20. The second Chapter. Of Free will

NOw it shall be good to intreat somewhat of the libertie of our will. ¹ And at this present we will inquire how much fréewill the naturall corruption, which came by originall sinne, hath left vnto vs: speciallie, séeing whatsoeuer we doo well, all that is said to be attributed vnto the grace of God. ² And although this word Free will be not read in the holie scriptures; yet the thing it selfe must not séeme to be either imagined or deuised. The Gréekes call it ⟨…⟩, which is, Of his owne power, or, Of his owne right: the which same thing the Latins signifie, when they call it Libertatem arbitrij, that is; The libertie or the choise of will. For that is frée, which followeth not the will of another, but his owne will. But the choise séemeth herein to consist, ³ that we followe, as we thinke good, those things which be decréed by reason. Then doubtles the will is frée when as it imbraceth those things, ⁴ which be allowed of the considering part of the mind. Wherefore the nature of frée choise, although it doo most of all declare it selfe in the will, ⁵ yet dooth the root thereof consist in reason. But they, which will vse this power aright, must haue a speciall regard, that there fall no error into reason. Which error commonlie is woont to come two maner of waies: for either it is vnknowne to vs what is iust, & what is vniust in the dooings of things; ⁶ or else if we doo knowe it, yet we faile in giuing iudgement of the reasons, which are woont to be alledged on both parts. For euer, in a maner, our lust ioineth it selfe vnto the weaker argument. ⁷ Whereof it coms to passe oftentimes, that the stronger and the better reason is neglected and forsaken.

And this we sée dooth oftentimes happen in disputations: for they which take vpon them to defend the weaker part, are woont to set a shew vpon the same, with all the ornaments and colours that they can; to the intent the hearers being allured with eloquence & counterfet spéech, may not throughlie weigh wherein the strength & weight of the argument doth consist. Moreouer, ⁸ it is to be vnderstood, that men doo not co~monlie deliberate concerning all maner of things; but of those onlie, which of the Gréeks be called ⟨…⟩, that is; Which are to be doone of vs. And in verie déed, all the things, which either we prosecute or refuse, ⁹ haue not néed of deliberation: for there be some things so manifest and vndoubtedlie good, [or euill] as it sufficeth that they be named; for they be foorthwith either chosen or refused: such are felicitie, infelicitie, life, death, and whatsoeuer is of the like sort. But there be certeine other more obscure or indifferent, vpon which things men are woont to deliberate. That God is to be worshipped, all men confesse, without anie doubting; but after what maner, and with what rites and ceremonies he must be worshipped; therein is great doubt. That it is profitable for men to be togither in cities, and to mainteine fellowship, all men doo knowe: but by what lawes they must be ruled, or what kind of Commonweale ought to be vsed; ¹⁰ there men manie times doo doubt verie much. In these, and such other like things is frée will occupied.

¹¹ 2 I define frée will after this sort; Frée will is a facultie or power, whereby we either take or refuse, as we lust our selues, those things, which be iudged by reason. But whether such a kind of power be in men or no, or how it is in them, cannot with one answer be defined. First we must of necessitie distinguish the state and condition of man. There be verelie found in man foure differences of state at the least: ¹² for the state of Adam, when he was created in the beginning, was farre differing from the state after his fall; such as is now also the state of all his posteritie. Moreouer, they which be regenerated in Christ, be in farre better state, than they which liue without Christ; for we shall become most happie, and most frée, when we haue put off this mortall bodie: wherefore we will make answer vnto the proposed question, ¹³ according to these foure states. We must beléeue, that Adam in his first creation, had frée will: which thing, before I shall declare, thrée kinds of works, that be in vs, are to be noted. Of the which some doo apperteine vnto nature; as to be sicke, to be in health, to be nourished, to digest our meate, and such other like: in the which things, albeit the first man was a great deale more happie, than we be at this present; yet he was subiect vnto some necessitie: for it behooued him both to eate, to be nourished, and to take meate. Neuertheles, he was frée from all calamities, which might bring death. There are other works also, which after a ciuill or morall consideration, be either iust or vniust. The third kind is of those works, which be liking and acceptable to God. As concerning all these, man was frée from the beginning: for He was created vnto the image of God, vnto whom nothing dooth better agrée, ¹⁴ than true & perfect libertie. And of him it is thus written; ¹⁵ God hath crowned him with glorie & honor: and againe; When he was in honor, ¹⁶ he knew it not. And what honour can there be, where libertie wanteth? Lastlie, God made subiect vnto him all things which he had created: ¹⁷ the which out of doubt he could not trulie, and according to right reason haue gouerned, if he himselfe had béene created a slaue vnto affections and lusts. But in what sort that state was, séeing there wanteth scripture to shew vs; there can nothing be defined for certeintie.

Augustine in his booke De correptione & gratia, ¹⁸ saith; that The helpe of the grace of God was bestowed vpon Adam: & such an helpe it was, as both he might forsake it when he would, and therein might remaine, if he would; but not that it should be as he would. And as touching this thing, Augustine dareth preferre the grace which we enioie by Christ, aboue that grace, which Adam had in paradise: for now by the grace of Christ, not onelie we abide, if we will, ¹⁹ but also (as Paule saith) We haue both to will, and to performe: for the hart of beléeuers is changed, so as of not willing, they be made willing. And this same, To will, was in the verie choise of the first man, neither was it the grace of God that wrought this in him. But why God gaue frée will vnto Adam, in his first creation; Augustine bringeth this reason, in his second booke De libero arbitrio; for that God had decréed to declare vnto him both his goodnes & his iustice. And he would haue declared towards him his goodnes, if he had doone well; which thing vndoubtedlie he could not haue doone, if he had not béene frée. ²⁰ But if so be he should behaue himselfe dishonestlie and naughtilie, God was to vse towards him the seueritie of his iustice. But he, when he was frée, fell miserablie. And euen as Christ describeth the man comming downe from Ierusalem to Iericho, ²¹ to haue fallen among théeues, to be ill intreated of them: so he [to wit Adam ] not onlie hauing his garment taken awaie, lost all his ornaments; but also hauing receiued manie wounds, was left for halfe dead, and destitute of hope.

3 Wherefore we saie, as concerning this second state [of man,] when we are strangers from Christ, ²² there is but a little fréedome remaining vnto vs: for both we be subiect to the necessities of nature, and are afflicted with diseases, will we or no; and last of all, we are striken with death. Howbeit, there is some fréedome left, as concerning woorks that be ciuill and morall: ²³ for these things are both subiect vnto our naturall knowledge, and also they excéed not the powers of our will; and yet in them also men haue experience of great difficultie, bicause licentious lusts doo resist morall honestie. Entisements and pleasures doo alwaies hurt our senses, and these are set forward by wicked persuaders; sathan also dooth continuallie vrge vs, and driue vs forward. For he enuieng mans commoditie, and perceiuing that ciuill discipline, by such kind of works, is still retaind; he coueteth by all meanes to ouerthrowe them. But that mans power maie doo much in these ciuill matters, at the leastwise, in respect of iudgement; manie good lawes set foorth by Lycurgus, Solon, Numa, and by diuers other, doo sufficientlie declare. And Paule to the Romanes; ²⁴ Doost thou thinke (saith he) ô man, that thou shalt escape the iudgement of God, when thou doost the selfe same things, that thou iudgest?

Moreouer, in these things there be two points, which must not be passed ouer. ²⁵ The first is, that God vseth the will of man to those ends, which he hath appointed. The second is (which dependeth also of the first) that those euents followe not, which they appoint that applie themselues to ciuill works: for oftentimes things doo farre otherwise happen, than they did euer imagine could be. And hereof it cometh to passe, that Ethnike men are woont verie often to be troubled. Pompeie, Cato, and Cicero thought to themselues, that they had intended excellent counsell: but when the same was come to naught, there remained nothing but desperation vnto the authors; for they being disappointed of their purposes, did attribute all vnto fortune and chance. ²⁶ But Ieremie declareth, that the successe and euent of things is in the hands of God; ²⁷ The waie of man (saith he) is not in his owne power, neither lieth it in man to direct his owne steps. Which place the Hebrues expound of Nabuchadnezar, who (they saie) went foorth of his house, not against the Iewes; but to make warre vpon the Ammonits, as we reade in the 21. chapter of Ezechiel: ²⁸ but when he came into a waie that had two turnings, he began to deliberate, and to take counsell of the entrails of beasts, of idols, and of lots by the brightnesse of a sword: and hauing aduertisement, he set vpon Iurie, and leauing the Ammonites, he besieged Ierusalem. These two things are not hidden vnto the godlie; namelie, that God is the authour of counsell, ²⁹ and giueth such a successe to things as he will. And therefore they determine nothing with themselues, but they adde this condition; If God will: which thing Iames warned vs to doo. And Paule in his epistle to the Romanes saith, ³⁰ that He desireth to haue a prosperous iornie vnto them, but yet by the will of God. Wherefore, if the thing happen otherwise than they looked for, they are comforted in themselues; bicause they knowe, that God their most louing father, better prouideth both for his owne kingdome, and their saluation, than they could haue prouided for themselues. And they haue alwaies in their mouth that which Dauid sang; Vnles the Lord build the house, in vaine doo they labour which build it. ³¹ Therefore it is their care, that they maie frame and applie their counsels vnto the word of God; and the euent they commit vnto GOD: and so they worke surelie on euerie part.

4 But in those workes, which be acceptable and gratefull vnto God, ³² such men as are strangers from God, haue no fréedome at all: wherevpon came that saieng of Augustine in his Enchiridion; that Man abusing his fréewill, hath lost both himselfe, and also the libertie of his will: for when sinne gat the vpper hand in battell, it brought man into bondage. I know there be some, which thus interpret this sentence of Augustine: that Adam lost fréewill, as touching grace and glorie, wherewith he was adorned; but not as touching nature. Verelie I will not much labour here, ³³ to denie that the reason and will, which belong vnto nature, were left vnto man after his fall: but that the same nature is vnperfect and wounded, they themselues cannot denie. For this the Maister of the sentences also affirmeth in his second booke and 25. distinction: for he saith, that A man now after his fall is in such a case as he maie sinne; and that it so fareth with him, as he cannot but sinne. And although Augustine, and others, did not so affirme; ³⁴ yet most sound reason might teach it vs: for holie works depend vpon two principles; namelie of knowledge, and of appetite. Concerning knowledge, Paule saith; The naturall man dooth not vnderstand those things which be of the spirit of God, ³⁵ yea verelie no more he cannot; for they be foolishnesse vnto him. But now, if we knowe not what is to be doone, and what is pleasing vnto GOD; by what meanes may we shew the same in our worke?

Moreouer, in what sort our appetite and cogitations are toward those holie works, it appéereth by the sixt chapter of Genesis; My spirit (saith God) shall not striue in man for euer, ³⁶ bicause he is flesh. And a little after; God sawe that the malice of man was great, and all the imagination of the thought of his hart was onlie vnto euill euerie daie. ³⁷ And in the eight chapter; The imagination of mans hart is euill euen from his infancie. And those things dooth God himselfe speake; and there is none to be beléeued better than him that made vs, when he giueth a testimonie of his owne worke. In the 18. chapter of Ieremie, the people said; We will followe our owne imaginations. Which place Ierom expounding, writeth thus; Where is therfore the power of fréewill, and the iudgement of mans owne will, ³⁸ without the grace of God; séeing it is a great offense vnto God for a man is followe his owne thoughts, and to do the will of his wicked hart? That we be subiect vnto seruitude, Christ teacheth vs in Iohn, saieng; He that dooth sinne, is the seruant of sinne. Wherefore, séeing we commit manie things, and haue sinnes cleauing vnto vs from our mothers wombe; we must of necessitie grant that we be seruants: ³⁹ But then we shall be free indeed, if the sonne shall set vs at libertie; otherwise we serue in a most bitter bondage. Whervpon Paule said, that he was sold vnder sinne, and so sold, as in his flesh, he confessed that there dwelt no good thing; and that he did the things which he would not, and which he hated; and that he felt another lawe in his members, resisting the lawe of the mind, and leading him awaie captiue to the lawe of sinne. And vnto the Galathians he saith; that The flesh dooth striue against the spirit, ⁴⁰ and the spirit against the flesh, so that we cannot doo what we would.

Which things being true, touching so woorthie an apostle, and touching holie men regenerated by Christ; what shall be thought of the wicked, which belong not vnto Christ? And vnto him they cannot come, vnlesse they be drawne: ⁴¹ for Christ saith; None can come vnto me, vnlesse my father shall drawe him. He which would go before of his owne accord, is not drawne, as Augustine saith; but is led. If therefore we must be drawne vnto Christ, in that we would not before, the same is a most gréeuous sinne: and therefore we will not, bicause The wisedome of the flesh is enimitie against God; ⁴² for it is not subiect vnto the lawe of God, no verelie, nor cannot be. And as manie as are not set at libertie by Christ, doo liue vnder the lawe, and (as Paule addeth to the Galathians) are vnder the cursse. ⁴³ Which thing should not be true, if they could fulfill the lawe of God: for they incurre not the danger of the cursse, vnlesse they transgresse the lawe. Further, Paule expressedlie saith; It is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, ⁴⁴ but of GOD that hath mercie. For our saluation is his worke, and not the worke of our strength; It is he that worketh in vs, both to will, and to perfourme. Before he doo that, whatsoeuer he dooth with vs, either by the lawe, or by the instruction of his word; he dealeth with stones: for our harts be stonie, vnlesse God doo change them into fleshie harts; which he promiseth in Ezechiel that he would doo, ⁴⁵ and would bring to passe, that we should walke in his waies.

And surelie, if we might liue well and rightlie without grace, we might also be iustified by our owne works: which doctrine is vtterlie condemned, both by Paule, and all the holie scripture. Ieremie saith; Conuert me, ô Lord, ⁴⁶ and I shall be conuerted. And Dauid saith; ⁴⁷ A pure hart create in me, ô God. The which thing that it commeth not to passe in all men, we perceiue by the 29. chapter of Deuteronomie, ⁴⁸ where it is thus written; The Lord hath not giuen vnto you eies to see, nor an eare to heare, nor an hart to vnderstand. And in the thirtie chapter, God promised, that he would circumcise their harts, and the harts of their séed, that they shuld walke in his commandements. For he both beginneth & finisheth our saluation: for this Paule saieth to the Philippians; ⁴⁹ I hope that he who hath begun in you, will perfourme it euen vnto the daie of Christ. This thing the holie men right well vnderstanding, doo praie with Dauid; ⁵⁰ Incline my hart vnto thy testimonies: and with Salomon; The Lord shall incline our harts, that we may walke in his waies; & with Paule vnto the Thessalonians; ⁵¹ The Lord direct your harts in patience, and in the expectation of Christ. And Salomon in his prouerbs saith; The hart of the king is in the hand of God, and he inclineth it to what end he will. ⁵² These testimonies doo sufficientlie declare, that it is Gods worke, and not ours, to be conuerted vnto him, and to doo vprightlie.

5 Here some obiect vnto vs the commandements, which are set foorth vnto vs in the holie scriptures: for they séeme to signifie, that it lieth in our selues to obserue those things, which we be commanded. For Esaie saith; If ye will, and will hearken vnto me, ye shall eate the good things of the land. And the Lord oftentimes commandeth vs, that we should conuert our selues vnto him; Be ye conuerted (saith he) vnto me, I will not the death of a sinner, ⁵³ I had rather that he conuerted and liue. And when he had published the lawe, he said; that He had set before them life and death, blessing and cursing. ⁵⁴ And an infinite sort of other such like testimonies might be brought. But here it must be considered, that these things in verie déed are commanded vnto men: ⁵⁵ but we are no where taught; that a man is able to performe them of his owne proper strength. Neither is it méet, that we measure the greatnesse of our owne strength by the precepts of Gods lawe; as though so much can be doone of our owne accord, as Gods lawe hath commanded: naie rather our infirmitie is to be measured hereby; that when we sée the excellencie and woorthines of Gods co~mandements to excell our strength by innumerable degrées, ⁵⁶ we may remember, that the lawe hath a certeine other end, than that it should be performed of vs.

Paule sheweth that end to be manifold; By the lawe (saith he) commeth the knowledge of sin: ⁵⁷ which he saith was therefore made, that the number of transgressions might be increased. For by this meanes, The lawe is become a schoole-maister to lead men vnto Christ; that when they sée themselues ouercharged with the heauie burthen of the commandements, and the greatnes of their sinnes, they may perceiue their saluation to consist onelie in the mercie of God, and redemption of Christ. For the weakenes and vnwoorthines of our selues being considered, we foorthwith begin to praie vnto God; that both he will for Christs sake pardon our sinnes, and giue vs sufficiencie of his spirit, that we may indeuour to followe his will. Giue what thou commandest (saith Augustine ) and command what thou wilt. Further, another vse of the lawe is, that we should sée wherevnto we must applie our selues. Also it may be, that if through the grace of God there be an accesse of obedience begun, men may applie themselues vnto the lawe. Lastlie, though in this life it be not giuen vnto vs, that men can in euerie condition satisfie the lawe; yet we shall fullie obteine the same in another life, when we shall cast awaie all this corruption. Yet God ought not to be accused of iniustice by reason hereof: for he is not in fault, that men be not able to kéepe his commandements. Neither can anie of vs be excused, ⁵⁸ bicause that willinglie and gréedilie we doo breake the lawe, that is appointed vnto vs. The same was giuen in such sort, as it might best agrée with our nature, when the same was first instituted: for the image of God could not by anie other meanes more plainelie and effectuallie be expressed. But and if by reason of sinne we be not able to accomplish the lawe; yet this at the least-wise we sée, namelie, what maner of persons we ought to be.

⁵⁹ 6 But that sentence, which is commonlie obiected; that Nothing is to be counted sinne, which dependeth not of election, must be vnderstood (as Augustine dooth interpret it) of that kind of sinne, which is not the punishment of sinne: for otherwise, originall sinne is neither voluntarie, nor receiued by election. But thou wilt saie; Séeing the matter standeth thus, we shall séeme of necessitie to sticke fast in sinne: which thing indéed I denie not; ⁶⁰ although such is this necessitie, as it hath no compulsion ioined therewith. God is of necessitie good, and cannot sinne by anie meanes: and yet is he not driuen by force to be good. Which thing Augustine, in his 22. booke De ciuitate Dei, and thirtie chapter, dooth verie well declare; Bicause God himselfe (saith he) cannot sinne, therefore shall we denie that he hath frée will? Ambrose, in his second booke, and third chapter, De fide, vnto Gratian the Emperour, testifieth, that God is frée, when he saith; ⁶¹ that One and the same spirit worketh all things, diuiding vnto all as pleaseth him, according to the choise of his frée will, and not for to obeie necessitie. In these sentences of these fathers, frée will is so taken, ⁶² that it is contrarie vnto violence and compulsion; not that it is equallie bent to either part. Whervpon Ierom in his homilie of the prodigall sonne, which he wrote vnto Damasus, bicause he tooke frée will in another sense, therefore he wrote otherwise; It is onelie God (saith he) on whom sinne falleth not, nor can fall: but others, forsomuch as they haue frée will, may be bowed euerie waie. Also it is agréeable vnto blessed spirits and angels, that they cannot sinne; séeing their felicitie is alreadie confirmed.

Wherefore Augustine in his 22. booke De ciuitate Dei, and thirtie chapter, saith; ⁶³ Euen as the first immortalitie, which Adam through sinne lost, was, that it was possible he should not die: euen so the first frée will was, that it was possible he should not sinne; but the last frée will shall be, that he shall not possiblie sinne. Yet neuertheles, there is granted a certeine kind of libertie vnto them: not wherby they can be bowed to either part; but such, as (although that which they doo is of necessitie) yet thereby they be not compelled, or violentlie driuen. For euen as there be certeine true things so manifest, as the mind cannot but consent vnto them; ⁶⁴ so the presence of God now reuealed and made manifest, is so good a thing, as the saints cannot faile or forsake the same. So likewise, although we of necessitie doo sinne, before we be regenerated in Christ; yet are not therefore the powers of the will violated: for whatsoeuer we doo, both we doo it willinglie; and also we are led to doo it vpon some hope.

And yet we must not be therefore accounted to differ nothing from brute beasts: for they, ⁶⁵ notwithstanding they be moued with a certeine kind of iudgement; yet it is not by a frée iudgement. But in men, although they be not yet renewed, there is (as we haue said) much libertie remaining, as touching ciuill & morall works. Further, among the verie sinnes, wherein they be of necessitie conuersant, they haue a choise to choose one, and refuse an other; though they cannot atteine vnto those things which please God. These things doo not accord with brute beasts: for they be rather driuen by the force of nature, than that they can doo anie thing by anie libertie or frée choise. Men may be said to be frée, ⁶⁶ either in respect of compulsion, or in respect of sinne, or in respect of miserie. The first libertie from compulsion, is giuen vnto all men; howbeit, vnto sinne and miserie all men, which haue not atteined vnto Christ, are altogether subiect. But after what sort men, which be regenerate, be subiect either to sinne, or to miserie, while they liue here, I will afterward declare. In the meane time we ought to be sure, that the will is not constrained to sinne, through this necessitie which we speake of.

7 But that we may with the more perspicuitie and plainenesse, declare all this whole matter, it must be first determined what these words Free, Violent, and Willing doo signifie. We call that Frée, ⁶⁷ which hauing two, or more things set before it, can choose, as it lusteth, what it will. And therefore we denie, that the will of men not regenerate is vniuersallie frée: ⁶⁸ for it cannot choose those things which doo belong to saluation. ⁶⁹ Violent is that, which is so mooued of an outward beginning, that it of it selfe nothing helpeth vnto that motion, but rather resisteth it: as when a stone is cast on high. That is said to worke of his owne accord, or willinglie, ⁷⁰ which hath an inward beginning inclining to that motion, wherby it is driuen. By these things it is manifest, that to doo of his owne accord, and to doo of necessitie, are not contrarie one to another: for they may be ioined together, as it is plaine in our will, which of necessitie embraceth felicitie; yet it embraceth it not against his will, or by compulsion; but of his owne accord, and gladlie. Neither is it possible, ⁷¹ that the will should be compelled, to will that which it will not. Yea, Augustine thinketh it to be so absurd, that a man should will that which he will not; as if one should say, that anie thing can be hot without heate.

⁷² But yet that necessitie, whereby the wicked are said to sinne, is not absolute and perfect; so as it cannot be otherwise: for so soone as the grace and spirit of Christ commeth, that necessitie is straitwaie loosed. Wherefore Augustine saith, ⁷³ that it is of nature to be able to haue faith, hope, and charitie; but to haue them indéed, is altogether the gift of grace: for that power or abilitie breaketh not foorth into act, vnlesse grace be giuen from God. Herein Augustine agréed with the Pelagians; that To be able, is of nature. ⁷⁴ But this Augustine added, which Pelagius did not allow; that To will well, and to liue vprightlie, is to be attributed vnto grace onelie. But I thinke, that as touching this power of nature, there must be made a distinction: for if they meane this, that our nature is so made of God, as neither faith, nor hope, nor charitie doo striue with the same, if they be giuen of God, but rather accomplish it, make it perfect, and adorne it; I confesse it to be true that they saie: ⁷⁵ but if they will haue the power of nature to signifie some strength of the same, whereby it can challenge to it selfe these things; I yéeld not to them in anie wise; for it is a wicked and damnable opinion.

We saie therefore, that the will of man hath respect both vnto good, and vnto euill; ⁷⁶ but after a sundrie fashion: for it may embrace euill of his owne accord; but it cannot embrace good, vnlesse it be restored by the grace of God. For we haue néed of a certeine diuine inspiration, to performe those things which are good; which thing indéed the verie Ethnike writers also, being forced by the truth, haue sometimes declared. For Aristotle, ⁷⁷ in his first booke of Ethiks saith; If there be anie gift of God, we must verelie thinke, that it is felicitie. And Felicitie he defineth to be nothing else, but a most excellent action, procéeding from the chéefest power of the mind, by a most notable vertue. And Plato confesseth in a certeine place, that vertues are ingendred in men by diuine inspiration. The Schoole-men also, if there were anie somewhat sounder than the rest, confessed, that the grace of God is necessarie to assist mans strength vnto euerie good worke. Howbeit, afterward they forgetting themselues, I wot not how, decréed; that a man, not being renewed, may doo some good déeds, which may please God, and which may merit the grace of Christ, of congruitie (as they terme it.)

8 That they call congruitie, ⁷⁸ which we may call méete and good; which is, when the rigour and sharpnes of the lawe is remitted: but condignitie they call that, which is of right due. ⁷⁹ But they which first inuented these termes, considered not, that those goodlie ciuill works, though in shew they séeme good vnto men, yet before God they be sinne; as Augustine by most certein reasons prooueth. For before we be conuerted vnto God, we be the children of wrath. ⁸⁰ And Iohn saith; He that beleeueth not in the sonne of God, hath not life euerlasting, ⁸¹ but the wrath of God abideth vpon him. And what can be offered vnto God by his enimies, and by such as hate him, that may be acceptable vnto him? Paule to the Ephesians saith, that We, ⁸² before we did come vnto Christ, were dead in our offenses and sinnes. But the dead, as they féele nothing, so can they bring nothing to passe, whereby they should be called backe vnto life. Paule vnto the Philippians counted all things, ⁸³ whatsoeuer he did before he was conuerted vnto Christ, but losse and doong; so farre off was he from placing any merit in them. God in the first chapter of Esaie testifieth, that he did abhor, detest, and counted abhominable those oblations, which the Iewes offered without faith and godlinesse. The same prophet compareth all our righteousnesse vnto most vile and filthie rags. And our sauiour Christ saith; I am the vine, and ye are the branches. And euen as the branch cannot beare fruit, vnlesse it abideth in the vine; so ye can bring foorth no fruit, vnlesse ye abide in me. And straitwaie he addeth; Without me ye can doo nothing. And in an other place he saith, ⁸⁴ that An euill tree cannot beare good fruit; for the root must first be good, before anie good fruit can be hoped to come from it; but good trées we cannot be, before we be graffed in Christ. ⁸⁵ This ingraffing in the holie scriptures is called regeneration. And euen as no man helpeth anie thing to the generation of himselfe; so no man can helpe anie thing to the regeneration of himselfe. ⁸⁶ Paule also saith, that Whatsoeuer is not of faith, is sinne. Séeing therfore the wicked be without faith, whatsoeuer they doo, ⁸⁷ is to be reckoned for sinne. If so be thine eie be single, thy whole bodie shalbe single; but if thy light be darkenesse, how great shall that darkenesse be? Vnlesse faith be present, we be conuersant in darknesse; and of necessitie doo cleaue vnto sinne.

Moreouer, if we followe the opinion of these men, ⁸⁸ we vtterlie ouerthrowe the nature of grace: For grace, if it should be of works (as Paule saith) it now ceaseth to be grace. Paule also addeth, That the Israelits following after the lawe of righteousnes, atteined not vnto righteousnesse: for that they sought it by works, ⁸⁹ and not by faith. Also vnto the Colossians he teacheth plainelie, what we be before we are iustified; We be alienated (saith he) from God, enimies in mind, ⁹⁰ and conuersant in euill works. And in the epistle to the Romans; men not yet ingraffed in Christ, he calleth wild oliue trées: and we knowe, that wild oliue trées be barren, neither can beare anie fruit. Besides this, works cannot be good, vnlesse they either satisfie the lawe; or els if they straie anie thing from the lawe, it is not imputed vnto them, bicause of Christ. But men, that be not renewed, cannot satisfie the lawe: for euen the regenerate cannot doo it. For séeing they be not ioined vnto Christ by faith, they cannot atteine vnto the benefit of Christ, whereby these imperfections be made whole and sound.

