlie: for he denieth, that God commeth vnto men in the likenes of strangers: 245 but angels were enterteined by Abraham & Lot in ghestwise. Whereas he saith, that God cannot be changed, as touching his substance; it is true: but that he appéered sometimes in certeine forms, it must be granted. He talked with Moses out of the burning bush; he declared himselfe vpon mount Sina by voices; he exhibited himselfe vnto the prophets by sundrie likenesses. I thinke that Plato meaneth those vile changes, which the poets speake of; that he was changed into a swan, an eagle, or a bull: which things must in no wise be attributed vnto God.
246 36 But whereas I said, that all things, whatsoeuer they be, are ruled by the prouidence of God; and that Platos saieng can be no let, it séemeth not sufficient. For Damascene also is against it, who saith in his second booke, the 29. chapter; that Those things, which be not in vs, are subiect to the prouidence of God: for he addeth, that the things within vs are not of Gods prouidence, but belong to our owne frée will. But shall not therfore our actions, which he saith are within vs, be in the prouidence of God? Let them beléeue this that will; for I beléeue it not. He addeth that which is more hard; namelie, that The choise of dooing things is in vs, but that the perfection and accomplishment of good things is the worke of God togither with vs. Who will saie, it commeth from vs, if we choose to be doone such things as are good? The apostle saith, 247 that God worketh in vs, to will and performe. And whereas Damascene taketh awaie these things from diuine prouidence, I like it not. He distinguisheth prouidence, into good pleasure and permission; these I am not against, I affirme both: namelie, that prouidence not onelie ruleth good things, but that it also bringeth them to passe; and that it permitteth euill things, but yet not so as it permitteth them all wholie to themselues: for it vseth them.
And he distinguisheth that same permission or good pleasure, and saith, that one is a dispensing and instructing permission; bicause it turneth to the discipline of saints, if they be left without helpe for a time. Sometime it is called a full growne permission, and as it were without hope of recouerie; as when men, through their owne default, perish and béecome past amendement. Euen we also saie, that God leaueth his elect for a time, but others for euer. Moreouer he saith; that God by an inward cause will haue men to be partakers of saluation; but that he will afterward punish them when they offend. He calleth it a following will, as though it dooth followe by our owne default. I [for my part] saie, that the will of God is of one sort, but that the obiects be diuerse. There is a chosen sort, whom he will haue to be saued; and there be reprobates also, whom he will for their sinnes to be punished. But yet we must not there make a staie, he will shew his power in them. Wherefore I affirme, that prouidence is vniuersall, whatsoeuer Damascene saith. Of which mind Augustine also is in the 58. sentence, saieng; that There is nothing doone, either visiblie or sensiblie, which is not either commanded or permitted from the inuisible or perpetuall pallace of the high Emperour: and so he excepteth nothing from the prouidence of God.
37 These be the things, 248 that I thought méet to be spoken of concerning this matter. There remaine manie other things, but an end must bée had. Indéed I knowe, 249 that the reuerend man Philip Melanchthon, whom I loue & honour, séemeth to saie otherwise: but here I appele to the same man himselfe, in his old common places; read ye those things which be there, concerning predestination and frée will. He saith, that the word [frée will] which peraduenture I would not haue said, is most strange vnto the diuine scriptures, and from the iudgement and meaning of the spirit. Further he saith, that Platos philosophie, in the beginning of the church, subuerted pietie. In the conclusion of that place; If we come (saith he) to our owne inward and outward dooings, those being referred to God prouidence, all things doo come to passe euen as they be appointed. But in outward actions, if they be referred vnto will, there is a fréedome [in vs.] If we shall consider the inward good things, which GOD dooth require, there he saith is no fréedome: if our inward affects begin to passe measure, they cannot be staid. The same thing saith Ambrose vpon Luke, and it is often alledged by Augustine, that Our hart is not in our owne power. There be others also, which disagrée not from them; of which number are Zuinglius and Luther, the noble instruments of reformed religion; likewise Oecolampadius, Bucer, and Caluine: and I might allege others, but I striue not to bring manie witnesses. I said, that to speake properlie, God is not the cause of sinne: and that there is nothing doone in the world, be it good or euill, without the prouidence of God. But & if I haue not hit the marke I shot at; I am sorie for it. If anie man shall by anie sufficient proofs shew this opinion to be vngodlie, or hurtfull to good conuersation, I am readie to alter the same. I haue discoursed the more at large herof, bicause it is a thing of great importance: and it falleth out oftentimes in the holie scriptures. And things are better vnderstood, which be set downe to the full; than such as are declared here and there by péecemeale.
VVe haue added these few things out of the like place vpon the first of Samuel, the second chapter.
250 38 Now there resteth, that we speake of the verie will it selfe of God. First of all I grant, that the distinction, which the schoolemen vse to make, misliketh me not, when as they affirme, that the will signified is one, and the will effectuall, or (as others write) the well pleasing will is another. The will signified is that, which sheweth what we ought to doo, 251 or what we ought to auoid; for thereby we gather the iudgment and ordinance of God, and that consisteth in the lawe, in the commandements, promises, thretnings and counsels: moreouer to this kind of will belongeth that saieng; Thou art the God that wouldest not iniquitie: 252 and that saieng also; Thou hast hated lieng and iniquitie: and all those testimonies; by which it can be shewed, that God would not haue sinnes. And how I praie you can God be willing that sinnes should be, séeing he hath made a lawe against them; séeing he most seuerelie punisheth them; séeing he hath planted in the minds of godlie men the abhorring of sinnes; séeing for the taking away of sinne he suffered his owne welbeloued sonne to be put to death vpon the crosse? 253 But we must note, that against this will of God, which is called the will of the signe, manie things be committed and doone. The number is great of wicked men, which contend against the lawe of God, which disquiet preachers, which slaie the prophets; yea which in times past killed the sonne of God himselfe. Neither must we omit, that this is trulie so named, 254 and indéed the will of God, séeing Christ saith; He that dooth the will of my father, the same is my mother, my brother and my sister. And it is written in Deuteronomie; What other thing will God, but that thou loue him, and walke in his waies?
