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16. The xvj. Chapter. Of Prouidence; vpon Genesis the 28. chapter, v

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The xvj. Chapter. Of Prouidence; vpon Genesis the 28. chapter, verse 16.

1 THe Grecians call prouidence ⟨…⟩, or ⟨…⟩. The Hebrues deriue it from the verbe Hisgiah, in the coniugation Hiphil, which is To see exactlie and to discerne. 2 As touching the definition thereof Cicero saith in his booke De inuentione, that it is that, whereby anie thing to come is forséene before it come to passe. Howbeit, this definition, if it be referred vnto diuine prouidence, dooth not expresse it: bicause this dooth onlie shew the knowledge of that which is to come, and the power of foreknowing. But in diuine prouidence, is not onelie comprehended the knowledge of the mind of God, but also his will and election, whereby things are decréed and determined to come to passe, rather by one way than another. Further, there is also a power and ablenes therein, to gouerne and direct those things which it is said to foresée; for in things, there is not onlie found the nature & substance of them; but also the order wherewith they be knit one with another. And the one so reacheth to the other, that it helpeth it, or is made perfect by it: & both waies things be well ordeined; particularlie, as touching themselues, each of them are said to be good; and generallie, as touching order, excellent good. And that this order is in all things, we may prooue it by the nature of order it selfe: 3 for it is defined by Augustine to be the disposition of things like and vnlike, attributing to euerie one that which belongeth vnto it. But no man is ignorant, that the parts of the world are diuers, and not alike, if they be compared one with another.

Moreouer, how conuenientlie each one of them is allotted by God to his owne place, proper seate, and standing, both experience teacheth, and the holie scriptures testifie. For it is said; That God hath set the seas and the waters their bounds, 4 neither may they passe the limits appointed vnto them. 5 Further; He measureth the aire with his span, &c. And séeing that so great a benefit of his, ought to be ascribed vnto him, in respect of his prouidence, we may thus define it; 6 that It is the meane which God vseth in directing of things to their proper ends. In which definition is not onlie comprehended the knowledge, but also the will and power of dooing it. Wherevpon this that we auouch, Paule in the first chapter to the Ephesians, hath verie well expressed, when he saith; 7 Who worketh al things according to the counsell of his will. And Cicero in his oration for Milo, taught by what tokens this prouidence may be knowne from naturall reason: for thus he writeth; Neither doubtlesse can anie man iudge otherwise, vnlesse it be such a one, as thinketh that there is no heauenlie power, nor diuine maiestie; and whom neither the sunne, neither the motions of the heauens and signes thereof, neither yet the order and course of all things doo mooue; and so foorth. The verie selfe-same demonstration Paule describeth in the first chapter to the Romans. 8 And Iob in the twelfe chapter; Aske the cattell, and the foules of the aire, the fishes of the sea, and the plants of the earth, and they shall informe thee. Also in the 19. psalme; The heauens declare the power of God. 9 Againe Iob in the 39. and 40. chapters; Concerning the goats, the harts, the horse, the Leuiathan, and Behemoth.

2 Wherefore let it thus be determined; 10 the order of things declare, that these things which be created, are not made by chance, and at all aduentures; wherefore God worketh according to his purpose: and vnto his owne prouidence, as vnto a certeine generall and chéefe art, all things are subiect; neither is there anie thing to be found, that can escape the same. Which neuertheles some are bould to denie, who thinke that onelie the chéefe and principall things are committed to the care of God: but the residue, if they be of small account, they attribute to naturall causes; if they be of greater importance, to angels & diuels. Which thing a man may sée in the dialog of Plato called Protagoras, where the creation of things is so described, that some things are granted to Epimetheus to make, and some things to Prometheus. Yet to the intent that mankind might be well prouided for, this only is auouched, that it was doone by the works of the gods. But in the Gospell we be otherwise taught by Christ; 11 All the heares of your head are numbred. And; Of two sparowes not one of them lighteth vpon the ground without the will of your heauenlie father. Againe; The Lord himselfe hath looked downe from heauen vpon the children of men. But if these men would vnderstand the matter thus, as though the prouidence of God extended not it selfe vnto all things, after such a sort as it dooth vnto men: 12 we would grant it; not that the prouidence which is méerelie simple in it selfe, should be said to be manifold; but bicause the effects which be directed by it, are diuers and sundrie, therefore it selfe also séemeth to haue diuers respects. Wherefore we grant, that the prouidence ouer godlie men surmounteth so far, as in comparison of them, it is said by the Lord vnto them that shall be damned, & to the foolish virgins; I knowe you not, 13 and so is it ouer men more than ouer vnreasonable creatures. And by a liuelie faith of this prouidence, 14 we reape manie commodities, and especiallie a comfort in aduersitie; where we knowe that those things happen vnto vs, not by casualtie, but by the will and procurement of God our father. Also we be dailie stirred vp the more vnto good things, when we vnderstand that God is both the knower and witnes of our actions; who afterward will giue a true iudgement of them. Besides this, the gifts which we enioie, be much more acceptable vnto vs in this respect, that they be offered vs by God which prouided them. Further, in the same we behold predestination, which bringeth so great a comfort vnto godlie men, as thereby they are woonderfullie confirmed.

15 3 Neither must we stand in anie feare, that there is anie newnesse in God, bicause of his prouidence. Men, which by their parents are brought foorth into the world without knowledge, can not atteine therevnto without alteration. Which thing we must not surmise as touching God, séeing he hath had his knowledge from all eternitie. Further, we drawe the same from the nature of things; but he hath it of himselfe. Wherefore Iames did trulie write, With him there is no variablenes, nor shadowing by turning. 16 Neither commeth it to passe at any time, that the knowledge of God is changed by the alteration of things. Moreouer, this excellent knowledge is safelie placed in God: for there is no danger, least he should abuse the same as men doo, 17 of whom Ieremie in his fourth chapter writeth; They are wise onlie, to the intent they may doo euill. But God is most excellent, and he hath the knowledge of that thing that is most excellent, which knowledge who so euer hath, can not vse other things amisse, as Plato taught in his second dialogue called Alcibiades; where it is prooued, that without that knowledge, it is better to be ignorant of manie things. For it had bin much better for Orestes, if he had not knowne his mother when he met hir, being determined for to kill hir. Neither is God, 18 by reason of this gouernment of things, remooued from his peaceable felicitie, or from the contemplation of better things. This thing hapneth vnto men, that sometimes by dealing in matters not necessarie, be drawne awaie from weightie and better occupations. Wherefore Paule, 19 not without cause, condemned vaine and curious questions. And this commeth through the slendernes of our vnderstanding, which is not able to applie it selfe to more things at once. But God being infinite as touching all his dooings, can easilie perceiue all things that now be, that shall be, and that at anie time haue bin. 20 Neither is God by this knowledge of things prouoked to euill: for that hapneth vnto men, bicause they haue a corrupt desire.