And he that teacheth, that a man is able, without the grace of God, to doo works which be acceptable vnto GOD; must also of necessitie teach, that Christ is not the redéemer of the whole man. For he which teacheth that we, without the grace of Christ, doo worke well, and liue vprightlie; the same ascribeth vnto our nature no small part of saluation without Christ. ⁹¹ Paule also in the epistle to the Romans saith; When we were seruants vnto sinne, we were free vnto righteousnes; which is nothing else, ⁹² but that we had no trade nor acquaintance with righteousnesse. Furthermore, he exhorteth vs, that Euen as we haue serued sinne, so we will be now seruants vnto righteousnes. And he also teacheth, that we should now altogether serue righteousnesse without any sinne; forsomuch as we serued sinne before altogether without righteousnesse. Lastlie, he hath left no meane at all betwéene the seruitude of sinne and righteousnesse. But these men contrariwise faine a sort (I knowe not who) which although they be not yet iustified; yet notwithstanding doo good & iust works, which may be acceptable vnto God. All these things sufficientlie teach, how absurd & fond these mens opinion is.

9 Yet in the meane time they crie out, that we be blasphemous, which auouch the whole nature of man to be euill. ⁹³ But (as Augustine dooth prudentlie write; Vnder the praises of nature, ⟨…⟩e hidden the enimies of grace. It were méet, that they should consider, vnto what ground we referre that euill, whereof we complaine: for we ascribe not the same either to nature, as it was created; or vnto God: but vnto sinne, wherevnto there was an entrance laid open by the first man. For we, by all maner of meanes, doo disagrée from the Manicheis: for they dreamed, that both our nature is euill, and that it was created euill by God. But we confesse and acknowledge; that man was created frée: and in that he hath now lost his fréedome, we ascribe not God to be the authour thereof, but mans owne fault. They which denie fréewill, haue bin called heretiks by the church. ⁹⁴ But this must be vnderstood concerning the first creation of our nature; for otherwise there is not one of the fathers, which (if the truth be well weighed) bewaileth not the calamitie of man, whereinto he fell through sinne.

Our aduersaries rather come néere vnto the Manicheis, which affirme, ⁹⁵ that Our corrupt affects, as they are now, were so created by God: for so they affirme, that he created them euill. But we, forsomuch as we perceiue that these troublesome affections be not void of sinne, denie that they were so created by God; but that through our owne default they are become vnbridled, and be repugnant to the word of God. Certeine it is, that man at the beginning was made vnto the image of God; and there is nothing more beséeming vnto it, than libertie. But séeing that image was in a maner blotted out in vs, so as there was néed to haue the same restored by Christ; what maruell is it, if our libertie be also for the most part taken awaie from it? When they reason that man is frée, ⁹⁶ they doo euen as if they should saie, that man is a two-footed creature, and therefore he is able to go vpright. But if they would so conclude of a lame man, it should easilie appeere how much they be deceiued: for the properties of man, which would be agréeable vnto his nature, being perfect, when they be applied vnto the same nature being corrupt, doo not agrée.

⁹⁷ Neither be the opinions of our aduersaries much dissenting from the Pelagians: for they taught, that nature being holpen by the grace of creation, and doctrine of the lawe, may liue vprightlie. And these men saie, that nature being holpen by grace preuenting and knocking, is able to doo good works, which may please God. The catholike church resisted the Pelagians, neither did it contend about the grace of creation, or of the lawe, neither about the grace preuenting: but it taught, that without the grace of Christ, wherewith we be iustified, none is able to worke aright. ⁹⁸ And by the iudgement of Augustine, who vehementlie contended against these men, there is no difference betwéene dooing rightlie without grace, and dooing rightlie without the faith of Christ. He, vpon the 31. psalme, to shew that there is no good worke without faith, writeth thus; A good intent maketh the worke good, but faith guideth that intent: wherefore consider not what a man dooth, but what he hath respect vnto while he is dooing.

10 And whereas in all the holie scriptures, there is not one sentence repugnant to our doctrine; yet they continuallie obiect vnto vs the example of Cornelius, ⁹⁹ who being not yet (as they thinke) regenerate, neither beléeuing in Christ, yet did such works as were acceptable vnto GOD. ¹⁰⁰ Indéed we grant, that both the almes and praiers of Cornelius were pleasing vnto God: for the angel affirmed the same. But these men adde of their owne; ¹⁰¹ that Cornelius, when he did these things, was not yet iustified, nor yet beléeued in Christ. But they marke not that the scripture in that place called him religious, and one that feared God: wherefore Cornelius beléeued, and in Messias beléeued he, being instructed in the Iewes learning; but whether IESVS of Nazareth were that Messias, he knew not for a certeintie, and therefore Peter was sent to instruct him more fullie. But here, to bleare our eies, ¹⁰² they saie, that Paule, in the 17. of the Acts, attributeth some godlines vnto the people of Athens, when as notwithstanding they were idolaters: for thus he saith; Ye men of Athens, I shew vnto you, that God, whom you ignorantlie worship. But euen as if a man that can handsomlie drawe some one letter, ¹⁰³ shall not therefore be straitwaie counted a good writer; neither he that can sing one or two verses, shall for that cause be taken for a singing man; (for these names require consideration and art, and it may come to passe by chance, that a man may drawe well, or sing well once or twise:) euen so none is to be counted verelie and out of doubt good, which setteth foorth one good worke or two, that haue some shew of godlines. But Paule called not the Atheniens godlie, without adding some termes of spéech, which should diminish godlines; ¹⁰⁴ Whom ye ignorantlie (saith he) worship. But what pietie can that be, which is ioined with the ignorance of the true GOD? Moreouer, a little before he had called them ⟨…⟩, that is, Verie superstitious: by these two words hée much diminished their pietie. ¹⁰⁵

But Luke absolutelie calleth Cornelius religious, and addeth; that He feared God: ¹⁰⁶ which addition is of so great force, ¹⁰⁷ that in the booke of Iob, a man fearing God, is translated of the seuentie interpretors, ⟨…⟩, that is, A true and religious man. And Dauid saith; Blessed is the man that feareth the Lord. ¹⁰⁸ And if so be he be blessed which feareth God, how is not the same man also iustified? But besides these things, which after a sort, by the causes, declare the iustification of Cornelius; ¹⁰⁹ we haue also another testimonie of the effects: ¹¹⁰ for that he gaue almes, which were acceptable vnto God. But we haue alreadie, by manie reasons prooued, that none can doo works acceptable vnto God, but he which is iustified and regenerate. Further, he distributed these almes vpon the people of the Iewes, as of whom he hauing béene instructed in the skill of godlines, would impart vnto them in like maner some of his temporall goods. For It is meet (as Paule saith vnto the Galathians) that he which is instructed, ¹¹¹ should communicate vnto him, which dooth instruct him in all good things. Moreouer, that soldier, which was sent vnto Peter, declareth, ¹¹² that he had a good testimonie of all the Iewes. All which things doo sufficientlie shew, that although we read not, that he was circumcised; yet he came so néere vnto the doctrine of the people of God, as that all men commended his pietie. ¹¹³ It is written besides, that he praied, and that continuallie. And if so be we diligentlie weigh the whole historie, we shall find, that he obserued the same houre, which the Iewes had appointed for common praier: for it saith, that At the ninth houre he sawe an angel standing by him, which gaue him to vnderstand, that his praier was heard. But out of the first chapter of Esaie, and 15. of Prouerbs, and manie other places, we be taught; that The vngodlie and sinfull sort be not heard of God. ¹¹⁴ Which neuertheles must be vnderstood, so long as they would be sinners, and reteine with them a will to sinne.

11 Neither is that, which Augustine writeth against the Donatists, repugnant to this doctrine; namelie, that The praiers of wicked priests be heard of God: ¹¹⁵ for he addeth, that it so commeth to passe, by reason of the peoples deuotion. But Cornelius, when he praid, was holpen by his owne faith, and not through the faith of others which stood by. And Augustine in his epistle vnto Sixtus, saith; that God in iustifieng of a man, is woont to giue his spirit, whereby he may pray for those things which be profitable for saluation. ¹¹⁶ And séeing Cornelius praid for those things, there can be no doubt, but he was iustified. Herevnto adde, that no man can rightlie praie vnto God, vnlesse he haue faith. And that we be iustified by faith, it hath bin sufficientlie testified and declared alreadie. Peter also, before he began to preach vnto him, saith; that He perceiued in verie truth that God is no accepter of persons, ¹¹⁷ but that he is accepted by him, of what nation so euer he be, which worketh righteousnesse: which words teach vs plainelie enough, that Cornelius was euen alreadie accepted of God, before Peter came vnto him. But I maruell, that there be anie, which dare affirme, that he had not the faith of Christ; when as Christ himselfe, in the eight chapter of Iohn saith, that He knoweth not God, which beleeueth not in the sonne of God. ¹¹⁸ And in the 14. chapter he admonisheth his disciples; If ye beleeue in God, beleeue also in me: ¹¹⁹ and if so be ye beleeued Moses, ye would also beleeue in me.

These things assure vs, that Cornelius beléeued verelie in God, and therefore did also beléeue in the Messias which should come; euen as he had bin instructed by the Iewes: although he knew not that he was alreadie come, and that IESVS of Nazareth, whom the Iewes had crucified, was the same Messias. He had the same faith, ¹²⁰ wherewith the fathers beléeued that Christ should come; wherefore séeing they were iustifie⟨…⟩ by the same faith, how dare we be so bold as denie the verie same vnto Cornelius? Nathaniel, which beléeued that Messias should come, and thought that he was not yet come, is by Christ pronounced to be a true Israelit, in whom there was no guile: which two things cannot concurre in a man not yet iustified. But Peter was therefore sent to Cornelius, that he might more plainelie and expressedlie knowe that thing, which he had before intricatlie beléeued of Christ. Of this mind was Gregorie in his 19. homilie vpon Ezechiel: ¹²¹ for he saith, that Faith is the entrie whereby we come to good works; but not contrariwise, that by good works we can come vnto faith. And so he concludeth, that Cornelius did first beléeue, before he could bring foorth anie laudable workes. And he citeth that place vnto the Hebrues; It is vnpossible without faith to please God. Which sentence, ¹²² as it appeareth by the selfe-same place, cannot be otherwise vnderstood, than of faith iustifieng. Beda, expounding the third chapter of the acts, is of the same mind; and citeth the words of Gregorie. Neither is the Maister of the sentences of anie other iudgement, in his second booke, and 25. distinction.

But our aduersaries obiect vnto vs Augustine, in his 7. chapter De praedestinatione sanctorum, where he reasoneth against those, which taught, that faith is of our selues; when yet in the meane time they confessed, that the works which followe, be of God; but yet obteined by faith. Indéed Augustine confesseth, that the works, ¹²³ which followe faith, be of God; but denieth that faith is of our selues. For he saith, that Paule writeth to the Ephesians; By grace ye are saued, through faith, and that not of your selues: for it is the gift of God. But that is a hard saieng, which he addeth; namelie, that the praiers and almes of Cornelius were accepted of God, before he beléeued in Christ. But we must here weigh the things which followe: for he addeth; And yet praied he not, neither gaue he almes without some faith: for how did he call vpon him, in whom he beléeued not? ¹²⁴ These words doo plainelie declare, that Augustine tooke not awaie from Cornelius all maner of faith in Christ; but onelie an vnfolden and distinct faith. Which thing that place chéeflie declareth, which is cited out of the epistle to the Romans; ¹²⁵ How shall they call vpon him, in whom they haue not beleeued? For those words be written of the faith and inuocation of men regenerate, as the next sentence following plainelie declareth; Euerie one which calleth vpon the name of the Lord, shalbe saued: for we cannot attribute saluation, but to them which be iustified. ¹²⁶ But Peter was sent vnto Cornelius, to build vp, and not to laie the foundation: for the foundations of faith were laid in him before.

12 But those things, which Augustine addeth, séeme to bring a greater difficultie: for he saith; But if he could, without the faith, namelie of Christ be saued, that singular workeman the apostle should not haue béene sent to edifie him. But séeing he alreadie before attributed vnto him faith and inuocation, after which of necessitie followeth saluation, whereof the apostle speaketh in the epistle to the Romans; ¹²⁷ how can he take saluation from him: vnlesse we peraduenture vnderstand, that faith and saluation in men iustified is not perfect, while they liue here? For our saluation commeth not in this life to that degrée, nor to that quantitie, which Christ requireth in his elect: for no man maie doubt, but that we shall not atteine to perfect saluation, before the resurrection and eternall saluation; although we haue begun to enioie the same alreadie after a sort. Paule to the Ephesians affirmeth, ¹²⁸ that We be now saued by faith. And yet vnto the Philippians he exhorteth vs, With feare and trembling to worke our owne saluation. ¹²⁹ Which places cannot be brought to one consent, ¹³⁰ vnles we saie, that the saluation begun in vs, through iustification, is dailie to be made perfect in vs: for we are alwais more and more renewed, and faith is made more full, more expressed, & of more efficacie. These words of Augustine, vnles we interpret them on this sort; either of necessitie they must be none of his, or else he is repugnant to himselfe. That the booke is Augustines, we cannot denie: but that he is repugnant vnto himselfe, that is not likelie.

But if thou saie that these things may agrée well enough togither, if we grant that Cornelius was not yet iustified; when as neuertheles he did some works well pleasing and acceptable vnto God: I answer, that this can by no meanes agrée with Augustines meaning. For he, in his 801. treatise vpon Iohn, and in his fourth booke, and third chapter against Iulian, and vpon the 31. psalme, dooth prooue by most sure reasons, that all works, doone before we be iustified, be sinne. But that faith is more expressedlie set foorth, and made perfect in them that are iustified; we may easilie perceiue, by that which Christ said vnto his apostles; Manie kings and prophets desired to see the things, ¹³¹ which ye see, and sawe them not. Yet notwithstanding, those kings and prophets were men godlie and iustified; although they knew not so expressedlie all the mysteries of Christ, as the apostles did. And Christ, when he praied, thus spake concerning the apostles themselues; The words which thou gauest me, ¹³² haue I giuen vnto them: those haue they receiued, and haue knowne that I came foorth from thee, and that thou hast sent me. These things doo shew, that the apostles beléeued in Christ; and therefore were iustified. Yet the verie historie of the Gospell sufficientlie declareth, that they were ignorant of manie things: ¹³³ for it is shewed oftentimes, that either they had their eies closed, that they should not sée; or else, that they vnderstood not those things which were spoken. ¹³⁴ Wherefore Augustine denieth, that Cornelius had saluation before Peter was sent vnto him: yet not altogither, but that he had no perfect and absolute saluation.

13 But they further obiect the same Augustine in his questions vnto Simplicianus, in the second booke, and second question: where he plainlie teacheth, that faith goeth before works. After that he putteth a certeine meane betwéen gra⟨…⟩e, and the celebration of the sacraments: for he saith, that it may be, that Catechumenus [or one newlie conuerted vnto christian religion,] and that he which is conuersant among the Catechumeni, may beléeue, and haue grace; and yet the same man is not yet washed by baptisme. Moreouer he saith, that grace is more plentifullie powred in after the sacraments. By which words he signifieth, that it is one and the selfe-same grace; but is afterward made more abundant. And that thou maist knowe he intreateth of a iustifieng faith, he citeth a place out of the epistle to the Ephesians; ¹³⁵ By grace ye are saued, through faith, and that not of your selues; for it is the gift of God. ¹³⁶ But our aduersaries will saie, that they also teach, that grace goeth before good works; and that by this grace, some faith is bestowed vpon men. But this at the beginning is so weake, as it cannot haue the power to iustifie: howbeit, there may some works be doon, which may be acceptable to God.

But we will call to mind what Augustine writeth of Pelagius, ¹³⁷ in his hundred and fift epistle vnto Innocentius bishop of Rome: he saith, that Pelagius, in the councell of Palestine, to the end he would not be accurssed [himselfe;] did cursse all those, which should saie, that they could liue vprightlie without grace. But he, by grace, ment no other thing, than the gift bestowed vpon vs in our creation; as frée choise, reason, will, and the doctrine of the lawe. The Palestine bishops, being beguiled by this colorable craft, did absolue him. Augustine excuseth them, bicause they dealt plainlie and simplie: for when they heard that Pelagius confessed the grace of God; they could not vnderstand it to be other, than that grace; which the holie scriptures doo set foorth; namelie, the same, whereby we are regenerate and ingraffed in Christ. Wherefore it appéereth, that they, which feigne vnto themselues another grace, than that whereby we are iustified, and ingraffed in Christ, doo thrust vpon vs a thing imagined by man; or rather a Pelagian refuge, which the holie scriptures acknowledge not.

Moreouer, Augustine in the same place, which we now spake of, dooth affirme; that the Catechumeni, and such as beléeue, though they be not baptised; yet neuertheles be conceiued: ¹³⁸ but they which are now conceiued to be the sonnes of God, cannot be strangers from him, or enimies vnto him; wherefore it followeth, that they also be alreadie iustified, though not in such perfect sort. And this also is manifest, ¹³⁹ in that Augustine calleth the grace following, a more full grace: as that which differeth not from the first in kind and nature, but onelie in degrée and quantitie: and séeing it is of the selfe-same kind, that the other is, the same shall also iustifie. ⟨…⟩ had their reward. But that God in appointing of kingdoms, had respect to some other end than to paie a reward to those men, Augustine himselfe sheweth vs sufficientlie, in his fift booke De ciuitate Dei, and twelfe chapter, which we before cited: ¹⁴⁰ for he saith, that Séeing the empire had first béene in the east; God would at length that the kingdome of the Romans shuld beare the chéefe dominion, to tame the wicked dooings of other nations.

16 But manie suspect, that by this doctrine is opened a windowe vnto manie vices: for if all the dooings of ciuill men, while they séeme to worke vpon vertue, be sinnes; they may easilie be pulled awaie from those goodlie works. ¹⁴¹ I answer, that we teach not, that ciuill discipline is to be let go; for the same by Gods prouidence is as it were a bond, wherewith ciuill societie is preserued. God can suffer cities and Common-weales, so long as in them flourisheth integritie of maners and honestie; but when those things be altogither vitiate and corrupt, then God is so prouoked vnto wrath, as he will punish those things, ¹⁴² which long before he had winked at. So long as men be without Christ, they sinne, euen when they shew foorth notable works: but yet they sinne farre lesse, than if by setting aside all ciuill duties, they should vtterlie abandon themselues to all maner of sins: for we are not Stoiks, to thinke that all sinnes are alike.

Further, if these men omit the dooing of those things, which by the verie light of reason they acknowledge to be honest; they wrestle against their owne conscience. ¹⁴³ And if so be we will more manifestlie sée whether doctrine, ours, or our aduersaries, dooth open the greater windowe vnto vices; let vs compare them one with another. They verelie, when they teach, that the wicked can doo good works, such as may please GOD, and through them can deserue grace (as they speake) of congruitie; what thing doo they else, than foster and nourish the miserable soules in that their damnable state? For they cause them to like of themselues for works of theirs, I knowe not what; and to hope it will come to passe (at least-wise in the end of their life) that they shall for those works sake obteine of God to be truelie and earnestlie conuerted: but in the meane time, they liue securelie; neither doo they with a iust and true repentance turne awaie from their wicked facts. But we contrariewise, when we admonish them dailie to come vnto Christ, and to be reconciled by true repentance (for otherwise good works shall profit them nothing at all, when as, although they be goodlie to the shew, yet they be sinnes before God;) doo we not earnestlie set them on, that leauing impietie and corrupt kind of life, they should conuert themselues vnto the righteousnes of God?

These things if thou prudentlie consider, thou shalt easilie perceiue, whether of vs dooth make the waie more open vnto lusts. This thing doublesse all they may iudge, which are touched with the desire of truth and godlines; for besides that, which I haue said, they shall easilie perceiue; that all the good works, which are attributed vnto men not regenerate, be a derogation and a robberie vnto the grace of God. For if we be able to doo manie things without the grace of God, ¹⁴⁴ which may be gratefull and acceptable to him; then are we not wholie redéemed and restored by him: which is a thing so impious and strange from the catholike truth, as nothing can be imagined more impudent and more wicked. For what godlines dooth there remaine, when Christ is depriued of his owne honour? Or what honour is left vnto Christ, if we teach, that he hath not brought vnto vs all the power we haue to liue vprightlie?

Some boast, that otherwhiles manie things happen to be doone before regeneration, the which be as certeine meanes to the obteinment thereof: and séeing it oftentimes commeth to passe, that by them we be iustified, they cannot séeme to be sinnes. Indéed we grant, that these are sometime certeine meanes, whereby God dooth lead vs vnto iustification; but thereby it is not prooued, that those be no sins vnto them, by whom they be doone. And doubtlesse, as concerning the nature of their works, ¹⁴⁵ vnto some they be occasions of greater destruction: for there be manie, which by reason of such works of theirs, doo woonderfullie puffe vp themselues, and please their owne fansie, and preferre themselues before others; and when they be full, and haue enough of their owne opinion, although they be persuaded and set on [to continue therein,] yet they refuse to procéed anie further. In such kind of men works be preparations vnto euerlasting death. But as touching the elect, God dooth gouerne and temperate their works, and findeth the meanes that they worke togither vnto saluation; although they be sinnes in their owne nature, and must be estéemed as things corrupt, so long as the light of iustification shineth not vpon them. ¹⁴⁶ Wherefore we confesse, that works are certeine preparatiues vnto healthfull conuersion: but yet to none, but such as be predestinate and elect, whom GOD dooth sometimes lead vnto iustification; not that they haue this strength of their owne nature, to prepare vnto iustification: for vnto the reprobate and cast-awaies, they serue vnto condemnation.

17 But let vs sée what works those be, which our aduersaries so highlie praise in men not regenerate. In them (they saie) there is a certeine acknowledging of sinne⟨…⟩ thereof springeth a terrour, wherewith they be vehementlie persed; afterward there is stirred vp a sorrowe for the losse of the kingdome of heauen; and then they be mooued with a lesse desire of wicked acts; and they take lesse pleasure in sinnes and allurements of this world: they séeme also with some indeuour to heare the word of God. And how (saie they) can these things séeme to be sinnes? Yet they say that they be of no such efficacie, as a man thereby may be conuerted, and leaue his old naughtie life. Here I would demand of these men, ¹⁴⁷ what maner of knowledge of sinne that is, which is so had; that in the meane time we doo preferre the same before the righteousnesse of God? Surelie, for so much as it wanteth the end, which is proper vnto it, and wherevnto it belongeth; it cannot be anie other, but sinne: for to this end knowledge is giuen vnto vs, that knowing sinne, we should forsake it; and that we should embrace Gods iustice: which end, vnlesse it be present, the worke is corrupted, and is made sinne. This thing all the Ethnike writers doo confesse, that that action is sinne, which is depriued of the end due vnto it.

Moreouer, what maner of feare of hell-fire is that, ¹⁴⁸ when as they procéed euerie daie in casting themselues headlong into it? Or what sorrowe is there for the losse of the celestiall kingdome, when as they continuallie refuse the same, being offered them by the holie scriptures, and by the preachers? If they be mooued with lesse desire to sinne, and take lesse pleasure of their sinnes; yet doo they take so much delight in them, as they cannot be plucked away from them. If they heare the woord of God with anie diligence, yet hauing heard it, they haue it in derision; for so much as they hope, that those things promised therein shall happen vnto them, although they liue in such sort as they doo. Wherefore we sée, that all these things doo wander from the marke & end which is appointed. And séeing that all these motions be of small efficacie, & doo leaue men vnder the wrath of God; there can nothing that is sound be hoped for at their hands.

But let vs heare what Esaie, in the 58. chapter pronounceth concerning this same kind of works; Euerie daie (saith he) doo they seeke me, and will knowe my waies, ¹⁴⁹ as it were a nation that wrought righteousnesse, and had not forsaken the statutes of their God. They aske of me the ordinances of iustice, and they will drawe neere vnto God. Wherefore doo we fast (saie they) and thou seest it not? We haue afflicted our soules, and thou regardest it not. Behold, in the daie wherein ye fast, ye find out that which ye desire; and ye all seeke and require your debts. Behold ye fast to strife and debate, and to smite with the fist. Is this such a fast as I haue chosen? These words of the prophet doo teach most plainlie, that it is sinne before God, to séeke after his waies, to fast, and for a man to afflict himselfe; séeing such works may be doone without the true worshipping of GOD, and without pietie. It cannot be denied, but that these are indéed goodlie and plausible works; ¹⁵⁰ but yet God the iust iudge dooth refuse them.

Augustine, in his booke of confessions, dooth laie before vs a plaine example of himselfe, concerning this matter: for he sheweth the motions which he suffered in his mind, before he was conuerted vnto Christ. For thus he writeth in the eight booke, and eleuenth chapter; I liued in my bond, till the whole was broken in sunder, wherewith I was holden being now little: but yet was I holden. Thou O Lord by thy seuere mercie didest double in mine eies the scoorges of feare and of shame. I said inwardlie with my selfe; Behold now let it be doone. Now in a maner I knowe it, and did it not. It wanted verie little, but I euen now touched it, & held it; & yet touched it not, nor held it not. And the woorst that was growne in vse, more preuailed with me than the better out of vse. And that verie instant, wherein I was to become a new man, the neerer it approched to me, the greater horror it draue into me. I was held backe by trifles of trifles, and by the vanities of vanities, and by mine old wanton louers, which priuilie whispered; Doost thou now forsake vs? And shall we neuer anie more after this time be with thée? Doost thou? And from this time forward wilt thou neuer vse this or that? ¹⁵¹ And I now began to hearken vnto them a great deale lesse than halfe. These things he declareth, and accuseth them before God to be sins; which neuerthelesse are so greatlie commended by these men. These indéed were meanes, wherby God brought Augustine to saluation; yet in the meane while, they were sinnes in him: for he obeied them not, but corrupted them with manie abuses; so that he could not with efficacie be changed therby. But what soeuer wanteth his due perfection, is sin. ¹⁵²

18 But these Sophisters are like a kind of serpents called Hydrae: for when one argument is cut off, as it were a head, an other ariseth. They obiect to vs the Publicane, thus praieng in the temple; God be mercifull to me a sinner. ¹⁵³ And it is said, that he went home to his house iustified: wherefore (say they) he was a sinner, when he praied; for we read that he was afterwards iustified. But his praier pleased God; wherefore (saie they) we may doo works acceptable to God before we be renewed. But these men should haue remembred, that this man praid; the which thing could not be doone without faith, as we declared touching Cornelius; For how shall they call vpon him, ¹⁵⁴ vpon whom they haue not beleeued? ¹⁵⁵ Wherefore he was iustified, euen at the same time that he praied. Neither must thou so vnderstand those words, as though he was then first iustified, when he had finished his praier: for although it is said to be afterward doone, yet dooth it not followe thereof, that the same was after no sort doone before. He obteined a more perfect iustification, ¹⁵⁶ a more ample spirit, and a more néere féeling of Gods mercie. He calleth himselfe a sinner, and that iustlie; partlie bicause he felt still in himselfe that which he misliked, (for alwaies how iust soeuer we be, we be commanded to praie; Forgiue vs our trespasses; ) and partlie, for that he pondered in his mind how gréeuous sinnes he had committed before he was iustified.

And godlie men ought chéeflie to consider, while they be praieng, how great the burthen of their sinnes is: for when they come vnto God with their praiers, they be mooued with true repentance to saie with Dauid; My bones are consumed awaie in my crieng out; ¹⁵⁷ continuallie daie & night thy hand is laid heauie vpon me; my iuice is dried vp, as the moisture of the earth is dried vp in the summer. ¹⁵⁸ Innumerable euils haue compassed me about; mine iniquities haue closed me in on euerie side, so as I cannot see, they be more increased than the haires of my head; my hart hath failed within me. I acknowledge my wickednes, and my sinne is alwaies against me; ¹⁵⁹ against thee, against thee haue I sinned, and doone euill before thee. And to the end godlie men should the better beware of sins afterward, God dooth stirre vp in them the sharpe féele of his wrath; that they may knowe what they haue deserued, vnlesse God had holpen them by his sonne. Also he openeth the eies of them, that they may perceiue what his fatherlie chastisement is towards them: and that the same may be the better felt, he oftentimes deferreth from them the taste and féele of his mercie. ¹⁶⁰ Therefore they crie; Make me to heare thy ioie and gladnes, that my bruised bones may reioise; hide thy face from my sinnes, and blot out all my wickednes; a cleane hart create in me, ô God, and a perfect spirit renew within me; cast me not awaie from thy face; take not thy holie spirit from me.