Moreouer, the other will of God is that, which is called mightie, effectuall, 255 and according to his good pleasure, which by no power can be vanquished and ouercome; séeing it is written thereof, that Whatsoeuer he would, 256 that hath he doone. Of this will Paule saith; Who is able to resist his will? And surelie, if there might be anie thing doone against Gods will and mind, it would be weake and féeble. These two wils are so distinct, not as if they were two things and faculties which be placed in God; séeing that act appéereth to be most absolute. But forsomuch as God dooth not alwaies reueale his generall & whole counsell vnto men (for that is not néedfull, 257 séeing it hath béene enough for him to shew that which is sufficient for obteining of saluation) thereof it coms, that these two wils doo differ. For what he hath by anie meanes declared, that must be referred to his signified will; and whatsoeuer he hath kept to himselfe, as secret and hidden, that apperteineth to his well pleasing will. But to the end that this may be the easelier vnderstood, it is méet to be shewed by plaine and notable examples. God commanded Abraham, that he should go to sacrifice his onelie sonne Isaac; 258 certeinelie in this precept was conteined his signified will: for God shewed Abraham, that he would onelie make a triall of his obedience; and shewed him not, that he would afterward let the sacrificing of Isaac; which prohibition doubtlesse did followe afterward; neither was his well pleasing will made manifest before. Wherefore we may decrée, that his well pleasing will, and his signified will is all one; but is in sundrie wise called, according as it is knowne or vnknowne vnto vs.
Besides this, it was said vnto Ezechias; 259 Set thine house in order, seeing thou shalt now die. Certeinlie, there was no other waie in the king but death, considering the force of his disease, and course of nature; and his death was the will of God, as it might be perceiued both by a naturall signe, and by the words of the prophet. Yet, bicause God, of his mercie, had decréed, vpon his repentance & teares, to prolong life for manie yéeres; this will of his was as well effectuall as well pleasing. 260 Also by his signified will destruction after fortie daies was denounced vnto the Niniuites, when as neuertheles God, by his well pleasing will, minded to forgiue them being penitent. This will is ioined with the other; for they which fall from the one, doo light vpon the other: and they which reiect that will of God, whereby he publisheth his lawe, his promises, his thretenings and counsels, doo run into that, whereby sinners suffer punishment for their wicked offenses.
39 Wherefore Augustine in his Enchiridion vnto Laurence, the 101. chapter, verie well saith; That which God will haue doone, is in anie wise doone, either of vs, or vpon vs: of vs, when we liue well; vpon vs, when we receiue punishment for sinnes committed. And in the 102. chapter he saith, that Sinners doo as much as in them lieth against the lawe of God; but as touching his omnipotencie they cannot. Yea, and Gregorie wrote in his morals, the 11. chapter, and sixt booke; Manie doo the will of God, when they indeuour to change the same: and in resisting, they vnwittinglie obeie the counsell of God. Also Ioseph answereth his brethren with this saieng; 261 You sold me indeed, but Gods purpose was to send me before you into Aegypt, that I might prepare for you both food and safetie. Moreouer, this is the same will, whereby God dooth predestinate his elect vnto eternall life; the which, as it is vnknowne vnto vs, so the same being most mightie, cannot be weakened. By this distinction of Gods will, we vnderstand sufficientlie what answer we ought to make, 262 when it is obiected vnto vs, that GOD made man a liuing soule, and therefore would not that he should perish. For we saie, that this is true as touching his signified will; for he offered vnto man a lawe, promises, thretenings, and counsels: which things, if he had imbraced, he had surelie liued. But if we haue respect vnto that other mightie and effectuall will, doubtles we cannot denie, but he would haue men to perish. For as we read in the 16. of Prouerbs; 263 God made all things for his owne selfe, euen the vngodlie to an euill daie. And Paule teacheth vs, that God is like vnto a potter, and that he maketh some vessels to honor, 264 and some to dishonour. And this is also the same will, whereby God ruleth, gouerneth, and moderateth the naughtie desires and sinnes of men at his owne pleasure, as it hath béene said before. By this will, God deliuereth the wicked into a reprobat sense, sendeth in the Chaldaeans to lead awaie his people into captiuitie, addeth efficacie vnto illusions, would haue the wicked to be seduced, and is said to harden them.