Wherefore Salomon said; Behold not the wine when it sheweth faire in the glasse, 21 &c. Psalme 119. Turne awaie mine eies least they behold vanitie. And Iob in the 31. chapter, saith, 22 that He made a couenant with his eies, 23 least he should thinke vpon a virgin. But God, which is the principall rule of iustice and goodnes, can not be moued to euill. But Auerroës said, 24 that at the least-wise his vnderstanding should be embaced, 25 if he would looke vpon and acknowledge all these simple things. But bicause he atteineth this knowledge, not from the things, but from himselfe; therefore that is not granted, neither doth it in verie déed follow. Euen as we sée that a glasse is not therefore stained, bicause it sheweth the images of vile things; neither yet is this sunne that we sée, defiled, when it shineth vpon places that be foule and lothsome. Labour also in vnderstanding doth not disquiet God, séeing in this action he vseth no instrument of a bodie; 26 as men doo, vnto whome, by meanes of their bodie, there ariseth labour in vnderstanding, for therin the bodie is verie much afflicted and wearied. Wherefore Salomon vpon iust cause, called this indeuour of knowledge, 27 A consuming and affliction of the spirit: for knowledge sometime bréedeth vnto vs disquietnes. For the more men doo vnderstand, the more things they sée that doo displease them, wherewith they are agréeued. Wherefore not without cause it is said; He that addeth knowledge, 28 increaseth labour also. For we doo not easilie beare those things that be vnwoorthilie committed. But God is not subiect to these humane affections, who hath it in him to fore-sée the end of things: and although the things be vnworthie, yet he directeth them, and knoweth that they shall tend to his owne glorie.

4 But it hath bin no hard matter, to take awaie from diuine prouidence, those obiections, which we haue hitherto remooued: for a plaine and readie waie was offered for the confuting of them. 29 But there remaine certeine other things, more hard to be expounded. The first is, bicause of chance and fortune, which séemeth to be taken awaie from the nature of things, if we attribute vnto God the prouidence of all: for there is nothing more against fortune & chance, than is reason. For fortune is a cause that worketh besides the purpose, when anie thing, not intended, or appointed, or decréed, hapneth to vs vnawares, and besides our expectation. But this argument we resist on this wise; As touching vs, fortune and chance are not taken awaie by the prouidence of God. For what doth let (as touching God) that nothing is doone by chance, but (as touching vs) that manie things be doone rashlie & by fortune? There is brought a méetlie fit similitude: 30 Admit that a maister send his seruant to the market, there to remain till nine of the clocke; which houre being not yet past, if he send thither some other seruant of his; as touching the maister it commeth not to passe rashlie or by chance, that those two seruants méet togither, séeing he fore-séeth the sending vnto that place: but vnto them it commeth not to passe of purpose, séeing the one knew nothing at all of the others comming. Wherefore manie things, which are doone by the fore-sight and knowledge of God, if thou respect the dull and weake cogitation of man, happen by chance and fortune. But if all things (saie they) be directed by God, and doone by his counsell, as we beléeue they be, where shall now be the chance of things? 31 For all things will come to passe of necessitie. And some thinke this argument to be so strong against the prouidence of God, as scarselie the fréedome of our will can be defended. But to this reason is applied in a manner the same forme of answere, which a little before we vsed as touching things that happen by fortune. For it may be, that if thou respect the next causes, those things that doo happen, both are, and are iustlie called things happening by chance; for it is nothing repugnant to that cause, that it bring foorth as well this effect, as another effect that is contrarie therevnto. For as touching mine owne will, it may so come to passe, that I doo sit, as also that I doo not sit. So then if these effects be referred vnto that cause, they shall be, by chance; for they may be otherwise: howbeit, as they be subiect to the prouidence of God, we must not denie but that they are of necessitie. 32 Wherefore there is granted a double necessitie; that is to wit, a necessitie absolute, and a necessitie by supposition. But it may be, that those things which by supposition are of necessitie, if thou take them without supposition, they be things contingent, and not of necessitie.

33 Esaie in the 14. chapter sheweth, that the kingdome of Babylon should be destroied; which was but a chance, as touching the worldlie causes therof: for there was no let, but that it might otherwise be. And yet neuertheles, the prophet minding to shew that it should vndoubtedlie come to passe, groundeth his reason vpon the determinate will of God, and said; God hath so purposed, and who shall be able to dissanull it? The hand of the Lord is now stretched foorth, and who shall plucke it backe? Wherefore the thing now by this reason was of necessitie. And in the 33. psalme we reade; 34 But the counsell of the Lord indureth for euer, and the purposes of his heart from generation to generation. Yet they still vrge the contrarie; Necessitie séemeth to be a let to the prouidence of God: for we consult not of those things which cannot otherwise be. 35 Forsomuch then as there be manie things in the world, which séeme to be of necessitie, those that be of this sort séeme to exclude the prouidence of God. But héere we must vnderstand in this place, that although all things, as they haue relation to the purpose & determinate will of God, being as it were doone and decréed, be of necessitie; yet as concerning God, the appointer and decréer of the act, all things are contingent; and nothing is of such necessitie in the world, but that the same may otherwise be. Neither doo we now speake of the definitions of things, or of necessarie propositions or conclusions; séeing these things are not gouerned by diuine prouidence: for they be descriptions of the eternall truth and diuine nature. Some there be also which thinke, that there should be no euill found in the world, if it were gouerned of God by his prouidence. For none that dealeth prouidentlie in his works, would permit euill to take place. But these may be easilie answered, that there is no euill to be found, that is not either profitable to the saints, and furthereth them to saluation; or that declareth not the iustice and mercie of God; or else that aduanceth not the order of all things, and the preseruation of the same.