Wherefore, they also that be iustified doo praie, that what infirmitie is yet left, may not be imputed vnto them. They call to mind those things, wherein they gréeuouslie sinned before; and they craue with tears to haue some taste of Gods mercie, & of the righteousnes which is bestowed on them. And this is the verie naturall meaning of such godlie praiers. Neither must we thinke, ¹⁶¹ that the same Publican praied otherwise: for he was not so minded, that he would still reteine his old purpose to sinne: but he trulie and from his hart conuerted vnto God. But our aduersaries imagine, that they, which still perseuere in their sinnes, and haue not determined to change their life; yet that they doo some good thing which pleaseth GOD. But we be taught, out of the holie scriptures, that He which beleeueth in God, hath eternall life, and therefore is iustified: but as for other things, neither be they good, nor yet doo please God. Wherefore, séeing the Publican praied, and that faithfullie; it is certeine that he had eternall life, and was not destitute of iustification.

19 But that all these things may be the perfectlier vnderstood, ¹⁶² it shall not be from the purpose; to knowe what things are required vnto a good worke, to make it acceptable vnto God. First of all, he that dooth anie good thing, it behooueth him to be mooued by the spirit of God: for otherwise, in vs, that is, in our flesh dwelleth nothing that is good; and they which be lead by the spirit of God, those be the children of God. Secondlie, it behooueth, that faith be present; by which it is vnderstood for a certeintie, that the worke which we take in hand, is of those kind of things, which God willeth, and by his lawe hath commanded to be doone; ¹⁶³ For whatsoeuer is not of faith, the same is sinne. Neither ought we so to handle the matter, that our owne hart should accuse vs in that thing which we doo. Thirdlie, whatsoeuer we doo, the same must be wholie directed to the glorie of God: that herevnto chéeflie and aboue all things we haue regard, that the praise and glorie of God may be set foorth by our works; ¹⁶⁴ Whether (saith Paule) ye eate, or whether ye drinke, or what other thing soeuer ye doo, doo it to the glorie of God. Fourthlie, forsomuch as, by reason of th’infirmitie, which is graffed in vs, there is alwaies some want in our works; yea euen in those works, which séeme to be doone well, it is necessarie that the grace and mercie of God, through Christ, be present with vs, wherby that defect or want may be supplied.

For this cause Dauid saith; ¹⁶⁵ Blessed are they whose iniquities be forgiuen; blessed is the man vnto whom the Lord hath not imputed sinne. And Paule saith; ¹⁶⁶ There is now no condemnation to them which be in Christ Iesus. Againe; ¹⁶⁷ That which was vnpossible to the lawe, insomuch as it was made weake through the flesh, God sending his owne sonne, &c. These testimonies sufficiently declare, both that our works doo faile of their perfection and iust end: and that also it commeth through Christ, and the mercie of God, that that blame mingled with our works is not imputed vnto vs. Lastlie, this also is required, ¹⁶⁸ that no man glorie of that which he vprightlie dooth; but that he glorie in GOD onelie; and acknowledge that what he dooth, he dooth by his goodnes; & not of his owne strength: for Who hath separated thee (saith Paule to the Corinthians? ¹⁶⁹ ) What hast thou that thou hast not receiued? But if thou hast receiued it, whie dooest thou glorie, as though thou hadst not receiued it? When all these things, which I haue here recited, shall take place: the worke with out all controuersie will be good and acceptable vnto God.

Here may the diligent reader, out of these conditions of a good worke, ¹⁷⁰ gather the definition thereof. On the contrarie part, if we haue respect vnto the nature of man, not regenerate: we shall easilie perceiue, that these conditions which we haue said to be necessarie vnto a good worke, cannot be found in him, For he is altogither void of the spirit of God, and of faith; and is so infected with the loue of himselfe, that whatsoeuer he dooth, he referreth it not vnto God, but vnto his owne profit. Moreouer, forsomuch as he is a stranger from Christ, it must néeds be, that he is left vnder the lawe: so that, what defect or fault soeuer there be in his works, (as of necessitie there must be much) the same cannot by anie other meanes be recompensed. To conclude, if perhaps he haue doone any notable & goodlie worke; he dooth not glorie in God, but in himselfe: for he is ignorant of Christ, and of grace. By these two descriptions of a woorke, good and acceptable vnto God; and of a man that liueth without Christ: I thinke it is now manifest, ¹⁷¹ that those works cannot be good and acceptable vnto God, which procéed from a man that is out of the faith.

20 But our aduersaries indeuour to wrest from vs two verie strong places, which we vse for the confirmation of this matter. ¹⁷² The first is, that we say; An euill tree cannot bring foorth good fruit; the other is; Euerie thing that is not of faith, is sinne: of which things somewhat must be said in this place. That metaphor of an euill trée, which cannot bring foorth good fruit, Christ vsed not onelie in the seuenth chapter of Matthew; ¹⁷³ but also in the twelfe chapter of the same Gospell: and thereof he inferred; Yee generation of vipers, how can you speake good things, when ye your selues be euill? But before I make open this cauillation, I thinke it good to declare, how Augustine, in the fourth booke, and third chapter against Iulian the Pelagian contended for this selfe-same place. He setteth foorth a goodlie worke of a man being an infidell; namelie, ¹⁷⁴ to cloth a naked man: and he demandeth, whether this worke may be called a sinne? Surelie, vnlesse this worke be of that kind that pleaseth God, I perceiue not, that anie other worke of an infidell can be acceptable to him. And Augustine affirmeth, and prooueth, that the same is sinne: and least that he might séeme to speake this without reason, he saith; It is therefore sinne, bicause he that did that goodlie worke, glorieth in his worke: for he dooth not by faith acknowledge either God or Christ, to whom he should ascribe the dooing thereof. Moreouer, he saith, that To auoid the nature of sinne, it is not inough that a good thing be doone; but also that it be well and vprightlie doone.

Shall we their sa⟨…⟩e, that an infidell hath done a good worke, and wrought vprightlie. If we grant not this, then we confesse that he sinned. But if we doo grant it, then we confesse the fruit to be good; whereas the infidell without Christ, is an euill tr⟨…⟩e. By this meanes we shall grant, that an euill trée dooth bring foorth good fruit: which thing neuertheles Christ dooth expressedlie denie. Our aduersaries therefore are driuen to such a passe, that now they doo not fight against vs onelie, but euen against Christ himselfe also: vnlesse peraduenture they will saie, that a man being faithlesse, an infidell, and a stranger from GOD, is a good trée. But if they affirme this, how doo they denie, that he pleaseth God; séeing that which is good, cannot be but acceptable vnto our good God? But he which pleaseth God, must out of all doubt haue faith: for vnto the Hebrues it is written; Without faith it is vnpossible to please God. ¹⁷⁵ But these men, by this their heresie, will obtrude vnto vs, that which the same epistle denieth can be doone. But a man (saie they) in that he is a man, is no euill trée. But Augustine saith; ¹⁷⁶ If we consider the natures onelie, then shall there be no where anie euill trée: for both angell and man were created by God, and receiued good natures. But these natures must not be measured by vs, according to that which they were made by God; but according to the state which came vnto them afterward. A man indued with a good will, shall be called a good trée: but an euill trée shall be the man, which is indued with an euill will. And we saie, that after the fall of Adam, and the first ruine of our kind, men be such, as they are not mooued with a good will; but with an euill.

But to returne to the almes of an infidell, ¹⁷⁷ whereof we began to speake; we may demand, whether this mercie, which is shewed, be of faith, or be faithlesse? And forsomuch as it is doone without faith, it must néeds be faithlesse: wherefore it cannot be without vice & sinne. It is not sufficient to haue mercie of our neighbour, ¹⁷⁸ vnlesse the same be also doone faithfullie and rightlie: for mercie is not of it selfe alone good. For God hath dissalowed manie benefits bestowed vpon our neighbours; as when the king of Israell spared the king of Syria; and Saule, ¹⁷⁹ Agag the king of Amaleck. But faith which woorketh by loue, ¹⁸⁰ is alwaies good, and can neuer be euill. But forsomuch as mercie is not of that kind, therefore it is necessarie, that there be vsed an vprightnes, whereby it may be doone faithfullie to receiue commendation. ¹⁸¹ They crie out, that this naturall affection of shewing mercie is good; which thing peraduenture we will not denie. But they should haue ⟨…⟩onsidered, that men not regenerate, abuse the good thing, when as they direct it not to God, who is the onelie end of all our actions: neither surelie dooth he commit a slight sinne, which peruerslie abuseth so great a gift of God.

21 Furthermore, the same Augustine affirmeth, that Whatsoeuer good thing can be perceiued to be in the worke of an infidell, the same is wholie of God. Wherefore, in that our neighbour is holpen, and some ordinance of reason obserued, and some ciuill honestie reteined; that commeth not anie otherwise, than of God: but so farre foorth as it procéedeth from an infidell, and a man corrupt, it is sinne, and displeaseth God. By these, and such other reasons, Pelagius was led to confesse, that these men, which so by nature behaue themselues aright, are good indéed, but yet without fruit. Augustine againe replieth against them, saieng; that Such is the nature of barren trées, that either they bring foorth no fruit at all, or else euill fruit. But Pelagius still endeuoureth to cleare himselfe, and therefore he saith, that these men are to be called barren: for that, although those things, which they doo, be good; yet helpe they nothing to the atteinement of the kingdome of heauen. But in saieng thus, ¹⁸² he saith nothing; naie rather, he hindereth his owne selfe. Truelie the Schoolemen of our time haue euen the verie same opinion; the which thing Augustine withstandeth by all the might he can: for he saith; By this means the Lord, which is good, shall cut downe and cast into the fier a good trée bringing foorth (as ye say) good fruit. What maner of iustice is this, which ye so seuerelie defend eueriewhere? Vpon this opinion of yours there followe manie vaine and absurd things. Thus much hitherto out of Augustine.

¹⁸³ But our men boast, that they differ much from Pelagius: for we put (saie they) a certeine grace preuenting and knocking, whereby in the harts of men may be inclosed some good treasure, by which they may worke some good thing: wherefore they are not plants vtterlie dead; ¹⁸⁴ for after a sort they bring foorth fruit. And although that which they doo bring foorth, cannot bud foorth into flowers, and into tried fruit; yet are there boughes, which may and doo come foorth of some sappe of the grace of God; whereof, euen they, which be strangers vnto the grace of God, be altogether destitute. But Pelagius confessed euen the verie same things: for he misliked not the name of grace, when as neuerthelesse, by the same name (as Augustine dooth prudentlie discouer him) he vnderstood what he listed, rather than what he ought: and a farre other matter, than that word signifieth among the catholike writers, or in the church of Christ, or in the holie scriptures. But these men, in their similitude, ¹⁸⁵ haue small consideration: for they remember not, that the Lord in the gospell did curse the trée which onelie bare leaues without fruit, and also commanded, that the same should be cut off, ¹⁸⁶ and cast into the fier.

But there is nothing in the danger of Gods curse, and of hell-fier; but sinne. But they haue yet an other colour, whereby they would auoid this place: for they saie, that these trées indéed be euill, but yet not vtterlie dead; for in them there is found out sappe of grace. For they affirme; that there is in man a certeine grace, which knocketh and preuenteth; whereby in the harts of men not regenerate, some good treasure may be inclosed, out of which may spring some blossoms from a man not penitent. For although they be not able to make that (which they bring foorth) prosper vnto a perfect and ripe fruit, or to beare flowers; yet at the least wise they bring foorth boughes and leaues, which doubtlesse be a token of secret grace and life. It is a woonder to sée, how these men stand in their owne conceit, concerning this knocking and preuenting grace: whereof we haue declared before what is to be thought. But they, which speake and iudge after this sort, are too much without consideration: for they marke not, that this grace of theirs, is no other, but a certeine inuiting vnto Christ, but yet not of efficacie; for men therewithall are left vnder the wrath of God, neither are their harts changed. What good treasure then can be in them, from whence may bud foorth woorks acceptable vnto God?

But because we will not flie from their similitude: Whereas they saie, that there be plants, which bring foorth boughes and leaues, although they haue no fruit; yet they should haue remembred, that Christ (as we before haue said) cursed those sort of trées: and when as he had sought for fruit vpon the figge trée, and found nothing but leaues; he smote the same with so effectuall a curse, as it dried vp. We denie not, but that by men may be doone some ciuill and morall good thing, which procéedeth through that power of God, wherewith all things be preserued: for as the Ethniks also confessed; In him we liue, ¹⁸⁷ we mooue, and haue our beeing. But that power, wherewith GOD gouerneth and mooueth all things, dooth nothing at all further men vnto eternall life, which be not regenerate. But the state of our cause is; whether they, which be as yet aliens from Christ, can doo anie thing, which maie be allowed and acceptable vnto God: that is it which we denie, and they affirme. But how much the place maketh for vs, which is brought concerning the euill trée, which cannot make good fruit, there hath bin sufficientlie spoken.

22 Now let vs examine the other place, which these men go about to wrest from vs; Whatsoeuer is not of faith, ¹⁸⁸ is sinne. This place did Augustine in a maner alwaies obiect against Pelagius. ¹⁸⁹ Pelagius made answer, that this is no other, than a particular reason, which was spoken onelie of meats; and for that cause ought not to be extended vnto other works, especiallie of infidels. Indéed we confesse, that that question sprang first by reason of meats. But after what sort the ⟨…⟩ason thereof is alledged, let vs consider by the words of Paule; He which iudgeth (saith he) that is, [he which putteth doubt in each part, and eateth] is condemned: this was to be prooued. The reason which he gaue, was; For that it is not of faith. But séeing this saieng is but particular, neither could that, which he had spoken, be reduced to a Syllogisme, vnlesse there should be added an vniuersall poposition, therefore he added; that Whatsoeuer is not of faith, is sinne. By which sentence Paules meaning is, ¹⁹⁰ that so often as we attempt anie thing, he would haue vs to be thoroughlie assured, that the same shall be acceptable vnto God, and is of him required by some commandement of the lawe: which certeintie if it want, he saith, that whatsoeuer we doo, it is sinne.

And Paules firme argument may thus be knit togither; Whatsoeuer is not of faith, is sinne; To eate meates prohibited in the lawe with a doubting, whether the same be lawfull or no, ¹⁹¹ is not of faith; Therefore it is sinne. Although the apostle prooueth a particular proposition, yet he vseth an vniuersall reason: the which as it is applied vnto meates; euen so it may be applied vnto all other actions, so as all things whatsoeuer doo want this faith, be sinnes. Wherefore, neither we, nor Augustine doo abuse that sentence, when we applie the same to the works of misbeléeuers. But in these daies manie crie out, that Faith in this place signifieth the persuasion of the conscience, and that Paule respected not that faith, which we saie dooth iustifie. But these men take too much vpon them, which bring in a new signification of faith, without anie testimonie of the scriptures: wherefore we might well denie this vnto them. But forsomuch as, if we grant them that which they would, yet are they still compelled to returne to our opinion; therefore we will not much contend with them about the same.

Admit it be as they would haue it; grant we that faith be the conscience. But what persuasion should there be of conscience, concerning works, that the same may vnderstand, which be good, and which be euill? ¹⁹² Doubtlesse other rule can we not haue (if we be godlie) than the lawe of God: for that is the rule, wherewith the good and the euill must be iudged. From thence must appéere the persuasion of our conscience, that by faith it may vnderstand that worke to be good, which it taketh in hand: and contrariewise to be euill, if it striue against the lawe of God. And this is nothing else, but that which we before spake concerning faith. Wherefore, let vs leaue these men, who, when they would be séene to speake things differing from vs, doo fall before they be aware into one and the selfe-same opinion with vs.

But we be here taught, that whatsoeuer we take in hand, a speciall regard must be had, that we be assured of the will of God. And the same thing taught Paule, when he said; ¹⁹³ Let vs trie what is the good will of God. And as the same apostle writeth vnto the Ephesians; Let vs not walke as vnskilfull, ¹⁹⁴ which vnderstand not what the will of God is. And that it be not thought, that this interpretation is of our owne deuise; I desire the reader to looke vpon Origin, vpon Primatius the disciple of Augustine, and vpon those Commentaries, ¹⁹⁵ which be ascribed to Ierom: whom thou shalt find to be of the same iudgement, when they expound euen that place, which we haue now alledged; for they acknowledge no other faith than that, which all men acknowledge.

23 But now to come to the principall point of this controuersie: I thinke, that it is plentifullie confirmed out of the holie scriptures, that all the works of infidels be sinnes. Of which mind not onelie is Augustine against Iulian, ¹⁹⁶ but also Ambrose in his booke De vocatione Gentium, the third chapter. for he saith, that Without the true worshipping of God, those things, which séeme to be vertues, are sinnes. Basil, in his second booke De baptismo, and seuenth chapter, of purpose mooueth this question, and maketh on our side. And he citeth places out of the scriptures: as out of Esaie; A sinner, ¹⁹⁷ when he sacrificeth, dooth all one, as if he should offer vp a dog: and when he offereth sweet cakes, it is all one, as if he offered vp swines flesh. And he added; He which committeth sinne, ¹⁹⁸ is the seruant of sinne, and serueth it onelie. Againe; No man can serue two masters, God & mammon. ¹⁹⁹ What agreement is there betweene light and darknes, betweene God and Belial? Finallie, ²⁰⁰ he citeth that testimonie, whereof we intreated before at large; ²⁰¹ An ill tree cannot bring foorth good fruit: vpon all these testimonies he concludeth the verie same thing, which we teach. By these things I thinke it is now plaine, ²⁰² what we are to iudge of the state of men not yet regenerate; first, they are frée from the seruitude of compulsion; secondlie, in morall and ciuill works they be able to doo manie things by their frée will; lastlie, among sinnes, they haue some choise, and sometimes imbrace this sinne, and sometimes that sinne, as their will serueth them: but yet they be not so frée, as to doo those things, which may please God: also they be bound to the miseries and calamities of this life, will they or no.

Now must we speake of the libertie of men regenerate, ²⁰³ which, besides that it is not lesse than the same, which we haue declared to be in the wicked; yet in this point it goeth beyond it, that it can atteine vnto good works, which be acceptable vnto God. For who is ignorant, that the worke of Abraham, ²⁰⁴ wherein he was prepared to sacrifice his owne sonne, was most acceptable vnto God? For he was therefore highlie commended by God himselfe. Paule vnto the Philippians calleth their almes, ²⁰⁵ sacrifices hauing a good sauour. And vnto the Hebrues we be taught, ²⁰⁶ that God is maruellouslie delighted with such sacrifices. And hereof it commeth, that Paule warneth the Philippians, ²⁰⁷ that with feare and trembling they should worke their owne saluation. But what néed is there of anie other testimonies, when as the Iudge himselfe, in the latter daie, ²⁰⁸ shall reckon vp the good works which godlie men haue bestowed vpon the members of Christ? Séeing therefore that men regenerate be good trées, it is agréeable, that they both can and doo bring foorth good fruits. ²⁰⁹ Howbeit, they which be thus regenerate, must neuer forget, that they obteined not this fréedome by their owne merits; but by the benefit of God: for he fashioned them anew, & in stéed of stonie harts hath put into them a hart of flesh. Finallie, it came not of themselues, but of the heauenlie father, that they should be drawne to Christ: for, vnlesse they had béene with great efficacie persuaded inwardlie in their minds by God the father, they had no lesse fled awaie from Christ, than other men. Wherefore, in that first change o⟨…⟩ impression of the holie Ghost, ²¹⁰ our mind onelie suffereth, as they vse to speake: but after that we be once persuaded and changed, we are so restored, that we be able to worke togither with the holie Ghost, and with grace.

24. And in what sort this restoring of frée will is, it must be considered by two principall points; out of which we at the beginning (when we described the nature of will) declared that euerie sinne, and euerie errour that is in election or choise, dooth come; bicause that when we deliberate touching anie matter, either we are vtterlie ignorant what is iust or vniust; or else, for that though we sée what is iust and vniust, yet lust and perturbation intermingleth it selfe, which by their great force cause vs to preferre the weaker reasons before sure and strong reasons. Wherefore, the knowledge of that which is right cannot take place. For the violence of the affections, and the whole attention of the mind, is fastened vpon those reasons, which serue for pleasure and lust; and the honester arguments are not considered, and therefore doo not breake foorth to effect. But by the benefit of regeneration, both these discommodities are holpen: ²¹¹ for as touching the first, the light of faith is present, which by adding the rule of the lawe of GOD, manifestlie vnderstandeth in the practising of things, what things are iust and vniust.

Furthermore, by the power of the holie Ghost, although all corruption of the affections be not taken awaie; yet is it so broken & made féeble, that it is not able, as before, to hinder the making of a right choise. Howbeit, for that this lust, so long as we liue here, cannot vtterlie be consumed; therefore it coms to passe, ²¹² that this libertie, which is giuen vnto the godlie, to doo things which may please God, is not perfect and absolute; but weake and maimed: and in this sort it is set foorth in the holie scriptures. For touching those works, which be acceptable to God, manie men are greatlie letted manie waies, that they cannot doo them as they would, & as the lawe requireth: for they alwaies féele a lawe in their members, which fighteth against the lawe of the mind; that whether they will or no, they be led captiue vnto the lawe of sin. For euen as we read to the Galathians; ²¹³ The flesh so lusteth against the spirit, as they doo not the things which they would. And Paule complaineth, that he did not the good, ²¹⁴ which he earnestlie desired, but rather the euill, which he hated. Godlie men no doubt doo in mind Serue the lawe of God, ²¹⁵ but in their flesh the lawe of sinne: in whom yet this is a notable gift of God, that they excéedinglie bewaile and lament these impediments; that although they doubt not, but that they haue the first fruits of the spirit; yet they grone, and feruentlie wish for the perfect restitution.

Moreouer, there happeneth fallings vnto them euerie daie, which doo admonish vs how weake this our libertie is. For this cause Iohn saith; If we saie that we haue no sinne, ²¹⁶ we deceiue our selues, and there is no truth in vs. Also Iames saith; We all offend in manie things. And the Lord hath taught vs in our dailie praier, to crie vnto the father; Forgiue vs our trespasses. But neuertheles, we are not hindered by this imperfection of libertie; but that we may worke togither with God, and to frame our selues as apt instruments vnto the holie Ghost. Wherefore Paule warned Timothie to stirre vp the grace that he had in him. ²¹⁷ And in the first epistle to the Corinthians, ²¹⁸ he admonished them to applie themselues to the frée gifts of God, and to gifts more excellent; as though their diligence were required to be able to vse rather this gift of the spirit than that.

²¹⁹ But those which are said to haue these things, are not simple and bare men; but when they be indued with the grace and the spirit of God, they be called the men of God: and bicause they be the men of God, they be also called perfect, and instructed to euerie good worke. Wherefore we grant, that men borne anew in Christ, haue all that fréedome which we grant vnto the vngodlie: and moreouer, that they be also able to doo works which be acceptable vnto God, ²²⁰ although they be not frée, neither from sinne, nor yet from the calamities and miseries of this life. Now should we also speake of the fourth state of man; but we may answer in one word touching the same; That séeing in our heauenlie habitation we shall inioie the chéefe felicitie, no kind of libertie can there be found wanting: ²²¹ vnlesse a man will call that a libertie, to be able to sinne, and to fall awaie from God, that is, from the chéefe good thing [which there cannot be.] But because that is a chéefe libertie, therefore we hope well, that in that countrie we shall be most frée.

²²² 25 But now there is an other question to be intreated of; to wit whether this concupiscence, and those corrupt motions, which remaine in the regenerate, be sinnes, and so ought to be called? These things are called by Paule, The lawe of sinne; ²²³ and the lawe of the members. And by an example of himselfe he taught, that they remaine in godlie men after regeneration. But whether these be sinnes or no, cannot rightlie be defined, vnlesse we first vnderstand what sinne is. Augustine saith, that Sinne is whatsoeuer is spoken, doone, or coueted against the lawe of God. But whether this definition belong vnto all sinnes, or to those sinnes onlie, which be commonlie called actuall; ²²⁴ it is vncerteine, by the ambiguitie of this word, Coueted or Lusted. For if the same be referred vnto the full assent of the will, ²²⁵ whereby we assent to corrupt desires, then is the definition stretched vnto actuall sinnes: but if this word Coueted, be so largelie taken, as is the last precept; Thou shalt not couet, the definition may be vniuersall, and may comprehend all sinnes. The Maister of the sentences, in his second booke, and 35. distinction, cited that definition, when he had now largelie intreated of originall sinne, and had disposed himselfe to the searching foorth of other naturall sinnes: wherefore it séemeth, that he thought the same definition to perteine onlie vnto actuall sinnes. But howsoeuer it be, touching this matter I will not much contend. Ambrose, in his booke De paradiso, and eight chapter, setteth foorth indéed a most large definition of sinne; Sinne (saith he) is nothing else than a transgression of the lawe of God, and a disobedience of the heauenlie commandements. But to passe ouer the sentences of the Fathers, the matter must be brought to the triall of the scriptures, that by them we may certeinelie knowe and vnderstand what sinne is.

Iohn, in the first epistle, and third chapter; ²²⁶ Sinne (saith he) is ⟨…⟩, that is, Iniquitie. That Gréeke woord is compounded of the particle priuatiue ⟨…⟩, and of this word ⟨…⟩, that is, A lawe. Here the nature of sinne is verie well declared; for it is said to be a priuation or want, whereby is taken from it the good thing which it ought to haue. If thou inquire what that good thing is, which by sinne is remooued; ²²⁷ this Gréeke word ⟨…⟩ expresseth it: for that good thing is taken awaie, which is expressed by the lawe of God. Wherefore we may saie, that it is sinne, whatsoeuer withstandeth the lawe of God. Now we are to sée, whether this definition, which is taken out of the holie scriptures, be correspondent or answerable vnto that corruption, which remaineth in the godlie, after regeneration. This doo we affirme, but our aduersaries denie. Howbeit the scripture, without all controuersie is of our side: for Paule saith expresselie, that The lawe of the members warreth against the lawe of God, and of the mind, ²²⁸ and that the wisdome of the flesh is enimitie against God, ²²⁹ so as neither it is, nor can be subdued vnto the lawe of God. And it wholie striueth against the first and greatest commandement; ²³⁰ Thou shalt loue the Lord thy God with all thy mind, with all thy hart, and with all thy strength. For if all our strength and abilitie, as méete it were, would yéeld vnto God; this coueting would neuer be resident in vs. Furthermore, the verie same coueting or lusting dooth also wrestle against the last precept; Thou shalt not couer. ²³¹ And Augustine testifieth, that these two precepts cannot fullie be obserued: and what the cause is, whie they be giuen, ⟨…⟩éeing they cannot be kept, he alledgeth goodlie reasons, which shall not here be néedfull to recite.

26 We haue declared by the definition of sinne, that this coueting, whereof we speake, is sin. Now let vs consider of other arguments. One is taken of the institution of man; for Man is made to the image and likenesse of God: and; ²³² We be predestinated, that we might be made conformable vnto the image of the sonne of God. And we are commanded To put on the new man, ²³³ which (as Paule saith in the third to the Colossians) is renewed to the knowledge and image of him, which hath created him: and which new man (as it is written in the epistle to the Ephesians) dooth consist in righteousnes and holines of truth. ²³⁴ And the image of God, which we are commanded to put on (as Tertullian saith) herein consisteth, ²³⁵ that we haue one and the selfe-same motions with GOD. And Paule, to the Philippians, exhorteth vs To be of one and the same mind with Christ. ²³⁶ But these motions and lusts doo most shamefullie corrupt and blot the image of God in vs. Furthermore, that which we ought to crucifie, mortifie, and put off; the same of necessitie must be sinne: for if they were good things, the holie Ghost would rather haue admonished vs to nourish & mainteine them. But Paule to the Colossians saith; Mortifie your members, ²³⁷ which bee vpon the earth. And vnto the Galathians; They which be of Christ, ²³⁸ haue crucified the flesh, with the concupiscences thereof. And in another place; Put off (saith he) the old man. ²³⁹ But and if so be these motions doo so displease God, it is in no other respect, than bicause they be sinnes: for God is so verie good, that there is nothing displeaseth him, vnlesse it be sinne.

