How far it may be lawfull to reioise in our enimies ouerthrowe.

25 Wherefore, if it be demanded, ¹⁷⁰ whether it be lawfull for a man to delite in the miserable state of an enimie: first I answer this in generall, that for his ruine into sinne, ¹⁷¹ not onelie we should not reioise, but also we ought earnestlie to lament. As touching aduersitie some doubt there may be. Salomon saith in the Prouerbes, the 24. chapter; Reioise not thou at the fall of thine enimie, and let not thy hart be glad when he stumbleth, least the Lord see it, and it displease him, and he take awaie his wrath from him. How then (wilt thou saie) did Moses (when Pharao was destroied and dead) sing that triumphant song; Sing we vnto the Lord: ¹⁷² and not onelie reioised in mind, but also appointed timbrels and danses? Some men doo thus distinguish this question; That so long as the enimie is afflicted, we should not reioise, bicause we are vncerteine of the will of God: for that euerie man ought to remember, that he also is a man, and that the selfe-same may happen vnto him [that happeneth to another;] for that no humane thing is strange fro~ him. But when God, by the slaughter and destruction of his enimie, hath declared his will and purpose, then wée ought to reioise. Thus haue they said.

But I saie, that when thou doost thus reioise, we must sée whether thou séeke thine owne, or not thine owne. For there be some, which onelie haue consideration to their owne: and when the enimie is afflicted, they thinke that their iniuries be reuenged of God. But if thou withdrawe thy mind from these cogitations, vnto the glorie of God; and considerest, that GOD dooth therefore reuenge his owne cause; that thine enimie may be bettered, that sinne may be hindered, that the Gospell be no more disturbed, or the word of God repressed: then are we to reioise earnestlie, and from the hart. And in verie déed, we must not in this matter take examples from holie men, but from the lawe of God. For Dauid wept at the death of Absolom, ¹⁷³ of Abner, and of Saule: but at the death of Nabal he reioised. Samuel moorned for Saule, but not for Agag. For so doo sundrie affections followe in godlie men, according as they be diuerslie stirred vp by the spirit of God. In these affections we must altogither séeke, not what is for owne profit, but what furthereth the saluation of our neighbour, and the glorie of God. Yea and these two affections are oftentimes ioined in one man. For so farre foorth, as we sée our enimie is a man, humanitie it selfe causeth, that we bewaile his calamitie: but if, on the other part, we cast our eies vpon the will of GOD, godlinesse requireth that we should reioise in his iudgements.

¹⁷⁴ 26 But there is none to be found of so euill and lewd a nature, but a man hauing due consideration, may sée some gifts of God in him, for he is either actiue, or strong, or learned, or noble, ¹⁷⁵ or eloquent, or wittie. These things, though we be prouoked by iniuries, we ought not to deface, or kéepe in silence; if anie oportunitie be offered to speake well of our enimies. Aeschines an Ethnike neither dissembled, nor diminished before the Rhodians, the eloquence of Demosthenes his most professed enimie; but rather amplified it, as much as he could, and recited vnto them that most venemous oration, which Demosthenes had written against him: and he added, that it was nothing without the action and pronuntiation of that Orator. ¹⁷⁶ Dauid both in words and déeds reuerenced Saule being his enimie, for that he was the annointed of the Lord. And the apostle therefore commandeth the same, bicause the world iudgeth that man should deale farre otherwise. For either it delighteth in curssed speakers, and enimies of the truth; or it thinketh it an honestie to requite iniuries. ¹⁷⁷ Wherfore Vespasian (when as there arose a contention betwéene a certeine Senator and a knight of Rome ) did with this sentence appease the strife; Doubtlesse, to reuile a Senator, it is not lawfull; but to reuile againe when a man is reuiled, that is both lawfull and ciuill: for that he, which first prouoked, did depriue himselfe of the prerogatiue of his honour. But Paule commandeth vs farre otherwise: for we must not consider what our aduersarie deserueth, but what becommeth our owne selues.

Neither dooth the apostle require onelie, that we should speake well of our enimies, but also wish well vnto them: for so thinke I, that ⟨…⟩, (Blesse ye) is to be taken in the second place, as an Antithesis to that which followeth; (And cursse not.) Some thinke it is onelie a repetition for the greater vehemencie. But I thinke it better agréeth, that we are first commanded to speake well of our enimies, and then to wish them good, and in no wise to cursse them as men commonlie vse to doo. And if this séeme a hard matter to be doone, let vs remember, that We are the children of him, ¹⁷⁸ who maketh his sunne to shine vpon the good and vpon the euill: and that we are his disciples, who answered his apostles, when they required fire from heauen to burne the Samaritans; ¹⁷⁹ Ye knowe not of whose spirit ye be; namelie his, which came not to destroie, but to saue; his, ¹⁸⁰ who healed them that railed vpon him; his, who restored vnto Malchus his eare, ¹⁸¹ who came with the other soldiers of the chéefe rulers, to take Christ; his, which both saluted the traitor Iudas as a friend, ¹⁸² and receiued him with a kisse; finallie, his, ¹⁸³ which forgaue the wicked théefe, and promised him eternall felicitie, which praied for them that crucified him, ¹⁸⁴ and which of his owne accord died for his enimies. It shall nothing profit thée, to recompense iniuries with iniuries, and taunts with taunts. Thou oughtest rather to commit the matter vnto God, who will be a most iust iudge, and by no perturbation can be led awaie from iustice.