¶ The same place is expounded In 1. Sam. 10, verse. 2.

5 But to followe some order herein; first let vs search whether there be anie prouidence, or no; secondlie, what it is; thirdlie, whether all things be subiect vnto it; fourthlie, whether it can be changed; and lastlie, whether it may abide anie casualtie of things. But before I come to the purpose, let vs speake somewhat as touching the signification of the names thereof. Wherefore among the Grecians a thing that commeth by chance is called ⟨…⟩, 36 which is of such sort, as both it may be, and it may not be: and whether it be or be not, there is no absurditie, either against reason, or against the word of God. It is distinguished into 3. parts; of which the first is called by the Grecians ⟨…⟩, bicause it inclineth equallie as much one waie as another. The second ⟨…⟩, which for the most part vseth to happen after this maner or after that, but yet may otherwise come to passe. The third is called ⟨…⟩, bicause it falleth out but seldome, and not vsuallie. The philosophers assigne two grounds or beginnings of chance, one in the matter, 37 the which as it lighteth vpon diuers and sundrie actiue causes, so it receiueth a diuers and sundrie forme; the other in the will, whereby our actions are gouerned: now the will hath consideration of the matter, bicause it is directed and ⟨…⟩ ⟨…⟩ forced by the vnderstanding. Augustine in his booke of questions, 38 quest. 31. saith, Wisedome is by the philosophers diuided into thrée parts; namelie, into vnderstanding, memorie, and prouidence: and that memorie is referred vnto things past, vnderstanding to things present; and that he is prouident, 39 which through the consideration of things past, and things present, can determine what will afterward come to passe. But God, not onelie vnderstandeth and séeth what will come to passe, but he also addeth a will vnto the same. For wée affirme not onelie a bare vnderstanding to be in God, but an effectuall will also, whereby he ruleth and gouerneth all things. 40 This of the Gretians is called ⟨…⟩, that is, Prouidence. And Cicero in his booke De natura deorum, nameth it An old soothsaieng wife of the Stoiks; who was of such account among them in old time, as in the Isle of Delos, she was woorshipped euen for a Goddesse, 41 bicause she helped Latona at hir child-bearing. But that fable signifieth nothing else, but that second causes, although they haue some force in themselues, yet they bring nothing to passe without the prouidence of God. For Latona, is nature; and prouidence the midwife: so that vnlesse this latter be present, doo helpe, and as it were plaie the midwifs part, the other bringeth foorth nothing.

6 But now, as touching those fiue points, which at the beginning I determined to intreat of seuerallie. In the first place, I propound to my selfe, 42 that there is a prouidence: which thing may be prooued by manie sure and inuincible arguments. For first, séeing that God is the author and creator of all things, and that he can doo nothing vnaduisedlie, but that with himselfe he hath his owne certeine and assured reasons, therefore of necessitie there is a prouidence. For if there be no artificer, but that hée séeth the reasons and ends of his worke, and conceiueth the waies by which he may bring the same to his purposed ends; it were a madnes not to attribute that vnto God the chéefe workeman, whome the holie scriptures not onlie teach to be the creator of all things, but as it were a potter. Chrysostome in the 19. Homilie vpon the epistle to the Ephesians saith, that If a ship, though it be sound and well rigged, can not brooke the seas without a good maister or gouernour; how much lesse can the whole workemanship of the world stand without the care and gouernment of God? For if a maister-workeman will not begin to build, before he haue deuised in his mind all the parts, fashions, and fourmes of the building; shall we thinke, that God hath rashlie, without counsell, or reason, made all things vniuersallie? Vndoubtedlie, the heauenlie spheares, the stars, the firmament, the aire, the water, the heate, the cold, so manie causes and changes of things contrarie and repugnant one to another, would fall to ruine, vnlesse they were susteined by some gouernour. Without care and prouidence, our bodie might not be defended from the rigor of the heauen. We call those prouident men, which being of such excellent iudgement and disposition, doo kéepe all the parts of their bodie in their proper office and dutie. But God hath the same place in the world, that the mind hath in man. Besides this, the holie scriptures ascribe vnto God the destructions of kingdoms, and prophesies, and miracles, which things doo far passe the compas of our nature. And last of all, they attribute vnto him the generall iudgement, wherein God will one daie render to euerie man according to their works. Wherefore we, being induced by these, and manie more reasons, doo conclude that there is a prouidence. For we passe not for the Epicureans, whose maner of spéech is this; 43 Euen so the powers on high, With labours toile are prest, The care whereof which on them lie, Bereaue them of their rest. And this also; God walketh vpon the poles of heauen, and considereth not the affaires of men. These monstruous opinions haue they bred, partlie for that they being of grosse wit, could not perceiue higher things; and partlie being of a shamefull and abhominable life, would deuise for themselues this consolation, least they should be perpetuallie tormented with the feare of punishments. For, He that liueth wickedlie, 44 abhorreth the light. And children, when they haue done a fault, would not haue either their father to be at home, or the maister in the schoole. And as touching the first part, these things vndoubtedlie should be sufficient for Christians, who are perswaded onelie by the word of God, without other reason, that there is a prouidence.