²⁴⁰ Lastlie, vnto sinne death is due as a reward: wherefore, where no sinne is, there death can haue no place. For this onelie apperteineth vnto the sonne of God, to die an innocent; For he died for our sinnes: ²⁴¹ but we therefore die, bicause we be not without sinne. And if it be so, then let vs sée what our aduersaries can alledge; why infants, which be now borne anew in Christ, doo die. For actuall sinnes they haue not, and the guiltines or blame of originall sinne is taken awaie: there remaineth onelie lust and corruption of nature, not wholie amended: & corrupt motions, which Augustine in his eleuenth booke of Confessions saith, are found in infants; and he both confesseth, and accuseth them as sinnes: and therefore, séeing these be sinnes, they doo not vniustlie die for them.

²⁴² Forsomuch then as it appéereth, by most substantiall reasons, that the corrupt lusts, which remaine in vs after baptisme, are sinnes; now it resteth, that we sée, vnto what kind or part of sinnes they belong. Sinne may séeme thus to be diuided; that There is one thing, which may be forgiuen; and another thing, which cannot. Transgression against the lawe of God, which is neuer forgiuen, is sinne against the holie Ghost. But if sinne may be forgiuen, that may be two maner of waies: for either it is so forgiuen, as we must of necessitie altogither depart from it; which we sée come to passe in sore and gréeuous sinnes, which Paule saith, Doo separate vs from the kingdome of God, and commonlie be called mortall: ²⁴³ or else be so forgiuen, as we depart not from them; partlie, through ignorance ingraffed in vs, and partlie, by reason of the infirmitie, wherewith we be infected.

And those be called small or veniall sinnes, without the which mans life cannot here be led. Paule hath put a notable difference betwéene these sins, when he exhorteth vs, that we should not suffer sinne to reigne in vs. ²⁴⁴ And of this third kind of sins the apostle co~plained, when he said; O vnhappie man that I am! ²⁴⁵ Who shall deliuer me from the bodie of this death? And of these sinnes doo we meane, when we teach, ²⁴⁶ that the works of men, notwithstanding they be godlie men, be not without deadlie sinnes; for that we doo nothing without this kind of defects. And such kind of defects be deadlie, bicause in their owne nature they deserue death: for The reward of sinne, is death. Further also, for that so long as we carrie about with vs these blemishes of corruption, we cannot enioie the life eternall: for so long are we excluded from it, vntill by death we haue put off all corruption. Moreouer, it is written; Curssed be euerie one, which abideth not in all the things, which are written in the words of this lawe. And he which complaineth with Paule, that he dooth not the good which he would, dooth not performe all the things, which the lawe requireth, ²⁴⁷ nor is not vtterlie without cursse: though the same, through the mercie of GOD, be not imputed vnto him vnto eternall destruction.

27 And so doo the men of our part speake of the good works of godlie persons; not that either we denie good works, or that we thinke not that the good works, which are doone by the men regenerate, are pleasing vnto God: but that our vncleannesse and impuritie may be acknowledged, to the perceiuing whereof we are blockish, and more than blind. Wherefore, setting aside sinne against the holie Ghost; other sins are diuided into thrée degrées. In the first is coueting or lust, which is ingraffed in vs; ²⁴⁸ secondlie, out of it dooth spring continuallie the first motions and impulsions vnto diuers sorts of wickednesse; thirdlie, commeth a consent of the will, and breaketh foorth into act. Paule assigned these thrée degrées, when he said; ²⁴⁹ Let not sinne reigne in your mortall bodies, that ye should obeie the lusts thereof. Sinne, which ought not to reigne in vs, is the ingraffed lust and corruption of nature. The first motions are the lusts of concupiscence, which spring from thence, the which we are admonished not to obeie. Then is added obedience, which dooth consummate and make perfect the sinne, which is commonlie called actuall sinne.

It is not to be doubted, ²⁵⁰ but that the corruption of nature apperteineth to originall sinne. Againe, that sinne, vnto the which commeth the consent of the will, they call actuall. But there is a doubt touching those first motions, by meanes wherof we, through the benefit of Christ, be not tied to a new blame and bond of the iudgment of God) whether they be to be referred vnto originall sinne, or vnto actuall sinne. Surelie they are betwéene both, and they take somewhat of each part: for, so farre foorth as by them we doo worke, couet, or desire anie thing; they haue some consideration of actuall sinne. And Paule vseth the words, ⟨…⟩; which out of all doubt signifie some action. But on the other part, bicause we suffer this kind of motion against our wils; therefore therein they communicate with originall sinne: for that sinne is not taken by choise, and of our owne accord.

²⁵¹ Ierom vpon the seuenth chapter of Matthew, maketh a distinction betwéene ⟨…⟩. ⟨…⟩ (saith he) dooth signifie the first motions, after that the consent of will is come vnto them: and ⟨…⟩, when they doo moue and stirre vp from the beginning. And he addeth, that although they haue a fault in them; yet are they not held for great faults: but the passion is to be counted for a sinne. Here thou must note, that Ierom confesseth, that the first motions haue the blame of sinne; although they be not counted for crimes, that is, although by the benefit of Christ they are not imputed vnto death: or else, although in mans iudgement they be not counted for a crime. And sinne is againe diuided into that which is onelie sinne, and into that which is both sinne, ²⁵² & also the punishment of sinne. Of which distinction Augustine maketh mention, vpon 57. psalme: for he saith, that The first falling awaie from God is sinne onlie; but those sinnes which followe, are both sinnes, and the punishments of sinnes, vntill the time that men come vnto hell fire. Wherefore, what euils soeuer are committed betwéene the first apostasie, or falling awaie, and [the time of] hell fire; the same as well be sinnes, as also the punishment taken for other sinnes. That hath Paule vnto the Romans verie well declared: ²⁵³ for first he saith; that The Ethniks (no doubt) knew God, but they glorified him not as God. And for that cause he addeth, ²⁵⁴ that They were deliuered vp vnto wicked desires, being filled with all corruption and couetousnesse, &c. And at last he maketh mention of the condemnation of hell fire, saieng: But thou, ²⁵⁵ according to thy hardnes and vnrepentant hart, heapest vp to thy selfe wrath, against the daie of wrath, and of the reuelation of the iust iudgement of God, wherein he shall render to euerie man according to his works.

But there be manie which thinke not that these sinnes be the punishments of sinne; bicause, of them men take no small pleasure. Howbeit, vnlesse they were blind, they might easilie vnderstand by the apostle, that they are punishments, and such indéed as are most gréeuous. For he saith, that Their hart was blinded, ²⁵⁶ and that they were made fooles, although they boasted that they were wise men, and were giuen ouer by God vnto a reprobate sense, to defile their bodies with shamefulnes. And what are all these, but most gréeuous punishments? ²⁵⁷ If when one hath committed theft, his hands should straitwaie be cut off, or his eies plucked out; we would saie that he were gréeuouslie punished by God. Paule saith, that These men were depriued of their mind, that their heart was made foolish, and that their bodies were most shamefullie defiled. And shall not these séeme to be punishments?

How can we estéeme our mind to be safe, sound, and vncorrupt, if sinne doo reigne therein? Salomon saith; ²⁵⁸ Can anie man nourish fire in his bosome, and not burne his garments? Or can a man go vpon hot burning coles, and yet not burne his owne feet? And therefore sinne is called a punishment; ²⁵⁹ bicause it hurteth and corrupteth nature: for the vnhappinesse of originall sinne hath so marred the same, as it can scarselie séeme to be halfe on liue. And the corrupt motions, and violent rages, which often times spring out of that vnhappinesse; vnlesse they be kept short, and mortified, doo make it the more raging. Finallie, if thou yéeld or giue thy consent to them, they euermore become stronster and stronger; and so nature runneth euermore headlong to the woorse.

28 All these things haue respect herevnto, that we may vnderstand, that lust graffed in vs, and corrupt motions, which still remaine in our minds, belong to this kind of sinnes; but yet so, as they are punishments of an other sinne going before; namelie, of originall sinne; if it be not of some other sinne that is more gréeuous. Yet neuerthelesse this is to be noted, that the first falling awaie also is in such sort sinne, ²⁶⁰ as it is also a punishment: for as we haue said, there is no sinne, which dooth not most gréeuouslie hurt the nature of man; and so at the l⟨…⟩ast wise it hath a punishment of it selfe ioined with it. But euerie sinne is not the punishment of an other sinne going before it: but those, whereof we now intreat, we affirme to be punishments of sinne going before; yea, and we abide by it, that they be sinnes. But it séemeth a woonder vnto manie, that séeing these be of necessitie, how they can be sinnes.

But touching this matter, let vs heare what Augustine saith in his third booke De libero arbitrio, and 18. chapter; Some things also (saith he) doone of necessitie, are not to be allowed: as when a man would doo well and can not. For otherwise, whie were these words spoken; ²⁶¹ The good that I would, I doo not; but the euill which I would not, that I doo. To will is readie with me, but to performe the good, I find no abilitie. ²⁶² And this; The flesh lusteth against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh. For these words are one repugnant to the other, that the things which ye would not doo, those ye doo. But all these things belong vnto men, & procéed from that condemnation of death: for if they be not a punishment of man, but nature in man; then are they no sinnes. ²⁶³ For if we depart not from that state wherein man was naturallie made, so that he could not be better; then, when he doth these things, he doth what he ought to doo. But if a man were good, it should be otherwise: but now, since it is thus, he is not good, nor yet is it in his power to be good; either for that he séeth not what maner of one he ought to be, or else in that he séeth the same, and is not able to be such a one as he perceiueth he should be. Thus much Augustine.

In which words manie things are most woorthie the noting. First of all he confesseth, that there be manie things which necessarilie happening, are to be disallowed. Secondlie, he alledgeth a reason why they are called sinnes; bicause we depart from that state wherein we are naturallie made. ²⁶⁴ Thirdlie he saith, that a man is not good, neither hath it in his power to be good. Fourthlie, he bringeth two reasons why he cannot be good; either bicause he séeth not what is to be doone; or else for that he séeth it, but by reason of infirmitie is not able to performe it. ²⁶⁵ Lastlie, this is to be noted, that he meaneth these things of men which be regenerate. For he citeth the words of Paule to the Galathians, and those places which we haue now alledged; which things we haue declared, cannot be vnderstood otherwise than of the regenerate. But against this saieng of Augustine, that séemeth to be, which Ierom writeth in his interpretation of faith; We saie, that they doo erre, which saie with Manichaeus that a man can not eschew euill.

²⁶⁶ 29 But these things may be reconciled easilie enough: for Ierom speaketh of nature, as it was instituted by God. For he writeth against the Manicheis, which taught, that we therefore cannot resist sinne; for that we were by nature created euill, by an euill god. Yet there is none of vs which doubteth, but that man, when he was created at the beginning, was most frée. But that Augustine speaketh of nature after the fall, it sufficientlie appéereth, in that he saith; All these things perteine to men, and came from the condemnation of death. Besides, he confesseth, that this is the punishment of man being fallen. Moreouer, if these things be referred vnto the regenerate, we may saie, that the saieng of Ierom hath a respect onlie to the grosser kinds of sinnes, ²⁶⁷ which doo separate vs from the kingdome of God; from which sinnes we doubt not, but men borne anew in Christ may absteine. But Augustine speaketh most largelie, and by sinnes vnderstandeth those also, the which we are presentlie in hand with; without the which we cannot here lead our life. And this latter solution is cited by the Maister of the sentences, in his second booke, and 36. distinction.

But they will obiect vnto vs, that we doo iniurie against baptisme, if we saie that sinne is not taken awaie thereby. But wée cannot iustlie be accused of this crime: for we affirme, that the giltinesse or imputation of fault is taken awaie by regeneration. For although these vices remaine, as both the scripture declareth, and experience teacheth; yet their bond [of punishment] and giltines is discharged. Wherfore Augustine sundrie times saith; ²⁶⁸ that Concupiscence indéed remaineth, but the blame thereof is taken awaie by Christ. And he addeth, that sometime it commeth to passe, that the act and worke of sinne passeth awaie, as we sée it is in theft, and in adulterie; but the giltinesse neuerthelesse abideth. And sometime it commeth to passe, that the blame is taken awaie, but the fault remaineth: which is plaine to be séene touching this lust, whereof we speake. In déed the same remaineth, but yet we cannot there-thorough be accused as giltie of eternall destruction. If thou demand wherefore it is called sinne, séeing the blame is taken awaie; I answer, bicause that in so much as it is not imputed vnto vs, it hath not that of his owne nature: for touching his owne nature, (as we haue before taught) it deserueth death and damnation; but this commeth by another means, namelie, by the mercie of God through Christ.

But euerie thing ought to be iudged of, ²⁶⁹ as it is in it selfe, and according to his owne nature. Wherefore, séeing the proper nature of sinne is to striue against the lawe of God; which thing we sée commeth to passe in lust, and in these first motions, therefore they are to be called sinnes. Neither doo we by this our declaration, ²⁷⁰ fall into that foolishnesse, wherewith the Pelagians reproched Augustine and other Catholiks; as though they should saie, that by regeneration is not blotted out sinne; but onelie raced. For when as haires be shauen, yet there remaine still vnder the skin, the rootes, whereby they growe vp againe. For although we affirme that in men regenerate remaine still lust, and corrupt motions; yet doo we not denie, but that God is perfectlie reconciled vnto vs. Wherefore, although these in their owne nature be sinnes; yet by the mercie of GOD they be so wiped out, as they cease to be imputed to vs at all. So then, if we haue respect to imputation, there remaineth nothing of them.

30 Last of all, they obiect vnto vs, that we doo iniurie vnto Augustine, in that we saie he affirmeth, that these be sinnes; séeing he interpreteth himselfe, that they be called sinnes improperlie. ²⁷¹ For as a scripture or writing is called a hand, bicause it is doone with the hand: so these things are called sinnes, bicause they come from originall sinne. And as cold is called slouthfull, bicause it maketh vs slouthfull; so these motions are called sinnes, bicause they stirre vs vp to sinnes: but yet properlie they are not sinnes. So (saie they) Augustine dooth not onelie interpret himselfe, whie he called these, sinnes; but also hath giuen vs a waie how we ought to vnderstand Paule, when he calleth them sinnes. Herevnto we answer, that if Augustine, ²⁷² or anie other of the fathers, denie that these be sinnes; the same must be vnderstood by waie of comparison, if they be conferred with actuall sinnes: but not that the nature of sinne can wholie be taken awaie from them. Which thing Augustine in an other place most plainlie declareth: for against Iulianus, in his sixt booke, and eight chapter; For neither is it (saith he) anie equitie, when in one man either the superior parts, are after a vile sort seruants vnto the inferior parts; or the inferior parts after a vile maner resist the superior parts: although they be not suffered to get the vpper hand. Séeing he calleth this sinne, iniquitie; he plainlie teacheth, that vnto it is agréeable the nature of sinne, which we before described.

And in his fift booke, and third chapter against the same Iulianus, he thus writeth; The concupiscence of the flesh, against which the good spirit lusteth, is sinne: bicause in it is a disobedience against the gouernment of the mind, and it is a punishment of sinne; for that it is rendred vnto the merits of the disobedient person; and it is a cause of sinne, through the falling awaie of him that sinneth. Here we sée, that concupiscence or lust, is by Augustine thrée maner of waies called sinne. ²⁷³ Neither can it be said, that he writeth these things of a man not regenerate: for he saith expresselie; Against whom the good spirit lusteth: for the spirit of God is not in the wicked, with whom he might striue. Wherefore we haue out of Augustine thrée places; one, which we cited before, out of his fift booke De libero arbitrio, and two against Iulianus, wherein he expressedlie confesseth, that concupiscence is sinne: and he bringeth a reason whie he so thinketh. Neither ought our aduersaries, as concerning the interpretation of Paule, to runne vnto a figure, to saie, that this is not properlie to be called sinne: for both out of Paule, and out of other places of the scripture is brought good reason, whie concupiscence, or lust, ²⁷⁴ is trulie and properlie called sinne. And it is to be woondred at, that these men, which are so readie else-where in euerie place with their figures, when as in this one proposition; This is my bodie, they so much contemne all kind of figures, where neuerthelesse a figure is most conuenient for that sentence. And if thou desire other testimonies of the fathers, to prooue that lust is sinne; we haue before cited Ierom vpon Matthew: and in Augustine against Iulianus, there are found cited manie other sentences of the ancient fathers; all which doo make with vs.

These things which followe are taken out of the like place vpon the first to the Corinthians, at the end of the second Chapter.

31 Now must we search out, whether the libertie of the will be taken quite awaie, ²⁷⁵ by meanes of those things which we haue rehersed. But bicause Paule affirmeth, that A naturall man can not knowe those things which be of God: ²⁷⁶ it séemeth a while to be against frée will. For if we be not able, through our naturall power to comprehend spirituall things; how can it come to passe, that we expresse them in our actions: séeing we sée by experience, that there is much more busines and labour in dooing, than in vnderstanding? And not onelie this, ²⁷⁷ but also the predestination, or prescience, séemeth to be a hinderance to it. For it séemeth that this may be inferred; If God hath knowen all things, before they be brought to passe, and can not be deceiued, the libertie of our will is quite gone, and all things happen of necessitie. Also, ²⁷⁸ the power of GOD, wherewith all things be wrought, causeth no small difficulty of this matter: for of such efficacie is the will of God, as Paule to the Romans said; Who is able to resist his will?

Moreouer, the scriptures affirme sinne to be of so great force, ²⁷⁹ as by the same all things in a maner are corrupted and despoiled in vs: wherfore the strength which is left vnto will, is verie féeble, the which is not able to doo as reason hath appointed. Againe, ²⁸⁰ so much is attributed to the grace of Christ by diuine oracles, as without the same it is said, that we are able to doo nothing, which either may be acceptable or gratefull vnto God. And séeing the same is not equallie giuen vnto all men, it is thought that their libertie is destroied; for so much as they haue not this grace in their owne power. ²⁸¹ The Mathematicians also extoll the powers celestiall, and in a maner persuade, that of them doo depend those things which happen; so as there might not séeme to be left vnto vs the perfect libertie of such things as are to come. ²⁸² Finallie, there haue béene such also, who would affirme, that there be definite causes of things to be doone; ²⁸³ the which being ioined one with an other, and tied with a sure knot, there is brought to them a certeine necessitie and destinie, which cannot be withstood.

32 But we néed not stand much vpon that argument, ²⁸⁴ which was taken fro~ the force of knowledge; bicause it expresselie appéereth by those things, which we haue alreadie spoken, that this libertie is not iudged to be in men not yet regenerate, as concerning works, which be in verie déed good, and doo please God: wherfore that kind of reasoning is not to be weakened, séeing it surelie confirmeth the doctrine of the apostle. ²⁸⁵ In the next reason there is a more difficultie and trouble: for there be few, which can perceiue how the prouidence of God, ²⁸⁶ or (as they terme it) his prescience can suffer anie frée choise to remaine in our will. And the place is so difficult and dangerous to be dealt in, as manie of the old writers, in reasoning about this matter, were brought to such a passe, as they iudged altogither, that of those things, which be doone, there ariseth a necessitie: yea, and they supposed, that God himselfe is held with this necessitie. Wherof came a prouerbe, ²⁸⁷ that God also might not withstand necessitie, so as he durst not attempt anie thing against the same.

²⁸⁸ Through this libertie of theirs, the poets went further, and said, that manie things be doone, euen whether the gods will or no. And Homer brought in Iupiter to be sad, and to lament the necessitie, or destinie, by the force whereof he was let from remoouing death, which approched vnto his swéet sonne Sarpedones. And he maketh Neptunus to take verie gréeuouslie⟨…⟩ the chance of his sonne Cyclops; of whom he being stirred vp with a lust to reuenge, would haue driuen Vlysses altogither from home, and complaineth, that this was not granted to him by destinie. And in Virgil, Iuno dooth no lesse outragiouslie bewaile; bicause she had kept wars so long togither with one nation, and yet could not remooue (as she desired) from the coast of Italie the Troian nauie. But we Christians doo not in such sort speake of God: for we haue most certeinlie learned out of the holie scriptures, that there is nothing vnpossible to God; and we are taught by Christ himselfe, that althings are possible vnto God. And our faith, after the example of Abraham, ²⁸⁹ dooth chéeflie cleaue to this persuasion; that God can doo whatsoeuer he hath promised. Neither must we conceiue in our mind, ²⁹⁰ that Christ was either condemned vnto the death, or forced to the crosse against his will, or his father not willing. GOD would these things to be doone, not being led thereto by an ineuitable necessitie; but by a superabundant & excéeding charitie towards men. So the scripture teacheth vs, which saith; ²⁹¹ So God loueth the world, as he gaue his onelie sonne, &c. And vnto the Romans it is written; ²⁹² Which spared not his owne sonne, but gaue him for vs all. Christ himselfe by the same loue, was mooued to die for vs; and he taught vs, ²⁹³ that A greater loue than this can none haue, that one putteth his life for his friends. And thereby he shewed himselfe to haue excéeded the measure of mans loue; bicause he would suffer death for his enimies. And that he willinglie, and of his owne accord tooke death vpon him, he sufficientlie declared; when in the last banket (which, according to the Paschall custome, he kept with his apostles) he said; ²⁹⁴ I haue earnestlie desired to eate this passeouer with you.

33 By these places we perceiue, that the Lords death was throughlie foreknowne, and vnderstood, and did in no respect infringe the libertie, either of Christ, or of the father. Therefore Cicero, otherwise a verie learned man, is greatlie to be woondered at: ²⁹⁵ against whom Augustine, in his fift booke De ciuitate Dei, especiallie in the ninth & tenth chapters, earnestlie disputeth concerning this question. The controuersie dependeth vpon this, that in the latter booke De diuinatione, all things are refelled, which were brought by Quintus, Ciceros brother, in the former booke. And Cicero indeuoreth by all meanes, to ouerthrowe all predictions of things to come, and of the prescience of God. Therefore Augustine affirmeth, that the Astrologians had reasons, which were better to be borne withall, than his: bicause, though they attribute ouermuch vnto the starres, yet they take not awaie all diuination and prescience. ²⁹⁶ And a certeine Physician (as the same Augustine declareth in his booke of confessions) being a graue man, and one that detested Astrologie; when he was demanded, how it came to passe that Mathematicians did prophesie so manie truths, he durst not (contrarie vnto all histories and experience) denie euerie diuination; but he answered, that a certeine destinie was spred ouer things: and he affirmed, that it was not incredible, but that reasonable soules did after a sort féele it. Surelie there is nothing to be found more repugnant, ²⁹⁷ than of the one side to affirme God to be; and on the other side to take from him the prescience of things to come. The prophet Esaie would these things to be so firmelie knit togither, as he said; Shew vs what things shall come to passe, ²⁹⁸ and we will declare you to be gods. But that Cicero had small knowledge, and no good iudgement of God; it appéereth by his booke, which he intituled De natura deorum: wherein, disputing vnder the person of Cotta, he striueth vtterlie to take awaie the nature of God.

And surelie, it is to be lamented, that so notable a man is to be charged with that, which the psalme of Dauid ascribeth vnto fooles: for there it is written; ²⁹⁹ that The foolish man hath said in his hart, There is no God. Vpon what occasion he appointed those parts in the dialog vnto Cotta, which was a bishop; I doo not well vnderstand: vnlesse perhaps he considered, that none in a maner are to be found, which both more fréelie speake, and woorse doo estéeme of God, than they doo, to whose trust are committed ceremonies and holie things. And bicause it was not hidden to Tullius Cicero, that it is a verie odious thing to professe an opinion, whereby God should be denied: therefore, when he had disputed as much as he thought good; in the end of his booke he shewed his opinion, yet in the behalfe of Lucius Balbus; and so, as he saith to Velleius, that the opinion of Cotta is to be allowed. Cicero was a man verie studious, as well of all kind of learning, as speciallie of the ciuill lawe. And whereas he thought, ³⁰⁰ that the state of mans dooings should be ouerthrowne, if frée will were denied: and he not knowing by what meanes this libertie might be reteined, with a prescience of things to come; he rather yéelded, that Gods wisedome should be taken from him, than that we should be depriued of the fréedome of our will.

Wherevpon it may be gathered, into what darknesse and obscuritie of things the sinne of the first man hath driuen mankind: for what a madnes is it to go about to throwe GOD, the creator of all things, out of the fortresse of his wisedome, ³⁰¹ that thou maist preserue man? This is that ouer selfe-loue, which euerie-where in the scriptures is condemned: we would that all things should perish, rather than our selues. This dooth not godlinesse require. Wherfore we, which be taught by the spirit of God, declare that both must be confessed; namelie, that both God dooth foreknow all things, and also that the fréedome of our mind (as we haue shewed before) must be reteined. So doo the holie scriptures instruct vs, wherein we read; ³⁰² Whom he foreknew, them hath he predestinate to be made conformable to the image of his sonne: and that We were chosen by God before the foundations of the world were laid. ³⁰³ In them doo we learne, that The heares of our head euerie one are numbered: ³⁰⁴ that The little sparrowes light not without the will of our heauenlie father. And séeing we iudge, that God dooth all things rightlie and iustlie; we cannot thinke that he dealeth without reason and vnderstanding.

34 But go to, let vs more néerelie consider the maner of Ciceros reasoning. ³⁰⁵ If (saith he) things to come are certeinlie knowne before, things among themselues shall haue some certeine order: and forsomuch as nothing is doone without a cause, of necessitie also it shall be granted, that there is an order and knitting togither of causes. Whereby will come to passe, that all things, which be doone, be doone of necessitie; by which meanes iust and wholsome lawes shall perish: and no admonitions or rebukings will be left, neither can there be anie place for religion or praiers. Wherefore thou must choose, whether of these two euils thou wilt: either that there is diuination, and prescience of God; or else to maintaine the frée power of mans will. Both togither cannot be had, they be repugnant one with another, as he thinketh. Wherefore vnto him it séemeth altogither necessarie, that one of these be mainteined and defended; and that the other be refused, as false and vnprofitable. Which deliberation being taken, ³⁰⁶ as Augustine no lesse wittilie, than godlie said; Cicero, otherwise a verie prudent man, while he coueteth to make vs frée, maketh vs impious and wicked persons, who should rob God of the knowledge, which he hath of things to come.

And we must diligentlie marke, that his arguments make no lesse against the foretellings of our prophets; than they impugne the diuinations of the Ethniks, whereof he at that time disputed. Wherefore thus I thinke best to answer his curious reasons. Let vs grant him what he would; to wit, that for the establishing of Gods prescience, we agrée that there is a certeine and determinate order before GOD, ³⁰⁷ as well of things, as of causes. But that which he bringeth in at last; namelie, that all things will therefore come to passe of necessitie; that will we denie. For though there be an order of causes appointed, yet dooth it not followe therof, that there cannot be som causes found among them, which may kéepe their libertie, or (as they call it) their contingence. And in this point Cicero séemeth to erre more than the Stoiks: for he, ³⁰⁸ to saue the libertie of man, would that all order of causes, and foreshewing of things to come, should be vtterlie taken awaie; which things take so sure hold of the nature of God, that the same being spoiled of them, it cannot séeme to consist. But the Stoiks, bicause they would take nothing from the nature of GOD, ³⁰⁹ doo bring in their destinie: and that our entire and perfect will may haue a place, they altogither remooue the same from the order of causes ioined togither.

35 But here let vs ioine issue with him, that we may stedfastlie denie, that the knowledge of GOD dooth nothing at all hinder our will; although it comprehend the things which are to come: for neuer shall the will of man bring anie thing to effect, vnlesse GOD haue both foreknowne it, and wild it to be brought to effect. When he shall knowe before hand, that to morrowe I will either runne or read; indéed I shall runne and read, yet not driuen thereto of anie necessitie, but (as they speake) contingentlie: for as farre as belongeth to my selfe, I might doo neither one nor other. But if thou vrge further, and saie; Yet neuerthelesse thou shalt doo it, in such sort as God knew that thou shouldst doo it. I grant: but thereof it followeth not, that I could not otherwise doo; bicause we doo not alwaies that which we can doo: nay rather, manie things might be doone, which in no wise be doone. ³¹⁰ And in that I shall read or runne, it procéedeth altogither of my owne choise: for of all things it is most in our power, to will, or not to will. Wherfore when they saie; Bicause God knew before, that thou wouldest read or runne; Therefore of necessitie thou shalt read: we must demand of them againe, whether vnder the name of necessitie, they meane a compelled and a repugnant will.

