21. The third Chapter. Of the Lawe

HEre I thought it good to speake somewhat concerning the nature of the lawe, ¹ and therewithall to shew, how the Manicheis and Pelagians vnderstood it not: and what the same worketh in vs, either before regeneration, or after we be iustified. First, as touching the forme thereof, the same must be affirmed, which Paule saith in his epistle to the Romans, when he writeth, that it is spirituall. But the vniuersall end therof, and which apperteineth vnto all men, is to bring men vnto the knowledge of sinne. Which thing Paule signified, saieng; ² that By the lawe commeth the knowledge of sinne. Here if thou demand wherefore the apostle said not rather; By the lawe commeth the knowledge of righteousnesse? I answer, bicause a man not yet regenerate, so long as he is without Christ, can not haue in himselfe the féele of good works, or of true righteousnesse, which may satisfie the lawe of God. Wherefore, when he compareth his dooings with the lawe, he perceiueth them to be onelie falles and transgressions. But if we doo speake of the end of the lawe, as touching the elect; that is Christ. And this dooth also Paule teach, saieng; ³ The end of the lawe is Christ vnto saluation: which yet he speaketh not vniuersallie, but Vnto euerie one that beleeueth. ⁴ For the lawe it selfe, by it selfe dooth not bring a man to this end. The Ethniks said, that The end of the lawe is a knowledge, which it bréedeth as touching things to be doone. Wherevpon Chrysippus (as he is cited in the Digests) saith; that The lawe is the knowledge of things diuine and humane. Howbeit, this end, and this definition be to largelie extended: for all wisdome, and all good arts, doo teach some knowledge of diuine and heauenlie things.

Now there remaineth, that we diligentlie consider what is the matter an⟨…⟩ efficient cause of the lawe. ⁵ And to comprehend these things bréeflie, I saie, that The lawe is the commandement of God, wherin both his will, and also his disposition or nature is expressed. ⁶ When I saie, A commandement; I note the generall word: for there be commandements of the people, of the senate, of kings, of emperors. But when I saie, Of God; I make a difference, which betokeneth the efficient cause. Whereas I saie, that in the lawe is expressed the will of God, that is more euident than néedeth exposition. But perhaps it may séeme more obscure, that I said, ⁷ we be taught in the lawe concerning the disposition of God, and be stirred vp to the knowledge of his nature: wherefore we will make the same plaine by examples. When God commandeth vs, that we should loue him; he teacheth vs thereby, that he is of a nature to be beloued: for things can not rightlie be loued, vnlesse the verie same are worthie to be loued. And vnlesse he were well affected towards vs, he would not set foorth vnto vs that chéefe good, which we should loue: wherfore he chéeflie persuadeth vs vnto this, bicause he desireth to haue vs partakers of himselfe. We perceiue therefore, that he is such a one towards vs, as he also desireth vs to be. And when he forbiddeth that we should not kill, first he sheweth his owne will. Further, he declareth himselfe to be a God, which detesteth violence and iniuries, and he had rather doo good vnto men, than hurt them. After the same sort these two things might be shewed in the rest of the precepts.

And out of this definition those things may be also gathered, the which we spake aboue, touching the forme and end of the lawe: bicause it is of necessitie, that such a doctrine be spirituall, & that it bréed an excellent knowledge. And we be taught, ⁸ that it is no small benefit, that God hath thereby giuen vnto men: for he bringeth to passe, that both we knowe our selues, and vnderstand the properties of God. ⁹ Plato in his bookes of the lawe of a publike weale, and in Minoe, séemeth thus to define a lawe; namelie, that It is a right waie of gouerning, which by profitable meanes directeth vnto the best end; by setting foorth punishments vnto the transgressors, and rewards vnto the obedient. This definition may verie well be applied vnto the lawe of God: yea verelie, there can be no such lawe, vnlesse it be of God. It is no maruell then, ¹⁰ if the old Law-makers, when they would haue their lawes commended, did feigne some god to be the author of them: for Minos ascribed his lawes to Iupiter; Lycurgus, his to Apollo; Solon and Draco, theirs to Minerua; Numa Pompilius, his to Aegeria. And we are assured out of the holie scriptures, that our lawe was giuen of God by Moses in mount Sina.

2 And these things thus ordered, concerning the nature and definition of a lawe; we may easilie vnderstand, how fowlie the Manicheis haue erred, which blasphemed the same, ¹¹ and cursed it as euill. For séeing the lawe commandeth nothing, but things to be commanded; and forbiddeth nothing, but things to be forbidden; how can it iustlie be accused? For there can be no iust or honest duetie found out, but that by the lawe of God it is commended; and nothing fowle or dishonest, but it is forbidden in the same: nor onelie wicked dooings are prohibited by the lawe, but also wicked lusts are condemned. Wherefore that sheweth, ¹² that not onelie the outward works, but the mind and will must be corrected. And since a great part of felicitie standeth in the acknowledging of God, & that philosophers doo so greatlie commend the knowledge of our selues; both which things, the lawe of GOD doth appoint: the same cannot (without gréeuous offense) be blamed as euill and pernicious. Yet the place wherein it is said; ¹³ that The lawe entred in, that sinne should abound, might séeme to make somewhat for the Manicheis. As also that to the Galathians; ¹⁴ that The lawe was giuen bicause of transgressions. And that in the 7. chapter of the epistle to the Romans; that Sinne through the commandement killeth. ¹⁵ And that which is said in the second epistle to the Corinthians; ¹⁶ that The lawe is the ministerie of death. All these séeme to confirme the error of the Manicheis.

But there must a choise diligentlie be made of those things, which of themselues belong to the lawe; from those which followe it by reason of another thing, and by accidentall means: for sinne, death, damnation, and other things of this sort, doo spring out of the lawe, by reason of the corruption of our nature. But if thou compare not the lawe with our nature, but consider the same by it selfe; or if thou referre it to a sound and vncorrupt nature: thou canst not otherwise pronounce of it, than that which Paule saith; ¹⁷ that It is spirituall, holie, good, and that it was ordeined for life; and that rather it must be said to declare, than to worke sinne. Wherefore, ¹⁸ if deformed men lieng hidden in the darke, should saie vnto one, which by chance bringeth a light; Get thée awaie hence, least thou make vs deformed by this thy light: certeinlie, we would not gather by their words, that the power and nature of the light is such, as it can make men deformed; but this rather, that those things, which of themselues be deformed, are by the light discouered and shewed what they be. Euen so fareth it altogither with the lawe: for after a sort it bringeth in light, & bringeth foorth to our knowledge the sinnes which before laie hidden.