7 But what prouidence is, we shall easilie vnderstand by the definition of the same. 45 Prouidence is the power of God, whereby he directeth all things, and bringeth them to their [appointed] ends. In this definition, the generall word is power. Assuredlie, God is most absolute, yet for our capacitie sake, we saie that there is in him two maner of powers, to wit, the power of vnderstanding, & the power of willing. For God vnderstandeth and séeth all things; and not this onelie, but he also willeth all things. Héere I will make no néedles disputation, whether the will of God be before the vnderstanding, or vnderstanding before the will. If anie man would knowe these things, I send them vnto Scotus and Thomas. This power and facultie which I speake of, belongeth vnto the qualitie, for it is a naturall power. The difference is, that God by this power directeth all things, whatsoeuer either be, or hereafter shall be. But yet this is not enough; for he also conducteth them to their ends. But to what ends? Euen vnto agréeable ends. And those be agréeable, which his purpose hath appointed. The power is the cause: and, that things be brought to their proper ends, is the effect. Here haue we comprehended all the kinds of causes which can be assigned in this matter. 46 This I speake, bicause there can be giuen no efficient cause of the prouidence of God. The formall cause is the power of God. The matter whereabout, are all manner of things whatsoeuer; for we in no wise except anie thing. But the finall cause is, that all things may atteine to their owne ends, and may redound to the glorie of God. By this definition we sée, 47 that the prouidence of God is not onlie a bare knowledge, but it is some bringing to effect. For as Paule saith; In him we liue, we mooue, and haue our being. And againe; Of him, and in him, and by him are all things. And as Salomon saith; Man may prepare his heart, but God ordereth the speach. For we are not able to mooue, no not the toong, being the lightest part of the bodie, without the prouidence of God. 48 And Christ saith; that A sparowe dooth not light vpon the ground without the will of our heauenlie Father. And, All the heares of our head are numbered. Some dreame that God indéed made all these things; but after he had made them, 49 cast them off. So (forsooth) carpenters, when they haue doone sufficientlie in building of a house, they afterward leaue the same: but if God should doo so, this world would soone come to ruine. For a house, vnles it be oftentimes repaired and vnderpropped, falleth to ruine and decaie. If the soule be seuered from the bodie, what remaineth, but that the bodie will become putrified and rotten?

Neither are they to be heard, which saie; that God indéed ruleth all things: but that this is nothing else, but to minister vnto all things the common influence, which euerie thing draweth vnto it selfe. This is euen to make God, not in verie déed, but in name to be the ruler and gouernour of the world. 50 For if so be that euerie thing, according to the nature thereof doo bend and applie vnto it selfe that common influence of God, then God followeth the nature of things created; where as rather contrariwise all things created ought to followe and séeke after God. But they saie, that euen as he, which throweth a stone, 51 or shooteth an arrowe, hath doone enough to haue first forced the same, although he himselfe afterward followe not after them, when they be out of his hand: so it was sufficient for God, in that he indued all things with a certeine power, although he do not perpetuallie gouerne them. But these things be not alike; for a stone and an arrowe doo fall immediatelie after that they be shot, bicause that force which is in things created cannot be of long continuance. Wherefore, vnlesse that God should prosecute by his euerlasting care and prouidence, the thing which he hath forced, the nature of euerie thing could not abide. When the Peripatetiks perceiued that all these inferiour things, were continuallie troubled; they iudged that the prouidence of God was aboue the moone: as if it were not conuenient for it to be carefull for these inferiour things, no further foorth than a certeine common influence is therby ministred vnto all things. But these are fond reasons; for the scriptures teach vs, that euen these things, which to vs may séeme to come most of all by chance, 52 are yet gouerned by the prouidence of God. In Deuteronomie the 19. If an ax flieng by chance out of his hands that heweth wood, strike a man and kill him as he passeth by; It is I (saith the Lord) that deliuered him into the hand of the slaier. And in the 14. chapter of Iob, it is said of God; Thou hast appointed man his bounds, which he shall not passe. Also in the booke of wisdome, (which booke though it be not in the canon, yet conteineth it manie good and godlie saiengs) in that booke (I saie) in the eight chapter, it is written; Wisedome reacheth from one end to another ⟨…⟩, 53 & disposeth all things ⟨…⟩: it reacheth (saith he) ⟨…⟩, that is to saie, Strong & mightie: & disposeth Profitablie: for so soundeth ⟨…⟩; & not Sweetlie, as the old translation hath. And that profite, although it be not oftentimes perceiued of vs, yet is it alwaies of such sort, as it dooth tend to the glorie of God.

8 But whether all things be subiect to the prouidence of God, is a matter in controuersie: 54 for some saie, they be; and some saie, they be not. But, as we said before; if God haue made all things, vndoubtedlie nothing is exempted from his prouidence: for if anie thing should be exempted from his prouidence, that also should be exempted from creation. It is written in the epistle to the Hebrues; He vpholdeth all things by the word of his power. The Hebrue p⟨…⟩ase; 55 The word of his power is in sted of His mightie word. This place agréeth with that which we cited out of the booke of wisdome. 56 Ezechiel calleth God; The Lord of all flesh. And Moses calleth God; The Lord of spirits. And Paule saith; 57 It is he that worketh all things, according to the determination of his will. Also Hesiodus an Ethnike poet saith; In this life we can no where escape from the mind of God. Yet there be some which would exempt from Gods prouidence, men and frée will, and things that either be of necessitie, or that come by chance. Cicero in his booke De fato saith; that The most ancient philosophers, such as Empedocles and Heraclitus, affirmed, that All things come to passe of necessitie: but the Peripatetikes were of the opinion, that manie things come by chance. And Chrysippus as a notable vmpire, although he taught that all other things were of necessitie; yet affirmed, that mans will, as touching the first election, is frée. Wherefore Eusebius in his treatise De praeparatione euangelica, said pleasantlie, that Democritus made men to be slaues; but that Chrysippus made them but halfe slaues.

Also Cicero in his second booke De diuinatione, will rather exclude all prouidence, than that men should not be frée. Which vanitie Augustine deriding in his fift booke De ciuitate Dei, saith, that He to make men frée, had made them rob God of his glorie. So we sée, that there be some which thinke not, that all things be vnder prouidence: but in that they except man by name, which is the chéefest workemanship of God, that séemeth too contumelious a thing against God. For séeing all artificers contemne trifling works of small value, but doo adorne, and haue a speciall care of those works which be excellent; who will imagin that God could despise that worke, which of all other he made most choice of? And if it should be so, in what state stand we? What refuge should we haue in aduersitie? 58 Dauid saith; Cast all thy care vpon God, and he will nourish thee. And Peter saith, It is he that taketh care of you. And Zacharie; He that toucheth you, shall touch the apple of mine eie. And I (saith the Lord) am thy buckler, and thy strong wall. The Lord (saith Dauid ) is my helper, and I shall not be afraid what man can doo against me. Though their tents were pitched against mee, yet my hart shall not be afraid.