27 Furthermore, thou shouldest héereby gather, that it is not lawfull to speake ill of anie man; nor yet to cursse anie man. For if it be forbidden to doo these things against our enimies, (which otherwise might séeme tollerable in mans iudgement) much lesse may we suffer our selues to doo it vnto others. Chrysostome, ¹⁸⁵ to the intent he might persuade vs to followe these words of Paule, reckoneth vp the commodities which the curssings and persecutions of aduersaries commonlie bring to the godlie. First (saith he) they verie well helpe vs to the obteinment of the kingdome of heauen: for Christ saith; ¹⁸⁶ Blessed are they, which suffer persecution for righteousnesse sake, for theirs is the kingdome of heauen. And he addeth; Blessed are ye, ¹⁸⁷ when they reuile you, and persecute you, speaking all manner of euill, and lieng against you for my sake. Be glad and reioise, for your reward is great in heauen, &c. Besides this, they are an occasion or matter of most excellent vertues: for as Paule teacheth; Tribulation, worketh patience; patience, experience: and experience, hope. ¹⁸⁸ But where is the patience of the saints, where is their experience, where is their hope; if thou take awaie the wicked enterprises of our enimies against vs?

Moreouer, the glorie of God can by no other meanes be highlie aduanced, than if we valiantlie and couragiouslie behaue our selues in those things, which are to be suffred for his name sake. For it is no hard matter, to cleaue vnto God, so long as all things go prosperouslie and quietlie with vs, and as we would desire. But when all maner of aduersities happen, and yet we constantlie abide in his obedience; this doubtlesse commeth of a manlie and stout faith. And therefore I thinke Iames said, that Patience hath a perfect worke. ¹⁸⁹ Vnlesse peraduenture a man will thus vnderstand it, that perfection is not in anie worke, vnlesse we perseuere in the same. For when we leaue off, we accomplish not the worke, and so without patience it is left vnperfect. Adde moreouer, that by this meanes chéeflie our enimies are terrified, that they procéed not to persecute vs. For when they sée, that we are not mooued by their iniuries, they thinke, that they loose their labour: and therfore they take not so great pleasure of the reproches, wherewith they haue exercised vs. But if they shall perceiue vs to be vexed, and to take it in ill part; they will thinke, that their iniuries haue taken good successe, and will be afterward more bold in their wicked indeuour. By this we may sée, ¹⁹⁰ why the Lord said; Blessed are ye, when men reuile you, & persecute you, and speake all maner of euill against you falselie for my sake: reioise and be glad, for your reward is great in heauen. This commandement of Christ the apostles executed; for they returned from the presence of the Councell, reioising that they were counted woorthie to be reuiled for his names sake. And Paule, in the first to the Corinthians, saith; ¹⁹¹ We are euill spoken of, and we blesse. In Gréeke it is ⟨…⟩.

28 But this persuasion Paule did not alwaies obserue: for to the Galathians he saith; I would to God they were cut off, ¹⁹² which trouble you! ¹⁹³ And Dauid saith; Let their table be made a snare before them, let their eies be made dim, that they may not see, and bow downe their backs alwaies. All other bookes of the prophets are euerie-where full of cursses and imprecations, wherewith they cursse the enimies of the people of God. ¹⁹⁴ Here doubtlesse (in my iudgement) it must be said, that we ought so to deale, as Paule now admonisheth, so long as we haue a respect vnto our owne iniuries; and that wée walke the ordinarie waie, and common course, whereby we are bound by loue to wish well vnto our neighbours. But if so be God open vnto vs his secret will, and declare what shall without doubt come to passe, concerning our enimies, and those which persecute vs; then, if we sincerelie and truelie loue him, we ought vndoubtedlie to staie our selues vpon his will and counsell. Howbeit, this caution is added: first, to be fullie assured, whether those things, which God hath opened vnto vs, perteine onelie to a threatening; or else wholie to declare his determinate and assured will. For where we suspect, that God onelie threateneth, to bring vs to repentance, we ought not to cease praieng euen for the wicked. ¹⁹⁵ So did Moses, when he made supplication to God for his nation: so did Abraham for the Sodomites, ¹⁹⁶ so did Samuel for Saule, and so did Ieremie for the people.