¹⁹ But some man will saie; If the lawe be good and holie, whie are men so discontented therewith, and haue it in hatred? Euen bicause it calleth men backe from those things, wherevnto by nature they are inclined: for it gréeueth them to be forbidden those things. And when we looke in the lawe, we sée the things which we ought to doo; and by reason of the pride, which is naturallie planted and ingraffed in vs, we would not be restrained by anie rules. Moreouer, we perceiue that our actions be wrested from that vprightnesse, which is set foorth in the lawe; and that (which is more gréeuous) we féele our selues to be so weake, that we cannot correct them, and reuoke them to the rule prescribed. But in the meane time we looke vpon the punishments, and vpon the wrath of God, which for sinne we doo incurre. ²⁰ All these things so offend our mind, as we be angrie, not with our selues and our sinnes, as méet it were; but with the lawe that is giuen by God: whereas otherwise the same is most perfect and most holie. Howbeit, this discommoditie may be remedied; and it may be brought to passe, that that which before displeased, may please vs afterward: and this will come to passe, if we ioine the lawe togither with Christ.

²¹ For as the waters of Marath were most bitter to the children of Israel in the wildernes; & yet the verie same, by casting in the wood, which God had appointed, were made swéete: euen so, although the lawe of it selfe be bitter; yet if Christ (whom God hath set foorth vnto vs to be an onelie sauior, and the verie iust end of the lawe) be added therevnto, then shall we féele it to be swéet. The which thing that it happened vnto Dauid, ²² it is manifestlie perceiued by the 19. Psal. wherein the praises of Gods lawe are woonderfullie set foorth: for it is called pleasant & swéet, aboue honie and the honie combe. And this is it, which is promised vs in the prophet, that GOD would write a lawe in our harts: which is nothing else, than that he would giue vnto vs the spirit of Christ, by whom we should be inclined to those things, which the lawe hath commanded to be doone; that at the least-wise the commandements of GOD may be pleasant vnto our harts. Which thing the apostle also teacheth, when he saith; ²³ I serue the lawe of God in my mind. Wherof the regenerate haue experience, who though they be not able to performe a perfect obedience vnto the commandements of God; yet doo they loue them, and excéedinglie desire them, and imbrace them as the chiefe God; and doo continuallie praie vnto God, that they maie drawe most néere to the perfection of them. By these things it appéereth, how the commoditie and righteousnesse of the lawe is defended against the Manicheis.

3 But on the other side, ²⁴ the Pelagians are no lesse to be shunned, which attribute more vnto the lawe, than is conuenient; for they iudge the same to be sufficient vnto saluation: and saie, that men, if they haue once vnderstood what is to be doone, may be able (by the verie strength of nature) easilie to performe the same. Wherefore Pelagius, for feare least he should haue béen condemned by the bishops of Palestine, as one which vtterlie denied the grace of God, confessed the same grace in word: for he affirmed, that it is néedfull to haue the grace of God vnto saluation. But by grace he ment no other thing, ²⁵ but nature it selfe fréelie granted vnto vs by God; insomuch as God hath made vs reasonable, and indued vs with frée will. Moreouer, he called grace a lawe, or a doctrine: bicause of our selues we be ignorant what is to be doone, or what to be beléeued; vnlesse God doo reueale those things vnto vs. Wherevpon Augustine, in his booke De gratia Christi, against Caelestinus, writeth; that They affirme the possibilitie of nature to be holpen by grace. But he addeth; that If their meanings be examined, and thoroughlie sifted, we shall perceiue, that by grace, doctrine, and lawe, they meane nothing else; but that a man, hauing onelie receiued the knowledge of the lawe, hath power enough of himselfe to doo the commandements.

Vnto which error the Schoole-diuines drawe verie néere, when they teach; that A man, ²⁶ by the verie power of nature, is able to kéepe the commandements of GOD, as touching the substance of the worke; although not according to the intent of him that commandeth. By which words this they signifie, that we be able to performe the verie works, although not in such sort as GOD hath commanded them to be doone; namelie, in charitie, and in the spirit: which latter part I suppose they added, that they might be séene in some point to disagrée from the Pelagians. But Augustine so farre disagréed from these kind of opinions; as vnto those, which be regenerate, while they liue in this flesh. he granteth not a perfect obseruation of the commandements of God: which euidentlie appéereth by his retractations. And that his iudgement therin is most true, Paule declareth in the epistle to the Romans. ²⁷

Doubtles, if the matter were so, ²⁸ as the Pelagians taught; there was no néed of Christs comming, and of the sacrifice of the crosse: for these things were therefore giuen, bicause by our owne strength we could not atteine to the righteousnesse of works. ²⁹ Which Paule plainlie testifieth, saieng; That which was vnpossible to the lawe, forsomuch as it was made weake by the flesh, &c. These things doo manifestlie teach, that man, by reason of the infirmitie of the flesh, might not fulfill the lawe. Further, he saith; The wisedome of the flesh is enimitie towards God, ³⁰ for it is not subiect vnto the lawe of God, neither can it be. For although the lawe hath power to teach, and to giue light vnto the mind; yet doth it not therefore minister strength, or change the will. Wherefore Ambrose in his booke De fuga saeculi, saith; that The lawe can stop the mouth of all men, but yet cannot conuert the mind. And a little after; The lawe in déed maketh the fault euident, but taketh not awaie the naughtinesse. Wherefore grace must be added therevnto; the which, bicause the Pelagians contemned, they wandered from saluation, and were iustlie condemned of the church.