³¹¹ For if this be their mind, that we vtterlie denie: bicause it may be, that God foreknew that I would doo some thing, and that neither vnwillinglie, nor with a constrained mind; but that I would doo it willinglie. But if by necessitie, they meane that this should in anie wise be doone of me, we will not denie it: for so much as the controuersie now is, not of the thing which is doone, or is not doone; but the disputation betwéene vs is onelie of the maner and forme of dooing. ³¹² Neither (as he thought) are admonitions, lawes, rebukings, or religious praiers taken awaie: these things doubtles will be of force, and that more frequentedlie than he could persuade himselfe; bicause God not onelie hath mans safetie in his foreknowledge, but also he comprehendeth in his vnderstanding, the waies and meanes, whereby he will helpe them. Wherefore if we shall perceiue our brother to haue néed of the remedies, which we haue héere mentioned, we must boldlie vse them: for they haue so farre foorth appéered, as God before hand knew, and would, that they should be profitable. Neither must we desist from our dutie, although it may be, that all mortall men would affirme that we labour in vaine. For we must followe the lawe prescribed vnto vs, and not the secret prescience of God, whereof we haue no suertie what he hath decréed of things to come.

And séeing the prescience of God is not the nature, or (as they terme it) the essence or being of our mind; we must giue iudgement of the actions which procéed from the same, according as they ought to be estéemed by the nature of the mind and will; and not by that which is placed out of the same. Wherefore, séeing the nature of will is, that it is mooued, neither vnwillinglie nor by constraint; it cannot be excluded from it by anie outward means. ³¹³ It may sooner be abolished not to be at all, than that the violent action can be taken there from: euen as thou maist easilier ridde anie of vs from being men, than when we be men to make vs that we shall not be furnished with a reasonable soule; for it followeth immediatlie, that the soule being abandoned of reason, he cannot anie longer be a man.

36 But if thou demand yet further, whether it be a matter of necessitie, that I shall read to morrowe; séeing God hath this foreknowen: ³¹⁴ we answer, that vpon condition, or supposition, some necessitie may be granted; but not perfect and absolute. Wherefore with that necessitie, which we grant, the choise of frée will may verie well agrée. Moreouer, Aristotle in his Ethiks, disputeth, and that learnedlie (as he dooth all other things) whether the casting foorth, which is doone in the sea, when shipwracke is at hand, is to be appointed among things voluntarie. And although he there confesseth a certeine action, that is mixed with willingnesse and vnwillingnesse: yet neuerthelesse he concludeth, that those kind of actions belong vnto the voluntarie sense; séeing for that time, wherein the shipmen be in danger, they will them, and altogither make choise of them. And if so be that notable Philosopher doubted not to place willingnesse in this kind of action, wheras men by a certeine force are tried to constraine themselues, to choose that thing, which otherwise (if that chance had not béene) they would neuer haue doone; then how much rather shall not we take willingnesse from our vsuall and common actions, when we perceiue our selues, of our owne accord, and with a mind most willing, to doo and indeuour those things, which we thinke good; although we doubt not, but God did long before vnderstand of the same?

And that the necessitie of this kind which we haue taught to be by supposition, doth not ouerthrowe the frée power of our will; ³¹⁵ Chrysostome doth plainlie shew, while he writing vpon the first epistle to the Corinthians, & interpreting these words; It behooueth that heresies be, that they which be tried among vs, ³¹⁶ may be made manifest, saith: Not vnlike this forme of spéech Christ vsed, when he said; ³¹⁷ It is necessarie that offenses doo come, but wo be vnto that man by whom they shall happen. Also he said to his apostles, that It behooued Christ to haue suffered, and so to enter into his glorie. ³¹⁸ All these things in holie matters are so to be expounded, as when they be called things of necessitie; yet nothing must be taken awaie from the nature of mans will. ³¹⁹ And this among the Schoole-men is woont to be called, A necessitie not of the consequent, but of consequence.

37 There be some which commonlie saie, that doubtles these distinctions helpe vs nothing at all; if God haue knowen before hand of things, those shall in anie wise come to passe. Yes verelie, they are profitable vnto vs, and that not meanlie: for bicause thereby we vnderstand, that mans will is not compelled; but that willinglie and without compulsion it desireth whatsoeuer it will. For otherwise I will aske thée againe, whether thou wouldest be saued against the will and consent of God? I suppose not. But if thou wouldest be saued according to his will, he of necessitie is not ignorant of thy saluation: for so it is ordeined, that none willeth that which he is ignorant of. ³²⁰ It happeneth vnto vs verie often, that we togither behold plaiers; yet dare we not saie, that the sight and knowledge which we haue, bringeth anie necessitie to them which plaie: and yet, while we sée them in plaie, it is of necessitie, that they doo plaie. Wherefore, as that necessitie infringeth not the nature of their will; euen so the excellencie of God compelleth not the will of man.

Some brall at vs, and saie, that this similitude is farre from the question proposed; bicause none at anie time doo behold plaiers, which be not, and plaie not indéed. Whereas it is ascribed to God, that he hath had a knowledge before hand, of all our doings euen from the beginning: when as yet, neither we, nor anie of our actions appéered to be. To these men I might answer, that vnto God all things are no otherwise present, than they which doo plaie are conuersant in the fight of them which behold. ³²¹ Let euerie one therefore take héed to himselfe, that he cast not the causes of his sinnes vpon God; and when such a kind of cogitation entreth into his mind, let him haue respect vnto lust, voluptuousnesse, wrath, hatred, and other perturbations of the mind, wherewith he is sore diseased; and out of these fountaines let him séeke for the causes of his sinnes. ³²² Neither must there be much credit giuen vnto the Peripatetiks in this matter, which denie, that God hath vnderstanding of particular affaires; least they should séeme to thinke, that the mind of God were abiect & vile, if he should drawe his knowledge from fraile and transitorie things. This thing is not agréeable vnto our documents: for we doo beléeue, that God of himselfe hath a perfect knowledge of all things; neither that he hath anie néed to challenge knowledge else-where to himselfe.

³²³ 38 And whereas touching the third point, it was iudged, that the power of God is a hinderance to our will: the argument is neither perfect nor strong. For, although that God by his infinit power, wherewith he is indued, ³²⁴ doth what his pleasure is; yet doth he suffer the state and nature of things to stand whole: neither doth he violate them, or wrest them anie other waie, than the condition of them doth beare. Wherfore it is said in the booke of Wisdome; that God doth mightilie reach euen from one end to another, and doth pleasantlie dispose all things: or (as the Gréeke text saith) ⟨…⟩, that is, Profitablie. Which might not be said, if by the high power of God the natures of things were disturbed. The summe is, that God doth here moderate his power in ruling of the world, that he may fitlie applie his action vnto all maner of things. In the fourth place sinne séemed to be a hinderance to the libertie of the will; ³²⁵ as if it so weakened the powers of man, that after a sort they might be able to doo nothing anie more. But there néedeth not now manie words about this matter; bicause there hath béene plentie inough spoken in those things which we haue declared, how much our libertie hath béen diminished by reason of sinne; and that speciallie as touching verie perfect and good actions, which might be acceptable and well pleasing vnto God. Besides, it hath béen declared, that our libertie is not by this means vtterlie taken awaie; but rather, that there is as yet a great deale of it remaining.

39 Moreouer, concerning the powers celestiall, there shalbe no great néed to intreate; ³²⁶ séeing the Astronomers doo glorie in their owne bookes, that The wise shall beare rule among the starres. But and if so be that these things, which they pronounce, might not be escaped, all their gaines would fall awaie: for no man would bestowe cost vpon the skill of those things, which he thought he should not be able, neither to auoid, nor change, either by indeuour or studie. Which thing without controuersie would ensue, if so be they should ascribe a méere necessitie vnto their foreshewings. By this meanes all praiers, pietie, and worshipping of God would be taken awaie: for who would praie to God for obteining of anie thing, if he were alreadie persuaded, that the same should not be granted vnto him? Wherefore Augustine said; ³²⁷ They which thus thinke, doo great wrong vnto heauen: for there they beléeue is a court appointed, ³²⁸ wherein are notable acts decréed, which cannot be auoided: the which if it were in the earth, it should néeds be taken awaie. How much lesse must we thinke, that the same is doone by God in the celestiall parts? I beséech you what iudgement would be left, if so be we did all things vpon constraint?

This matter some excuse, saieng, that fro~ heauen is onelie signified what shall come to passe: yet that we be not thereby driuen by anie necessitie. And they bring foorth a place out of the booke of Genesis, ³²⁹ wherein it séemeth to be spoken; that The starres be put as signes. But that place is to be vnderstood concerning seasons, winds, ³³⁰ raines, tempests, and such like sort. But how can they affirme, that in heauen they sée certeine signes of things to come? They shall hardlie prooue it, especiallie touching mans affaires. ³³¹ For what answer can they make of twins, which being conceiued at one time, and haue all one aspect of the heauens; yet (as experience teacheth) the chance and successe of them is altogither differing?

³³² Augustine, in his fift booke De ciuitate Dei, and second chapter, is woorth the reading; where he writeth, ³³³ that sometime there happened two brothers to be like affectioned, that when one sickened, the other also was diseased: and when the one recouered, the other was also eased. Concerning which thing Hippocrates being demanded of his opinion, ³³⁴ made answer, that he thoght them to be twins; and that therefore they had the temperature or complexion of their bodie all of one nature. ³³⁵ But Possidonius the Mathematician did ascribe the whole cause vnto the starres; bicause in their natiuitie they occupied all one aspect of the heauens. But what (saith Augustine ) will these men saie of twins, and innumerable liuing creatures, which are borne in houres and moments alike; and yet atteine to such diuersitie of fortunes? ³³⁶ And Augustine witnesseth, that this example was taken out of Cicero; the which neuerthelesse we read not in his books at this daie extant, vnlesse perhaps he found the same in his booke De fato, which remaineth amongst vs all torne, mangled, and diminished.

³³⁷ 40 Moreouer, destinie, which the Stoiks appoint to haue méere necessitie, hindereth not our matter; forsomuch as we admit not the same to be. They seuered it from the wils of men, bicause they thought that all things would go to naught, if togither with other causes they comprehended will vnder destinie. Howbeit, it séemed not good to them, ³³⁸ vtterlie to seuer mans will from destinie; sauing in respect of the first choise, which they would haue to be wholie in our will. But whiles we shall choose anie cause that might be vnder destinie, they would haue it followe of necessitie; that what things soeuer they were, they should be ioined vnto it. Euen as Euripides said vnto Laius, that It was frée for him not to procreate; but when he had procreated, then of necessitie he should suffer euen those things, which Apollo prophesied to be conteined vnder destinie.

³³⁹ But we, as we declared at the first, denie not, but that things are knit togither, as God ordeined, and knew before hand; yet so, as the nature and condition of them remaineth whole and sound. For vnto whom soeuer a thing contingent (as the Schoole-diuines speake) is due, they haue the same: and to whom soeuer necessitie belongeth, with necessitie they be constreined. But in verie déed, grace, which finallie séemeth to resist frée will, dooth not take the same awaie; ³⁴⁰ but rather helpeth and restoreth it. But now we will cease from these matters, least we dispute more curiouslie of them than beséemeth christians. Let euerie one followe their owne vocation; and let vs leaue inquiring, more than is requisite, about the secret and hidden will of God, touching prescience and predestination: and let vs followe that doctrine of God, which is plainlie laid out before vs in the holy scriptures.

¶ Looke another place of the same argument in the addition at the end of this booke. Now we thinke it conuenient to ioine vnto this disputation certeine other discourses; namelie, of Voluntarie and Not voluntarie, and also of mans choise, and such like.

Of Voluntarie and Not voluntarie.

41 Aristotle in his first booke of Ethiks treateth at large of that which is voluntarie, ³⁴¹ and of that which is not voluntarie: the reason whereof is, bicause praise, dispraise, pardon, and sometimes mercie be voluntarie. The argument is taken from the consequents. Praises and dispraises serue vnto morall knowledge; for as commendable maners and actions are to be desired, so those which are blame-woorthie are to be auoided. Howbeit, such praises and dispraises cannot be iudged of, vnlesse we knowe whether they be doon with a willing or vnwilling mind. Further, he added another cause; to wit, that this doctrine is a part of the ciuill facultie, wherto belongeth the making of lawes. And lawes set foorth rewards and punishments to the obseruers and transgressors of them: it is néedfull therefore that they knowe which be voluntarie things, and which be not voluntarie. ³⁴² For men that be vnwilling, doo not obteine rewards; and they which sinne by compulsion, should not suffer punishments. Some wrest this reason of lawe-makers herevnto, as though they ought to regard this, that they command not those things, which of necessitie must be doon, nor those things, which are vnpossible to be doone; but onlie those, which be in our owne power: and that therefore it behooueth them to knowe what is the nature of voluntarie and not voluntarie. I knowe in verie déed, ³⁴³ that this is the definition of lawe; that It is a reason commanding honest things, and calling backe from things that be dishonest. But that which these men auouch, to wit, that it commandeth things which be possible, I would onelie grant it as touching ciuill laws, but not of diuine laws: for those require things that be vnpossible, especiallie in respect of the state of nature, corrupt & defiled. Howbeit, Aristotle vsed not this reson; he onlie touched these things which I haue mentioned of punishments & rewards. ³⁴⁴ But whie did he speake of the affects, since those be not voluntarie, but are naturallie planted in our minds? The Gréek scholies answer; that, albeit as touching substance and root they be of nature, yet may they some kind of waie be called voluntarie, insomuch as by vse & exercise they may be inlarged or repressed. Or else we will answer, that Aristotle made mention of both, of affects I meane and of actions; but voluntarie must onelie be referred to the actions. The which thing being doone, it will also belong vnto the vertues, which are conuersant in the affections: for those also are gotten by actions, which when they be right and commendable, must be accounted voluntarie. Morouer, whie dooth Aristotle saie, that somtime pardon, somtime mercie must be shewed? Bicause we doo not alwaies take mercie on them whom we pardon; for a man in defending himself, killed him which set vpo~ him; he did it not willinglie, he is forgiuen, but we take not pitie on him.

³⁴⁵ 42 But how the knowledge of that which is Voluntarie and Not voluntarie, may helpe to moderate the punishments which laws appoint, it may many waies be shewed. They which haue committed anie thing against their wils, or of compulsion, are not punished: And in the ciuill lawes there be verie manie titles, which prouide remedie in the case of ignorance or compulsion: euen as they doo likewise concerning those things which be doone for feare, and by craftie collusion, and touching them which be vnder 25. yéeres of age, &c. Also he that is taken with madnesse or frensie is forgiuen; yea and a mad man, although he kill his father; shall not be punished. The lawes of God quit the hewer of wood, ³⁴⁶ which by chance and not willinglie shall kill an other, bicause perhaps the axe might flie out of the helue, and certeine cities were appointed for refuge. Also Plato in his ninth booke of laws, sheweth that manie things are to be forgiuen, where the will did not consent. So as it greatlie auaileth lawe-makers and iudges of the lawe, bicause of giuing punishments and rewards, to knowe what is doone voluntarie, and what is not doone voluntarie. We will speake first of Not voluntarie: for in this matter the priuation séemeth to be better knowen, than the thing it selfe. By darknesse is the light better knowen, and sicknesse dooth make the goodnes of health the more manifest. ³⁴⁷ This definition of Not voluntarie appéereth by the reckoning vp of the parts thereof, so that it is rather a diuision than a definition; albeit that iust and full diuisions haue sometime the place of a definition. And we then chéeflie vse them, when that which is common to the parts, can not be expressed by anie one certeine point thereof. Howbeit we must vnderstand, that it is called Not voluntarie, of these two formes or kinds, which be of one signification: for euen that which is doone violentlie and vnwittinglie, is not voluntarie. And we prooue, that the diuision of these two parts is rightlie made: for Voluntarie, which is contrarie to Not voluntarie, standeth of two things; of knowledge, and desire. First we must knowe that which we must desire, then are we stirred vp therevnto by a motion of the desire. But either of these two may be hindred: ignorance taketh awaie knowledge, and violence letteth the desire. For good cause therefore be these two put contrarie to that which is voluntarie. Violence is defined what it is after this maner; It is a vehement inforcing, which either not at all, or verie difficultlie can be abidden. But some man will maruell, how two things may be set against one: for against Voluntarie is set that which is doone by violence, and also that which is doone vnwittinglie. Herevnto we answer, that there is but one set against one: constraint or Not voluntarie, is set against willingnesse or voluntarie. But this vnwillingnesse or not voluntarie, is afterward distributed into two parts: for it is one thing that is doone by violence, & an other which is doone by vnskilfulnes.

43 And as touching violence, ³⁴⁸ Aristotle saith that the beginning of the motion thereof must be outward: for those things which be mooued by an inward beginning, are mooued naturallie, not violentlie. But some cut off the latter particle which Aristotle hath in that place, so as that which suffereth or dooth, bringeth not anie helpe to that beginning. Howbeit, those which so saie are deceiued: for as we perceiue of a wracke that is made in a great tempest, the beginning thereof is outward; namelie, there be winds, waues, and stormes: but the wracke would not be, vnlesse that the shipmen themselues would take out of the ship those things which are to be cast awaie. And they which vnder a tyrant, are forced to doo things that be shamefull, they haue the beginning of their actions from without; namelie, the commandement of the tyrant: but yet those things would not be doone, if they themselues would not yéeld to the dooing of them. Wherefore it appeareth, that these things haue their beginning outwardlie; yet neuerthelesse that they bring some helpe therevnto. Others thinke, that [Dooing] is there added in vaine: for if the beginning be an outward motion, then should it be enough if he were named a sufferer: for that which is mooued, suffereth, but doth not. We answer; It maie well be, that the selfe same things which are mooued violentlie, ³⁴⁹ maie also haue a dooing, as instruments: for a staffe mooued by vs, doth also mooue a stone. And in some thick throng, where men be pressed, when a man is there choked, he is crushed by those which stand about him; so as they are said to thrust against him, although they thrust not of their owne accord, but are driuen by others, and inforced by the rest of the companie. The examples brought by Aristotle are such, as one of them is of a liuing creature, when against our wils we be caried awaie by men, in whose power we are. Another is of things which haue no life, as when we be caried with the wind whither we would not, which oftentimes happeneth to them that be sailers. If anie shall demand, whether voluntarie & without constraint, be all one: we will answer, ³⁵⁰ that without constraint extendeth further than voluntarie. For without constraint, agréeth euen to things that be without life, but so doth not voluntarie. Neither is it required, that the first beginning should be a motion in vs: for our knowledge commeth of an outward obiect, albeit that the same motion, wherewith the sense is brought to passe by the obiect, is of another order. The beginning whereof Aristotle spake, is the cause; yet not anie cause ye will, but onlie the efficient cause. And that is vnderstood to be the same, which is enough to mooue by it selfe.

44 There is mooued a question, as touching certeine actions, which séeme to be as it were meane, ³⁵¹ and it is doubted whether they be voluntarie or not voluntarie. And the question propounded may either be simple, or of two parts. It is simple, if thou shalt saie; Whether be those things voluntarie, which are doone for the feare of greater euils, rather than the obteining of some good & honest thing? And they declare that such a thing happened vnto Socrates, who would not obeie the thirtie tyrants, which required of him to kill a certeine citizen of Athens: which he would not doo, when neuertheles they threatned him, that they would kill his father and children. And this they sought, to the intent they might make him to be a companion and partaker of their most cruell purposes. The question also (which liketh me better) might be of two parts; namelie, whether those things be voluntarie things, which are doone for feare of greater euils; or for the obteining of some honest thing, which otherwise would not be doon. As if a lie be spoken, which in his owne nature is filthie; it is doubtfull whether it be voluntarie or not voluntarie, when it is made for the defense either of his owne life, or the life of another man. Also adulterie is a shamefull thing, which no man of himselfe should choose: but if one, for the slaieng of a tyrant, should, to win fauor with the tyrants wife, haue carnall copulation with hir, that by hir he might haue a readie waie to kill the tyrant; the question is, whether that adulterie should be called voluntarie. And all we knowe what great paines merchant men doo take, what things the ambitious sort, and those which delight in pleasure, doo endure, that they maie enioie their ends. And they would not abide those things which they doo, vnlesse it were for their commoditie. Wherefore it is doubted, whether those things be voluntarie. But if anie man doo doubt which be called great euils, ³⁵² let him looke on those things which be their contraries, & he shall sée that there be greater good things; namelie, life, chastitie, libertie, and godlines: and he shall perceiue that death, breach of chastitie, ³⁵³ bondage, vngodlinesse, and such like, are the great euils: which things be so gréeuous, as manie times some shamefull things are committed for the auoiding of them.

How detestable things are oftentimes doone for the scaping of death, may easilie be knowen. Cato slew himselfe, bicause he would not come in subiection. Regulus, least he should breake his faith, returned vnto his death to Carthage. Virginius rather slew his daughter, than he would suffer hir to liue violated and a bond-woman. And manie such like things haue the holie scriptures. ³⁵⁴ Lot rather offred his daughters to be defloured; than he would suffer his ghests to haue iniurie doone vnto them; on the other side, his daughters rather defiled themselues by incest with their father, ³⁵⁵ than that the world shuld want [posteritie.] Abraham to shun death commanded Sara to saie that he was hir brother, ³⁵⁶ and put hir chastitie in open danger. In like maner Iudith, with the danger of hir chastitie, ³⁵⁷ went to Holophernes for the deliuerance of hir people. We dispute not here whether these things were well or wickedlie doone, but we onelie séeke whether they ought to be called voluntarie, or not voluntarie. And there is a great difference betwéene wicked men, which either to flatter tyrants, or else bicause they be delighted in shamefull and euill works, offer themselues of their owne accord to doo these things: and betwéene others which for honestie sake cannot be induced to commit these things, vnlesse there be laid before their eies great and most gréeuous calamities, or else great rewards. And thou maist heare of some, which hauing proposed some great good vnto themselues, will saie, that for the obteining thereof, they are constrained to attempt anie thing. And on the other part it is also said of manie (that whereas they cruellie oppresse the people, and beare rule for their owne sakes onelie) they are constrained by tyrants to doo that which is wicked. And at this daie there be a great sort which fall awaie from the christian truth, being constrained by the most cruell persecution of tyrants. There is also brought a similitude of the casting foorth of things from a ship, which is doone when the tempest of weather constraineth; not that this serueth anie thing at all vnto maners, but that by the euidence of the matter, that which is now in question, may the better appéere.

45 These actions, which we haue rehearsed, are mixed actions: ³⁵⁸ for in respect that they may be omitted, and are not of such necessitie as they must in anie wise be doone, they séeme to be Voluntarie; but in respect no man could choose them for themselues, they séeme, Not voluntarie; but rather drawe néere to the nature of those things that be voluntarie, bicause in them is a certeine comparison of euill things. Two euils are proposed; to wit, either pouertie with the losse of goods, or else with those goods a present death: the will chooseth the lesse euill, and coueteth to auoid the greater. Therefore when the will doth his part in those actions, these things cannot choose but be called voluntarie. Besides this, Aristotle in his Rhetoriks admonished, that the lesse euill hath the consideration of the good, and is greatlie to be wished for, since that which is desired, is good: and there is no doubt, but it is the will that chooseth the end. But the end of these actions whereof we dispute, is applied to the consideration of the time. For since the safetie which the mariners wish, cannot be had, except by casting their goods into the sea, the will doth choose that casting of them awaie. Wherefore the time in all this matter must be considered, I meane not that time which is past, or to come, (for before that chance, no man would choose these doings; & afterward when the mariners haue escaped, they are sorie and discontented in their mind for those things which were cast awaie:) but the matter must be iudged of, according to the present time, while it is doone. And therefore, since there is then made a choise, and that the matter is called into deliberation, and that the originall of the dooing is in the dooer of it, who either may doo it, or maie not doo it; those things are said to be voluntarie. As touching the action, we cannot iudge in generall, but we must haue a respect to the circumstance of the time. And yet simplie these things are called, Not voluntarie, bicause for themselues no man would desire them: but neuerthelesse, since they be not considered simplie, but are to be desired in this respect, and he that desireth them, is not without knowledge (for he knoweth what he doth) and his will or desire wherby he chooseth these things is present) therfore be they actions Voluntarie. For all things must be iudged of according as they be doone; and doone they cannot be, but at a certeine time, and therefore they must be iudged according to that time, and not as they are apprehended by reason, for so are they, Not voluntarie. For while they be considered of simplie, they are set aside from the consideration of time. Neither is it to be doubted, but that herein commeth the consent of the will: for those things would not be doone, vnles the will would giue hir assent. True indéed it is, that no man would those things for their owne sakes, but for some other thing: but yet this causeth not, but that they be Voluntarie. If they were violent, the dooer would not inferre anie inforcement therevnto: but the originall of the doing and of the assenting therevnto is in him that is the dooer, and therefore may choose whither he will doo it or no. Séeing therfore these be called relatiues and are referred vnto the will; they must not be iudged of simplie, but according to the respect they haue vnto the will. Wherfore since the will (as hath béene declared) hath place in those things, they must be called, Voluntarie.

46 By two reasons haue these mingled actions béene prooued hitherto to be voluntarie. ³⁵⁹ First, bicause they must be estéemed according to the nature of the time present, wherin they be doone; secondlie, for that they be in the power of the dooer. For vnlesse the will should mooue the instrumentall parts, in verie déed they would not be doone. There is a third reason taken from praise and dispraise; Bicause men are somtime praised, and sometime dispraised in the suffering of these vile and shamefull things; Therefore dooth this appéere to be voluntarie: for praise and dispraise speaketh not but of things voluntarie. And Aristotle saith; that Men are sometime praised or dispraised herein, bicause they are not so alwaies, as we shall perceiue: for otherwhile praise is not giuen to these men, but pardon is granted them; but on the other side (saith he) they be dispraised. That same particle [On the other side] signifieth two things: either men will not abide reprochfull things, for the loue of great and excellent things; or else they suffer indéed such things, but yet for light and vnworthie causes: in which causes they are reprehended. Aristotle onelie mentioned one of these, the other he kept in silence. ³⁶⁰ These great good and honest things, for the which men must indure gréeuous and hard haps, are iudged to be our countrie, our parents, children, wife, iustice, and such like. Zopyrus the Persian, as Herodotus reporteth, mangled his owne nose, his eares, and his lips, that he might betraie the citie of Babylon vnto his king Darius. Vlysses (as it is said of Homer ) suffered his bodie to be beaten, and to be deformed with stripes, and apparelled himselfe in vile clothes, and in that habit, as if he had béene a runnagate seruant, went vnto the Troians, and entring into the citie, throughlie spied out the same. But on the other side, all men dispraise Dolo, bicause he reuealed the secrets of his owne countrie, that he might not be constrained to abide anie torments. ³⁶¹ But it is to be considered, that when it is said, we must sometime suffer shamefull things, that must not be referred vnto wickednesse, or vnto horrible crimes; for those things must not be committed for anie maner of vtilitie or honor: but it is onelie said, that those things should sometime be suffered, which haue some gréefe and reproch. As if a magistrate should be bidden to run like a seruant through the common stréets, or to weare openlie a womans garment: if great preferment, and lawfull commoditie be laid before him, he will not refuse these things. So then, they must be verie great matters, for the which the like should be doone, if a man will be praised for the same. I doo not allow the examples of the Scholies: for when they shew, that these vile things must be suffered, they teach that a lie must be made, or else that there must be carnall companie with a tyrants wife, to the intent hir husband may be slaine. For these be sinfull things, neither (as I haue said) dooth Aristotle speake of them: neither yet can such things be commended, sith that praises doo agrée with vertues, and dispraises with vices. There be some found of so abiect and vile a mind, as they ought for iust cause to be dispraised; sith for a iust and honest matter they will not suffer anie thing at all. So are soldiers dispraised, which forsake their station, and they that without constraint doo yéeld vp castles and strong holds. And in like maner are they dispraised, which are readie to doo anie thing, rather than they will be compelled to paie anie summe of monie.