But when they be out of doubt, that it is the certeine and fixed will of God, they doo not onelie praie against the wicked by prophesieng as thinketh Augustine against Faustus, in his 16. booke, and 22. chapter (where he thus writeth; But cursses, when they are vttered by the waie of prophesie, procéed not of an ill desire of him that cursseth, but of the foreknowing spirit of him that denounceth them:) but also from the hart, God now consenting therevnto, and wishing the same with it. Dauid, when as otherwise he was so mercifull to Semei, to Absolom, and to Saule, and to other enimies; yet sometimes he so cursseth and banneth the wicked, as he driueth a horror into them that read them. Christ also first bewailed the infelicitie of the citie of Ierusalem, ¹⁹⁷ for that she knew not the time of hir visitation: and he saith; How often would I haue gathered togither thy children, as a hen dooth hir chickens vnder hir wings, and thou wouldest not? Howbeit, euen he, knowing the assured and vnmooueable will of GOD, burst foorth into these words; I giue thanks vnto thee, ¹⁹⁸ ô father of heauen and of earth, for that thou hast hidden these things from the wise and prudent, and hast reuealed them to the little ones: euen so Lord, for that it hath so pleased in thy sight.

Moreouer, men of God, when they come to this point, they haue not a respect to their owne cause, neither doo regard their owne iniuries; but consider, that by the wicked works of the vngodlie, the church of God is harmed, the spirituall procéedings thereof are hindered, and the course of the Gospell is letted. And they most ardentlie desire, that the name of God might be sanctified, and his kingdome most amplie spred abroad. And hereof it commeth, that when the godlie praie against wicked men, they persecute not their owne enimies, but the enimies of God, whom they wish to be most purelie worshipped. Dauid sawe that he was called by God to the kingdome; and vnderstood that the enterprises of the wicked were not so much repugnant to his owne dignitie, as to the will of God. Wherefore, woorthilie in his praiers, he wisheth rather, that they should perish, and that most vilie; than that anie iot of the most iust will of God should be hindered. So that both in this place, and in such other like, we are forbidden, not onelie to cursse, but also to speake euill when we be ouercome with the spites and iniuries of the wicked; by whom it is not méet that wée should suffer our courage to be quailed, or to be led from the rule of charitie. ¹⁹⁹ Herein doubtlesse consisteth the magnanimitie of christians, and their incredible valiantnes of courage; not onlie not to cursse them that persecute them, but also to speake well of them, and to praie vnto God for them.

29 Howbeit, I cannot woonder enough, that Thomas Aquinas should saie, that by the words of Paule, ²⁰⁰ christians are not compelled; by force of the precept to shew particularlie vnto their enimies the affect of charitie, or (as they vse to speake) to shew signes of beneuolence vnto them, except it be in case of necessitie. For it is enough, if they exclude them not from the generall bond of loue, wherewith we ought to loue our neighbours. Neither (saith he) is it of necessitie, that we should pray peculiarlie for them. But this is sufficient, if we exclude them not from the common praiers, which we make for all men. And if anie man (saith he) besides the case of necessitie, doo shew vnto an enimie tokens of speciall loue, or doo speciallie make intercession for him; that man followeth counsell, but obeieth not the commandement. ²⁰¹ Yet Christ & Paule, when they spake of these things, taught not this distinction. This doctrine doubtlesse cutteth in sunder the sinewes of christian religion, it presseth downe the vehemence of Gods spirit, and taketh awaie the force and sharpenesse of the lawe of God. Let these men go now and crie out, that we be they, which dissolue the indeuour of good works, and open a windowe to licentious life; when as they cannot denie, but that themselues are those, which at their owne pleasure change the certeine and seuere commandements of God into counsels. Doubtlesse Christ and Paule commanded those things, and doo not giue them onelie as counsels. But this is excéedinglie to be lamented, that these commandements in this iron age of ours, are made like the lawes of Athens. For they, although they were wiselie inuented and published abroad; yet notwithstanding laie neglected, and were euerie where of all men violated. And we must thinke, that this came of no other cause, but that the whole iuice & bloud of christian religion is in a maner dried vp.

Of a cursse.

²⁰² 30 The Hebrues did not vtterlie ouerthrowe & destroie certeine eities, which they had taken into their hands; but did inhabit them. Howbeit, some they curssed, & vtterlie rooted out. And their vow of the thing that was promised, was called Cherem, of the verbe Charam, which is, To wast, To destroie, To kill, To deface, & To accursse. The Graecians called that word Cherem, ⟨…⟩: and they also called ⟨…⟩, as things consecrate and put apart. And it may be, that they were so called, bicause they were hanged vp in temples, and were sequestred from the vse of men, and might not be remooued from off that place. Yea, men were sometimes called by that word. Paule in verie déed vsed that word manie times: for he saith to the Galathians; Let him be accurssed, ²⁰³ whosoeuer shall preach anie other Gospell. And to the Romans, he wished himselfe to be ²⁰⁴ accurssed for the brethren. And to the Corinthians the first epistle, he saith; He that loueth nor the Lord Iesus, let him be accurssed, Maranatha: where he taketh this word ⟨…⟩, for this word Cherem, that is, A thing separated and disioined altogither from the companie and vse of man: so as it was vnlawfull to touch it, or vse it. A testimonie whereof we haue in the booke of Iosua the sixt chapter, as touching the citie of Ierico. ²⁰⁵ And it séemeth that it was so accurssed, bicause it was after a sort the first fruits of the cities which were taken. For, after that they were passed ouer Iordan, it was the first that was conquered of all the cities, and that by no helpe of man; for that the wals thereof fell downe of their owne accord, and by the will of GOD. Wherefore it was méet, that the spoiles thereof should altogither be consecrated vnto God.