³¹ 4 As concerning then the office of the lawe, these few things must be obserued; first, that the same is not altogither vnprofitable, euen without regeneration: for it may be auaileable to some ciuill discipline. For, if men doo the outward works of the lawe, in such sort as they may: although they be sinnes vnto them, which doo them; yet through them, ciuill order may be preserued. For where there is no obseruation of these things, all things are confounded; wrongs be doone, naughtie lust rageth out of measure, the wrath of God is kindled; so as he suffereth those common-weales, which be thus corrupted, not long to continue. Also there is an other worke of the lawe, which is inward, apperteining to the conscience, that it should perpetuallie accuse, vex, whip and condemne the same. And by this meane, as we haue said, God dooth at the length bring men to iustification: ³² which iustification being obteined, the lawe dooth not yet lie idle; but is like vnto a glasse, wherein the regenerate behold what fruits of faith they ought to bring foorth, how much they ought euerie daie to profit, what they haue to giue thanks for, and how much they want of the iust restitution, whereby they may the more earnestlie praie vnto God therefore. Also, the lawe setteth a marke before our eies, whervnto they ought to leuell in all their actions: vnto the which, although they cannot atteine in this life; yet they must applie their indeuour to depart but a little from it. By these things it appéereth, how much the lawe dooth auaile in outward works; what it worketh in the conscience, and how much it helpeth them which be regenerate.

Of Philosophie, and of the comparison hereof, especiallie morall, with Diuinitie; taken out of the beginning of the Commentaries vpon Aristotles Ethiks.

5 All the knowledge that we haue, is either reuealed, or gotten by indeuour: in the former part is diuinitie, and in the latter is philosophie. The name of philosophie is compounded. Wisedome of some is called a knowledge of all the things that be extant. ³³ But since that wisdome comprehendeth nothing but a certeine and vndoubted knowledge, it cannot be as concerning all things; for some certeine things are vnknowne: things that come by chance and casuallie, cannot be knowne, bicause of their vncerteintie. Others saie, that the same is a knowledge of diuine and humane things: howbeit, betwéene diuine and humane, there are found manie things; namelie, the circles of heauen, starres, elements, meteors, stones, mines, plants, herbes, and brute beasts. But they referre heauen vnto God; bicause it is a thing immortall: but inferiour things, they saie, belong vnto men, forsomuch as they be corruptible. But in what place will they account the science Mathematicall? Howbeit it séemeth méet that it be defined; to wit, ³⁴ that It is an habit giuen to mens minds by God, increased by diligence & exercise, wherby althings that be, are comprehended, so far foorth as they can certeinlie & by firme reason be comprehended, that man maie attaine vnto felicitie. And héere be all the kinds of causes. The forme, which is the habit. The matter, wherein it cleaueth; that is to wit, ³⁵ the mind and reason of man, and those things about which (as about obiects) the same is occupied; namelie, about all things that be extant, yet not simplie and absolutelie, but so far foorth as they can be certeinelie knowne. The worker is specified; namelie, in that God is appointed to be the author: for he hath planted light in our minds, and hath sowen in vs the séeds, which are the originals of all sciences. Whervpon Cicero in the first booke of his Tusculane questions, saith, that Philosophie is the gift and inuention of the gods. And this dooth Lucretius also grant, although he were an Epicure. And forsomuch as an assured knowledge of all things may rather be desired than hoped for, and is sooner loued than possessed; and that the more we giue our selues to the same, so much the more are we stirred vp towards it: therfore it is called philosophie. The author of this name was Pythagoras: he, when he was come to Philonta, and had spoken with Leontes, which in this place was a tyrant; maruelling at the wit and eloquence of the man, demanded of him what art or science he would professe: who would not saie, that he was a wise man, but one that desired wisedome, that is, a philosopher.

6 And this being defined on this wise, it is diuided into the part actiue and contemplatiue: ³⁶ both which Aristotle intreated of, according as the subiect required. These doo so differ, as contemplatiue alone⟨…⟩ie beholdeth, and actiue practiseth those things that be knowen. So as they differ in their ends: for contemplatiue reposeth it selfe in the verie contemplation of things; for it is not able to exercise them. But actiue dooth therefore behold, that it may in worke expresse the thing which it knoweth. And we sée vndoubtedlie, that in man there be two works: for he vnderstandeth, and afterward he worketh. And euen as God not onelie vnderstandeth himselfe, and is happie and perfect to himselfe; but also by his prouidence dooth create, & things being brought foorth, gouerneth them: so likewise is there two sorts of mans felicitie; the one, which we may call actiue, and thereof dooth Aristotle write in his first booke of Ethiks; and the other, which is farre more perfect and exquisite, is contemplatiue, and of that he disputed in the tenth booke. Whereby it appéereth, that man, if he become perfect in this double felicitie, draweth verie néere vnto the similitude of God. Wherefore Plato, in his booke of the immortalitie of the soule, said: that Philosophie is the imitating of God, according to mans abilitie. Neither is this distinction of practise and speculation giuen (as some thinke) by the works of our owne vnderstanding and will: for it ought not thus to be; bicause knowledges are distinguished by their obiects. But if a man will somewhat more diligentlie consider of the matter, he shall sée, that it must be taken according as those things be which are vnderstood: for those either haue God and nature for their causes, and then they belong to the kind speculatiue; bicause such things we cannot doo by our owne choise. But there be other things, which haue vs for their causes, in respect that we doo will & choose: and these be of the actiue facultie.

But let vs sée whether of these is the more excellent. By the common and receiued opinion, the speculatiue is preferred before the actiue: ³⁷ for action is ordeined vnto contemplation; but not so on the other part. And no man doubteth, but that which is ordeined to another thing, is of lesse worthinesse than that thing. But they againe obiect, that the generall word of contemplation belongeth vnto action: for therefore doo we behold nature, that we may loue the author thereof; and therefore doo we séeke to knowe God, to the intent we may honor him: and for this cause is our diuinitie of some, called actiue. Howbeit, these men, in reasoning after this maner, are verie much deceiued: for there is no science therefore called actiue, bicause there followeth a worke of that knowledge, vnlesse the selfe-same thing be performed which was first knowen. When we behold nature, and the heauen, albeit of the same there followe a worshipping and louing of God; yet must not such a knowledge be called actiue, forsomuch as that is not brought to passe which we doo behold: for there is no man that can make nature and heauen, and other works that followe thereof. Accidentallie they are said to be doone: for not all they which doo behold these things, doo loue and honor God; naie rather, they be oftentimes furthest of all from him. And further, the works following that knowledge, & also our diuinitie, haue respect vnto this; that we may knowe God more and more, vntill we behold him face to face in the kingdome of heauen.