40 But séeing these things are expresselie read, & that we oftentimes light vpon them in the holie scriptures, we must diligentlie consider, how they should be vnderstood. The co~mon sort thinke, that whereas it is written, that God dooth blind, dooth harden, dooth deliuer, dooth send in, dooth be guile; nothing else is ment thereby, but that he suffereth these things to be doone. After the which manner, 265 verie manie of the fathers doo interpret those spéeches, being led doubtles by this reason; that they thought it a wicked and blasphemous thing, if God should be accounted the author of sinne; and they would not that men should cast vpon God himselfe the causes of their sinnes. Which counsell of theirs, I verie well allow, and confesse (togither with them) that these things be doone by the permission of God: for séeing he can inhibit sinnes to be doone, and yet dooth not let them, he is rightlie said to permit or suffer them. Wherefore Augustine verie well saith, 266 in his Enchiridion vnto Laurence, the 98. chapter, that There is no mind so wicked, but that God can amend the same, if he will: but not to prohibit, when thou canst, is to permit. And the same author against Iulian, in the fift booke, the ninth chapter sheweth, that There be manie euils, which God would not permit, vnlesse he were willing thervnto.
But there must be somwhat else also brought besides permission, if we will dulie satisfie those places of the scripture, which are obiected. For they which saie, that God dooth onelie permit, they cannot altogither exclude his will; bicause he permitteth the same either willinglie or else vnwillinglie: vnwillinglie I am assured hee dooth not, bicause none may compell him; it followeth therefore, that he dooth willinglie permit those things to be doone. Neither must we imagin, the same will of permission to be stacke in God; for in God there is nothing that is not perfect and absolute. 267 Wherefore it must of necessitie be determinned, that God dooth not onelie permit sinne, but also after a sort willeth it; yet not in respect that it is sinne, (for his will is alwaies of necessitie carried vnto good) but in that it is a punishment of wickednes doone before: for in that respect, although it be sinne, yet it goeth vnder the forme of good. So doo princes and magistrats otherwhiles set lions and wild beasts vpon ill men, and incourage elephants against enimies; yet they made not those kind of beasts, but they cause the féercenes and crueltie of them to serue their vse. So God vseth the labour of tyrants, when he will take iust punishment of anie people.
Wherefore the king of Babylon is called the hammer, staffe, and sawe of the Lords hand, 268 when God would by his violence, chastise the people of Israel. For that king, notwithstanding he was the mightiest prince, was not able of his owne force to afflict the children of Israel: naie rather, he was rebuked of arrogancie, bicause he sometime ascribed that thing to his owne strength: for God declareth, that he himselfe was the verie author of so great destruction. And Iob, when he was so gréeuouslie vexed by the Sabees, by the Chaldaeans, and also by the diuell, 269 and depriued in a maner of all his goods, he no lesse godlie than wiselie said; The Lord gaue, and the Lord hath taken awaie. And that he might the more euidentlie shew, that this happened by the will of God, he added; Euen as it pleased the Lord, so it is come to passe: for he sawe that God vsed the Sabees, Chaldaeans, and the diuell as instruments. And in the second booke of Samuel, 270 the 24. chapter, it is said, that God stirred vp Dauid to number the people: which act in Paralipomenon is attributed to the diuell. 271 Both with saiengs be true, bicause God, by the ministerie and worke of the diuell prouoked him to doo it. For euen as Salomon saith; The hart of the king is in the hand of God, 272 he inclineth the same which waie soeuer he will: certeinelie, not by instilling of new euill, as we haue oftentimes said before; but by vsing of the same which he hath [alreadie] found, either to the punishment of sinnes, or else to the perfourmance of his other counsels. Therefore, when it is written, that God dooth either harden or make blind, we must beléeue that he not onelie forsaketh and leaueth; but that he also applieth his will.
41 Neither must we passe it ouer, that in the seuenth and eight of Exodus, it is written, that God hardened the hart of Pharao, 273 when neuertheles in the eight chapter it is written, that Pharao himselfe hardened his owne hart, 274 either of which is certeinelie true. For first Pharao had in himselfe the originals of so great an obstinacie, and he willinglie, and of his owne accord set himselfe against the word of God. But on the other part (as I haue declared before) God prouided, that the same his obstinacie shuld be openlie shewed, and did moderate and gouerne it according to his owne pleasure. We must not thinke, that GOD dooth so rule the world, as he should sit like an idle man in a watch tower, and there doo nothing: or that he suffereth the world and inferiour things, to haue scope to wander at will, as dooth a horsse which hath the raines at libertie. Neither is that true, which is alledged by some, that God neither willeth nor nilleth those euils or sinnes; as if hée thought not vpon them at all. Euen as if one should aske me, whether I would the French king should hunt this daie or no, I might rightlie answere, that neither I would it, nor would it not, séeing the matter perteineth nothing vnto me. But as touching God, it cannot rightlie be answered so; séeing what things soeuer are in all the world, they doo belong to his care and prouidence.
But I would that these men did weigh with themselues, by what testimonie of the scripture they be able to confirme that permission of theirs, which they so obstinatelie reteine. I am not ignorant, that they alledge for themselues, that which is said in the 81. psalme; 275 I permitted them to their owne harts lust. But if we confer with the true Hebrue text, it will appéere more féeble, & of lesse proofe than they be aware of. For the verbe Schillach in the Hebrue, is in the coniugation Piel, which by the force of the coniugation signifieth, A vehement action; neither is it conuenient, that we should abate the force thereof, through expounding of it by the word Permission. Nay rather, 276 it agrées with the phrase of Paule, wherein it is said in the epistle to the Romans, that God deliuered the wicked to a reprobate sense: and it is rather shewed, that God cast awaie the wicked, than permitted them. But whereto did he permit them, or cast them off? Verelie to their own wicked desires; as who saith, they should be wholie possessed and gouerned by them. And in this sense is that Hebrue word oftentimes vsed in the scriptures. In Genesis it is shewed, 277 that God cast man out of Paradise; and who would there interpret the word Cast out [by the word] Permitted, seing he rather draue and thrust them out from thence? Moreouer, in the 19. chapter the angels saie, And the Lord hath sent vs out to destroie Sodom: in which place, 278 To send foorth cannot be the selfe same that is to Permit. And it is written in Ezechiel; It brought foorth the branch: 279 while notwithstanding a vine dooth not permit the branch to come foorth of it, but dooth rather inforce it to bud out. Wherfore let the interpretour beware, least in that place he interpret the Hebrue verbe Schillach, by the verbe of permitting.