31 But it séemeth to be vtterlie strange from the seruice of God, ²⁰⁶ to destroie both cities and men: and these things haue rather a shew of crueltie, than of religion. I answer, that destructions indéed of their owne proper nature, apperteine neither to religion, nor to godlines: but so farre foorth as they be referred to the glorie of God. And this may happen two maner of waies; as when that destruction is counted for a certeine token of the seueritie and iustice of GOD, against those people, whom he, for their wickednesse, would haue to be destroied: or else, as a certeine testimonie of Gods goodnesse and mercie towards the Israelites, whom in that expedition he mercifullie helped. Wherefore, the ouerthrowing of the citie, houses, men, and beasts, did shew the iustice and seueritie of God: and the consecration declared the goodnesse, helpe, and mercie vttered to that people. Moreouer, God would by that meanes prooue the obedience of his people, in absteining from the spoiles which were consecrated to God. For we knowe, that soldiers, when they haue gotten the victorie, are hardlie restrained from the preie. But they which obeied not the cursse, when if was published, were most gréeuouslie punished. Which the holie historie of Iosua declareth to haue happened vnto Achan, ²⁰⁷ bicause he vsurped vnto himselfe some of the spoiles of Ierico. We knowe also, ²⁰⁸ that Saule was for this cause béerest of his kingdome, in that he had reserued Agag the king, and certeine oxen and fat cattell of the preie, which were alreadie bound by the vow of the cursse.

32 But touching the forme and end of the cursse, we haue spoken inough. ²⁰⁹ For the forme is the destruction of cities, men, and beasts: and the consecration of gold, siluer, iron, brasse, pearles, pretious stones, & costlie things, which were appointed onelie to the vse of the tabernacle. ²¹⁰ But the end was, that they might be monuments of Gods goodnesse and iustice; and also an exercise and triall of the Israelits. Now resteth to speake somewhat of the matter, and efficient cause thereof. ²¹¹ Certeinlie, the matter was, whatsoeuer was to be found aliue in those cities: for all that ought to be killed. And the buildings, and other garnishings of the citie to be cleane destroied: but as for the riches and ornaments, they (as it is said) were consecrated vnto the worshipping of God. But there was to be noted, that none were vowed vnto so horrible a destruction, except such as were alreadie declared and openlie vowed to be enimies of GOD. For it is not lawfull to kill innocents. Wherefore, they sinned most gréeuouslie, which so vowed Paules death, ²¹² as they would neither eate nor drinke, till they had killed him. And at this daie, they behaue themselues more than wickedlie, which confesse themselues to haue made a vow, most cruellie to kill all the professors of the Gospell. Yea & Ieptha without doubt was deceiued, ²¹³ who bicause of this kind of vowing, thought that his daughter ought either to be slaine, or else forced to perpetuall virginitie.

²¹⁴ Agamemnon also is to be condemned, who (as Cicero in his booke of Offices reporteth) vowed vnto Diana the fairest thing that should be borne in his kingdome: ²¹⁵ which foolish vow to performe, he sacrificed his daughter Iphigenia. But the efficient cause of the vow Cherem, sometimes is God: as it is written in the seuenth & tenth chapters of Deuteronomie. ²¹⁶ For there it is commanded, that places dedicated to idols, altars, images, groues and monuments, should vtterlie be destroied: and that was a perpetuall cursse in the land of Chanaan, and to be alwaies obserued. ²¹⁷ Sometimes the prince made such a vow, as we read of Iosua: and sometimes the people, ²¹⁸ as we find in the 21. chapter of Numbers. The prophet also sometime did this: and thus did Samuel charge Saule, ²¹⁹ that he should destroie all things which belonged to the Amalechits. The name of this citie, whereof there is mention in the first of Iudges, was afterward called Horma; whereas before it was not so called. And it was so called, of the word Cherem: for such a name were they woont to giue the places that were destroied, by reason of a vow or cursse. In the booke of Numbers, a certeine portion, which the Israelits kept by force, was (by reason of such a vow) called Horma. ²²⁰

33 But it would séeme to be a question, whether these destructions were against charitie? I saie, they were not: for such enimies were chosen to be vtterlie destroied of the Iewes, by the iudgement of God, and not at the pleasure of men. And as concerning the loue or hatred of enimies, we must vnderstand, ²²¹ that Augustine hath written toward the end of the former booke of the sermon of the Lord vpon the mount, that he dooth ascend a certeine step of righteousnesse, which loueth his neighbour, although he as yet hate his enimie. But he shall then performe goodwill and goodnesse, according to the commandement of him (which came to fulfill the lawe and not to breake it) when he shall extend the same euen to the loue of his enimie. For the other degrée, although it be somewhat, yet is it so small, that it may be common also with Publicans. Neither is that, which is said in the lawe; Thou shalt hate thine enimie, ²²² to be taken as a commandement vnto the iust, but as a permission vnto the weake. Thus much writeth he. To whom if I shall saie as the truth is, I doo not agrée, but am certeinlie persuaded, that to hate our enimies is not permitted by God; no not in them which be vnperfect: for it is an euerlasting precept, that we should loue our neighbour as our selues. And he is our neighbour, ²²³ vpon whom we light by anie occasion: as Christ declared in the parable of the Iewes and of the Samaritane. ²²⁴ Those vndoutedlie were compared as enimies one to another: wherfore the condition of enimitie, when it happeneth, cannot let, but that such as are enimies one to another, be neighbours notwithstanding. Moreouer, forsomuch as we sée, ²²⁵ that Dauid and other prophets did oftentimes cursse their enimies: by what meanes can we call them weake, to whom God gaue libertie to hate their enimies? For they were holie men, and verie perfect.