And our sauiour Christ confirmed this opinion, when he said; This is eternall life, ³⁸ that they may knowe thee the onelie true God, and Iesus Christ whom thou hast sent. ³⁹ And not onelie doo these two points diuide philosophie, but they also diuide our vnderstanding: wherevpon the one is called actiue, and the other speculatiue; not as though there can be two powers or faculties of the mind; but bicause the vnderstanding, according as it is conuersant about such and such other things, so is it called either speculatiue or actiue. That philosophie which is speculatiue, is diuided into thrée parts. ⁴⁰ For there be some things euen vtterlie sundred and seuered from the matter; so is God, and so are the intelligences, and they are called supernaturall: or else they are things so inherent in the matter, as without it they can not so much as be defined, & in that sort they are naturall: or else they are after a middle sort; for that they cannot be without a matter, either of iron, or wood, or such like, and yet may be defined or vnderstood without those things; as are the Mathematiks.

7 These things may be yet further distinguished; but I cease, ⁴¹ and I will so diuide actiue philosophie, as therein may be taught precepts touching the life and instruction either of one or of manie. If it be of one, it is a booke of morall philosophie: if of manie, they are either more in number, or fewer. If they be fewer, they concerne houshold gouernment: if they be more, they belong to the common weale. But in what place shall we leaue arts? ⁴² They are comprehended vnder the third actiue kind, and belong vnto politike gouernment; neither must they be excluded from the nature of wisedome. For art is ⟨…⟩. In this definition there appéere two things. First, that art is an habit belonging to knowledge, whereby some things are certeinlie comprehended; namelie, through exercise and experience, so as it can not be excluded from wisedome. And it is not to be doubted, that the ancients called them, Wise men, which found out these arts, or else did excell in them. Wherevpon Bezeleel and Aoliab in the holie scriptures are called wise men. The other thing that we speake of is, that this knowledge is actiue; for these things are knowne by exercise: and by these habits somewhat is doone and brought to passe, which helpeth to mainteine the life. Wherfore the walkers vpon ropes, and iuglers, and such other like, which doo nothing profitable vnto mans life, must not be called artificers; but deceiuers and triflers.

⁴³ But arts may be diuided into those, which bring foorth some worke; and into those, which in the verie action are consumed. Now dooth it appéere by these things, what we are to iudge concerning Logike: for euen the same also must be reckoned among the arts, and it worketh most profitable things in the life; so as it ought not to be diuided from wisedome, especiallie séeing it is a readie meane, instrument, and waie to procure wisedome vnto vs. Neither must the waie be cut off from his scope appointed. Yea moreouer, Cicero distinguished the parts of philosophie; so that it is partlie touching life and maners, partlie touching nature and things hidden; or else it concerneth the art of disputing: in the first of his Academ. which he rehearseth out of Plato. Neither dooth Galen disagrée from this opinion. But as concerning the authors of philosophie, we must vnderstand, that they brought more profit to the world, than did Ceres, that inuented the increase of corne and graine; than did Bacchus, that found out the wines; or than Hercules, that rid the world of monsters: for these things belong to the maintenance of bodilie life; but philosophie nourisheth and instructeth the soule it selfe.

8 Now must we remooue a certeine small impediment: and it is that which Paule saith in the second chapter to the Colossians; ⁴⁴ Beware least there be anie man that spoile you through philosophie. ⁴⁵ By which words in verie déed he semeth to terrifie christian men from the studie of philosophie: howbeit, if ye marke well the apostles meaning, I am sure that ye will be nothing troubled. True philosophie, since it is gathered by the knowledge of the creatures, and by those propositions concludeth manie things as touching the iustice and goodnes, which God planted naturallie in the minds of men, it cannot be iustlie accused. For it is the worke of God, and without his speciall gift it cannot be had of men. But Paule reprooueth that philosophie, which is corrupted through the inuentions of men, & ambitious contentions of philosophers. For if they had kept themselues within certeine bounds, and had onelie pronounced those things, which the knowledge of the creatures did by most assured reasons declare, as touching God and nature; they should not haue erred from the truth. Wherfore the apostle saith; Through philosophie and vaine deceit: ⁴⁶ and he addeth; Which are according to the traditions of men, and rudiments of the world. Not the creatures, but men did teach, that the world should be euerlasting.

It was not nature that shewed, but it was vaine cogitations that deuised the world to be compact of the concourse of such small and indiuisible moates as we sée in the sunne-shine, and to consist as it were of no ground. And who doubteth, but that the fate and impassibilitie of the Stoiks, the perpetuall doubting of the Academiks, and the idle and vnoccupied deitie of the Epicures, was this vaine deceit? Men dreamt of a communitie of things, of the intermingling of wiues one with another in Common-weales, of pleasure to be the chéefest good, and of gods to be worshipped after the maner of common people; but they tooke no knowledge by a naturall light, and by vsuall propositions knowen of themselues by assured reasons. These in verie déed are the venoms and corruptions, wherewith the diuell by naughtie men corrupteth philosophie, being the gift of God; and this being so defiled and corrupted, Paule would haue to be eschewed.