59 9 But thou wilt saie, that In inferior matters, manie things are done either without order, or else disorderlie: for we sée often-times the godlie to be oppressed, and the wicked to flourish. Admit it be so; but is there no prouidence therefore, bicause we doo not sée the causes thereof? If peraduenture thou shouldest be in a smithes shop, 60 and séest manie tooles, some crooked, some bowed, some hooked, and some sawed in; wouldest thou strait-waie condemne them all for naught, bicause they appeare not straight and handsome? I thinke not; but thou wouldest rather confesse thy selfe to be ignorant of the vse of them. Such an honor must be giuen to God, as when thou séest tyrants and wicked men to enioie wealth and prosperitie, thou must saie, that they be instruments of the prouidence of God, although thou canst not perceiue what God intendeth by them. Augustine saith, that God is so good, as he is able to drawe out some goodnes euen out of the wicked. Further, if there were no tyrants, what vertue & patience of martyrs should there be? God will haue some to be the triumph of his goodnes, he will haue some also vpon whom he may exercise his might and power. But perhaps thou wilt saie; Is it not enough that men be martyrs in the preparation of their mind? Indéed there be noble vertues hidden in the minds of the godlie, but yet oftentimes this dooth not satisfie God: he will bring them foorth into act, that they may be séene. Wherefore our eies must be lifted vp, that we thinke not of the vngodlie, but of God. So the prophets call Nabuchadnezar, Pharao, 61 and Senacherib, hatchets, hammers, sawes, and swords in the hand of God.

Iob, when he was turned out of all that he had, respected not the Chaldaeans, nor the diuell, but said; The Lord gaue, 62 and the Lord hath taken awaie. He is accounted a learned physician, 63 which can drawe out vnto the outward part of the bodie the corrupt humors, which be hidden within the bodie; yet we would abhorre blanes and sores: but the physician saith, that then the sicke man beginneth to heale, when such things breake foorth. In like maner God, with his medicines and fires of persecutions bringeth into light those things, which before laie hidden in our minds. Let the wicked doo what they will, yet can they doo nothing more than is the will of God. So said Peter in the Acts as touching Pilat and Herod; 64 They agreed togither, that they might doo, whatsoeuer thy will and thy counsell had decreed to doo.

10 But thou wilt saie; 65 Some things be of necessitie, which cannot otherwise be than they are; doo those fall vnder the prouidence of God? Yea trulie, there is nothing created of such necessitie, but if it be referred vnto God, it hath the nature of a thing that commeth by chance. For as we said; God reacheth from end to end, and ordereth all things. What thing is of more necessitie than the course of the s⟨…⟩nne? And yet Iosua made the sunne to stand still. 66 What thing is of more necessitie, than that the fire should burne, if fuell be applied therevnto? Therefore it hath béene an old saieng; If actiue things be applied to things passiue, the action must follow of necessitie. Yet neuertheles God brought to passe, that those thrée yoong men walked safelie in the flaming fornace. 67 What is of more necessitie, than that the shadowe should followe the sunne shining? And yet God brought to passe, that when the sunne did shine, 68 the shadowe went backward. But man séemed to haue béene made, and to be left in the hand of his owne counsell. 69 Thou shalt keepe those things (saith Ecclesiasticus) & they shall keepe thee. I grant that man, as concerning the inward causes, was so made at the beginning, as nothing could be to him of anie necessitie: but we doo not therefore exclude the grace of God and prouidence. Let vs heare the holie scriptures as touching that matter. For Ecclesiasticus is not among the number of the canonicall books; 70 The kings hart (saith Salomon) is in the hand of God. 71 But God saith; I haue giuen them precepts. 72 But he also saith; I will make you to walke in my commandements. Againe; I will giue you a new hart, 73 and a new spirit. Wherefore man is not to be exempted from the prouidence of God.

11 But much lesse are those things to be excluded, which séeme to be doone by chance. 74 For although we can not perceiue the reason of the second causes, yet God séeth it; yea, the Philosophers teach vs, that euerie cause, which they call Per accidens, that is, Comming by chance, must be reuoked vnto that which is a cause by it selfe: for that which is Per accidens, can not be anie cause. Wherfore Aristotle in his litle booke De bona fortuna, when he demanded for what cause some were fortunate, and some not? He answered, that it is doone by a certeine violent motion, and impulsion; whereof neuerthelesse, he that is driuen, can not yéeld a cause: hereby it commeth to passe (saith he) that some are fortunate, 75 and some not. Furthermore he saith, that this euent, if it be referred to our will & knowledge, happeneth by chance; but that inforcement is a cause by it selfe. But the question is not thus dissolued. For how commeth it to passe, that this fortune is giuen to one man, and not to another? The Astrologers would supplie that, which they thought Aristotle wanted. Ptolome in his booke ⟨…⟩, referreth this vnto the starres; by which (he saith) men being diuerslie borne, are carried some to prosperitie, and some to aduersitie. And this, some called, A power, 76 some Constellation, and other some Particular destinie; Socrates called it Daemoniu~. But whie it happeneth more to one man, than to another; & more at one time, than at another; none other cause can be assigned, but the prouidence of God: which vndoubtedlie is, that all things should be referred to the glorie of God.

77 It is not you (saith Ioseph to his brethren) that sould me into Aegypt; but God sent me hither before you. So God said that he sent Saule vnto Samuel, 78 although it séemed as if he had turned out of the waie to him by chance. So Christ said vnto his Apostles; 79 There shall one meete you bearing a pitcher of water. These things were certeine vnto the prouidence of God, although otherwise in the sight of men, they might séeme but things comming by chance. But thou wilt saie; Be there then no second causes? Dooth God nothing by his angels? We take not awaie the second causes; but we make them instruments of the prouidence of God: for Angels be administring spirits. 80 And Dauid saith; Who doo execute his will. But although God send his angels, yet he him selfe is present and principall ouer all things; If I shall ascend (saith Dauid) into heauen, 81 thou art there; if I go downe into hell, thou art there also. For he dooth not so giue his angels charge, as though he him selfe were absent. Which thing the poets feigne of Apollo, that he placed P⟨…⟩aëton in his chariot, and by that meanes all the heauens in his absence were set on fire. But sinnes, (will some man saie) depend not on prouidence. 82 How sinnes be ruled by God, shall be shewed afterward. In the meane time this I saie; The cause of sinne vndoubtedlie commeth from vs: but at what time, and against whom it should breake foorth, that is in the power of God. It was wholie determined by Nabuchadnezar, 83 that he would oppresse some people; but that he should oppresse the Iewes more than others, that was prouided by God.