Neither dooth that séeme to make much to the purpose, which the same Augustine saith; ²²⁶ namelie, that The saiengs of these holie men were no vowes and desires, but rather forspeakings, and prophesies of them, who liuing vnder the old testament, did oftentimes prophesie the euent of things to come. For the apostles are also found in the new testament, not onelie to haue spoken words of curssings (as Paule, when he saith; I would to God they were cut off that trouble you! ²²⁷ ) but also to haue imposed most gréeuous punishments. For so much as it is written in the Acts of the apostles, that the same Paule depriued Elimas the magician of his sight; ²²⁸ and Peter slue Ananias and Saphyra. Wherfore it were better to saie, that these great men did not such things of hatred granted to them against vnperfect men; but forced therevnto by some other maner of meanes. ²²⁹ And so me thinketh we must make this distinction: that they sometimes had to doo for their owne causes, and sometimes for Gods cause. When they had to doo for their own matters, they seasoned all their dooings with all modestie and gentlenesse: as we sée Dauid did, who sundrie times spared Saule his deadlie enimie. ²³⁰ Moses also, and other holie men, did verie oftentimes susteine gréeuous things, both constantlie and valiantlie: but when Gods busines was to be handled, they behaued themselues seuerelie and noblie. But this if they had doone, while they tendered their owne matters, they might haue séemed to wrest the sword out of the hand of God, and of the magistrate: as they doo, which reuenge their owne iniuries.

²³¹ 33 This also is to be added, that men appointed to take in hand, and to defend Gods cause, though they may then doo things sharpelie and seuerelie; ought notwithstanding preciselie and diligentlie to beware, least vnder that pretence, they followe their owne affections. The apostles when they desired Christ to send fire from heauen vpon the Samaritans (as they knew had béene doone in the old time, ²³² at the petition of Elias ) were rebuked of the Lord; bicause they knew not of whose spirit they were: which without doubt was a most fit answer. For they, whom God sendeth to execute these offices, ought not now to be counted priuate or méere men, but such as were prepared and instructed by him to supplie his roome vpon the earth. ²³³ But whether is it lawfull for priuate men to praie against vngodlie and cruell tyrants, by whom the true worshipping of God is hindered, and to cursse them? Augustine answereth, that it is alwaies lawfull for godlie men to praie against the kingdome of sinne; and that may be taken awaie, when the vngodlie forsake their wickednes: for whose vnfeined repentance we must alwaies praie vnto God. But if they séeme past all hope, it is lawfull to praie, that their sinnes may once at the length come to an end; namelie, that they, being taken awaie, might cease both to hinder the worshipping of God, and also to trouble the saints. For it is not conuenient, that their sin should range abroad vnpunished; sith when it is left vnpunished, it is méere vniustice: but when the punishment of God is ioined to it, then it hath in it selfe lesse deformitie.

²³⁴ Wherefore, by the same Augustine, God is verie well called, not a cruell punisher, but a iust corrector. Moreouer, séeing that holie men be verie familiar with God, and therefore, so soone as by anie heauenlie reuelation they be certified of his will, they hauing an earnest loue vnto him, cannot but allow his iudgment: yea, they faithfullie praie, that the same may be accomplished. Howbeit, insomuch as they be men, they be both sorrie, and also take it gréeuouslie, to haue their neighbours so vexed. For which cause Samuel moorned for Saule, ²³⁵ although he were not ignorant, that he was reiected of God. Ieremie also wept for the captiuitie, ²³⁶ which was at hand. And Christ wept for the citie of Ierusalem, that should be destroied. For they, ²³⁷ which be men indéed, cannot choose but be sorie for their neighbours, and for their owne flesh, when it is afflicted. ²³⁸ Neither dooth God require of vs a Stoicall lacke of compassion. But of this matter, if the reader desire to sée more, let him peruse my Commentaries vpon the Corinths. And as concerning this present matter, I saie, that the people of Israel, in destroieng or curssing of these nations, followed not their owne hatred; but the instinction of God. For they were his lientenants, and might be called his workemen; séeing they destroied those, whom God himselfe had declared to be his enimies, and commanded, that they should be destroied by them.

Of Affects, or affections in generall; out of the Commentaries vpon Aristotles Ethiks.