47 And it appéereth euidentlie inough, whie Aristotle said; that Sometime praise dooth followe the suffering of gréeuous things, bicause this commeth not to passe continuallie. ³⁶² For sometimes, neither praise nor dispraise doo in that respect happen vnto them which suffer reprochfull things, but they are pardoned. And this happeneth, when [by reason of these things] a man dooth that which becommeth him not: as when tyrants doo threaten those things, or else they shall light vpon vs, vnlesse we suffer such reproches, as are beyond the power of mans nature: there Aristotle saith, that we pardon him. It is offered vnto men, that they shall be burned, or be cut in sunder: there, if they yéeld, either in disclosing of secrets, or in suffering of anie vile thing, they are pardoned. And some thinke, that in those cases it is lawfull to make a lie. Aristotle addeth, that neuerthelesse there be certeine things, ³⁶³ wherevnto no man ought to suffer himselfe to be compelled: he ought rather to abide anie thing, & when he yéeldeth, he shall not be pardoned nor excused. Wherefore our martyrs be in the right opinion, who haue determined rather to indure anie thing, than to depart from godlinesse. Aristotle bringeth an example out of the tragedie of Euripides; for Alcmaeon was not pardoned, in that he killed his mother; bicause she was lead vnto so great a wickednesse vpon a verie light or rather ridiculous cause. Since these actions, whereof we treat, be mixed (as we haue said) of Not voluntarie & Voluntarie: when Voluntarie beareth rule, either praise or dispraise followeth them; but if Not voluntarie haue the ouerhand, and that a man may séeme to haue doone the thing against his will, he is forgiuen. For those actions which be mixed, are so composed of two things; as either the one or the other of those things, whereof they be compounded, may surmount or ouercome. And rightlie dooth Aristotle make exception of gréeuous crimes, which shall not be pardoned: for who will forgiue him which condemneth an innocent, which committeth adulterie, which betraieth his countrie, which for the sharpenesse of torments denieth godlinesse? These things can or ought by no meanes to be excused. Anaxarchus, bicause he would not pleasure the tyrant, when he was beaten in a morter with iron pestles, said: Beat on hardlie Anaxarchus bag. So far was it off that he would change his will, or yéeld vnto torments. And Zeno in his torments bit off his owne toong, least through the force of gréefe he should be constrained to bewraie the conspiratours. Wherefore there be foure kinds of men, which Aristotle speaketh of; the first is, of them which are commended in their suffering of gréeuous things; the second, of them which are dispraised; the third, of them which obtaine pardon; the fourth is, of them which obteine no pardon.

48 Aristotle sheweth of two difficult and hard things which happen, ³⁶⁴ in suffering or in not suffering of gréeuous and cruell things for an honest cause. The first belongeth to the facultie of iudging; bicause we are oftentimes ignorant what things ought to be suffered for anie cause: whether anie thing must be suffered in the goods of the mind; whether in the bodie, or in the goods of fortune; and againe, what maner of things they ought to be that we should suffer, or that we should not suffer. And rightlie dooth Aristotle saie, that this is sometime hard to be iudged: for otherwhile, this difficultie dooth not happen. For all men knowe, that wickednesse is not for anie cause to be suffered. But Achilles doubted, whether he should rather haue wished for long life (but yet without glorie) by lurking at home; or else for famous glorie, togither with short life, by warfaring at Troie. Also a sonne will doubt, whether he ought to hold his peace; or to betraie his father, whom he knoweth to rob his countrie, to enter into the treasurie by secret passages in the earth, and from thence to steale awaie the common treasure. In like maner Dauid will doubt, whether he ought to counterfet himselfe to be a foole; or rather suffer himselfe to be slaine of a barbarous king. The cause is hard to be iudged: for sorrowfull things are to be compared with dishonest things; neither is it easie for all men to discerne betwéene these things. And vertue consisteth in matters difficult. Therefore from hence come praises; or else, if we flie from vertue to vices, dispraises. Héere dooth varietie of the circumstances increase the difficultie, which causeth that we cannot haue certeine rules in those things. The other kind of difficultie ariseth of the weakenesse of strength, not of iudgement; for when we be out of danger or sorrow, we sée what is to be chosen, and oftentimes we discerne that which is right. But when we come to the féeling and experience of gréefe, paines and torments; we are then of an other mind. Whereof also it commeth to passe, that when we be in health, we giue good counsell vnto them that be sicke; but yet we doo not rightlie aduise our owne selues, when we are sicke. And they are verie much to be commended, which stand fast in their sound determination, and in their good purpose. And on the other part, they which shall fall from their sound determination, are to be dispraised. Themistocles is maruellouslie commended, who would rather die, than beare armes against his countrie. But they on the contrarie side are most worthie of dispraise, which would rather denie godlinesse, than to suffer torments or death.

³⁶⁵ 49 When Aristotle had set downe two kinds of the things which be Not voluntarie, then he confuted their opinion, which made a third kind of the same. For they said, that the wicked actions, which we commit for atteining of pleasure and profit, are violent: and they made onelie those to be voluntarie actions, which be rightlie consenting vnto reason. By these reasons they are confuted. The first is, bicause then all our actions would be violent: for whatsoeuer we doo, we doo for these causes; namelie, for delectation and commoditie. The second reason is, bicause that which is violent, is ioined with sadnesse: but they which deale for pleasure sake, are glad, not sad; so as it appeareth that those actions are not violent. The third reason is; that then euerie euill man would excuse his euill actions, transferring his fault vnto outward things; that is to wit, such as are pleasant and profitable; and he would saie, that he were constrained by these things: which is a matter to be laughed at. The fourth reason; There is no greater cause whie these men should make themselues authors of honest actions, than pleasant & profitable things to be the cause of shamefull actions; bicause they haue in them selues the originall as well of these as of those. Bréeflie, if these mens opinion were true, there would be no sinnes nor wickednesses of men, which might not be excused vnder pretence that the same is doone against their will, or violentlie. The reason is alleged; bicause all men deale for these causes, namelie for delight and profit. Which in verie déed is true, if also vnder the word, ⟨…⟩, thou comprehend honest things: for there be manie, which for honestie sake doo manie things.

But thou wilt saie, that the aduersaries doo not so vse that word, as thereby they haue noted onelie delightfull & profitable things. I knowe it. But thus dooth Aristotle argue, and saith, that They, which will rather blame delightfull and profitable things, than themselues, which yéeld themselues so readilie to be allured thereby, deserue to be laughed at. This is it that they are iustlie to be blamed for, that they suffer themselues so soone to be caught by these things, and to be called away from iust actions. Why should they attribute vnto themselues honest things, and ascribe that which is dishonest vnto outward things; séeing that those also are in our power? Euen as it appéereth in men that be temperate and continent, which doo soone temper themselues from these things. And furthermore it may be woondered at, why they doo not in like maner saie, that they are constreined by honest things; séeing that they choose them, and since those be no lesse outward, than be pleasures and commodities. Vndoubtedlie, if we of good right ascribe to our selues honest things, the dishonest also shall belong vnto vs: for contraries doo both belong to the selfe-same generall kind, and are to be measured by the selfe-same rule. Aristotle séemeth to speake those things against Plato: for ³⁶⁶ Plato said, that Good men are not made good by nature; as if he should saie, they are good by will, and by their owne election. And on the other side, of euill men (in his ninth booke of lawes) he said, that they are all and in all respects euill; but yet vnwillinglie. But Aristotle affirmed, that as well good men as euill are led by their owne accord, and with voluntarie actions. For as well of goodnes as of naughtinesse there be originals, which doo mooue outwardlie; to wit, things which doo offer themselues to our vnderstanding: but since they be both in the one and the other, there is an helpe and aid giuen therevnto by vs, which doo choose and discerne the same.

50 Now that we haue spoken of Not voluntarie, which is doone by violence; let vs sée what can be said of Not voluntarie, procéeding from them that be ignorant. And first Aristotle taketh awaie Voluntarie, from that which is doone by ignorance; for nothing, done by him that is ignorant, can be called Voluntarie; séeing this requireth a knowledge of that which is doone. But Aristotle noteth a certein diffrence of those men, ³⁶⁷ which doo anie thing of ignorance: for some of them, when they haue afterward perceiued what they haue doone; it repenteth them: and there be others, which repent them not, but rather confirme that which hath béene doone. These two kind of ignorant men, bicause they differ much one from another, doo make diuers forms and kinds of ignorance: and bicause they differ one from another in matter, it is méet also that they be called by sundrie names. Wherefore he that repenteth him, after he hath perceiued his error, shall be called ⟨…⟩, that is, One that dooth against his will. And he which repenteth him not, shall be said to haue doone it being not willing: for he reteineth still the name of the generall word; to wit, of Not voluntarie. At the beginning our actions were diuided, that some of them are Voluntarie, & some Not voluntarie. We began the discourse of the parts of this diuision, with that which is Not voluntarie; & that, Not voluntarie, we distinguished againe into that which is against the will, or violent which is doone by force; and into that which is doone by ignorance. Violent was defined to be that, whose beginning is from without vs, and wherin that, which is the dooer or sufferer, giueth no helpe therevnto. Now is shewed the other part of Not voluntarie, wherby a thing is doone thorough ignorance: and this is shewed to be of two sorts; namelie, with repentance, or without repentance. That which is with repentance, is simplie against the will; but that which is without repentance, is at the beginning Not voluntarie; but after the acknowledging of the fact, bicause he dooth not repent him, he séemeth to be somwhat, yea to be verie far from dooing of it against his will; naie rather, that he hath somewhat Voluntarie therein. These things therfore in name must be thus distinguished. The first shall be called he that dooth against his will, and the other shall be called, he that dooth not with his will. ³⁶⁸ Oedipus is said in the fables to haue slaine his father, and to haue married his mother against his will: for vnderstanding what he had doone, he so repented him, as he put out both his eies. And on the other side, Tiberius racked his host of Rhodes ignorantlie, whom afterward when he knew, he put him to death. Wherfore at the beginning, when he racked him ignorantlie, he did it not with his will; but bicause afterward he did not repent him, he could not he said to haue doone it against his will. And there may be brought another example. He that killeth a man, thinking he had béen a wild beast, if he be afterward sorie, he did it against his will. But if anie man, to whom brasen monie was owing, receiueth gold, and dooth not repent him of his error, but rather reioiseth; he is said to haue doone it not willing, but yet not against his will. Thus may the reason be made; Whatsoeuer is doone violentlie, or against the will, it hath sorrowe or repentance ioined therewith; But not all things that are doon by him, which is ignorant, haue repentance or sorrowe ioined therewith; Therefore all such kind of things are not violent or against the will.

51 There is vsed also another distinction. ³⁶⁹ It is one thing to doo through ignorance, and another thing for the dooer to be ignorant. They are said to doo a thing through ignorance or vnwittinglie, vnto whom ignorance is after a sort the cause that they doo. On the other side, manie doo things being ignorant, who by reason of som gréeuous perturbation, whereof themselues are the cause, doo as it were bring an error vnto themselues. These things differ as the generall and the speciall kind, as a thing spred foorth, and a thing drawne togither. For whosoeuer dooth a thing through ignorance, is ignorant; but not so on the contrarie part, whosoeuer is ignorant, dooth a thing through ignorance. Herof Aristotle bringeth examples, first of droonkennes. ³⁷⁰ Manie things are doone by droonken men, wherein they knowe not what they doo; yet are they not properlie said to doo anie thing vnwittinglie, bicause they might haue absteined from too much wine: and they which drinke more than is requisite, did bring ignorance vnto themselues. Wherfore such a vice causeth not that they should be said to haue doone against their will. Another similitude is of anger: for they which shall be mooued with a great furie of wrath, doo oftentimes not knowe what they doo, but yet they deale not against their will: for they ought to haue tempered their wrath, and to haue atteined vnto vertue, whereby they might haue moderated that perturbation. Which, sith they would not doo, they are not excused of those things, which they through anger did amisse. And bréeflie it is said, that ignorance of that kind is the cause not of constreining the will, but of naughtinesse; otherwise euerie wicked man is ignorant, yet is he not therefore to be excused. That euill men be ignorant, this doth prooue it; namelie, that they knowe not what to followe, or what to auoid. For they are beguiled of their owne lusts, for whose sake they are so deceiued, as they perceiue not what things are trulie pleasant, & trulie profitable; and contrariwise, which be trulie gréeuous, and which be trulie damnable. Wherfore they are corrupt in their iudgement, and knowe not the nature of the end for the which they worke.

52 The reason may be framed thus; Not euerie euill man worketh through ignorance; But euerie euill man worketh being ignorant; Therefore to worke being ignorant, and to worke through ignorance, are things different. The Maior proposition is manifest; bicause euill men (as is said) if they wrought through ignorance, might be excused. And that, as is conteined in the Minor proposition, they be ignorant, we haue declared a little before. ³⁷¹ A generall ignorance (saith Aristotle ) excuseth not. That is called generall, which is not of the circumstances; but of the whole thing it selfe. As if one would saie, that he is ignorant that fornication or adulterie be sinnes; he is not excused, bicause he ought to haue knowen these things: nay rather, he shall be the more gréeuouslie accused for this ignorance. But a particular ignorance, that is to wit, of circumstances, excuseth and deserueth pardon; bicause the circumstances could not be knowen. Otherwhile such chances fall out, as no man can for certeintie knowe such circumstances. But contrariwise, the generall ignorance obteineth not mercie; bicause it was in the power of them that are ignorant, to haue learned it. Wherefore if they be ignorant, they them selues are in the fault, that they knowe not; and they séeme to haue had a desire to be ignorant. Againe, if the excuse of vniuersall ignorance were auailable, then should no wicked men be accused. The cause of their error is; that they onlie séeke for pleasure and profit, but neglect vertues and honestie: which neuerthelesse they doo vnaduisedlie.

Wherevpon Plato in his treatise Memnon, dooth verie well expound this. First he taketh this as granted, that there is no man which would be a miserable and vnhappie man. Which being granted, he addeth, that then there is no man which desireth euill things; since to be miserable, and to be vnhappie, is nothing else, than to be conuersant in euill things, and to be delighted in them. So then it appéereth, that euill men doo choose to themselues those things that be euill, vnwittinglie. And this error (as saith Cicero ) we haue sucked togither euen with our nurses milke. But the reason whie this generall ignorance maketh not a man to doo against his will, is, for that it hindereth not his choosing of things, naie rather it is ioined therewith: for ill men choose rather to steale than to labour, rather to be idle than to exercise anie art, rather surfeting than abstinence. It may be, that otherwhile the whole matter may be generallie vnknowen, and sometime generallie knowen, but vnknowen priuatlie and particularlie. As if anie man shall saie, he knoweth adulterie to be sinne; but that he is ignorant particularlie, that this adulterie is forbidden: neither of these ignorances is worthie of pardon. But if anie man doo not knowe the circumstances in generall, and thinke that there is no consideration to be had of the end, nor of the place, nor of the time, nor of the matter that he is about to doo; whether shall this man be worthie of mercie or pardon? No verelie: for he ought to haue knowen this. And this common kind of perceiuing belongeth to the vniuersall knowledge, which must in anie wise be had: but the ignorance of this or that circumstance particularlie may be excused, since no man either maie or is able perfectlie to knowe all those circumstances in euerie particular. Wherefore onelie the ignorance of them maketh the action to be an action doone against the will.

53 And bicause such circumstances be of great weight (for they obteine pardon and mercie when they are not knowen,) therefore Aristotle reckoneth them vp, that they may be throughlie tried out and knowen. They are in number seuen or eight: and there is a common verse of them in the schooles; Who, what, where, whereby: Wherefore, how, and when.

These are seuen, but yet one wanteth, that is, Whereabout; vnder which word is signified the matter or subiect of action. And when it is said of Aristotle, Wherein, there be signified two things; namelie, place and time. So that, ³⁷² if we will haue the iust number, there be eight; of which number this reason may be alledged. Bicause either we respect the causes of the action, or else we consider the nature or substance of the action. The cause, if it be efficient, then is it named of this circumstance, Who. If it be the end, then we account it of the circumstance, Wherefore. Or if it be the matter, then we adde to it the circumstance, Whereabout. Or if it be as touching instruments, or the organs, we referre it to the efficient cause [which before we called, Who. ] But if so be we consider the action it selfe, the nature thereof is expressed by the circumstance, Whereby. But when we consider the measure thereof, then haue we the circumstance of time and place, which we call, When and Where. And last of all, we regard the proportion of the maner, which is a thing belonging to qualitie, and is the circumstance that we named, How. No man (saith Aristotle ) is ignorant of all these circumstances (he meaneth) of them all at once. A man may be ignorant of one or other of them particularlie, but none can be ignorant of them altogither, vnlesse he be a verie foole: for how shall a man haue no knowledge of himselfe? This is not generallie true, bicause a man may easilie be ignorant of the cause efficient. If himselfe be that efficient, I confesse it is the harder, not to knowe himselfe. But euen this also may haplie come to passe, that one, sometimes minding an other matter, may stirre a ship; and yet marketh not that which he dooth. But that we now speake of, is to be vnderstood for the most part. Howbeit, this subtill point falleth not out in things that are morall. The matter is made plaine by examples.

³⁷³ What did the circumstances excuse Aeschylus the tragicall Poet? He in a tragedie did séeme to reueale certeine sacred mysteries of Ceres, which thing raised so great a tumult in the theatre, as he was well néere slaine. He fled vnto the altar of Bacchus, from thence he was brought to the iudgement of the Areopagits: he pleaded his cause, he excused himselfe, that he knew not those things to be mysteries; and bicause he knew not what he did, he was quit. Also an other man made a certeine engine or instrument of warre, which did cast stones: the effect whereof when he was minded to shew, he discharged the péece, and by a stroke killed a certeine man: he excused himselfe that he knew not what he did. The circumstance, Whereabout, which is the matter or subiect of action, appéereth by the example of Merope. She laie in wait for hir sonne, and killed him, thinking that he had béene hir enimie, when he was hir sonne. Héer the error was in the circumstance, Whereabout. And this example is said to be in Euripides, in the tragedie of Crespontes, which is not extant. Sometimes we know not: and that is called the circumstance, Wherewith; as if a man thinke he runneth with a blunt speare, & the same shalbe armed with a sharpe head. Or a man thinking that he dooth throwe a pumice, when he hath throwne a stone, whereby some bodie is hit, or woounded, or slaine. Otherwise we are ignorant of the end. A man for health, or for recouerie from sicknesse, letteth bloud, giueth a medicine, or lanceth the flesh, and there followeth a contrarie effect; for either the partie dieth, or he is hurt: the ignorance of the end dooth excuse him.

Also the maner of the action: as when a man dooth a thing and would not, it holds him excused. They which contend one with an other, with all the strength of their hands or fingers, (which is a kind of wrestling) and one mindeth to teach the other, and thinking to strike but lightlie, striketh gréeuouslie: he is excused. Sith that there is an ignorance in those things, that which is doone shalbe counted against his will, especiallie, if those circumstances, which are the more principall, be hidden from vs. And these circumstances be, Wherefore, Whereabout, or Wherein. But Aristotle in his example séemeth to haue omitted the circumstance of place, and time, [that is, Where and When. ] Which is no maruell, since they might séeme to be knowne well enough, as those which néeded no examples. Neither is it required, that when manie things of one sort be expounded, examples should be brought of all things. For it sufficeth, that some things be shewed so to be: for the examples, which make plaine some of those things, do serue also for the declaring of other things. But least there should be found a lacke of them, we saie it may be, that some man knoweth not that the place wherein he co~mitteth anie euill is holie: & otherwhile also the circumstance of the time; namelie of a festiuall daie, or of a holie daie, or of a birth daie, may be vnknowne.

54 If that which is doone against the will, ought to be ascribed to the actions which are doone vnwittinglie, while we be ignorant of these particular circumstances, there is required moreouer, that the error being knowne and discouered, the action should be gréeuous, and we should be sorie for that which happened to vs vnawares. For if this gréefe should not ensue vpon it, the action may be called, not voluntarie, yet shall it not be against the will. But héere it is worth the séeing, ³⁷⁴ how ignorance can be called the cause of a thing doone against the will. This is therefore, bicause it depriueth vs of knowledge, which if it had béene present, that which is now doone, had not béene committed; or if it had béene committed, it had made the action voluntarie. Wherefore, either it depriueth vs of the knowledge, whereon voluntarie dooth depend, or else it depriueth vs of that knowledge; which, if it had béene present, the action had not followed. And it may be, that he which dooth vnwittinglie, hath ignorance ioined togither with the act which he dooth; ³⁷⁵ and yet he is not vnwilling to that which is doone, but rather desireth it: wherevpon there followeth no sorrowe afterward, when the thing is knowne.

And this kind of ignorance dooth not excuse him, nor yet maketh him to haue doone it against his will. As when a man, thinkeing to kill a hart, killeth his enimie, whom he before wished to haue béene slaine; and now being slaine, reioiseth, notwithstanding he then knew not what he did. There is moreouer, a certeine ignorance, which some of set purpose would haue: for they desire and choose, that they may be ignorant, least by knowledge they should be withdrawne from sinning, or from pleasurs. And this kind of ignorance is greatlie to be accused, much lesse excused. There is an other ignorance, which is so doone, as a man knowing what is right and méet, when he commeth to the action, neglecteth that cogitation of honestie & right; and rather considereth his profit and pleasure. And this commeth to passe, either of a vehement perturbation of the mind, or else of some ill habit. Neither also dooth this ignorance excuse, for he that so is ignorant for lacke of consideration, he dooth not that which he might and ought to haue doone. Now and then, ignorance commeth héereof, that a man will neglect to learne, or else for that he shunneth labour, or bicause he vseth no studie and diligence. For euerie man ought to knowe the generall lawes. Since therefore euen this man dooth not that which he can and ought, he is not to be excused. Howbeit, in these actions there is something that is Not voluntarie. for this ignorance preuenteth actions, or the motion of the will, which motion if it were present, knowledge would not followe. The last ignorance is that, whereof we treat: this excuseth, it obteineth pardon and mercie; bicause the circumstances are not knowen, and for that after the action, sorrowe and gréefe doo followe.

Of that which is Voluntarie.

³⁷⁶ 55 As touching Voluntarie, the definition standeth of two parts. First (saith Aristotle ) the beginning thereof must be inward. Secondlie, the circumstances must be knowne: for if voluntarie be contrarie to that, which is against the will; and that which is against the will, consist of two parts: then is it necessarie, that the contraries to them must be placed in the definition of voluntarie. Hervpon we sée the excellent method of Aristotle: for except he had before hand shewed the nature of violence and ignorance, he could not so easilie haue defined what voluntarie was. Moreouer, Aristotle was the rather mooued to write of these things, bicause that those things, which are doone of angrie men, or men that are mooued with desire, are comprehended in the definition of voluntarie. For both the originall of the dooing is in the man himselfe, which is the dooer, and they doo vnderstand and verie well knowe the particulars: for they vse deliberations, and sharpe iudgement, either to reuenge or to compasse that which they desire: which would not be doon if they were ignorant of the circumstances. Wherevpon it is concluded, that those things are voluntarie; and that those doo erre, which haue thought such things to be doone against the will. And what mooued them to thinke, that those things are against the will, it may easilie be perceiued. They sawe that it was altogither difficult, ³⁷⁷ to resist those two affections; namelie, anger and desire, as those which are more violent than the residue; and therefore they thought that men are constreined by them. Wherefore Heraclitus said, ⟨…⟩, that is, It is hard wrestling against anger. And Plato in his second booke De republica, saith; ⟨…⟩, that is; Anger is neither to be striuen with, nor to be subdued. But if there can be no striuing against the same, nor that it can be conquered, it séemeth to compell, and to make that the actions be doon against the will. For which cause the same Plato in his ninth booke De legibus saith, that An angrie man, ⟨…⟩, that is to saie, Is like to one that dooth against his will. He saith not that he dooth altogither against his will, but like vnto him. And Cato the Censor said, that he which is angrie, differeth from a mad man onelie in time. Yea and other men, as Euenus, haue béene bold to saie, that Wrath is much woorse than madnesse. But Plato in his treatise of Cratylus, writing of desire, compared the same to a verie strong bond. Wherefore we also doubt not, but that these two affections are vehement, and of great force; but yet that they are not so strong, as they cannot be bridled by reason. Which we sée come to passe in temperate men, and those which be indued with méekenesse, and other vertues. But yet would I not denie, that those actions are more voluntarie, which be doon without the inforcement of such affects: which neuerthelesse is no cause, that these should be excluded from the number of them.

56 Aristotle saith, that none of the rest of the liuing creatures doo anie thing against their wils, no not children. The proposition is to be confirmed; Those things that are doone by inforcement or by desire, be voluntarie. That was declared before by the definition. Now are other reasons added herevnto, whereof the first is this; If they were actions against the will, neither brute beasts nor children should doo anie thing of their owne accord; But those doo manie things of their owne accord; Therefore those things are doon against the will. The argument is conditionall of the consequent, taken to ouerthrowe the antecedent. The conclusion is prooued; Bicause brute beasts and children, since they be without reason, whatsoeuer they doo, ³⁷⁸ they doo it through those affects. But how absurd the consequent is, hereby it appéereth; insomuch as we sée, that these liuing creatures and children doo certeine things against their wils. As when they be ouercome and shut vp in anie place: but on the other side, when they be loosed and set at libertie, they doo manie things willinglie and of their owne accord. They choose themselues meat, when they will they enter into chambers & dens, & from thence, when it séemeth good, they go foorth. They defend their yoong ones, they flie to their nests; and infinite such other things they doo willinglie and of their owne accord. They reioise in libertie, and on the other side, when they be constreined to anie thing, it gréeueth them, and they are not a little disquieted. Alexanders horse Bucephalus admitted no man to sit vpon him but Alexander, which without doubt he did not by constreint. The elephants doo loue their maisters, they obeie them, yea they knéele downe when they be commanded. But what should we speake of elephants? Dogs in a house doo fawne vpon their maisters, but doo barke at strangers; they hunt chéerfullie, they followe those which féed them: & all these things certeinlie they doo of their owne accord. Manie things belonging to this matter might be rehearsed of birds, fishes, and other brute creatures, which are so woonderfull things, and are doone of them with so great an inclination; that sometimes manie haue thought, that in brute beasts there is a will, whereby they choose those things which like them most, refusing other things, which doo displease them. Yea and some men haue ascribed some reason vnto them, bicause they sée that those things which they doo, they doo them with great industrie. Which we would not grant, albeit as we haue said, we must affirme, that they doo those things of their owne accord. But and if thou wilt saie, that they be called wild beasts, bicause they be led after a certeine violent sort, we will not denie it; and yet will we affirme, that they are not without an inward appetite, whereby they are mooued: wherefore the actions which spring from them, must be said to be of their owne accord. And it is no maruell, if Aristotle in this matter ioined children togither with brute beasts: for those also, by reason of the infirmitie of age, haue not the vse of reason, but are onelie mooued with the affects, especiallie with anger and desire. And yet who will denie, that they doo those things willinglie? They runne abroad, they plaie, they skip, they make sport, and they fawne on their parents. But if they did not things of their owne accord, they should haue great iniurie doone them, when they be beaten of their schoole-masters. For what other thing doo they séeke, but that they should absteine from those things, from which they knowe they are able to refraine? ³⁷⁹ And as concerning the appetite, we must vnderstand that the same is of two sorts: for one followeth the sense, and an other the reason. Brute beasts and children are mooued with that appetite, which followeth the sense; howbeit such appetite is not all one in both of them. Herevpon ariseth the difference; bicause brute beasts are altogither destitute of reason, and therefore their desire is neuer obedient vnto reason: but children haue reason, yet not in act, although in power. Therfore, when through age, reason breaketh out into act, their desire may be obedient vnto reason. We must also consider, that this Gréeke word ⟨…⟩ is more large than Voluntarie: for it is extended both vnto brute beasts, and to children, vnto whom Voluntarie dooth not properlie apperteine, séeing (if we shall speake properlie) they haue no will.