12 The next question is, 84 Whether this prouidence be immutable. Whie should it not? For it is the rule of all things that be doone. It is written in the third of Malachie; I am the Lord, & am not changed. In the first of Iames; With him there is no variablenes, 85 nor shadowing by turning. And in the 19. of Prouerbs; There be manie cogitations in the hart of man, 86 but the counsell of the Lord continueth stedfast. In the 46. of Esaie; It is I that speake, 87 and my counsell abideth surelie, and I doo what so euer pleaseth me. For séeing prouidence is both the knowledge and will of God, and that those things belong to the verie essence of God, it can not be changed, except God him selfe be changed therewithall. The second causes indéed, séeing they be diuerse and sundrie, they oftentimes hinder themselues; 88 which thing we sée come to passe in the influences of heauen, that some of them be an impediment to others; but the will of God can not be hindred by anie violence. In old time God ordeined the ceremonies of the Iewes, 89 afterward he would haue them to be abrogated. How then? Is not the prouidence of God mutable? I answere; that In God is altogether one and the selfe-same will; but that he fore-sawe from the beginning, what might agrée with the diuersitie of times. Augustine to Marcellinus saith, that A husbandman doth sometime sowe, sometime reape, and sometime compasse the soile; yet we must not saie that the art of husbandrie is therefore mutable. Vindicianus saith, that A certeine physician ministred a medicine to a sicke man, and healed him; and that he manie yeares after falling into the same disease, tooke the same medicine without the counsell of the physician: but when he waxed woorse, he came to the physician, shewing him the matter, and began to complaine of the medicine. No maruell (quoth Vindicianus ) then; for I ministred not the same vnto thée. Now when some men marueled thereat, and were of opinion that he vsed some inchantment; There is no such matter (saith he) for now is he of another age, and hath other humors than he had when I gaue him that his medicine. But shall not therefore the art of physick be like it self? Euen so in anie wise God, although he foresée all things, yet he hath not decréed, that all things should be done at one time.

90 13 Now let vs come to chance. If so be that the prouidence of God be so certeine, whether can it admit anie casualtie? Here will I first vse two distinctions, and afterward I will answere. There is one necessitie which is absolute, and an other conditionall. For when we saie, that God is wise or iust, we vnderstand that that is simplie, and absolutelie necessarie. There be other things necessarie by supposition; as that which is commonlie canuassed in the schooles, to wit, that whatsoeuer is, while it is, is necessarie. Christ and the prophets fore-shewed that the citie of Ierusalem should be ouerthrowne; therefore of necessitie it shall be ouerthrowne: not that this necessitie is in the nature of the citie, but bicause Christ & the prophets haue foretold it, 91 who could not be deceiued. Paule saith; that There must needs be heresies: 92 & Christ saith; It is necessarie that offenses come. For these causes being set downe; namelie, the corrupt natures of men, & the diuels hatred towards mankind: & the end being granted, to wit that the elect shuld be tried, it is necessarie by supposition, that it should so com to passe. 93 Also things may be considered two maner of waies, either as they be in act; & in that case they haue the nature of necessitie, for they be no longer indefinite. As, to write, or not to write, is by chance: but if thou be now in the act of writing, it is no more chance, but necessarie. Wherfore we saie that the knowledge of the senses is certeine, bicause the things themselues cannot otherwise be. Or else things may be considered, as they lie hidden in their causes: but séeing causes may sometime bring foorth effects, and sometimes not, therefore there is no necessarie power of working in them. But if those things be referred vnto God, the reason is far otherwise: 94 For he calleth those things which be not, as though they were; for he comprehendeth all time, and hath neither beginning nor ending. All things also, which are to come for euer hereafter, are notwithstanding present vnto him. Here also commeth in the will of God; for we must not ascribe vnto him a bare knowledge; but such as is effectuall, or actuall. And by this meanes I saie, that the verie things themselues are to be considered as necessarie. Augustine In genesi ad literam, the sixt booke, chapter 15. There be manie waies whereby man, and other things might haue béene made by God, and those meanes had some possibilitie, and no necessitie: but this is by the will of God, 95 whose will is the necessitie of things. And though such things, being referred vnto God, be necessarie; yet of vs they must be weighed according to their inward and proper causes, and so be called things contingent, or that come by chance. For it is of no necessitie, that such as the efficient cause is, such also should be the effect.

14 If thou demand, 96 Whie these two kinds of causes be in the nature of things, so as some be limited and necessarie, others indefinit and contingent? Nothing else can be answered, but that God hath laid these conditions vpon all things. God bringeth foorth all things, and he limiteth and boundeth all things; but yet so, as he neither confoundeth nor destroieth the nature of things. Boëtius in his Topiks saith, that Destinie is so called, of drawing to, and giuing place fitlie: for God draweth all things; but yet after a sort so giueth place, as he disturbeth nothing. Euen so things, although in their owne nature they incline indifferentlie on both parts; yet by God, they are made to incline more to one side than to another. The will of Saule, 97 of his owne nature, was no more determined to go than to tarrie: but when God would send him vnto Samuel, that will began to incline to the one part. And therefore God put into his mind the will of his father, and brought to passe, that the same should effectuallie mooue and persuade his mind: and that all other desires of rest and ease (if anie were) that might haue reteined him at home, should be subdued. Wherfore it came to passe, that the will of Saule obeied the prouidence of God. But yet in the meane time, the nature of the thing was not violated; but that the will of Saule was alike frée vnto either part. Hereby it appéereth, how necessarie the grace of God is vnto vs. For our owne will, as it is all manner of waies corrupted, turneth all things to the worser part. Also there be manie things, which doo dull and blind our vnderstanding, that the will cannot easilie followe. God therefore propoundeth good vnto our vnderstanding, afterward he kindleth faith, & stirreth vp the will that we doo will the same effectuallie.