42 Neither must we passe it ouer, 280 that the holie scriptures no lesse attribute the permission of God vnto good things than vnto euill. For the apostle in the sixt chapter to the Hebrues, when he intreated of good things, saith; If God shall permit. Iulian the Pelagian (as appéereth out of Augustine, in the third chapter of the fift booke which he wrote against him) was of the opinion, that when it is said in the scriptures, that God deliuereth or blindeth; it must onelie be vnderstood, that he leaueth or permitteth. But contrariwise, Augustine saith, that God dooth not onlie permit, but (as the apostle taught) He declareth his wrath and power. Furthermore, Iulian writeth, that such spéeches are hyperbolicall or excessiue spéeches: 281 but Augustine affirmeth that they be proper. Iulian interpreteth, that these which are said to be deliuered to their owne lusts, were infected before with these diseases: wherfore, he addeth; What néed was it, 282 that they should be deliuered to them? It was enough that they were suffered to wallowe and rest in them. Vnto this Augustine saith; Dooest thou thinke it all one, to haue desires, and to be giuen ouer vnto them? For the vngodlie be giuen ouer vnto their naughtie luss, not onelie that they may haue them, but that they may be altogither had and possessed of them. Wherefore the same father added; Euen as God dealeth in the bodies of wicked men, by vexing & punishing them; euen so he worketh in the minds of them, by driuing of them vnto sinnes. And in the same place he intreateth of the historie of Semei, 283 where Dauid saith; The Lord commanded him to curse me. The Lord (saith Augustine ) iustlie inclined the will of Semei (being euill through his owne fault) to raile vpon Dauid: and the cause is shewed; For the Lord shall reward me good for this rebuke.
The same Augustine also in his booke De gratia & libero arbitrio writeth, that God dooth worke in mens minds, inclining them as well vnto good as vnto euill, oftentimes by his secret iudgement, yet somtimes by his manifest iudgement, but euermore by his iust iudgement. Wherevnto adde, that how and for what cause he dooth these things, it is excéeding hard to expresse. But yet this is most certeinlie to be determined, that these euils, so far foorth as they come of God, be not sinnes; but are things iust and good: but in that they procéed either from the diuell, or from men; of good right they ought to be accounted sinnes. 284 The Manicheis, when they could not vnwrap themselues out of this doubt, did feigne, that there were two beginnings of things, whereof the one should be good, but the other euill. But we teach, that there is one God, the author of all good things; wée saie, that sinnes sprang vp by the departing of Adam from God, and yet that those sinnes are tempered and ruled by the will and pleasure of God. Wherevpon we conclude, that the verie actions themselues, that is, the subiects of sins; be of God; and that he, when he thinketh it meet, dooth withdrawe his grace and succour, and that afterward he ruleth & bendeth the naughtie lusts of men, which waie soeuer it shall please him: and that séeing he vseth the sinnes of men to the punishment of other sinnes, it cannot be said, that he by no meanes at all would them.
285 But of the sinne of Adam the question is the more difficult, bicause there was no fall of his went before, which should be punished by God with a latter sinne. Yet vnto this we answer, that the action of his, that is, the subiect of deformitie and vnrighteousnes was of God; but the priuation or defect came of the frée will of Adam, whom God created vncorrupt, frée and perfect; but yet not so, that he might not reuolt and doo amisse. Neither was the grace of God, whereby he should be kept backe from falling, so great, as it did firmelie establish him. And it cannot be doubted, but that God would that Adam should fall; otherwise he had not fallen: and he would haue him fall, doubtlesse not in respect of sinne; but that he might vse that fall to make manifest his power, and the vnmeasurable riches of his goodnes: and that he might shew himselfe able, not onelie to make man pure and perfect; but to restore him also, being fallen and perished. And for that cause he sent his sonne to die for mankind vpon the crosse. Wherefore Gregorie cried out; O happie fault, 286 which deserued to haue such a redéemer!
43 But this must be diligentlie marked, that God dooth somtimes allow those things, 287 whereas yet it pleaseth him not that they should be doone. Not as though there be two wils in him; for he hath but one will onelie, whereof notwithstanding there be diuers obiects: for he considereth our mind and determination, the which oftentimes he alloweth. But on the other part, he hath before his eies, the order of his prouidence, the which by all meanes he willeth to be sound and stedfast. Therefore, he somtimes inspireth in our harts, things which in their own nature should be good; yet for all that he will not haue those things to be brought to an end, bicause they serue not to the order of his prouidence. So we saie, that the praier of Christ, wherein he desired to escape death, pleased God, 288 although he would not fulfill the same. Neither did Christ, with a lewd or corrupt will, but with a righteous and good will, will that which he desired. But the prouidence and predestination of God remained immooueable, whereby he had decréed, that at the verie same time he should be fastened vpon the crosse for our saluation. Wherefore we must religiouslie and godlie meditate manie things; but when we vnderstand that God will not haue those things to be doone, our cogitations must be applied to his will. But to intreat of this thing with more perspicuitie and plainenes, let vs first of all determine, that mans will ought after some sort to be made conformable to the will of God; for otherwise it should not be right: for that which is right must agrée with the rule of God. Yet is it not of necessitie, that what God would haue to be doone, should please vs all maner of waies; bicause it is requisite sometimes, that the same should displease vs, and that rightlie, and without sin. Which thing the better to vnderstand, it shall be shewed by examples.