9 Howbeit, ⁴⁷ now must we sée how these things that we haue hitherto spoken, will agrée with the holie scriptures; for there also haue we philosophie actiue and contemplatiue. Those things that we beléeue, and are comprehended in the articles of the faith, doo belong vnto contemplation; for those we perceiue by knowledge, but we doo them not: and albeit they are not comprehended in science, yet neuerthelesse are they vnderstood. Vnto the actiue kind are those referred, which are conteined in lawes, counsels, and exhortations. Thus far doo these agrée: yet doo they differ, bicause in philosophie, that which is actiue goeth before that which is speculatiue. For (as it hath béene said) we cannot with humane strength behold either God or nature, till first our affections be at quiet. ⁴⁸ But in the holie scriptures, speculation taketh the first place; insomuch as we must first beléeue and be iustified by faith: and then afterward doo followe good works, and that the more and more abundantlie, as we be dailie renewed by the holie Ghost. Thus dooth Paule set it foorth in his epistles: for he first handleth doctrine, and afterward he descendeth to the instruction of maners, and framing of the life. And so were the children of Israel first gathered in Aegypt vnder the faith of one God the sauiour; and afterward in the desert they receiued lawes, which serue vnto the knowledge, which consisteth in practise. Againe, in the table of the ten commandements is obserued the same order, for it saith first; I am the Lord thy God: the which thing belongeth to faith, or speculatiue knowledge: afterward doo followe precepts, which belong to the works required of God. The cause of this difference is, that humane contemplations are gotten by searching out, and by the indeuour of meditation; & therefore moderate affects are necessarie. But those things that we beléeue, are receiued by the inspiration of God; so that there is no néed of those preparations. And in mans reason, it behooueth men first to doo iust things, before they be iustified. But the order of diuine sanctification, is farre otherwise appointed: for we first beléeue, and afterward be iustified; then by the spirit and by grace are our minds renewed; finallie, there followe iust and honest déeds.

10 Moreouer, the end of philosophie is, that we should obteine that blessednesse or felicitie, which may be gotten here by mans strength: but the end of christian godlinesse is to haue repaired in vs that image, wherevnto we are made in righteousnesse and holinesse of truth, that we may dailie growe vp in the knowledge of God, vntill we be brought to sée him euen as he is, with face discouered. Besides this, in the morall philosophie of Aristotle, we shall not heare of the remission of sinnes; nor of the feare and confidence towards GOD, nor of iustification by faith, nor of Christ, or such other like things: for these things are opened by the will of God, being such as cannot be gathered by a naturall knowledge from the creatures. And we denie not, ⁴⁹ but it oftentimes happeneth, that the selfe-same things are commended in Aristotles Ethiks, which are commanded by God in the holie scriptures; but then are those all one in matter, but not informe, properties, and principles: for in them there is a sundrie respect, a difference of properties, and their originals not all one.

⁵⁰ Euen in like maner as the raine water, and anie fountaine water is all one in matter; but the strength, propertie, & originals be of great diuersitie: for the one commeth by a heat of the heauens, and by the clouds and coldnesse of the middle region of the aire; but this other is either gathered from the sea, out of the hollowe places of the earth, and is so strained as it becommeth swéet; or else it commeth by conuerting the aire into water, through the coldnesse of the place where the spring ariseth. Euen so, those things that a christian doth, he doth them by the drift of the holie Ghost: for they which be driuen by the holie Ghost, be the children of God; but they which deale by philosophie, according to morall rules, doo worke by the guide of humane reason. Such be stirred to doo these things, bicause they so iudge it to be honest and right; but the christians, bicause God hath so decréed it. Those thinke, that if they so doo, they profit and make perfect themselues; but these, bicause they may obeie the maiestie of God. Those doo beléeue their owne selues; but these doo beléeue God, and the words of the lawe which he hath made. Those be caried with a loue of themselues; but these with the loue of God alone. Doubtles, of this manifold diuersitie it commeth to passe, that one and the same thing, as concerning the matter, both pleaseth GOD, and by his iudgement is condemned of him. And thus much of these differences, and of the consent that is betwéene the holie scripture and humane philosophie.

11 But to returne to that whence we digressed; namelie, whether this facultie be repugnant vnto godlinesse: I affirme, that it is no more against the same, than is Astrologie, than is the art of mariners or soldiers, than is fishing, hunting, and finallie, than is the knowledge of the lawe of man, which all men knowe how necessarie it is for the gouernement of common-weales. Verelie the same picketh out hir lawes and institutions, which be ingrafted in our minds, concerning iustice and goodnesse; the verie which notwithstanding, morall philosophers doo discusse and turne most exquisitlie, in such sort as they not onelie knowe these things verie manifestlie, but also can with great perspicuitie teach them vnto others. Héerof it commeth, that in Gréeke ⟨…⟩, which is, wisdome; is called as it were ⟨…⟩, that is, perspicuitie: and ⟨…⟩, wise, as it were ⟨…⟩, manifest or perspicuous; ⁵¹ bicause it declareth and maketh verie plaine, those things which it handleth. And so, by this meanes, the lawiers might easilie defend their science to be a part of philosophie: albeit they by their lawes doo not so grauelie decrée touching vertue, goodnesse, and iustice, as the philosophers dispute of them. For example sake; Philosophie detesteth ingratitude towards all states of men, but the lawes doo not punish the same, vnlesse it be committed by children towards their parents; or of late seruants towards their patrons. Humane lawes compell no man to giue their goods to the poore; but philosophie commendeth bountifulnesse and liberalitie towards all men. And what shall I saie more?

Cicero, ⁵² in the commendation of this kind of philosophie pronounceth thus, in his fift booke of Tusculane questions; O philosophie, the guide of life! O thou that art the searcher out of vertue and expeller of vice! What could not onelie we, but altogither euen the life of men haue béene without thée? Thou broughtest foorth cities, thou gatheredst togither the dispersed men into societie of life, thou first of all ioinedst them togither in houses, afterward in marriages, and after that, in the vnitie of letters and words; thou wast the mistresse of maners and discipline, &c. All men knowe what an excellent thing is the strength of herbes, stones, metals, and medicins; and this doo not we also denie: but for all that, doth it not followe, that this is a worthie facultie, whereby the acts, the choises, the arts, the methods, the wits, vertues and vices of men be perceiued? What can be accounted more excellent, than for a man to knowe himselfe? And this doo we singularlie well knowe héerby. And moreouer, we must call to mind that which Plato said; to wit, that It may easilie come to passe, that earnest loues toward vertue, may be stirred vp in vs, if otherwhile some image thereof might be set before our eies. And on the other side, we are a great deale to blame, that we doo no where behold the same néere at hand. There ariseth no small pleasure by this science, to knowe within what bounds the light of nature ought to kéepe it selfe, and how far in his owne right it may extend. And Christian religion is excéedinglie kindled, by considering the manners of the Ethniks: since by a comparison we perceiue, how greatlie those things, which be taught in the holie scriptures, doo excell the philosophicall precepts. For it is a common saieng; that Contraries, when they are compared togither, doo shine with the greater light. And errors can not conuenientlie be shunned, except they be first knowne. Wherefore, he that hath knowen both of these faculties, shall the easilier auoid the faults of the one; namelie, of humane philosophie, especiallie, when they shall be shewed plainlie in their owne proper places.