15 But thou wilt saie; 98 Why is anie thing said to be contingent, séeing God hath alreadie determined of the one part, and so it is made a thing of necessitie? I answere; Euerie thing of his owne propertie and beginning is contingent; but prouidence, which bringeth a necessitie, is an outward cause, of which nothing ought to be named. I knowe there be manie, which affirme, that those things which can not be done by mans power, are brought vnto that passe by God, that our will may either choose or refuse them; 99 and that there the prouidence of God staieth, and goeth no further: but when as God foreséeth what euerie man will choose, and what he will refuse, his foreknowledge hindreth nothing at all. Howbeit, these saiengs doo not sufficientlie agrée with the holie scriptures. For they teach, that God doth not prouide for things, that he will forsake them; but that (as we haue said) he may conduct them to their ends, and those ends doo serue the prouidence of God. For so saith Paule; God hath made all things according to the purpose of his will. 100 So said God himselfe in Esaie; 101 All things that I will, I doo. 102 And Christ saith; Verelie, euen a little sparowe lighteth not vpon the ground without the will of our father. I knowe that Origin, Cyrill, Chrysostome, and others being vrged by certeine manifest places of the scriptures, such as these are; 103 It behooued Christ to suffer; The scripturs ought to be fulfilled, do thus interpret them; to wit, that these things did not therefore come to passe, bicause God fore-sawe them; but therefore God fore-sawe them, 104 bicause they should come to passe. This iudgement of theirs, if they spake as touching absolute knowledge, could not much be reprehended. For, not bicause I sée a man writing, therefore he writeth; but bicause he writeth, therefore I sée him writing. Howbeit, we cannot affirme a bare knowledge in God, but we must also attribute vnto him a will, whereby he directeth and ordereth all things. Yet shall it be true that they say, if their meaning be of the effect, or (as they saie) A posteriore, that is, of the latter. For we hereof, that a thing is doone, doo vnderstand, that it was the purpose of God that so it should be. Otherwise the scriptures speake verie plainelie; It behooued Christ to die; 105 It behooued that the scriptures should be fulfilled. But how did it behooue? By supposition; bicause God so for-sawe it: not that that necessitie was in the nature of the thing.

106 16 But peraduenture thou wilt saie, that therefore the causes in the nature of the thing it selfe be infinit, for that I take not the perfect and full causes, in so much as I should haue added the prouidence of God. I answere; I onelie take the inward and proper causes of euerie thing, whose effects, bicause they might or might not be brought foorth by them, be things contingent. But I adde not prouidence, bicause the same is an outward cause. The which being added, it cannot be auoided, but that by supposition, 107 some necessitie must followe. For, Saule met with men carrieng of kids, bread, & wine: their will, in respect of the nature thereof, was infinite, either to haue giuen him, or not to haue giuen him anie thing: but God by his prouidence did limit that will vnto the one part. They went to Bethel, there to sacrifice; they met with Saule wearie vpon the waie, & almost dead with hunger; it séemed a courtesie to refresh him: this did God put into their minds. And if there were anie thing, which might be a let vnto this will, those things he bridled. And these things we dispute onelie concerning the wils of men: for otherwise, in other things which be contingent, I knowe the means be infinite, which God is woont to vse. Another example of this matter we haue out of the 21. chapter of Ezechiel; 108 Nabuchadnezar marched into Syria, and when he was now onward on the waie, at a place where two waies met, he began to consult with himselfe, whether it were better for him to lead his power against the Iewes, or else against Rabath the chéefe citie of the Ammonits. Hée drew lots therevpon, the lots did God so frame, that he brought him to Ierusalem. The nature of the thing it selfe was contingent, but the same being appointed of God became a thing of necessitie. 109 Ioseph was so sold and carried into Aegypt, that as concerning the nature of the thing, it might be, that either he should liue alwaies in bondage, or else that he should at one time or other be deliuered. But God sent dreames into the Baker and Butler; those dreames did Ioseph interpret: afterward he shewed Pharao a dreame, which when none of the diuinours could expound, the Butler gaue him intelligence of Ioseph: and by this meanes it came to passe, that Ioseph was deliuered out of prison. Wherefore be it thus determined (as we haue said) that all things hauing relation to the prouidence of God, be necessarie; but of their owne nature are contingent.

But thou wilt say; 110 Shall th⟨…⟩ffects be absolutelie called things comming by chance, or rather of necessitie? Some there be, that for the dignitie of prouidence, will haue them called necessarie: but I would rather call them contingent, according to their owne nature. Albeit I will not greatlie striue, so that the same necessitie be vnderstood onelie by supposition. Rightlie did some of the Gréeks name prouidence ⟨…⟩, of pass⟨…⟩ing through; bicause it passeth through euerie thing: others called it ⟨…⟩, bicause nothing can escape it. Some will saie, that we receiue the opinion of the Stoiks concerning destinie. That is not true; for they defined their destinie to be a necessitie by a knitting togither of causes, and affirmed that the same did ouer-rule euen God himselfe. But contrariwise, we teach that God gouerneth all things, and that he vseth them to his owne glorie. But if they affirme that destinie is nothing else, but the prouidence of God; the question is onlie as touching the word, and not of the thing: as Augustine else-where hath taught. Lastlie, thou wilt saie, that by this meanes, 111 there will be no place for aduisements, admonitions, and corrections, séeing that which God will, must néeds come to passe. The selfe same thing was obiected to Augustine, wherevpon he wrote the booke De correptione & gratia. Vndoubtedlie God, although he haue decréed a thing to be doone, yet he vseth meanes in bringing the same to passe. He will change the naughtie will of man; he vseth admonitions, preachings, and chastisements. For these be the instruments of Gods prouidence: so farre is it that the prouidence of God excludeth them. In this question we haue set in a maner the roots, and laid the foundations of predestination: but of it we will intreate an other time, when opportunitie shall serue.