Moses heard, 289 that God would root out his people; he otherwise would, and sorrowed excéedinglie: and that it might not be, he resisted it by praier. Also Samuel knew that Saule was reiected, 290 yet he did not foorthwith settle his mind vpon that will of God; but he heauilie tooke the fall of that king, & for that cause he wept along time. 291 And Ieremie vnderstood that Ierusalem should be destroied, and he lamentablie bewailed the ruine thereof. 292 Here some saie, that the decrée or pleasure of God, is either knowne to vs, or else vnknowen. When it shall be manifest vnto vs, we ought to bend our will vnto him; but if it be hidden from vs, we haue a lawe reuealed, which we may safelie followe. Indéed these men saie somewhat, but yet this saieng of theirs dooth not fullie satisfie. For Ieremie and Christ knew verie well, that by the decrée and will of God Ierusalem should be vtterlie destroied; yet neuertheles they wept for the cause, and in wéeping they sinned not. Moreouer, it commeth oftentimes to passe, that euen by the verie works of God we knowe his will; wherein yet, we must not straightwaie repose our selues: for somtimes it happeneth, that the sonne séeth the father die, which sonne if he be godlie, he vnderstandeth withall, that Gods will is, that he should die. Shall he not therefore be sorrowfull, and desire that his life may still be prolonged? What shall then be doone, when such things doo happen? Verelie we must consider what is méete for the will of God, and what is conuenient for our will.
Trulie it agréeth with the will of God, that he should worke according to his goodnesse and righteousnes, to the end he may benefite the good, and punish the wicked: and it is fit for our will, that it should doo those things which be agréeable therevnto. Also, what things are agréeable to our nature, we shall perceiue by the constitution thereof; that is, by the lawe of nature and of God; and otherwhile also by an inward inspiration of the spirit: and thus, albeit we doo in verie déed disagrée from the will of God, yet as touching the forme and efficient cause, we agrée with the same. For as much as God sometime, willeth two things at once, namelie to punish a citie, a nation, and our parents; and also that we for that cause should moorne: neither are these things repugnant one with another. In times past God willed Sodom and Gomorrha to be destroied, which thing he declaring vnto Abraham, Abraham was manie waies sorrowfull, and he intreated for them which should be destroied; neither are we to thinke that Abraham powred out his praiers without the spirituall inspiration of God.
293 44 Furthermore, to these things this also must be added; namelie, that the things which we knowe that God would, may be two waies considered. First simplie and absolutelie; in which respect we must doo those things, which be agréeable to our will or nature rightlie instituted: or else we must behold them, with a iust comparison vnto the diuine prouidence, wherevnto if we conferre them, they must wholie rest therevpon; bicause (as Augustine in his Enchiridion saith) that It is a wicked thing to striue against the prouidence of God. Bréefelie it is our part in all things, to will that which God would we should will, and that to a right end; that is, with a good purpose: or (as men commonlie speake) with a right intent; although as touching the matter, it behooueth not that that should alwaies like vs, which séemeth méet vnto God. But if thou demand what those things be, which agrée with our nature well instituted? I answere, things holie, honest and iust. Wherefore the apostle said to the Philippians; 294 Whatsoeuer things be true, honest, iust, pure, profitable, of good report; if there be anie vertue, or if there be anie praise, those things thinke vpon and doo. And therefore Dauid, when he determined to build the temple, 295 although God would not haue it doone; yet was Dauids will allowed as iust and right. Our of doubt, the good king knew that God was willing to haue a temple built into him, and he vnderstood that it should be doone at Ierusalem; wherefore his will dissented not from godlines. Moreouer, séeing he was a child of God, and was stirred vp by his spirit, no doubt, but God inspired him with that will.
Neither must we marke what God dooth outwardlie, but consider what he dooth within vs, and then we must followe that. He worketh in vs both to will and performe; 296 indéed not alwaies a perfection of the worke, or a will that is perfect and sound: neither are these two alwaies so ioined togither, as he worketh at once both to will and to performe. For sometime he onelie worketh to will, and granteth not, that the thing which we will, shall come to effect. 297 And not onelie our will ought to be conformable to the will of God, but also our vnderstanding: for we ought to vnderstand those things onlie, which God would reueale vnto vs, and no further. No man therefore hath said; I will vnderstand those things which God himselfe knoweth. These things are largelie intreated of in the first booke of sentences, the 48. distinction; and in Augustines Enchiridion.
An other discourse of the same argument.
I Affirme the cause of mans sinne to be the will or the frée will of our first parents, who fell of their owne accord, and obeied rather the suggestion of the diuell than the commandement of God; from whom afterward was deriued originall sinne vnto all the posteritie: wherevpon we haue vice and corruption inough in our owne selues. Wherefore God instilleth not in vs a new naughtines vnto sinning, neither dooth he bring in corruption; and therefore I doo affirme our wils to be the causes of sinne, and not God.