34 An affect is a certeine power or facultie, ²³⁹ whereby we either séeke or shun the obiects laid before vs. And in liuing creatures, in that they be liuing, and haue sense, it dooth insue knowledge. And some affects doo insue touching; but some doo accompanie the cogitation and opinion. Those which followe of touching, foorthwith, ²⁴⁰ as the sense lighteth into an obiect, either agréeable or vnagréeable, doo either pursue it, or flie from it. For when the sense and the obiect doo agrée the one with the other, then it is pleasure: but when it happeneth otherwise, it is counted gréefe. And while the sinewes are hurt, there ariseth a great gréefe; which gréefe vndoubtedlie is not an opinion or a cogitation, as manie haue fondlie conceiued: for, besides the cogitation or opinion, the bodie it selfe is ill affected. And it is not in the power of our opinion or imagination, to change such maner of obiects: for those, which doo cause gréefe, will alwaies hurt the sinewes; which sinewes doo apperteine to the féeling, and will vex the bodie. And on the other side, those obiects, which of their owne nature are pleasant, will alwaies delite; so that the bodie be not ill affected with some ill qualitie. ²⁴¹ But those affects, which doo not insue in touching, spring and arise from the cogitation or imagination; although there be no outward obiect present. And they be the motions of the hart, whereby we pursue or shun obiects; according as the cogitation, either trulie or falselie sheweth those things to be either profitable or vnprofitable. Those affects are called ²⁴² ⟨…⟩, and therfore they be not cogitations, but are deriued of them. Of these affects there be diuers sorts: for some of them be simple, and others compounded. Of the simple we reckon foure; ²⁴³ Gladnesse, Sadnesse, ²⁴⁴ Hope, and Feare: for the obiect, which is presented vnto vs, is either good or euill. And the same is shewed by the cogitation, either as present, or by and by to come.

If good be shewed to be present, there ariseth gladnesse, which is a motion of the hart, whereby it openeth & spreadeth foorth it selfe, swéetlie imbracing the present good. But if the good be not present, but is looked for; hope ariseth, being a motion of the hart, whereby it inlargeth and prepareth it selfe to imbrace that good, when it shall come. But the euill, when it is presentlie shewed, the hart dooth shun it: for sadnesse is a motion of the hart, whereby it draweth it selfe togither, that it might auoid the present euill. But if the euill that is to come be shewed, then we feare. And that affect is a motion of the hart, wherby it draweth it selfe togither, lest it should be oppressed by the euill to come. These are the simple affects, which are giuen vnto liuing creatures, that they might not onelie vse a knowledge for their owne safetie; but also, that if that knowledge should be but a weake helpe, such kind of spurs might be ioined withall, as might stir vs vp to our safetie, and call vs backe from things that are hurtfull vnto vs. They be as it were winds, wherby the ship is driuen: and they are placed in the third kind of qualitie. And albeit that the first and second kind are of very great force, to the gouerning and ruling of liuing creatures; yet are those of more force to rule, and doo worke with a greater vehemence, than the habits or naturall powers doo. Howbeit, there are other affects of this sort, which are not simple, but are compounded of manie things; as is anger, which comprehendeth gréefe and gladnes togither; and such other like there be.

²⁴⁵ 35 Now it remaineth, that we sée what be the organs or places of these affects. Plato did place anger in the hart; desire and gladnesse in the liuer. But Aristotle was of another mind, who placed as well anger as gréefe, gladnesse, and such like, in the hart: albeit that Aristotle placed also the naturall affects; to wit, those which belong to the vegetatiue or growing power, in the organs, which be proper vnto that facultie: and such are hunger, thirst, and the stirring vp vnto procreation. Neither would he denie, but that the liuer is the chéefe among these inward parts; bicause therein is the principall storehouse of the bloud; and that humor is both nourishment, and also is the proper matter of the séed. But setting aside these naturall affects, which are not ioined vnto knowledge; let vs deale with those, which are ioined either to the apprehension of the senses, or else vnto the cogitation. ²⁴⁶ And since, according to the opinion of Aristotle, we place them in the hart; let vs prooue this opinion of ours by arguments. Certeinlie, this must be doone, wheresoeuer they are to be placed, either in the braine, or in the hart, or in the liuer. They shall not be placed in the braine, since there the actions and powers, which be repugnant to these affects; namelie, iudgement, and reason, haue their abiding. But one and the selfe-same power bringeth not foorth at one verie time, actions which be repugnant. And that the actions of the affects, and those of iudgement and reason be one repugnant to another; euen Medea hir selfe in Ouid testified, who said; Video meliora, probóque; deteriora sequor: The better I allow, and vew; But yet the woorst I doo insew.

And by this verie reason it appéereth, that these affects are not (as the Stoiks thought) cogitations or opinions; since these actions consist in the braine. And therfore it remaineth, that if they be not in the braine, they must be placed either in the hart, or in the liuer. And verelie they cannot be ascribed vnto the liuer; bicause those affects, which belong therevnto, cannot be gouerned by iudgment and reason, as hunger, thirst, and moouing vnto procreation may be. No doubt but iudgement or reason may ouer-rule the power that mooueth; to wit, that it shall not eate nor drinke, nor procreate children: but it cannot let, that it should disclose it selfe, that it should prouoke, disquiet, and stir vp. But those affects, which followe perceiuing or knowledge, may be staied by reason and iudgement: and so they be not of the selfe-same nature that those be, which are placed in the liuer. Wherefore, they shall not belong vnto that part of the bodie, but vnto the hart. And with this opinion, which wée thinke is Aristotles, the holie scriptures doo agrée, which saie; ²⁴⁷ Thou shalt loue the Lord thy God, with all thy hart, with all thy soule, and with all thy strength, and thou shalt feare to offend him.