Necessarie rules aswell for the expounding, as for obeieng of the lawe.

⁵³ 12 First, we are to marke the order of the tables, which we sée set foorth in the ten commandements. For the first table is that, which treateth concerning God, without anie meane: but the other is directed vnto our neighbour. And we must iudge, that the dignitie of the first table is the greater, bicause it conteineth the other, and as a principall architecture hath the same vnder it; and further, that the end thereof is more noble, bicause the end of the latter table is ruled and gouerned by the former. Wherfore Luther in his catechisme, verie prudentlie in euerie one precept of the latter table, rehearsed the end of the first table. For example sake; Bicause God must be loued with all the heart, and with all the soule; therefore thou shalt not kill. Againe; Bicause God must be loued with all the hart, and with all the soule, therefore thou must not commit adulterie. In the ten commandements onelie, ⁵⁴ the summe of the lawe is set foorth, and that after the plainer and homelier sort; wherein we ought to vnderstand all the parts thereof. The head and summe of all deceitfull things is ⟨…⟩, which signifieth, Immoderate coueting of more, or, To carue himselfe a greater part than is iust. Euen as against all foule voluptuous pleasures, onlie adulterie is expresselie named, vnder which is comprehended all kinds of vncleanes. And touching the commandement of idolatrie, therein is forbidden all kind of false worshipping, wheras that onlie is expressed which is most grosse. Where two lawes are made one contrarie to an other; ⁵⁵ the obedience must be doone vnto the latter. ⁵⁶ God commanded that the first fruits should be offered vnto him, and sacrifices to be made vnto his name: but he himselfe afterward commanded, that all the goods of the Amalechites should be vtterlie destroied. ⁵⁷ Vnto this latter commandement Saule should haue obeied.

13 This is to be obserued in all precepts, ⁵⁸ as well ceremoniall, as iudiciall, and morall. When two precepts of God séeme one to be repugnant to an other, so as the one is a hinderance to the other, that they cannot both at one time be obserued; yea rather, ⁵⁹ it is necessarie that the one of them for the time being be omitted: then, that which shall be iudged weightiest and greatest, must be reteined. But yet in the meane time, that other, which is reckoned to be lesse and lighter, is not violated; bicause in the same there is nothing doone against the will of God. The lawe commandeth, ⁶⁰ that euerie one should haue respect to the safetie of his neighbour: and if one be a magistrate, that he by armes defend his citie. The same lawe commandeth, ⁶¹ that We must not labour on the sabboth daie: the enimie besiegeth the citie, and that on the sabboth daie; ⁶² bicause he knoweth that that lawe was laid vpon the citizens. Here séemeth a contrarietie of the precepts: for on the one part, safetie must be mainteined; and on the other part, the sabboth must be obserued. The Machabeis iudged it best to fight, bicause the safetie of the common-weale séemed greater and better than the ceremonie of the sabboth.

Also the lawe is, ⁶³ that we should féed the hungrie: and an other lawe commandeth, ⁶⁴ that the shew-bread should be eaten of none, but of the priests. Dauid came hungrie vnto the priest, ⁶⁵ nothing he had but the shew-bread: wherefore here commeth togither two contrarie precepts. The wise priest followeth and obserueth that, which is the woorthier; namelie, to féed the hungrie: he brought out the shew-bread, and helped Dauid. There is also another lawe, that we must furnish the prince with armor; for he is to be holpen by his subiects: and contrariewise, it is commanded, ⁶⁶ that things consecrated vnto God must not be translated vnto other vses. Dauid the kings sonne in law, which warred for him as his generall lieutenant, ⁶⁷ was then vnarmed: the priest had no weapon at hand, but the sword of Goliah. Here be two precepts, which séeme contrarie; the priest followeth the one, and deliuereth the sword vnto the magistrate: bicause he iudged it better, to arme the magistrate, than to obserue the ceremonie.

Also there is a lawe, that the church must not be depriued of ministers, ⁶⁸ so as it should be destitute of them: and Paule hath another lawe, that a nouice or man newlie entered into religion, ⁶⁹ should not be a bishop. The church of Milane was much troubled, bicause it could not find a méet bishop, that as well was frée from the heresie of Arrius, as also that had great authoritie and learning giuen him of God: onelie there was Ambrose; but yet a nouice, and newlie come to the faith. Here are two lawes met, in shew contrarie one to another; but it was méet for the lesser lawe to giue place to the greater: for Christ so taught, ⁷⁰ when by the sentence of the prophet he saith; I will haue mercie, & not sacrifice. Howbeit, he meaneth not, that he will not haue sacrifice: but that, if two commandements méet togither, whereof the one belongeth vnto mercie, and the other vnto sacrifice; he testifieth, that he had rather haue mercie, than sacrifice.

⁷¹ 14 Hitherto also may be referred, that Augustine vnto Publicola discréetlie and largelie disputeth, whether it be lawfull for a christian man to receiue of an Ethnike an oth by false gods: and at the end he concludeth that it is lawfull. For when as the Romans had on euerie side neighbours that were idolaters, it was of necessitie, that they should kéepe with them some ciuill faith and couenants. Indéed it behooued, that they should haue sworne by the true God; but when that might not be brought to passe, it remained, that the Romane christians should abuse their naughtinesse, and receiue that oth which was offered by the names of the idols. ⁷² For so Iacob receiued an oth of Laban, when he doubted not, but that he worshipped the gods of Nachor his father. There is an excellent historie extant in the 41. chapter of Ieremie, ⁷³ when Ishmael had slaine Godolias, he incountered with certeine men going to worship at Ierusalem; those also he led out of the waie, and slue. Of these men there were ten that said; Slaie vs not, we haue honie, oile, and graine; if thou wilt pardon vs our life, we will shew thee where those things be. Those men may séeme not to haue doone rightlie, in shewing of their goods vnto théeues: for that was to be willing to helpe manifest robberie. For they could not haue found nor taken awaie those goods, vnlesse they had béene shewed vnto them; howbeit, they in verie déed vsed the wickednesse of other to saue their owne life.