But the scripture saith in the epistle to the Romans, 298 that God deliuered vp the Ethnikes vnto a reprobate mind, and vnto vile affections. And in the second of Samuel it is said, that God stirred vp Dauid to number the people. 299 And in the same historie Dauid said, that God commanded Semei to curse Dauid. 300 In the same booke the twelfe chapter, God said vnto Dauid by the prophet; 301 I will take thy wiues, and giue them to thy neighbour, and he shall sleepe with them: for thou didst it secretlie, but I will doo this thing before all Israel, and in the open sunne light. It is said by others, that these spéeches must be referred vnto the permission; which thing I doo not absolutelie denie: for God, if he would, might haue let these mischéefs, but hée would not hinder them. Howbeit I adde, that such a permission must not be granted, whereby some may affirme, that God dealeth so idlelie, and so leaueth the gouernement of things, as hée dooth nothing about sinnes themselues.
First, he taketh his gifts and his grace from certeine men, bicause they abused the same; which grace being remooued, and that iustlie, for a punishment of their former sinnes, men being destitute of that helpe, doo fall into more gréeuous crimes. And that God dooth sometime withdrawe his grace, Dauid knew well enough, when he somtime said; 302 Turne not thy face from me, nor take awaie thine holie spirit from me.
Secondlie, God dooth punish sinnes with sinnes; as it appéereth in the epistle to the Romans, 303 and in the places now alledged. And sinnes, so far foorth as they be punishments, doo belong vnto iustice, and in that respect are good. Wherefore it is not vnfit for God, thus by sinnes to punish former sinnes.
Thirdlie, hée ruleth and gouerneth sinnes themselues; for he suffereth them not to rage so far out of measure, as the euill will of man desireth: he restreineth them, he kéepeth them backe, neither dooth he suffer them to rage against euerie man, and at all times: also, hée directeth them to the performance of his counsels; namelie, to the triall of iust men, and to the scourge of the wicked, & such like purposes. Wherfore the scripture saith, 304 that féerce and cruell tyrants are in the hand of God, as staues, hammers, and sawes.
Fourthlie, God sendeth in other occasions, which if they should light vpon good men, they would prouoke them vnto good things: but bicause they light vpon euill men, they are by those mens fault, soone taken in euill part, and are made occasions of sinne. So Paule saith, 305 that By the lawe sinne was increased. And the words of God, spoken vnto Pharao by Moses, were an occasion to expresse out of him blasphemies and hardnes of his hart. Which thing God sawe would come to passe, yet did he not restreine his owne word, when he knew that Pharao would become the woorse thereby; who neuertheles had the naughtines in his owne selfe, and tooke not the same of God.
Fiftlie, since that the defect of sinne is onelie in humane actions, the which are depriued of right gouernement; the verie action of man cannot be susteined, preserued, and stirred vp, without the common influence of GOD, by which all things are gouerned and preserued: for trulie is it said; 306 In God we be, we liue, and are mooued. Therefore the defect, which properlie is sinne, procéedeth not of God: but the action, which is a naturall thing, wherein the defect sticketh, cannot be drawne foorth, but by the common influence of God.
These be the things, which I said that God dooth by his prouidence and gouernement about sinnes; although he be not the true and proper cause of sinnes. By which interpretation we may rightlie vnderstand, what those spéeches of the holie scriptures, and saiengs of the fathers doo meane, wherein God séemes to bée made the cause or author of sinne.
← 16. The xvj. Chapter. Of Prouidence; vpon · Contents · 18. The xviij. Chapter. How it may be said →
Footnotes
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In 2. Sam. 17. verse. 22. ↩
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- Sa. 16, 10.
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⟨…⟩. 12, ⟨…⟩1. ↩
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Arguments inferring God not to be the author of sin. ↩
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Iere. 23, 21. ↩
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Ose. 13, 9. ↩
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Iohn. 8, 44. ↩
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Iohn. 3, 13. ↩
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Iames. 1, 13. ↩
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- Par. 36, verse. 15.
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Gen. 18, 25. Iere. 25, 31. ↩
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Rom. 3, 5. ↩
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Matt. 26, 24. ↩
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Rom. 2, 15. ↩
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- Tim. 2, 4.
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Arguments on the contrarie part. ↩
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Rom. 1, 24. ↩
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Exod. 9, 12. ↩
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Esaie. 6, 10. ↩
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Matt. 6, 13. ↩
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Rom. 7, 1. ↩
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- kin. 22, 22.
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Actus. ↩
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- Kin. 12, 15
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- Par. 21, 16.
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- Kin. 14, 8.
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- Par. 25, 14
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Ezec. 14, 9. ↩
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Iere. 14, 10. ↩
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Esai. 63, 17. ↩
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Prou. 21, 1. ↩
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Psa. 105, 25. ↩
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- Thes. 2, 11
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Iosua. 11, 20 ↩
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Esai. 10, 5. and 15. ↩
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- Sam. 24, 1.
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- Par. 21, 1.
