NOw it shall be good to intreat somewhat of the libertie of our will. 1 And at this present we will inquire how much fréewill the naturall corruption, which came by originall sinne, hath left vnto vs: speciallie, séeing whatsoeuer we doo well, all that is said to be attributed vnto the grace of God. 2 And although this word Free will be not read in the holie scriptures; yet the thing it selfe must not séeme to be either imagined or deuised. The Gréekes call it ⟨…⟩, which is, Of his owne power, or, Of his owne right: the which same thing the Latins signifie, when they call it Libertatem arbitrij, that is; The libertie or the choise of will. For that is frée, which followeth not the will of another, but his owne will. But the choise séemeth herein to consist, 3 that we followe, as we thinke good, those things which be decréed by reason. Then doubtles the will is frée when as it imbraceth those things, 4 which be allowed of the considering part of the mind. Wherefore the nature of frée choise, although it doo most of all declare it selfe in the will, 5 yet dooth the root thereof consist in reason. But they, which will vse this power aright, must haue a speciall regard, that there fall no error into reason. Which error commonlie is woont to come two maner of waies: for either it is vnknowne to vs what is iust, & what is vniust in the dooings of things; 6 or else if we doo knowe it, yet we faile in giuing iudgement of the reasons, which are woont to be alledged on both parts. For euer, in a maner, our lust ioineth it selfe vnto the weaker argument. 7 Whereof it coms to passe oftentimes, that the stronger and the better reason is neglected and forsaken.
And this we sée dooth oftentimes happen in disputations: for they which take vpon them to defend the weaker part, are woont to set a shew vpon the same, with all the ornaments and colours that they can; to the intent the hearers being allured with eloquence & counterfet spéech, may not throughlie weigh wherein the strength & weight of the argument doth consist. Moreouer, 8 it is to be vnderstood, that men doo not co~monlie deliberate concerning all maner of things; but of those onlie, which of the Gréeks be called ⟨…⟩, that is; Which are to be doone of vs. And in verie déed, all the things, which either we prosecute or refuse, 9 haue not néed of deliberation: for there be some things so manifest and vndoubtedlie good, [or euill] as it sufficeth that they be named; for they be foorthwith either chosen or refused: such are felicitie, infelicitie, life, death, and whatsoeuer is of the like sort. But there be certeine other more obscure or indifferent, vpon which things men are woont to deliberate. That God is to be worshipped, all men confesse, without anie doubting; but after what maner, and with what rites and ceremonies he must be worshipped; therein is great doubt. That it is profitable for men to be togither in cities, and to mainteine fellowship, all men doo knowe: but by what lawes they must be ruled, or what kind of Commonweale ought to be vsed; 10 there men manie times doo doubt verie much. In these, and such other like things is frée will occupied.
11 2 I define frée will after this sort; Frée will is a facultie or power, whereby we either take or refuse, as we lust our selues, those things, which be iudged by reason. But whether such a kind of power be in men or no, or how it is in them, cannot with one answer be defined. First we must of necessitie distinguish the state and condition of man. There be verelie found in man foure differences of state at the least: 12 for the state of Adam, when he was created in the beginning, was farre differing from the state after his fall; such as is now also the state of all his posteritie. Moreouer, they which be regenerated in Christ, be in farre better state, than they which liue without Christ; for we shall become most happie, and most frée, when we haue put off this mortall bodie: wherefore we will make answer vnto the proposed question, 13 according to these foure states. We must beléeue, that Adam in his first creation, had frée will: which thing, before I shall declare, thrée kinds of works, that be in vs, are to be noted. Of the which some doo apperteine vnto nature; as to be sicke, to be in health, to be nourished, to digest our meate, and such other like: in the which things, albeit the first man was a great deale more happie, than we be at this present; yet he was subiect vnto some necessitie: for it behooued him both to eate, to be nourished, and to take meate. Neuertheles, he was frée from all calamities, which might bring death. There are other works also, which after a ciuill or morall consideration, be either iust or vniust. The third kind is of those works, which be liking and acceptable to God. As concerning all these, man was frée from the beginning: for He was created vnto the image of God, vnto whom nothing dooth better agrée, 14 than true & perfect libertie. And of him it is thus written; 15 God hath crowned him with glorie & honor: and againe; When he was in honor, 16 he knew it not. And what honour can there be, where libertie wanteth? Lastlie, God made subiect vnto him all things which he had created: 17 the which out of doubt he could not trulie, and according to right reason haue gouerned, if he himselfe had béene created a slaue vnto affections and lusts. But in what sort that state was, séeing there wanteth scripture to shew vs; there can nothing be defined for certeintie.