So may he be excused, which taketh vp monie vpon interest; for that would he not doo, except he were constreined through want and necessitie: and when he is compelled to be at another mans deuotion, he suffereth iniurie, but dooth it not. So Paule vnto the Philippians saith; that There be some, ⁷⁴ which teach the Gospell through euill will: and yet (he saith) that Therein he reioiseth, yea and will reioise; for that they, ⁷⁵ if they doo anie thing of an ill will, shall render account vnto the Lord: not that he would warrant their offense. And here it must chéeflie be considered, whether the thing it selfe in his owne nature be euill. For if it be, then must we not in anie wise allow the same by our consent: if it be not, there is no let, but that being forced by necessitie, we may assent therevnto, so as the same may be vndertaken without anie fault of ours. But yet in the meane time must he, with whom we in such wise doo compact or consent, be admonished of his fault.

15 Yet there commeth a question, ⁷⁶ whether that old man, which is spoken of in the 19. of Iudges, and 14. verse, did right; when he promised his daughter, and the Leuits wife vnto the Gabionits, to the intent they should not doo violence vnto his ghest. All the writers answer it not after one maner. Some saie, that he had respect vnto the greatnes and gréeuousnesse of the crime, and preferred the lesser euill before the greater; and that he would not breake the faith which he had giuen to his ghest. and they thinke that by such reasons he was to be excused. None otherwise iudge they as concerning Lot. ⁷⁷ And among the rest, Chrysostome greatlie commendeth Lot in that matter. Which Ambrose also doth in his booke of Abraham the Patriarch; for that he made lesse account of the iniurie of his house, than of so great a villanie. ⁷⁸ But Augustine in his questions vpon Genesis, dooth weigh these things more diligentlie and narrowlie; and denieth altogither, that the recompensing of one fault with another is to be suffered. In his iudgement it was not lawfull for him, to yéeld his daughters to the lewd lust of the Sodomites, thereby to kéepe them from a more gréeuous sinne. Neither is it lawfull, that we in our owne selues, shuld commit a lesse fault, to auoid a greater: for the apostle doth plainlie teach, that We must not doo euill, ⁷⁹ that good may come of it. Wherefore, when the matter commeth to sin, although it séeme to be but light; yet it must be wholie forborne. And if anie matter more hainous might séeme to insue by the delaie of sinne, the care thereof must be committed vnto God: but, we vnder that pretence must not commit anie sinne. This was Augustines opinion, which I doo verie well allow.

And least we go from the historie which we haue in hand: although this old man was to kéepe his faith with his ghest; yet should he also haue vsed faithfulnesse and protection towards his daughter, and the Leuites wife. Neither was it lawfull for him to shew a more faithfulnesse vnto his ghest, than the word of God permitted. Wherefore, he could not in right, humble vnto them either his daughter, or the wife of his ghest: for the father hath not so much power ouer his daughter, as he may set hir foorth to be abused by other men; neither ought the daughter hir selfe to obeie in anie thing that is sinne, although hir father would will hir, & command hir. But they saie, that the lesser euill must be preferred before the greater. I knowe, that so it hath béene customablie spoken. ⁸⁰ But it must be rightlie vnderstood; namelie, that it taketh place in outward affections, and in the troubles of the bodie, and of the life: bicause in such maner of discommodities, as often as we are to take deliberation what we should preferre, the lesser losse must be preferred before the greater; bicause it hath a respect of good. But in sinne there is no consideration of good; and surelie whatsoeuer is sinne, the same must straitwaie be reiected, let there afterward followe what will. But Augustine after a sort excuseth Lot, and that old man; bicause they offended by reason of a sorrowfull and troubled mind.

It oftentimes happeneth vnto wise men, that when their mind is disquieted, they doo those things, which afterward, when they come to themselues, they doo not allow. But this excuse dooth not vtterlie discharge men of sinne, although it somewhat reléeueth them. Howbeit, if a man will saie, that Paule did prefer the lesse sinne before the greater, ⁸¹ when he said; that He would be accursed from Christ for his brethren, rather than they should continue in that blindnesse and obstinacie wherein they were holden: he that obiecteth this against vs, let him consider that he dooth not rightlie vnderstand the place of Paule. Doubtlesse the apostle desired to redéeme the Iewes with the perill of his owne selfe: not vndoubtedlie with sinne, but with his losse and hurt; namelie to be accursed of Christ: not that he ment to be an Apostata, or to forsake his beléefe in Christ; but onelie to be without the fruition of eternall and happie life. ⁸² Augustine hath also manie things against this redéeming of sinnes: and among other things saith; What if a man require either of a maiden fornication, or of a married woman adulterie; and threatneth to kill himselfe, vnlesse he may obteine his desire; shall the pure and chast woman giue anie care vnto him? No forsooth: neither if he shall afterward kill himselfe, must the chast woman séeme to be guiltie of his death. They ought indéed to be sorrowfull for his mishap, and to bewaile his fact; but they shall not thinke themselues to haue doone amisse: bicause they consented not vnto him in vnlawfull things.

The same Augustine, vpon the 146. psalme, ⁸³ writeth; that If a man shall denie vnto his wife due beneuolence, to the end he may liue continentlie, and in the meane time, his wife fall into adulterie; he committeth sinne, and his deuise is not to be allowed: for that vice is not to be permitted in the wife, for exercising of his continencie. God (saith he) dooth not redéeme so great a losse, with such a gaine. Wherefore the sentence of Leo the first, in distinction 46, chapter Non suo, is to be liked, which said; that It is an vnméet thing, that anie should direct their crime to other mens commodities. ⁸⁴ Augustine De mendacio ad Consentium saith; that We must doo what we can for the safetie of others: but if the case so stand, that it cannot be holpen without committing of sinne, there resteth nothing else for vs to doo. And he addeth that none must be brought vnto heauen by making a lie. The same father saith in another place; If the poore sée a rich man cruell and couetous, and would priuilie steale some thing from him, to helpe either themselues, or some other poore; they diminish not sinne, but increase it. ⁸⁵ And Gregorie bishop of Rome, in an epistle vnto Siagrius, saith; that To commit a lesse sin, for to auoid a greater; is to offer sacrifice to God of a wicked act: ⁸⁶ as we read in the 21. chapter of the Prouerbs. But where as Chrysostome and Ambrose, in this respect doo commend Lot, they must be thus vnderstood; namelie, that they allowed of his faith and charitie towards strangers; and that they had a consideration of the horriblenes of that sinne, which the citizens were readie to commit: not, that they allow the making of their women common.