36 But we must note, ²⁴⁸ that hunger and thirst are sometime vnderstood for the defect it selfe, when we be quite emptie; and in this respect they cannot be gouerned by iudgment and reason, nor yet haue their originall from thence: but that gréefe, which dooth followe, belongeth to the hart; since the first emptinesse is in the organs, which doo belong vnto the vegetatiue power. And as touching the affects also, which followe the sense of féeling, there must be two things considered; to wit, the dissolutions of the whole, the rending in péeces, and burnings: which things are doone in the flesh and sinewes. But the gréefes, which followe them, be motions of the hart. Neither must we passe ouer this, that the hart hath two other motions, beside affects; namelie, the pulses. But we are not now at this present to speake of them, and therefore I come againe to the affects: which, since we haue called them motions of the heart, ²⁴⁹ we must not thinke them to be violent: bicause they haue their originall from nature it selfe, for they arise from the powers of the heart. But yet must we vnderstand, that such is the course of nature, that those things which be ouer vehement, doo hurt; yea they marre and corrupt. As for example: if the light be too great, it destroieth the eies; ouer-much heat, or ouer-much cold doo destroie liuing creatures: but whatsoeuer is moderate; dooth profit and preserue. Which selfe same thing must be iudged of the affects. Vehement gréefe, feare or gladnesse be hurtfull; but when there is vsed a meane, they bring verie manie helpes and commodities. Now haue we spoken enough of the formall cause: for we haue prooued, that they be motions of the heart, which doo followe the knowledge of the senses; or else followe cogitation or opinion, which neuerthelesse are naturall and not violent. And we haue also shewed what we must determine as concerning the matter or subiect.

²⁵⁰ Now it remaineth, that we speake of the efficient cause. As for this, it is the obiect, whereby the sense or cogitation is mooued; namelie, that good thing or euill thing, which offereth it selfe, either present or to come. And moreouer, the efficient cause is a power of the heart, which foorthwith mooueth the same to pursue or to shun that which is offered. Howbeit, betwéene the obiect and power stirred vp of the hart, there commeth betwéene a middle knowledge: for the power of the heart is not stirred vp by the obiect, vnlesse it be through knowledge. For immediatlie, so soone as the obiects are apprehended, either by the sense, or by the knowledge; the spirits faculties, which doo attend vpon the knowledge, doo strike the hart it selfe, and the power of the hart is awakened, whereby it is mooued either to flie from, ²⁵¹ or to pursue. But yet it must be noted, that according to the diuers temperature of the bodie, so is this motion of the heart, either slowlie or spéedilie stirred vp; and by reason of the affects, doo become more vehement in some, and in other some more féeble. Hot and drie humors doo easilie and vehementlie stirre vp; but those which be cold and moist, be somewhat slower: from which the affects must of necessitie procéed somewhat slacklie. And further, the humors are mooued, according to the nature or condition of th’affects. In gréefe or feare is raised melancholie; in gladnesse, bloud; and in anger, yellowe choler. Ouer this, the motions be either of the propertie of drawing togither, or of spreading abroad. When the obiect, which is offered, shalbe good; the heart spreadeth it selfe abroad to receiue it: but if the obiect shalbe euill, then the humors withdrawe themselues to the inward parts. And hence procéedeth palenesse of the face; and from hence arise blushings, according as the bloud either retireth vnto the inward parts, or else powreth out it selfe into the outward parts. And thus much shall suffice as touching the cause.

37 Now remaineth, ²⁵² that we consider of two things. First, that these affects be not either cogitations, or opinions; as the Stoiks thought them to be. Secondlie, that they must not be all condemned as vitious and euill. First it may euidentlie be prooued in those affects that be called naturall, as are hunger and thirst: which affects inuade vs without anie cogitation. Also, who will call it a cogitation or opinion, when we be afflicted with a dissolution of the whole, with a breaking of the sinewes, or burning by flame or fire? They may as well persuade vs, as touching the naturall affections of parents towards their children, which are not onlie vehement in men, but in brute beasts also. Howbeit, since the matter is plaine; I thinke it néedles to stand much therevpon. Now, as concerning the second; I will not denie, ²⁵³ but some affects haue their faults ioined with them. But I will shew, that manie of them are good; and that those, which are euill, are euill through mans fault, not in their owne nature. And first may we speake of the error of iudgement, for we doo not alwaies iudge aright of the obiects which are before vs. That which is euill, is otherwhile taken for that which is good; and that which is good, is estéemed to be euill. But the affects, as we haue declared, doo accompanie the iudgements of the mind; and so the fault passeth from the iudgement vnto the affect. ²⁵⁴ The apostles iudged the contumelies, which they suffred for the name of Christ, to be honourable vnto them, and therfore departed with ioie and gladnesse from the Councell.