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An obiection. ↩
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A similitude. ↩
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A similitude. ↩
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An obiection. ↩
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A similitude. ↩
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A similitude. ↩
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Act. 2, 23. ↩
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Act. 4, 27. ↩
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Of the question. ↩
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Three opinions. The first of the Libertines. ↩
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The second opinion. ↩
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The third opinion. ↩
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The definition or ha~dling of the question. ↩
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What euill is. ↩
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A similitude. ↩
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A proposition, whereby the question is defined. ↩
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That God by him selfe is not the cause of sinne. ↩
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God is of sinne the remouing or prohibiting cause. Two similitudes. ↩
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Similitudes. ↩
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Three sorts of Gods working about his creatures. ↩
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The first action of God is generall. ↩
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Rom. 1, 20. ↩
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The second kind of Gods working. ↩
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How sins do seruice vnto God. ↩
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A similitude. ↩
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A similitude. ↩
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How things that come by chance serue the prouidence of God. Exo. 21, 13. Deut. 19, 2. ↩
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- Sa. 16, 10.
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The creatures be the instruments of God, but not all after one sort. ↩
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How one worke may be both of God, of the diuell, and of euill men. ↩
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Act. 4, 27. ↩
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Iob. 1, 21. ↩
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Iere. 48, 10. ↩
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Augustine. ↩
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It is not alway iust for man to will as God willeth. ↩
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An obiection. ↩
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Zach. 1, 15. ↩
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Phil. 2, 13. ↩
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That euill hath no efficient cause. ↩
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A similitude. ↩
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The causes of euill actions. ↩
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Wisd. 1, 24. ↩
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In what sort God gouerneth sins. ↩
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- Sam. 16, verse. 10.
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Ezec. 21, 21. ↩
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How God offereth occasions of sinning. ↩
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A definition of an offense giuen, and an offense taken. ↩
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Mat. 15, 14. ↩
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Examples of these occasions. ↩
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Good things vnto the wicked are occasions of sinning. ↩
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Exod. 5, 1. and 2. ↩
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Rom. 7, 12. ↩
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Exod. 1, 9. ↩
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Dan. 4, 27. ↩
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Gen. 37, 8. ↩
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- Sa. 16, 10.
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- Sa. 16, 20.
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Whie God suggesteth those things which he knoweth that men will abuse. ↩
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Augustine. ↩
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Zuinglius. ↩
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Rom. 1, 28. ↩
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Of permission. ↩
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Augustine. ↩
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Rom. 9, 19. ↩
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Rom. 9, 21. ↩
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- Pet. 4, 19.
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Psal. 111, 2 ↩
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Exod. 8, 15. ↩
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Rom. 9, 17. ↩
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That God constreineth not the wil. ↩
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The difference betweene the first man and our nature now corrupt. ↩
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Gen. 1, 2. ↩
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Of the bond of sins vnto punishment. ↩
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Rom. 6, 23. ↩
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Of the subiect, vnto which the deformitie of sin cleaueth. ↩
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Gen. 1, 3. ↩
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Augustine. ↩
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The names of nature, essence, and substance. ↩
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Euerie act and moouing is of God. ↩
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Sins of omission, or negligence. ↩
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How sin is drawn from the nature of the second causes, ↩
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A similitude. ↩
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How the selfesame act is produced by God and by vs. ↩
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A similitude. ↩
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How it is that the will dooth all and God dooth all ↩
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How sinne is the punishment of sinne. ↩
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Rom. 1, 24. ↩
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A conclusion of the question. ↩
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- Tim. 2, 13.
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Barnard. ↩
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Gen. 22, 2. Exod. 11, 2. ↩
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Augustine. ↩
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The proper causes of sinnes particularlie. ↩
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The summe of those things which are expounded in this question. ↩
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What is to be said to the reasons of the first part. To the first. ↩
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To the second. ↩
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To the third. ↩
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Why God taketh not awaie sinne since he hateth it. ↩
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A similitude. ↩
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To the fourth and fift. ↩
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To the sixt. ↩
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A distinction of the will of God ↩
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Exo. 33, 19. ↩
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- Par. 36, 12
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To the seuenth. ↩
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Luk. 19, 41. ↩
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To the right. ↩
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Ose. 13, 9. ↩
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To the ninth. ↩
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Ioh. 8, 44. ↩
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To the tenth. ↩
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Ier. 23, 21. ↩
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To the eleuenth. ↩
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Ioh. 3, 19. ↩
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To the twelfe. ↩
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Iam. 1, 13. ↩
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To the 13. ↩
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In what respect God tempteth. ↩
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Psal. 26, 1. ↩
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To the 14. ↩
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Gen. 18, 25. ↩
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To the 15. ↩
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To the 16. ↩
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The will of God is manifold. ↩
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Iames. 4, 15. ↩
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To the 17. ↩
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Admonitions are not vnprofitable. ↩
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To the 18. ↩
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To the rest of the arguments. ↩
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- Tim. 2, 4.
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How God would haue all men to be saued. ↩
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Matth. 23. 23. and Luk. 11, 42. ↩
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Generall propositions must be restrained. ↩
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Esai. 54, 13. Luke. 3, 6. ↩
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Iohn. 1, 9. ↩
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Matt. 11, 21. ↩
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Psal. 135, 6. ↩
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An answer to the arguments on the second part. Rom. 1, 24. To the first. ↩
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To the second. ↩
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Exod. 9, 12. ↩
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Esaie. 6, 10. ↩
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To the third. ↩
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Rom. 11, 30 ↩
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Rom. 11, 32. ↩
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The blinding of vnbeleeuers. ↩
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To the fourth. Matt. 6, 13. Of leading into temptation. ↩
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Matt. 26, 41, ↩
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Whether the punishment and fault be all one. ↩
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Of voluntarie, and not voluntarie. ↩
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To the fift. ↩
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To the sixt. ↩
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To the seuenth. ↩
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- kin. 22. 22.