16 Ouer this, we must obserue, ⁸⁷ that all the commandements of God, either command, or forbid some thing. And they command not, to the intent onlie that anie thing should be slightlie doone; but that it should be also doone with all the hart, with all the mind, ⁸⁸ and with all the strength, and that most exactlie; so as there be not one iot in vs, but is obedient vnto the will of God. And what they forbid, that doo they not onelie so forbid, that it shall not be in vs; but also, that there be not left in vs so much as anie motion or inclination therevnto. And therefore God pronounced; Thou shalt not lust: to the intent, that those things which GOD hath forbidden, we should abhorre in mind, in will, & wholie in all the parts, as well of the mind as of the bodie. And after this maner these two commandements answer one vnto an other; ⁸⁹ Thou shalt loue the Lord thy God with all thy soule, and with all thy hart, &c. which is to be repeated in all the precepts that doo command anie thing: ⁹⁰ and the latter; Thou shalt not lust: which in like maner must be vnderstood touching all things which be forbidden. Wherefore in these two commandements, the efficacie, and (as I may saie) the verie soule of the lawe is vnderstood; as without which the rest of the commandements of GOD can not be full and perfect.

---

← 20. The second Chapter. Of Free will · Contents · 22. The fourth Chapter. Of Idolatrie →

Footnotes

1. In Rom. 5. Of the nature of the lawe, the Manicheis and Pelagians vnderstood it not. ↩

2. Rom. 3, 20. ↩

3. Rom. 10, 4. ↩

4. The lawe by it selfe dooth not lead to Christ and to saluation. ↩

5. The matter and efficient cause of the lawe. ↩

6. What the lawe is. ↩

7. The lawe teacheth vs concerning the nature and disposition of god. ↩

8. The benefit of the lawe. ↩

9. Platos definition of the lawe. ↩

10. The old Law-giuers made God to be the author of their lawes. ↩

11. The Manicheis condemned the lawe as euill. ↩

12. It biddeth both the works and will to be corrected. ↩

13. Rom. 5, 20. ↩

14. Gala. 3, 19. ↩

15. Rom. 7, 11. ↩

16. 2. Cor. 3, 7.
    ↩

17. Rom. 7, 12. ↩

18. A similitude. ↩

19. Why men doo hate the lawe. ↩

20. We be not angrie (as it shuld be) with our selues, but with the lawe, and with God. ↩

21. A similitude. Exod. 15, 25 ↩

22. verse. 11. The praises of the lawe in the Psalms. Iere. 31, 33. ↩

23. Rom. 7, 25. ↩

24. The Pelagians iudge the lawe to be sufficient to saluation ↩

25. By grace he ment nothing else but nature and the lawe. ↩

26. Wherein the schoolemen come neere to the Pelagians. ↩

27. Rom. 7. ↩

28. The Pelagians make the death of Christ of none effect. ↩

29. Rom, 8, 3. ↩

30. Rom. 8, 7. ↩

31. The office of the lawe. ↩

32. After regeneration the lawe is not idle. ↩

33. How farre wisdom⟨…⟩ knowledge extendeth. ↩

34. A definition of wisdome. ↩

35. The causes of wisdome. ↩

36. A diuision of philosophie. ↩

37. Which part of wisdome excelleth other. ↩

38. Iohn. 6. ↩

39. A diuision of mans vnderstanding. ↩

40. A diuision of speculatiue philosophie. ↩

41. A diuision of actiue philosophie, ↩

42. Vnto what kind arts doo belong. ↩

43. A diuision of arts. ↩

44. verse. 8. ↩

45. Whether it be lawfull for a christian to studie philosophie. ↩

46. In what respect ph⟨…⟩losophie is condemned by Paule. ↩

47. A comparison of the former things with the holie scriptures. ↩

48. Why in diuinitie philosophie speculatiue goeth before actiue. ↩

49. How one verie thing is otherwise taught in diuinitie, than it is in philosophie. ↩

50. A similitude. ↩

51. How lawe knowledge is a part of philosophie. ↩

52. The praise of morall philosophie. ↩

53. In the Co~ mentaries vpon Aristotles Ethicks. ↩

54. In Rom. 2. Looke par. 2. pl. 14. art. 3. ↩

55. In 1. Sam. 15. verse. 1⟨…⟩. ↩

56. Exod. 1⟨…⟩, 29 ↩

57. 1. Sam. 15. 3
    ↩

58. In Iud. 11. verse. 11. ↩

59. Looke in 1. Sam. 21. verse. 1. ↩

60. Exod. 20, 13 ↩

61. verse. 10. ↩

62. 1. Mac. 2, 14
    ↩

63. Prou. 25, 21 ↩

64. Exod. 29, 32 ↩

65. 1. Sam. 21, 6
    ↩

66. Leu. 22, &c. ↩

67. 1. Sam. 21, 9
    ↩

68. Ephes. 4, 11. ↩

69. 1. Tim. 3, 6.
    ↩

70. Matth. 9, 13 Ose. 6, 6. ↩

71. In 2. Sam. 3, verse 12. ↩

72. Gen. 31, 44. ↩

73. Ierem. 41, 2. ↩

74. Phil. 1, 15. ↩

75. Ibidem. 18. ↩

76. In Iudges. 19, verse 14. ↩

77. Gen. 19, 8. Chrysost. Ambrose. ↩

78. Augustine. ↩

79. Rom, 3, 8. ↩

80. How a lesse euill must be preferred before a greater. ↩

81. Rom. 9, 3. ↩

82. Augustine. ↩

83. Augustine. ↩

84. Augustine. ↩

85. Gregorie vnto Siagrius. ↩

86. verse. 27. ↩

87. In the 7. chap. to the Rom. ↩

88. The commanded precepts must bee doone with all the strength. ↩

89. Deut. 6, 5. ↩

90. Exod. 20, 17 ↩