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Footnotes

  1. In Gen. 28, verse 16. ↩

  2. A definition of prouidence. ↩

  3. That there is an order in things. Order is defined. ↩

  4. Iere, 5, 22. ↩

  5. Esai. 40, 12. ↩

  6. A true definition of prouidence. ↩

  7. Ephes. 1, 11. ↩

  8. Rom. 1, ⟨…⟩0, Iob. 12, 7. ↩

  9. Psal. 29, 1. Iob. chap. 39. & 40. ↩

  10. Whether al things be ruled by the prouidence of God. ↩

  11. Mat. 10, 19. ↩

  12. Prouidence seemes of sundrie respects by reason of the diuers eff⟨…⟩c⟨…⟩s in things. ↩

  13. Matt. 25, 12. ↩

  14. The vse of prouidence. ↩

  15. Whether prouidence doo bring anie changing in God ↩

  16. Iam. 1, 17. ↩

  17. Ierem. 4, 12. ↩

  18. It is no let to the felicitie of God. ↩

    1. Tim. 1, 4. and 4, 7. 2. Tim. 2, 22. Titus. 3, 9.
    ↩

  20. It stirreth not vp vnto euill. ↩

  21. Pro. 23, 31. ↩

  22. Psa. 119, 37. ↩

  23. Iob. 31, 1. ↩

  24. Auerroës. ↩

  25. It embaceth not his vnderstanding ↩

  26. It bringeth no labour vnto God. ↩

  27. Eccles. 2, 17. ↩

  28. Eccles. 1, 18. ↩

  29. Whether prouidence take awaie chance and fortune. ↩

  30. A similitude. ↩

  31. Whether prouidence take awaie the contingence of things. ↩

  32. Necessitie of two sorts ↩

  33. Esay. 14, 17. ↩

  34. Psal. 33, 11. ↩

  35. Whether necessitie be a let vnto prouidence. ↩

  36. What is a thing contingent, and how manie sorts there be. ↩

  37. Two grounds of contingence ↩

  38. Prudence deuided into three parts. ↩

  39. Who is prouident. ↩

  40. ⟨…⟩. ↩

  41. Prouidence worshipped as a God. ↩

  42. That there is a prouidence. ↩

  43. Why the Epicures denie prouidence. ↩

  44. Iohn. 3, 20. ↩

  45. What prouidence is. ↩

  46. All the causes of prouidence. No efficient cause of the prouidence of God. ↩

  47. Prouidence is no bare but an efficient knowledge. Acts. 17, 28. Rom. 11, 36. Prou. 16, 1. ↩

  48. Matt. 10, 19. ↩

  49. A similitude. ↩

  50. Whether God onlie by common influence doo rule all things. ↩

  51. A similitude. ↩

  52. That God dooth gouerne both the superiour and the inferiour things. Deut. 19, 5. Iob. 14, 5. ↩

  53. Wisdo. 8, 1. ↩

  54. Whether all things be vnder the prouidence of God. ↩

  55. Heb. 1, 3. ↩

  56. Ezec. 18, 4. Num. 11, 29. ↩

  57. Ephe. 1, 11. ↩

  58. Psalm. 37, 5. 1. Pet. 5, 7. Zacharie. 2, verse. 8. Gen. 15, 1. Psal. 56, 12. Psalm. 27, 3. ↩

  59. If prouidence doo gouerne all things, why is there such a confusion of things? ↩

  60. A similitude. ↩

  61. Esaie. 10, 5. ↩

  62. Iob. 1, 21. ↩

  63. A similitude. ↩

  64. Acts. 4, 24. ↩

  65. Whether things of necessitie be vnder prouidence. ↩

  66. Iosua. 10, 1⟨…⟩. ↩

  67. Dan. 3, 93. ↩

  68. Esaie. 38, 8. ↩

  69. Ecclesiasticus. 15, 14. ↩

  70. Prou. 16. 1. ↩

  71. Ezec. 20. 11. ↩

  72. Ezec. 36. 26. ↩

  73. Man is not exempted from the prouidence of God. ↩

  74. Things by chance are vnder the prouidence of God. ↩

  75. Why some be fortunate and some not. ↩

  76. Daemoniu~ hath relation aswell to ill fortune, as to good. ↩

  77. Gen. 45. 8. ↩

    1. Sa. 9. 16.
    ↩

  79. Mar. 14. 13. ↩

  80. Heb. 1. 14. Psal. 102. ↩

  81. Psal. 139. 8. ↩

  82. How sinnes doo depend of Gods prouidence. ↩

  83. Ezec. 21. 21. ↩

  84. Whether prouidence be vnchangeable. Mala. 3. 6. ↩

  85. Iames. 1. 17. ↩

  86. Prou. 19. 12 ↩

  87. Esai. 46. 10. ↩

  88. A similitude. ↩

  89. God would once haue ceremonies, and afterward he abrogated them. ↩

  90. Things comming by chance. A distinction of necessitie. Looke part 2. Art. 22. chapter. 2. and part. 3. chap. 1. Art. 49. ↩

  91. Matt. 24, 1. ↩

    1. Cor. 11 verse 19. Matt. 18, 7.
    ↩

  93. Two sundrie respects of things. ↩

  94. Rom. 4, 17. ↩

  95. In what respect things be of necessitie, and in what respect contingent. ↩

  96. Why in nature some things be necessarie, and other some contingent. ↩

  97. God maketh things of equall weight to incline on the one side. 1. Sam. 9. 16. ↩

  98. How it can be said contingent, when it is determined by God. ↩

  99. That God worketh our will to choose or refuse, and that prouidence goeth no further. ↩

  100. Ephes. 1, 11. ↩

  101. Esai. 46, 10. ↩

  102. Matt. 10, 29. ↩

  103. Luk. 24, 26. Luk. 22, 23. ↩

  104. Whether things com to passe bicause God fore-sawe them, or contrariwise. ↩

  105. Luk. 24, 26. Iohn. 19, 36. ↩

  106. How causes are infinit. ↩

    1. Sam. 10, 3.
    ↩

  108. Eze. 21, 23. ↩

  109. Gen. 37, 28. ↩

  110. Whether effects be necessarie or contingent. ↩

  111. Whether counsels & admonitions be taken awaie by prouidence. ↩

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