57 Moreouer, whereas some which were against Aristotle, affirme that those things which are doone by anger or lust, are doone against the will; then it would followe, that either all such things should be doone against the will; or else that good things are with the will, and euill things against the will. Howbeit, neither of these things may be granted. But this did Aristotle ouerthrowe, and saith; Is it not a ridiculous thing to affirme, that these things are doone with the will, and those by constraint and against the will; séeing that shamefull acts, which are doone through anger or lust, haue no lesse the selfe same beginning that honest acts haue, which procéed of the selfe same affects? No doubt but those things, which haue all one beginning, must be accounted of the selfe same order. And further he saith, as touching anger, that this, by the lawe of honestie and iustice is required at our hands, that we should be angrie against some; namelie, against vices, and against wicked men, whom vnlesse that priuate men should rebuke, and magistrates should punish, they were to be blamed. Also there be manie things, which if a man doo not desire, and by great indeuour procure to himselfe, it is a great offense; as for example: health and doctrine. Shall we therefore saie, that the lawe of honestie and iustice dooth require of vs, things to be doone against our will and by constraint, and such things as we are not able to performe; or from the which we are not able to absteine? This would be absurd as touching ciuill lawes. And againe, whatsoeuer things are doone against the will, they bring gréefe and sorrowe with them. But those things that are doone through anger and lust are delightfull, so farre is it off, that they bring trouble and heauinesse with them. As concerning lust, there is no doubt thereof. But as for anger, it may be doubted, bicause Aristotle in his Rhetoriks intreating of those things which bring pleasure, in describing the affection of wrath, bringeth in the verse of Homer, which saith, that Anger vnto Achilles was euen as honie that melted vnder his toong. Neither indéed is anger anie other thing than a desire of reuenge. Moreouer (saith Aristotle ) what difference is there betwéene those things to be doone against the will, which are according vnto reason, or which be wickedlie doone according to wrath, sith either of them are things that may be auoided? This reason semeth to stand on the nature of sinne: for séeing that sinne consisteth in those things, which ought or can be auoided; and that this estate is found as well in those things, which are doone amisse by reason, as in those, which are naughtilie doone of anger with a desire; they ought to be both called voluntarie. Why then are these things, rather than those other, accounted of the aduersaries to be doone against the will?

58 And as concerning humane affections, Aristotle dooth thus argue; Bicause the vnreasonable affections, which we haue, be humane, and those be humane affections, which doo arise of anger or desire, therefore are they also voluntarie, and are doone without constreint. For whatsoeuer is humane, is voluntarie. But there is no man will saie, that desires and angers be not affections in the minds of men, euen as reason is in the selfe same men. Wherefore, if actions, which flowe from reason be humane, bicause reason is a part of our mind; so likewise shall those be humane, which procéed from anger or desire. For the powers of anger, and of desire, be in the minds of men. It may happen that this will be obiected; to wit, that The actions which be of anger or desire, procéed from the part vnreasonable. True it is (saith Aristotle ) but yet these be powers of an humane mind, and therefore shall the acts procéeding from thence be humane. And these powers, although by essence they haue no reason, yet are they partakers thereof, and may be ruled by the same: which thing commeth not to passe in brute beasts. Againe, these affections and actions are the first beginnings doone with the will; for they may be restreined by the will. And it standeth not with them, as it dooth with the power that nourisheth and increaseth, which worketh euen whether we will or no. And therefore we conclude, that it is absurd to affirme, that these things are doone against the will, or by constreint.

³⁸⁰ 59 Now let vs sée, how these things, which we haue here treated of, doo agrée with the holie scriptures. Aristotle said, that he would treat of Voluntarie, and Not voluntarie; bicause praises and dispraises, rewards, punishments, and mercie, doo accompanie those things which be voluntarie. ³⁸¹ Euen so, in the 111. psalme, the faithfull are praised, bicause they be a willing people. ³⁸² Also Eunuchs are commended, not those Eunuchs which are so become through violence, or be so borne; but they which shall willinglie chasten themselues for the kingdom of heauen sake. ³⁸³ An hewer of wood, which by chance killeth his fellowe, is forgiuen; bicause that action was not voluntarie. ³⁸⁴ The deuill is constrained to speake a truth, is compelled to depart from them which were possessed; but yet he deserueth no praise or rewards at all. ³⁸⁵ Balaam is of the angell compelled by the sword, that he should not curse the people of God; he hath no praise at all, bicause he did it not willinglie. The definition of violent, as it hath an outward beginning, so doth it not giue anie helpe, as a thing that worketh or that suffereth. And it declareth, that originall sinne is no violent thing, bicause it is an inward corruption in vs: and we further it by that naughtinesse, which dailie we adde therevnto. But and if anie man will saie, that we are without knowledge and vnderstanding, when the same is gotten; and that it commeth by occasion of the first naughtie motions of our mind wherein is giuen no choise or deliberation: we answer, that those things which Aristotle saith, must be vnderstood as touching morall and actuall doings: for these sinnes did not he knowe. Howbeit, this sufficeth vs, that such things cannot be called violent, séeing they haue their beginning from within. Also we grant, that there be mingled actions; and we affirme that they ought to be reckoned among those which be voluntarie: and therefore the holie scriptures doo exhort vs vnto them, persuading vs, that wée must indure anie thing, rather than to run into sinne. Paule saith; We must neuer doo euill, ³⁸⁶ that good may come of it. ³⁸⁷ We must rather obey God than men. ³⁸⁸ And we are called To take our crosse and to followe the Lord. And he is said, to haue found his soule, which hath lost the same. Neither hath the deniall of a mans owne selfe anie other respect. These actions be of the mingled sort, bicause no man would choose these things, except by chance: but these things we will and we doo, partlie to auoid sinnes, and partlie to be ioined vnto the Lord.

Howbeit thou wilt saie, that these things haue an outward beginning; wherfore they be rather violent. For vnlesse the Lord did these things in vs, none of vs would doo them. We grant, that the beginning, whereby our wils are changed, is from without: but our wils being changed by the spirit of God, are inward vnto vs, and at their commandement we are mooued vnto these actions, and therefore they ought to be called voluntarie, for they are not doone of God without vs. Yea and we be praised and dispraised for these mingled actions: for Christ saith, that He will denie before his father, ³⁸⁹ those which shall denie him before men. Neither (saith he) will I be ashamed of him, which is not ashamed of me before men. And they in verie déed are commended, which for Christ his sake do suffer gréeuous vexations; ³⁹⁰ Blessed (saith he) are they, which suffer persecution, for theirs is the kingdome of heauen. In such things as these (saith Aristotle ) is pardon giuen. As when Dauid, that he might not be slaine, feigneth himselfe before king Achis, ³⁹¹ to be mad. But there be certeine things, which we should neuer be led to commit. And what be those? They be sinnes. And it is an old saieng; Vsque ad aras; that is to wit, Sauing a mans conscience and religion. Iob is an example vnto vs, who in aduersities could neuer be driuen, either by the reprochfull speaking, or bragging of his wife, to blaspheme God. And they which are driuen vnto these things, so farre is it off, that they find mercie, as they rather fall from the hope thereof: as in the epistle to the Hebrues, it is said of them which departed fro~ the knowen truth. So did it happen to Spiera the Italian, & to those which slew themselues, when they had abiured the Gospell. Aristotle propoundeth two things verie hard. The one is, what a man should suffer for anie thing. The answer is easie; We must suffer anie thing, rather than we should depart from Christ and his holie commandements. ³⁹² What auaileth it a man if he gaine all the world, and suffer losse of his owne soule? ³⁹³ Feare ye not them which kill the bodie, but are not able to kill the soule, (saith the Lord.) Of the other difficultie we haue experience in our owne selues: and we often sée followers which onelie beléeue for a time. Againe, The spirit is readie, ³⁹⁴ but the flesh is weake. But on the other side, we comfort our selues, bicause All things are possible to him that beleueth. ³⁹⁵ And Paule said, ³⁹⁶ that He was able to doo all things through Christ, which strengthened him. Iustlie moreouer did Aristotle reprooue them, which thought that honest and iust things are voluntarie; but affirmed, that dishonest things are not voluntarie: for we must not thinke so in anie wise. ³⁹⁷ Paule said; I know that in me, that is, in my flesh, dwelleth no good thing. Yea, and if we haue anie thing that is good, that must be altogither transferred vnto God. For vnto the Philippians we read, ³⁹⁸ that It is God which worketh in vs both to will, and to performe.

60 Now let vs sée what is to be said touching ignorance. There is a certeine ignorance, after which repentance dooth foorthwith followe, vpon the perceiuing of the error; and sometime no repentance at all dooth followe. As touching the latter member, ³⁹⁹ the Lord saith; Forgiue them, for they knowe not what they doo. The same thing did Stephan praie. ⁴⁰⁰ Among those neuerthelesse, for whom praier was made, some did otherwhile repent, and some did neuer repent. Also Ionathas tasted honie, ⁴⁰¹ being ignorant what his father decréed; and knowing his fathers decrée, he sorrowed not, but rather was angrie with him. But Paule, when he perceiued his error, sorowed. In like maner sorowed they, of whom Peter said in the Acts; I knowe that they did it of ignorance. And that they sorowed, those words which they speake, doo declare; ⁴⁰² Men and bretheren, what behooueth vs to doo? The sorowe which followeth, doth not alwaies shew that there happened no sinne; for both they, which crucified the Lord, sinned; and also Paule sinned: for these men were ignorant of that which they ought to haue knowne. But if there had happened to haue come a certeine ignorance of the circumstance, which could not haue béene knowne; as in Noah, when he was dronken, ⁴⁰³ who had not séene the wine before, neither knew the strength and propertie thereof. And as it happened vnto Iacob, when he laie with Lea in the place of Rachel: ⁴⁰⁴ for both of them were ignorant what to doo, and were excused. But he that knoweth not the generall and principall points of the lawes, is not excused. Therefore is it said of Paule, in the first epistle to the Corinthians; ⁴⁰⁵ He that is ignorant, let him be ignorant. And this ignorance, which dooth not excuse, is sometime laid vpon men by God as a punishment, while he punisheth sinnes with sinnes. ⁴⁰⁶ Vnto the Thessalonians, the second epistle it is written; Bicause they haue not receiued the loue of the truth, that they might be saued, therfore will God send vpon them strong delusion, that they shuld beleeue lies. And in Ezechiel; If the prophet be deceiued, ⁴⁰⁷ I haue deceiued him. ⁴⁰⁸ Also Achab was seduced by the euill spirit, God being willing therevnto. Thus then we sée what ignorance doth excuse, & what ignorance doth not excuse. Aristotle addeth, that Those things, which be doone by dronkennes & anger, are voluntarie; the which also we do affirme: For as touching those things we haue receiued a lawe; Be angrie, but sinne not. ⁴⁰⁹ Let not the sunne go downe vpon your wrath. And we forbid to saie vnto anie man; Thou foole. ⁴¹⁰ And as touching dronkennesse, it is said of the Lord, ⁴¹¹ Beware that your bodies be not oppressed with surfeting and dronkennesse. Also Paule; Be ye not dronken with wine, wherin is excesse. ⁴¹² These things therefore, which are doone by anger and dronkennesse, doo not excuse; séeing these things might either not be admitted or be bridled. But that all the wicked and vngodlie sort are ignorant, though they be not excused, the scriptures doo euerie where plainelie declare; ⁴¹³ The foolish man hath said in his hart, that there is no God. In the seuenth chapter of the Prouerbs, ⁴¹⁴ as touching them which are lead with lust, and with pleasures; He is led as an oxe vnto the slaughter, and like as it were a foole, which in fetters is led to his punishment. ⁴¹⁵ In the epistle to the Romans; They which called themselues wise, became fooles, and the foolish hart of them was blinded. Vnto the Ephesians; ⁴¹⁶ Ye shall not walk as other gentils walke, in vanitie of their mind, being strangers from the life of God, thorough the ignorance that is in them, and the darkenes of their hart. Yea and as Esaie saith, and all the Euangelists testifie; ⁴¹⁷ They seeing shall not see, and hearing shall not heare; seeing they be in the darkenesse, they knowe not whither they may go.

But among the circumstances, which being vnknowne doo excuse, Aristotle dooth speciallie reckon vp the end, and Whereabout. And this in verie déed is true. ⁴¹⁸ Dauid sent awaie Absalom to go into Hebron, but to what end, or to what purpose he did it, he could not know: he is excused. Also Abimelech had an other mans wife, ⁴¹⁹ but he knew not what she was, with whom he was conuersant: therefore might he saie vnto God, that he did it in the simplicitie of his hart, and that it was vnknowne vnto him. ⁴²⁰ Also, that Simon Magus was baptised, the church is excused; bicause it knew not of his ill and fraudulent counsell. Howbeit, in those ignorances which doo excuse vs, if there followe no sorrowe, we are giltie: we allow not that which is doone. He which shot an arrowe, & by thance slew king Achab, ⁴²¹ if he had béene witting of the déed, he would not haue sorrowed, neither would it haue béene perceiued, that that which was doone, was doone against his will. Againe, Dauid sorrowed for the death which followed of Absalom; also of the death of Abner and Amazias: wherevpon it appéereth, that such things happened vnto him against his will and mind. Voluntarinesse comprehendeth two things; both, that the beginning be from within, and that there be not an ignorance of that which is doon. Originall sinne hath his beginning from within, and we know, that such a corruption is against God and righteousnesse, although that of our owne choise we call not for the same: and therefore it is voluntarie. Yet is it in yong children, where there is a want of knowledge. But this maketh no matter, bicause we meane héere, of actuall sinnes. Neither can Aristotle, or morall facultie atteine vnto that kind of sinne. That those moreouer be voluntarie sinnes, which are doone through lust and wrath, it hath béene shewed by diuers reasons. The which thing we doo admit: for we haue receiued lawes concerning either of both vices; Thou shalt not lust. ⁴²² Againe, we are commanded, that we should not be angrie with our brother without a cause. Aristotle in his arguments affirmed, that brute beasts doo things of their owne accord Esaie likewise said; The oxe hath knowne his owner, ⁴²³ and the asse his masters crib. ⁴²⁴ And Ieremie said, that The storke knoweth his appointed time: chapter eight. And the same opinion are we of touching children: for in the time of Elizaeus, they were punished by beares. Also Isaac, while he was oppressed by Ismael, was commanded to be cast foorth by Sara. And further, Aristotle affirmeth, that it is required and otherwhile exacted of vs, that we should be angrie. ⁴²⁵ The zeale of thy house hath euen eaten me. And Phinees is commended by God, bicause he was reuenged vpon the vnpure fornicatours. And where it is said, that those things, which be doone against the will, haue sorrowe ioined with them, Paule to the Romans testifieth the same; Vnhappie man that I am! ⁴²⁶ Who shall deliuer me from the bodie of this death? But whereas Aristotle saith, that those things, which are committed through wrath and lust, and also those things, which are doone by the reason and will, are to be auoided: this we correct, on this wise; That auoided indéed they may be, if Gods grace be applied therevnto: for without the same, who can beware of the motions of anger and lust? No doubt but we may temper our selues from outward actions, but these motions of the hart are not in our power. Also we agrée that they be mens actions, which procéed from lust and wrath: for euen of them also we shall yéeld an account.

Of mans Election, or making of choise.

61 Aristotle saith; ⁴²⁷ that making of choise is most proper to vertue. For in the definition, which he made of vertue, first was placed the generall kind, namelie the habit; then he added the difference, to wit, mediocritie; after that were ioined togither the two properties; namelie, that through vertue we do things of our own accord; and then, that we doo them by making of choise. Howbeit, of these two properties, making of choise is the more proper: neither onlie, if it be compared with that, which is of our owne accord, but also if it be compared with the other properties of vertue, which no doubt are manie. For this cause are the actions procéeding from vertue commended, bicause they come from the making of choise. ⁴²⁸ Maners (saith Aristotle ) ⟨…⟩re more iudged by making of choise, than by actions. True indéed it is, that maners are knowne by actions, as a trée is by the fruit: but yet that iudgement is deceiuable; for hypocrites doo verie oftentimes make a counterfet shew, and otherwhile we sée things doone of a far other purpose, than it is méet they should be. The Manicheis absteined from wiues; also from the eating of flesh: not bicause they were giuen to chastitie or sobrietie; but bicause of their erronious and blasphemous opinions. Tyrants doo sometimes deale curteouslie with their subiects, but to beguile them. And wicked men doo sometimes absteine from wickednes, but that is for feare of punishments, not for the loue of iustice. Euill men forbeare to sinne for the feare of punishment. Wherefore in iudgements, when the fact is apparant, there is oftentimes inquirie made of the will, mind, and purpose of him that dooth it. Neither at anie time is the making of choise subiect to fortune, as is action. Yea rather, they, which are found in anie crime, are oftentimes accustomed to saie, that they ment to haue doone otherwise, and that they purposed not in their mind, that such things should happen. And we easilie grant, that the actions are more apparant, since they are laid open to euerie mans eies; but yet they make not the iudgement either surer, or more certeine. Men doo iudge of maners, by that which followeth, namelie by the worke: but the iudgement of choosing procéedeth from the cause, and (as they vse to speake) from that which went before. And sometimes it happeneth, that a man dooth no action; so as it cannot be iudged by his actions, whether he be good or euill: but immediatlie, so soone as he sheweth what choise he hath made, although he doo no action, yet men giue a iudgement of him, either as touching his naughtinesse, or his goodnesse. But how can it be said, that yong children, and also bruit beasts want the making of choise, ⁴²⁹ when as they choose one meate before an other; plaie before discipline; and shunne some things more than other things? We must answer, that making of choise is of two sorts. One is common, whereby one thing is either preferred before an other, or else is more eschewed than an other: and this kind of choise neither brute beasts nor children doo want. The other is the verie proper choise, which hath counsell going before, and is directed by the iudgement of reason. And this kind of making choise can neither bruit beasts nor children haue: for when they pursue one thing before an other, or auoid one thing rather than an other, they are not lead by reason; but by sense. Also those things, which we doo in hast, and vpon the sudden, are without making of choise, not that we want reason while we commit those things, but bicause we admit no space of time to deliberate on them. Also the counsell, and the iudgement, and deliberation of reason is hindered by the vehemencie of the perturbation.

⁴³⁰ Wherefore there be reckoned vp thrée things, that want the making of choise. First, brute beasts, bicause they are not capable of reason. Secondlie, yong children; which although they be indued with reason, yet can they not vse the same, bicause of their tender age: in the third place are counted sudden and hastie motions of the mind: wherein, although men haue reason enough and also yeares, yet doo they want time of deliberation. Wherefore they, which doo anie thing by the force of anie affection, are woont to saie, that they did it not of purpose, or aduisedlie. Since that making of choise dooth belong vnto the mind, it is either of the power of knowing, ⁴³¹ or the power of appetite. All appetite is diuided into thrée parts. Either it is of the more noble part of the mind, and is ioined with reason, and is called the will; or else it is of the grosser part, and then it is diuided into the desiring power, and into the angrie power. Herevpon Aristotle said, that some thought choise to be the will, others thought it to be anger, others thought it to be desire: but if it belong vnto the knowledge, then come they which affirme choise to be an opinion, who perhaps were the Stoiks. But first Aristotle treateth of desire and anger, ⁴³² and reasoneth that their opinion is fond, bicause that then we should yéeld, that brute beasts haue choise: for they are mooued both with desire and anger, which he reiecteth, as an absurd and vnworthie thing. Wherefore it plainelie appéereth, that Aristotle did vtterlie remooue desire from choise, bicause we may not by anie means saie, that desire is choise: which cannot so be iudged of, as touching willingnesse. Indéed willingnesse differeth from choise, but it cannot be sundered from the same; séeing euerie choise is according to the will. And the argument which he vsed is this; If desire were choise, whatsoeuer thing worketh by desire, should (no doubt) worke by choise; But not euerie thing that worketh by desire, dooth worke by choise. The ouerthrowe of the consequent appéereth in this, bicause an incontinent man worketh by desire, but not by choise; for that he followeth it not. He determined to doo well, but he stood not to his determination; therefore he delt not according to the choise, which he had conceiued in his mind. Choise is an appetite, which is a counsellor; but the incontinent man, while he is carried awaie by desire, heareth no counsell. And on the other side, the continent man giueth no eare to desire, but followeth his right choise. And this reason may be applied vnto anger; for he also that dooth anie thing by anger, dooth it not by choise: and this we may sée in angrie men. And héerein it shall suffice to haue said, that an incontinent man is not altogither without choise; but yet he followeth not that which he hath in his mind.

He is compared to a man that sléepeth, to him that is dronken, & to a citie wherein good lawes are not regarded. Héere Aristotle reasoneth; Choise is contrarie to desire; But desire is not contrarie to desire; Ergo desire is not choise. This argument is in the second figure. The reason is this; Those things that agrée in one third, they also agrée in themselues: Euen so those things that doo not oppose themselues against one third, doo not agrée togither at once themselues. But there ariseth a doubt: ⁴³³ bicause desire séemeth to be against desire. Some man desireth fame, and to haue his name renowmed, and the same man is much desirous of monie; one of these desires is repugnant to an other. Augustus desired souereigntie, and yet was desirous to imitate Silla, in giuing vp of souereigntie. These things séeme to be repugnant. Pamphilus lo~ged to be with his louer Glycerie, and yet was desirous not to offend his father. These things declare, that desires be contrarie. The answer is manie waies to be made. Contraries must alwaies be contrarie: but these things are not alwaies contrarie, as appéereth in the Sophister, which at one time hath both these desires; namelie, the desire of glorie, and the desire of monie. Moreouer, it behooueth that contraries haue respect to one and the selfe same thing: but the one of these desires respecteth fame, the other monie. Those things that respect one thing, after a quite contrarie maner, are verie contraries, and cannot be both at once togither. As, to desire to haue fame, and to desire not to haue fame; to be noble, and not to be noble; to be mainteined, and not to be mainteined: these be contrarie desires, and cannot be both at once togither. Aristotle was not of the mind, that among desires there is no contrarietie, but that contrarie desires cannot be togither at once in one man. But euill desire is alwaies an enimie to sound choise in one and the selfe-same man, and at one and the selfe-same time. Neither is euerie choise alwaies an aduersarie to euerie desire: for the desire of theft is not against the choise, whereby a man determineth to become rich, though it be by vniust meanes. And the desire of slaughter is not against the choise, which a tyrant hath made. But a sound choise (as it hath béene said) is euermore against an euill desire. But what maner of contrarietie is this of desire & choise? No proper contrarietie, but such as is of contrarie winds, or of two enimies. For it behooueth that these contrarieties, which be proper contrarieties, be in one and the selfe-same subiect, and that from thence they driue awaie one another; as white and blacke, cold & heat: which thing agréeth not with choise and ill desire, for they be placed in diuers parts of the mind. For choise is placed in the mind or reason, but desire in the grosser part of the soule.

Another argument is gathered from the obiects, the which being contraries, ⁴³⁴ doo cause that the powers themselues are not the verie same. Desire is caried vnto those things which be pleasant, and which be vnpleasant; namelie, to obteine the one sort, and to auoid the other. But choise hath not respect vnto these things, but regardeth onelie that which is shamefull and honest, profitable and hurtfull. Howbeit, here there is a doubt; bicause the choise séemeth to be of things pleasant, and of things gréeuous. Before yong men there is set vertue and pleasure, and they are said to be set as it were in the point of two waies; that when they shall be come vnto the yéeres of mans state, they may bend either to the right hand, or to the left. Wherevpon they are at their choise, to choose whether waie they will. Thus haue Pythagoras scholers and the Poets described the matter. And to Paris there was a choise giuen; Pallas offered him learning and good arts; Iuno offered him ciuill honors, & a happie gouernement of the common-weale; finallie, Venus offered him the grosser sort of pleasures: wherefore the choise was in Paris, and he rather chose that which was pleasant. Yea, and our sauior Christ setteth before vs a broad and a narrowe waie, a wide and a strait gate: so as it séemeth, that the choise is both of that which is gréeuous, and that which is pleasant. We answer: If by choise, thou vnderstand the action of the mind, whereby one thing is preferred before another; we cannot denie, but that choise is both of that which is pleasant, and that which is gréeuous, séeing we preferre pleasantnesse before gréefe. But deliberation concerneth not properlie pleasant and grosse delights: for to those we are not borne. Wherefore those which preferre such pleasures before seuere honestie, or sometimes before a gréeuous sense, are not said to choose, but rather to be led and violentlie caried by the desire. Yet is it not to be denied, but that it may sometimes be, that the honest and profitable things, which we choose, may be pleasant: howbeit, that happeneth at all aduentures, (or as the common sort speake) accidentallie. Wherfore choise is exercised about that which is good, and about that which is euill: for this by our choise we séeke, euen to obteine good things, and to auoid euill. ⁴³⁵ But if a man demand, whether there can be a choosing of euill? We will answer, that this cannot be, bicause we neuer make choise of that which is euill: for it behooueth, that that which is chosen, either be good, or at the least wise haue in it selfe a shew and resemblance of goodnesse. But thou wilt saie; Are not the lesse euils oftentimes chosen before the greater? I grant they are: but Aristotle in his Rhetoriks saith, that the lesse euill in that case, hath a consideration of good. ⁴³⁶ Finallie, Aristotle said, that anger pertaineth much lesse to choise; bicause those things séeme not to be doone deliberatelie, which be doone in anger. ⁴³⁷

Neither is the choise, saith Aristotle, our will, although it haue an affinitie thervnto. In which words he propoundeth two things; the one, that will hath an affinitie with choise: for both of them are placed in the chiefest part of the mind. And moreouer, the common people saie, that they will those things which they choose. And yet neuerthelesse, how néere so euer they be, they differ one from another: for the will is more at libertie, and stretcheth further than choise and election dooth. For will extendeth vnto manie things, wherevnto the choise doth not atteine: as vnto the end, vnto things vnpossible, and to those things which by vs cannot be performed. By common sense it is manifest, ⁴³⁸ that choise perteineth not to things vnpossible: for he shuld be counted a mad man, that would choose such things, as can by no means be compassed. That the will extendeth to such things, it appéereth, bicause that thou maist find manie men, which would not die: which in nature is vnpossible. Also there be, which would be monarchs of all the world, and beare rule ouer all men: which also is a thing vnpossible. Moreouer, the will is the end, but the choise is rather of those things which belong vnto the end, and therefore they differ. Bicause the end, especiallie the chiefest end is of that nature, that foorthwith, so soone as it is set before vs, it cannot be refused. Therefore since it is not in our power to slippe from the same, it belongeth not to the choise: for that concerneth those things which are in our power. But yet we must vnderstand, that there is a choise of such ends as consist betwéene two extremes: for manie times is set before a yong man the choise of good learning, or of chiualrie, or of ecclesiasticall function, or of the administration of the common-weale. First, they choose to themselues one of these things which liketh them best; then also they choose the means, whereby they may excell them. But we answer, that choise in those ends hath no place, as they be ends, but as they be certeine means vnto felicitie. For an end, so farre foorth as it is an end, is (as Aristotle saith) no choise.