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To the eight. God is brought in by the figure Prosopopoeia. ↩
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To the ninth. ↩
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To the 10. 1. Kin. 12, 15 2. Par. 21, 16. ↩
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To the 11. ↩
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Ezec. 14, 9. ↩
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To the 12. ↩
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Prou. 21, 1. To the 13. ↩
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Iob, 12, 24. ↩
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To the 14. ↩
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Psa. 105, 25. ↩
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Esai. 63, 17. ↩
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To the 15. ↩
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Ierem. 4, 10. ↩
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To the 16. ↩
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Ierem. 3, 17. ↩
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To the 17. ↩
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Iosua. 11, 20 ↩
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To harden what it is. ↩
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Rom. 9, 17. verse. 22. ↩
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Prou. 16, 4 ↩
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Iude. 4. ↩
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Zuinglius. ↩
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To the 18. ↩
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An obiection. ↩
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Zacha. 6, 1. ↩
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Iohn. 10, 21. ↩
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Psal. 69, 29. ↩
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To the 19. ↩
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Esaie. 10, 5. and. 19, ↩
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To the 20. ↩
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- Sam, 24, 1. 1. Pa⟨…⟩. ⟨…⟩1, 1.
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Ibidem. ↩
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Matt. 25, 28 ↩
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- Sam. 2, 25
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- Kin. 12, 15
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To the 21. ↩
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Barnard. ↩
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We cannot make choise of anie part without the spirit of God. ↩
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In punishing, there is no respect what wee are able or not able, but what we doo against the lawe of God. ↩
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To the 22. ↩
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Zuinglius. ↩
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To the 23. ↩
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- Par. 15, 16
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To the 24. ↩
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Acts. 2, 23. Acts. 4, 27. ↩
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Matt. 26, 53. ↩
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Of free wil. ↩
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The reconcilement betweene Barnard and Augustine touching freewill. ↩
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What maner of libertie the godlie haue. ↩
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- Cor. 3, 5.
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Phili. 2, 13. ↩
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That nothing is doone without the prouidence of God. Mat, 10, 29. and 30. ↩
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Plato. ↩
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An obiection. ↩
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That God appeereth in visible forms. ↩
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Another obiection. ↩
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Phil. 2, 13. ↩
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The conclusion of this place. ↩
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Philip Melanchthon. ↩
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Looke part 1. place 15. Art. 3. ↩
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The will ⟨…⟩ified, and the will ef⟨…⟩ctuall. ↩
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Psal. 5. 5. and 7. Ibidem. 7. ↩
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Manie things are committed against the signified will of God ↩
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That the will signified is the verie will of God. Mat. 12, 50. Deu. 10, 12, ↩
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The effectuall will. ↩
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Psal. 135. 6. Rom. 9, 19. ↩
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What difference there is betweene these two wils. ↩
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Gen, 22, 2, ↩
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Esaie. 38, 1. ↩
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Ionas. 3, 4. A coniunction of the signified will with the effectuall. ↩
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Gen. 45, 8. ↩
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Gen. 2, 7. ↩
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Prou. 16, 4. ↩
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Rom 9, 21. ↩
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How these words To blind, to harden, &c. are of the fathers interpreted by permission. ↩
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Augustine. ↩
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In what respect God not onelie permiteth, but also would haue sinne. ↩
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Esaie. 10, 15. ↩
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Iob. 1, 21. ↩
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- Sam. 24, 1.
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- Par. 21, 1.
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Prou 21, 1. ↩
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Exod. 7, 13. and 8, 15. ↩
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In what sort Pharao both hardened himselfe, & was hardened by God. ↩
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Psal. 81, 13, ↩
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How the word of permitting is vnderstood in the scriptures. Rom. 1, 24. ↩
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Gen. 3, 24, ↩
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Gen. 19, 13. ↩
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Ezec. 17, 6, ↩
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The scriptures attribute the permission of God as well to good things as to bad. Hebru. 6, 30 ↩
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Augustines opinion of permission. Rom. 9, 22. ↩
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Whether to haue lusts and to be deliuered to them is all one. ↩
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2, Sam. 16, verse. 10. ↩
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The Manicheis. ↩
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Of the sinne of Adam. ↩
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Gregorie. ↩
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In 1. Kin. ⟨…⟩. verse, 16. How God sometimes alloweth those things that he would not to be. ↩
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Mat. 26, 39. ↩
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Exo. 32, 32. ↩
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- Sam. 15, verse, 35.
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Ierem. 28, 6. ↩
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Whether we ought to doo anie thing contrarie vnto the decree of God knowne vnto vs. ↩
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In Gen. 18, verse 22. The things that we knowe God would, are two waies considered. ↩
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Phili. 4, 8. ↩
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- Sam. 7, 1.
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Phili. 2, 13. ↩
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Both our will and vnderstanding must be confo⟨…⟩ med to the will of God ↩
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Rom. 1, 26, and 28. ↩
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- Sam. 24, 1
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- Sam. 16, verse. 11.
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verse. 11. ↩
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Psal. 51, 9. ↩
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Rom. 1, 24. ↩
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Esaie. 10, 5. ↩
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Rom. 7, 8. ↩
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Acts. 17, 28. ↩