⁴³⁹ Finallie, to prooue that choise is not opinion, which was set downe in the fourth place, the reason is drawne from the obiects. Opinion is of all things; But choise is not of all things; Therfore choise is not opinion. The argument is in the second figure, taken from the nature of relatiues: for the power is referred vnto his obiect. Now let vs sée what is opinion; ⁴⁴⁰ It is an assent of the mind, whereby we take vpon vs to mainteine the one part of a thing that is gainesaid: yet we auow it not without all feare, but somewhat doubting, least perhaps the other part of the contradiction should be found true. And herein opinion differeth from knowledge: for knowledge is a most sure and vnmooueable assent. Therefore let no man go about to persuade one that hath knowledge, or is a professor of the Mathematicall sciences, that a thing is otherwise than he knoweth it to be: for it is vnpossible to persuade him therevnto. But chéeflie doo Orators indeuour to roote opinions out of the minds of men, when they sée that iudges, or hearers doo otherwise iudge, than they themselues would would haue them. Aristotle prooueth, ⁴⁴¹ that opinion is of all maner of things; bicause men hold opinion euen of things eternall. For men haue opinion of manie things concerning God, concerning angels, concerning heauen, and such like things, which of the philosophers are holden for eternall. Also men haue an opinion of those things, which cannot be; to wit, that there be Chimeras, Centaures, and such like monsters: and that the diametre is equall to the side lines of the quadrangle, which cannot possiblie be. Also things necessarie be otherwhile subiect vnto opinion: for it may be, that what one hath perceiued by knowledge, another beléeueth by opinion. But when it is said, that opinion is as touching all things, this must not be vnderstood as concerning simple motions, or single words; but as touching propositions, which consist of manie motions or words, & doo shew, that either a thing is, or is not. Neither yet is there opinion of all these things: for there be certeine things, which euen of themselues are knowne either to the sense, or to the mind. As, that fire is hot, we certeinlie knowe by experiment of the sense, we haue not an opinion thereof; and that the whole is greater than the part thereof; or that we pronounce of euerie thing, either that it is, or is not (which things be called principles) we are not led by opinion, sith of themselues they are knowne to our vnderstanding. Opinion therefore is of all things; that is to wit, of all propositions, which of themselues are not knowne vnto vs. ⁴⁴² Also opinion is distinguished from diuine faith: for faith signifieth a firme assent giuen vnto the word of God, by the persuasion of the holie Ghost; so that it neither staggereth nor wauereth as dooth opinion. The Minor proposition of the argument aforesaid is thus prooued; Bicause choise is onelie of those things, which may be doone of vs, wherefore it is not of all things, as opinion is.

Aristotle hath another argument drawne from the parts. These two whole things, choise and opinion, haue not the same parts, whereinto they might be diuided; Ergo they are not all one. For the parts of choise are euill and good; but the parts of opinion are false and true opinion. And yet this argument may séeme to be weake; for we commonlie saie, that there be manie euill opinions; ⁴⁴³ as if a man thinke that our soules are mortall, or that God dooth not by his prouidence care for mens actions. Whosoeuer thinke these things, are said to haue ill opinions, First we answer hervnto, that ill is here vnderstood as it belongeth to maners: & therfore Aristotle saith, that opinion is neither euill nor good, bicause it is not reckoned among maners. But the common sort doo call opinions, euill; bicause that which is false, is euill; euen as that which is true, is good. For those things, which are commonlie called transcendent, are so ioined one with another, that true, is good; and false, is euill. Also these opinions may sometimes be called good or euill in a morall sense; bicause thorough those false or true opinions, men are stirred vp either to good or vnto euill maners. ⁴⁴⁴ The next argument is taken from the effects, to prooue that it cannot be particularlie said, that anie kind of opinion is all one with choise. Here we haue to deale with the particular part, bicause it hath béen alreadie declared in the whole, that opinion & choise doo differ. Wherefore, least anie man might saie; They differ generallie, and yet it may be, that some opinion is a particular choise; Aristotle prooueth, that this cannot be: bicause (saith he) this is the effect of choise, that through a iust cause we shall become men denominated of that qualitie; to wit, iust men. But this happeneth not in opinion; and therefore they are by no meanes all one. Those things, which be here spoken, are most euident in an incontinent man: for he, bicause he maketh an ill choise, is said to be an euill man, whereas in other matters he may hold an opinion right inough. For as touching vertues, he iudgeth rightlie; and thinketh, that it is good to temper him selfe from vnchastitie and droonkennesse, & yet dooth not choose this: he is not called a good man. But yet none can denie, but that euen by conceiuing an opinion, we are become indued with some certeine kind of qualitie, since opinion it selfe is a qualitie, and euen of opinions doo arise some affects of the mind. But Aristotle is to be vnderstood as touching that qualitie, whereby we conceiue an opinion, and doo make our choise: for in choosing of chast things, we become chast; by choosing of strong things, we become strong; by choosing of iust things, we become iust. But it is not likewise true in generall, as touching opinion: for in conceiuing an opinion of eternall things, we are not made eternall; nor yet in conceiuing an opinion of anie thing touching iustice, are we made iust. Howbeit this is true, that by true opinions we become more apt vnto vertues; and through false opinions, more prone vnto vices. But opinion it selfe dooth straitwaie of it selfe, so soone as it is present, communicate vnto vs such formes or denominations; but yet it behooueth that there be a choise had therein. Moreouer, choise is occupied in pursuing or flieng, but so is not opinion: for when anie thing is offered vnto vs, we begin to conceiue an opinion what it is, what com⟨…⟩oditie may be gotten thereby, and how it must be vsed. But we doo not so much conceiue in our opinion, whether the thing should be shunned or followed: for that rather apperteineth to choise. Yea rather, betwéene these things there séemeth, that there should be a certeine order set: for first (as I said) we conceiue in opinion what it is, what profit it bringeth, and how it will serue our turne. Which things being co~ceiued in opinion, then we procéed either to pursue, or to eschew the matter.

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← 19. The first Chapter. Of Sinne · Contents · 21. The third Chapter. Of the Lawe →

Footnotes

1. In Rom. 7. at the end of the chapter. ↩

2. This word Free will is not read in the scriptures. ↩

3. What is free. ↩

4. When the will is free. ↩

5. Free choise is placed i⟨…⟩ the will, but rooted in the reason. ↩

6. Two sorts of error in reason. ↩

7. Our lust ioineth it selfe with the weaker argument. ↩

8. Men vse not to deliberate but in things to be doone. ↩

9. Some things to be doone need no deliberation. ↩

10. In what things free will consisteth. ↩

11. Definition of free will. ↩

12. In man are foure differences of state. ↩

13. Adam was free in his first state. Three kinds of works in man. ↩

14. Gen. 1, 27. ↩

15. Psalm. 8, 6. ↩

16. Psal. 49, 13. ↩

17. Gen. 1, 28. ↩

18. The grace that wee haue by Christ is preferred before Adams grace in paradise. ↩

19. Phil. 2, 13. ↩

20. Why God at the creation gaue free will. ↩

21. Luk. 10, 30, ↩

22. Little freedome remaineth to them that be not regenerate. ↩

23. What freedome is left to the not regenerate. ↩

24. Rom. 2, 3. ↩

25. God vseth the wils of men to his owne ends. ↩

26. Ier. 10, 23. ↩

27. The successe of things is gouerned by the will of God not by our will. ↩

28. verse. 20. ↩

29. God is the author of counsels, and giueth successe as he will. ↩

30. The godlie determine alwaies with this condition: if God will. Iames. 4, 15. Rom. 1, 10. ↩

31. Psal. 127, 1. ↩

32. In works acceptable vnto God, strangers from Christ haue no freedome. ↩

33. Nature indeed was left after sinne, but yet vnperfect and wounded. ↩

34. A reason why men cannot chuse but sinne. ↩

35. 1. Cor. 2, 14
    ↩

36. Gen 2. 3 & 5 ↩

37. verse. 21. Touching our strength our owne creator must be best beleeued. verse. 12. ↩

38. Without the grace of God we be bondmen. Iohn. 8, 34. ↩

39. verse. 36. Rom. 7, 14. & 18. & 23. ↩

40. Gal. 5, 18. ↩

41. Iohn. 6, 44. None can come vnto Christ vnlesse he be drawne. ↩

42. Rom. 8, 7. ↩

43. Gal. 3, 10. Places to prooue that before regeneration we be not free. ↩

44. Rom 9, 16. ↩

45. Eze. 11, 12. ↩

46. Iere. 31, 11. ↩

47. Psal. 51, 18. ↩

48. verse. 4. ↩

49. Phil. 1, 6. ↩

50. Psa. 119, 36. ↩

51. 2. Thes. 3, 5.
    ↩

52. Prou. 21, 1. It is the worke of God, not our owne, that we be conuerted vnto God. The end & vse of the lawe. Esaie. 1, 19. ↩

53. Eze. 18, 30, and 32. ↩

54. Deu. 30, 15. ↩

55. Lawes indeed are Lawes indeed are giuen but it is not taught that mans strength is able to performe them. ↩

56. By the law of God we may measure our infirmitie, but not our strength. ↩

57. Rom. 3, 30. Rom. 7, 13. ↩

58. Why God is not to be accused of iniustice. ↩

59. Looke In 1. King. 16. at the beginning, and in the booke De votis, pag. 279. put foorth at Basil. ↩

60. Necessitie of sinning is without constraint. ↩

61. 1. Co. 12, 11
    ↩

62. Freedome is contrarie vnto compulsion not vnto necessitie. ↩

63. A similitude. ↩

64. Why the blessed cannot sinne. ↩

65. The not regenerate differ from brute beasts. ↩

66. Three maner of freedoms. ↩

67. What is Free, Violent, and Willing. ↩

68. A definition of Free. ↩

69. The will of the not regenerate is greatlie restrained. ↩

70. What they cannot choose. ↩

71. The will cannot be compelled. ↩

72. The necessitie of sinning is not absolute in the wicked. ↩

73. Augustine saith that it is of nature to be able to haue faith. ↩

74. The opinion of Augustine compared with the Pelagians. ↩

75. What manner of power vnto faith is in nature. ↩

76. How the will of man hath respect vnto good and euill. ↩

77. Aristotles definition of felicitie. ↩

78. What they call congruitie. ↩

79. What condignitie. ↩

80. Ephe. 2, 3. ↩

81. Iohn. 3, 36. ↩

82. Ephe. 2, 1. ↩

83. Philip. 3, 8. Before regeneration we can doo nothing that should please God. Esaie. 1, 12. Esai. 64, 6. Iohn. 15, 1. and, 5. ↩

84. Matt. 7, 18. ↩

85. Rom. 6, 5. ↩

86. Rom. 14, 23. ↩

87. Matt. 6, 22. ↩

88. Rom. 11, 6. ↩

89. Colos. 1. ↩

90. Rom. 11, 17. ↩

91. Rom. 6, 20. ↩

92. verse, 19. ↩

93. Vnder the praises of nature lurke the enimies of grace. ↩

94. Why they are called heretiks, which denie freewill. ↩

95. Our aduersaries come somewhat nigh vnto the Manicheis. ↩

96. A similitude. ↩

97. A comparison of our aduersaries with the Pelagians. ↩

98. To be with out faith in Christ, and without grace, in Augustines iudgement is all one thing. ↩

99. Acts. 10, 2, and 3, 4, ↩

100. Of Cornelius and his works. ↩

101. Cornelius beleeued before baptisme. ↩

102. verse. 23. ↩

103. A similitude. ↩

104. True godlines cannot be ioined with ignorance. ↩

105. verse. 22. ↩

106. Iob. 1, 1. ↩

107. How great a dignitie it is to feare God. ↩

108. Psal. 112, 1. ↩

109. Acts. 10. ↩

110. The effects are a testimonie of Cornelius iustification. ↩

111. Galat. 6, 6. ↩

112. Acts. 10, 22. ↩

113. verse. 30. He praie⟨…⟩ continuallie. ↩

114. How it is to be vnderstood that sinners are not heard of God. ↩

115. Why God heareth the the praiers of ill ministers. ↩

116. Rom. 12, 14 ↩

117. Acts. 10, 34. ↩

118. Iohn. 14, 1. ↩

119. Iohn. 5, 46. ↩

120. Cornelius had the faith of the fathers in the old testament. Iohn. 1, 48. The example of Nathaniel. ↩

121. A similitude. ↩

122. Heb. 11, 6. ↩

123. Faith is not of our selues. Ephe. 2, 8. ↩

124. Cornelius had faith in Christ, but not distinct and vnfolden. ↩

125. verse. 13. ↩

126. Peter was sent to edifie Cornelius, not to laie the ground of his faith. ↩

127. The saluation which we haue in this life is not perfect. ↩

128. Ephes. 2, 8. ↩

129. Phil. 2, 12. ↩

130. Saluation begun by iustification is to be made perfect euerie daie. ↩

131. Matt. 13, 17. ↩

132. Iohn. 17, 8. ↩

133. Luke. 24, 16, Matt. 16, 9. Luke. 18, 34 ↩

134. Note the interpretation of the words of Augustine. ↩

135. Ephes. 2, 8. ↩

136. Whether grace and a weake faith haue the power to iustifie. ↩

137. A historie of Pelagius. ↩

138. Who be Catechumeni, and conceiued sonnes of God. ↩

139. Grace following is all one with the first, but differeth in degree and quantitie. ↩

140. Why God by his prouidence so transferreth kingdoms from nation to nation. ↩

141. Ciuill discipline must not be pretermitted of infidels. ↩

142. The Ethniks sinne lesse by keeping of ciuill discipline, than by reiecting of it. All sinnes are not alike. ↩

143. Our aduersaries, not we, ⟨…⟩oo open a windowe vnto sinnes. ↩

144. Our aduersaries doe derogat⟨…⟩ much of the grace of God. ↩

145. Goodlie works are sometimes occasions of destruction. ↩

146. Works doon before iustification bee otherwhiles preparations to the same, but yet to the predestinate onlie. ↩

147. A knowledge of sinne hauing not his proper end is sinne. ↩

148. The end of the knowledge of sinne. ↩

149. Esaie. 58, 2. ↩

150. God refuseth works although they be goodlie. ↩

151. Augustine accuseth the meane works which he did before his conuersion. ↩

152. Whatsoeuer wanteth his due perfection is sinne ↩

153. Of the Publican. Luk. 18, 13. ↩

154. Rom. 10, 14 ↩

155. While he praied he was iustified. ↩

156. If he be iustified, why dooth hee call himselfe a sinner? The iustified doo yet still praie for their sinnes. Matth. 6, 12 ↩

157. Psal. 31, 3. ↩

158. Psal. 40, 15. ↩

159. Psal. 51, 6. ↩

160. Ibidem. 10. ↩

161. He did not so call himselfe a sinner, as he ment to retein⟨…⟩ his old sinnes. ↩

162. What is required vnto the works, which be acceptable vnto God. ↩

163. Rom. 14, 23 ↩

164. 1. Co. 10, 31
     ↩

165. Psal. 32, 1. ↩

166. Rom. 8, 1. ↩

167. Ibidem. 3. ↩

168. Ierem. 9, 23. 1. Cor. 1, 31. ↩

169. 1. Cor, 4, 7.
     ↩

170. Whence may be gathered the definition of good works. ↩

171. How far the wicked are from the condition of good works. ↩

172. A metaphor of a good and euill tree. Matt. 7, 18. Rom. 14, 23. ↩

173. verse. 33. verse. 34. ↩

174. To cloth the naked without faith is sin. ↩

175. Heb. 11, 6. ↩

176. If the respect be vnto nature, no tree is euill. Natures must not be weighed as they were made by God, but according to the state that coms to them afterward. ↩

177. Mercie doone to a neighbour without faith is faithlesse. ↩

178. Mercie of it selfe is not good. ↩

179. 1. kin. 20, 35. 1. Sam. 15, verse. 16.
     ↩

180. God disallowed certeine works of mercie. ↩

181. The wicked abuse naturall affections. ↩

182. Pelagius and the Schoolemen affirme good works but not such as further to the kingdome of heauen. ↩

183. A grace preuenting and knocking. ↩

184. A similitude. ↩

185. Against the former similitude. ↩

186. Mat. 21, 1⟨…⟩. Luk. 13, 6. ↩

187. Acts. 17, 28. ↩

188. Rom. 14, 23 ↩

189. Augustine obiected against Pelagius, that whatsoeuer is not of faith is sinne. ↩

190. We must assure our selues of that wee doo, that it is acceptable vnto God. ↩

191. Paule by a particular proposition prooueth a generall. ↩

192. The lawe of God is the rule of the conscience. ↩

193. Rom. 12, 2. ↩

194. Rom. 5, 17. ↩

195. Commentaries ascribed vnto Ierom. ↩

196. Ambrose & Basil saie that the works of infidels are sins. ↩

197. Esaie. 62, 3. ↩

198. Iohn. 8, 34. ↩

199. Matt. 6, 24 ↩

200. 2. Cor. 6, 14.
     ↩

201. Matt. 7, 18. ↩

202. Of the freedome of men regenerate. ↩

203. The godlie can atteine vnto works acceptable vnto God. ↩

204. Gen. 22, 10, and 19. ↩

205. Phil. 4, 18. ↩

206. Heb. 13, 16. ↩

207. Phil. 2, 12. ↩

208. Matt. 25, 35. ↩

209. The regenerate haue their freedome by the benefit of God, not by their owne merit. Ezec. 36, 26 Iohn. 6, 44. ↩

210. At the first impulsion of the holie Ghost the mind suffereth. ↩

211. By the benefit of regeneration both the vnderstanding and lust are holpen. ↩

212. The libertie also of the godlie is vnperfect. ↩

213. Gal. 5, 17. ↩

214. Rom. 7, 15. ↩

215. Ibidem. 25. ↩

216. 1. Ioh. 1, 10 Iames. 3, 2. Matth. 6, 12 We are not let by the imperfection of libertie, but that we may worke togither with God.
     ↩
217. 2. Tim. 1, 6.
     ↩
218. 1. Cor. 14, 1.
     ↩

219. The regenerate are called men of God, not men simplie 2. Tim. 3, 17. ↩

220. The difference betweene the freedome of the godlie and of the vngodlie. ↩

221. Of the freedome in our heauenlie countrie. ↩

222. Before part ⟨…⟩. place. 1. art. 10. and in the booke De votis, pag. 354. ↩

223. Whether concupiscence and the motions left in the regenerate be sinnes. Rom. 7, 23. ↩

224. A definition of sinne. ↩

225. How Coueted in that definition is to be vnderstood. ↩

226. verse. 4. A definition of sinne out of the word of God. ↩

227. Sinne is called a priuation of that good thing which the lawe of God prescribeth. ↩

228. Rom, 7, 23, ↩

229. Rom. 8, 7. ↩

230. Mat. 22, 37. ↩

231. Exod. 20, 17 Augustine. ↩

232. Gen. 1, 27. Rom. 8, 29. ↩

233. verse. 10. ↩

234. Eph. 4, 24. ↩

235. Wherein consisteth the image of God. ↩

236. Phil. 2, 5. ↩

237. Colo. 3, 5. ↩

238. Gal. 5, 24. ↩

239. Eph. 4, 22. ↩

240. Rom. 6, 23. ↩

241. Rom. 4, 25. ↩

242. Vnto what kind of sin naturall lust, and the first motions vnto euill, is to be referred. A distinction of sinne. Mat. 12, 31. ↩

243. 1. Cor. 6, 9.
     ↩

244. Rom. 6, 1⟨…⟩. ↩

245. Rom. 7, 24. ↩

246. Lust and the first motions vnto euill, be in their owne nature mortall. Rom. 5, 23. ↩

247. By the mercie of God they be not imputed to damnation. ↩

248. Three degrees of sinnes remissible. ↩

249. Rom. 6, 12. ↩

250. The lust in nature belongs vnto originall sinne. ↩

251. ⟨…⟩. ↩

252. An other distinction of sinne. ↩

253. Rom. 1, 21. ↩

254. verse. 24. ↩

255. Rom. 2, 5. ↩

256. Rom. 1, 2⟨…⟩. ↩

257. A similitude. ↩

258. Prou. 6, 27. ↩

259. Why sinne is said to be a punishment. ↩

260. Falling from faith may be called the punishment of sinne. ↩

261. Rom. 7, 15, and 18. ↩

262. Gal. 5, 17. ↩

263. The first motions be sinnes, bicause we depart from the state wherein we were made. ↩

264. Why it is not in mans power to be good. ↩

265. These things are spoken euen of the regenerate. ↩

266. He speaketh of nature in perfect state. ↩

267. The regenerate can abstaine from the grosser kinds of sinnes. ↩

268. Concupiscence remaineth, but the giltines is taken awaie. ↩

269. Euerie thing must be iudged of, according to his own nature. ↩

270. The Pelagians vpbraided the Catholiks of folishnes. A similitude. ↩

271. Similitudes. ↩

272. The fathers meane that they be no actuall sinnes. ↩

273. Note these words of Augustine. ↩

274. Concupiscence left in vs is verelie and properlie sinne ↩

275. Against Free will. ↩

276. The first reason. 1. Cor. 2, 14. ↩

277. The 2. reason. ↩

278. The 3. reason. ↩

279. The 4. reason. ↩

280. The 5. reason. ↩

281. The 6. reason. ↩

282. The 7. reason. ↩

283. Looke part 1. pl. 13. art. 13. ↩

284. To the first reason. ↩

285. To the second reason. ↩

286. Few see how the prouidence of God can suffer anie free choise in our will. ↩

287. A prouerbe. ↩

288. A licence of the Poets. ↩

289. Rom. 4, 20. ↩

290. Christ was not deliuered to the crosse against his fathers wil. ↩

291. Iohn. 3, 16. ↩

292. Rom. 8, 23. ↩

293. Iohn. 15, 13. ↩

294. Luke. 22, 15. ↩

295. Augustine against Cicero. ↩

296. Augustines example of a Physician ↩

297. If he be God he foreseeth things to come. ↩

298. Esai. 41, 23. ↩

299. Psal. 14, 1. ↩

300. What draue Cicero so earnestlie to stand with free will. ↩

301. Selfe-loue is the originall of impietie. ↩

302. Rom. 8, 29. ↩

303. Ephes. 1, 4. ↩

304. Matt. 10, 29. and 30. ↩

305. Ciceros maner of reasoning. ↩

306. Augustine. ↩

307. It is granted that before God is a necessitie of causes & things. ↩

308. Cicero erreth more than the Stoiks. ↩

309. The Stoiks remoue our will fro~ the order of causes. ↩

310. Manie things might be doone, which are not doone. ↩

311. Two sorts of necessitie. ↩

312. Admonitions, lawes, and praiers are not taken awaie. ↩

313. Our will can neuer be constrained. ↩

314. A necessitie vpon condition may be granted, but not absolute. Aristotle. ↩

315. Chrysost. ↩

316. 1. Co. 11, 19.
     ↩

317. Matt. 18, 7. ↩

318. Luk. 24, 26. ↩

319. A necessitie of the consequent, not of consequence. ↩

320. A similitude. ↩

321. Let no man laie his owne fault vpon God. ↩

322. The Peripatetikes are reprooued. ↩

323. To the 3. reason. ↩

324. The power of God doth what it wil, but it marreth not the nature of things. Wisd. ⟨…⟩, 1. ↩

325. To the 4. reason. ↩

326. To the 5. reason. Wisdome shall rule in the starres. ↩

327. Augustine. ↩

328. The iniuries against heauen. ↩

329. Gen. 1, 14. ↩

330. How a place in Gen. is to be vnderstood. ↩

331. Twins conceiued at one instant. ↩

332. Augustine. ↩

333. Two brothers of like affection. ↩

334. Hippocrates. ↩

335. Possidonius. ↩

336. Ciceros booke De fato. ↩

337. To the sixt. ↩

338. The Stoiks doo not vtterlie seuer mans will from destinie. ↩

339. How we put the knitting togither of causes. ↩

340. To the seuenth. ↩

341. Out of the Commentaries vpon Aristotles Ethiks. ↩

342. Whether lawes may command things not possible to be performed. ↩

343. A definition of lawe. ↩

344. Whether the affects of the mind be voluntarie or not voluntarie. ↩

345. To knowe which is voluntarie and which not voluntarie, may serue to the moderating of punishment due by lawe. ↩

346. Deut. 19, 5. ↩

347. The definition of not voluntarie. ↩

348. That the originall of that which is violent, is from without. ↩

349. Whether those things that are moued violentlie, may also themselues haue a doing. ↩

350. Whether voluntarie and without constraint, be all one. ↩

351. Whether those that seeme to be meane actions, be voluntarie, or not voluntarie. ↩

352. Which he called great euils. ↩

353. The lesse euils are chosen for auoiding the greater. ↩

354. Gen. 19, 8. ↩

355. Gen. 19, 31. ↩

356. Gen. 20, 2. ↩

357. Iudith. 10, 11, and 12. ↩

358. That some actions be both voluntarie, and not voluntarie. ↩

359. That the actions called mixed, be voluntarie, bicause. for them we are praised or dispraised. ↩

360. For which good things hard mishaps must be abidden. ↩

361. What kind of shamefull things must be abidden for a gret good thing. ↩

362. That praise dooth not alwaies folowe them that suffer greeuous things. ↩

363. Certeine things whereto a man must not suffer him selfe to be constrained. ↩

364. Two difficulties about the suffring for honest things: one commeth from our iudgement, & the other from the infirmitie of our strength. ↩

365. Whether those things that be doone for pleasure or vtilitie sake be not voluntarie. ↩

366. In Mnemone. ↩

367. Two kinds of ignorance. ↩

368. Examples of both sorts of ignorance. ↩

369. Another distinction of ignorance. ↩

370. An example. ↩

371. An ignorance generall, and an ignorance particular. ↩

372. The circumstances are eight in number. ↩

373. How circumstances do excuse. ↩

374. How ignorance is the cause of a thing doone against the will. ↩

375. What kind of ignorance dooth not excuse. ↩

376. The definition of voluntarie standeth vpon two parts. ↩

377. Why some thinke that angrie and lusting men doo things against their wils. ↩

378. That children and brute creatures doo some things with their wils, and some things against their wils. ↩

379. The appetite or desire of two sorts. ↩

380. How these things agree with the holie scriptures. ↩

381. Psa. 111, 3. ↩

382. Matt. 19, 12. ↩

383. Deut. 19, 5. ↩

384. Matt. 8, 29. ↩

385. Num. 22, 31 ↩

386. Rom. 3, 8. ↩

387. Acts. 5, 29. ↩

388. Matt. 10, 38 and 16, 24. Matt. 10. 39. ↩

389. Matt. 10, 33 ↩

390. Matt. 5, 10. ↩

391. 1. Kin. 21, 13
     ↩

392. Matt. 16, 26. ↩

393. Matt. 10, 28 ↩

394. Matt. 26, 41. ↩

395. Mark. 9, 23. ↩

396. Phil. 4, 13. ↩

397. Rom. 7, 18. ↩

398. Phil. 2, 13. ↩

399. Luk. 23, 34. ↩

400. Acts. 7, 60. ↩

401. 1 Sam. 14, 43 ↩

402. Acts. 2, 37. ↩

403. Gen. 9, ⟨…⟩1. ↩

404. Gen. 29. verse. 21, & ⟨…⟩ ↩

405. 1. Co. 14, 38
     ↩
406. 2. The. 2, 11
     ↩

407. Eze. 14, 9. ↩

408. 3. King 22, 20, &c.
     ↩

409. Eph. 4, 25. ↩

410. Matt. 5, 22. ↩

411. Luk. 21, 34. ↩

412. Ephe. 5, 18. ↩

413. Psal. 13, 2. ↩

414. verse. 22. ↩

415. Rom. 1. ↩

416. Ephe. 4, 17. ↩

417. Esaie. 44, 18 ↩

418. 2. Sam. 15, 9
     ↩

419. Gen. 20. ↩

420. Acts. 8. ↩

421. 1. Kin. 22. 34.
     ↩

422. Matth. 5, 22. ↩

423. Esaie. 1, 3. ↩

424. verse. 7. ↩

425. Psal. 69, 9. ↩

426. Rom, 7, 24. ↩

427. Choise most proper to vertue. ↩

428. Maners are more iudged by choise than by actions. ↩

429. Whether children and brute beasts, be without choise. ↩

430. Three things void of choise. ↩

431. An order whereby the definition of choise is found out ↩

432. That choise and desire are diuerse. ↩

433. Desire against desire. ↩

434. Whether choise be both of that which is pleasant and vnpleasant. ↩

435. Whether there can be a choosing of euil. ↩

436. That wrath is not choise. ↩

437. That the will is not the choise, but these two doo differ. ↩

438. That the choise is not of things vnpossible. ↩

439. That choise is not opinion. ↩

440. A definition of opinion. ↩

441. That opinion concerneth all things. ↩

442. Opinion distinguished from faith. ↩

443. Ill opinions. ↩

444. That no kind of opinion is all one with choise. ↩