But contrariwise, when Dauid was driuen out of his kingdome by his sonne, he sorrowed; bicause he sawe, that his casting foorth would be an offense vnto men, which knew what God promised vnto Dauid by the prophets. He sawe moreouer, that these things did happen through his owne fault: and sith that these were euils, he could not choose but sorrowe. Either of these both Dauid as the apostles iudged rightlie of the things obiected, albeit in diuers maners they iudged of the things that happened. Vaine men doo estéeme flatteries to be good things indéed, and therefore are delighted with them. Others iudge more rightlie of them; for they perceiue them to be but mockeries, and for that cause doo dislike of them. Those that are good men, doo reioise in méere vertues; for they iudge rightlie of them. Againe, thou shalt sée others, which doo hate them; bicause they be infected with a corrupt iudgement: so as the naughtinesse and goodnes of the affects, procéedeth of the true or false iudgement, concerning the things which are obiected. Howbeit, it is not requisite to saie, that all the affects are euill; bicause manie men being seduced by error, doo light vpon those ill motions of the mind: for they which erre not, are not hurt by the affects of error.

²⁵⁵ 38 An other euill there is in the affects, which in verie déed procéedeth not of error; but for that there be some, which are aduersaries vnto right reason: such is the desire of other mens goods, of murther, of adulterie, and such like. These affects must of good right be condemned; but yet for these sakes must not sentence be giuen generallie; sith there be other affects, which are agréeable to right reason and sound iudgement; namelie, loue towards vertue, and hatred and anger against sinnes. ²⁵⁶ Which affects, being agréeable to reason, are not onelie honest and laudable, but also verie profitable: for they are giuen as certeine spurs to godlie life. For it is not sufficient to knowe those things that are good, but we must be earnestlie stirred vp vnto them. For the affects be as it were sinewes, by whose stretching foorth, or shrinking in, we are the earnestlier, or the lightlier stirred vp. Who séeth not, that this is most true, that anger is as it were a whetstone vnto fortitude? We should be verie dull euen vnto honest actions, if we had not these prouocations: we should be euen as a ship in the sea destitute of wind. Wherefore, the nature it selfe of affects is not euill, since manie of them be verie profitable and honest. Vndoubtedlie, God gaue the organs of these affects, and he appointed humors to attend on them, and knowledges to accompanie them: so as it can not be denied, but that they are the works of God; and especiallie since he in his lawe requireth such affects. For he willeth vs to loue and to feare God, to loue our neighbours, and seruants to feare their masters: and full of such precepts are the holie scriptures.

²⁵⁷ That same impassibilitie then of affects, which the Stoiks would haue (albeit that Basil, Nazianzen, and certeine other of the fathers, otherwhile séeme greatlie to commend) must vtterlie be refused. Christ wept, was sad vnto death, was mooued with mercie: so then he was not without affects. And therefore affects are not repugnant euen to the perfection of our humane nature. True it is, there happen euils manie times, through the fault of our corrupt nature: but we must indeuor our selues to correct our vitious affects, and to confirme and restore those that be good and agréeable to reason. And this we read, that the holie and godlie heroicall men did, both in the old, and in the new testament. These fathers did not followe their affections, as guided by them; but vsed them vnto those vertues and noble acts, which God commanded. And it is apparant in the holie scriptures, that those heroicall men were stirred vp of God, with certein more vehement affections, than other men are. But it may be doubted of, ²⁵⁸ from whence the excéeding corruptions of affects, or else so great a disagréement from reason in some of them (such as is the gréedie desire of other mens goods, of murther, rape, & adulterie, which can not anie maner of waie be allowed) had their originall. Vnto which question an answer may easilie be made out of the holie scriptures; bicause that By one man, that is by Adams fall, sinne entered into the world. But the philosophers, which vnderstand not this, doo flie vnto temperatures of the bodie; and vnto aspects and motions of the starres: howbeit, as the thing it selfe declareth, they can not by those causes yéeld a perfect reason.

39 Now let vs sée, ²⁵⁹ how those affects may be ruled and corrected. The first waie is ciuill; to wit, through morall vertues. For those doo reduce them to a mediocritie; and those would suffice; if we should onelie haue respect vnto the present life. But in truth, before God they are not sufficient; neither dooth this ciuill iustice suffice before his tribunall seate. And therefore another rule is yet necessarie; namelie, the rule of the diuine scriptures, the which doo profit nothing at all, vnlesse they be apprehended by faith. This rule bringeth two maner of commodities with it. The first is, that that which is wanting vnto true righteousnes (considering the morall state wherein we be) is not imputed to vs, and that the whole fulfilling is ascribed to vs out of Christ his fulnesse. Besides this, there is giuen vnto vs greater strength to withstand lusts. And finallie by faith, the verie actions of vertues, & good affects, are altogither referred to God: which without faith cannot be doone. And therefore, in men, which are estranged from Christ, those moderate affects, how gorgious soeuer they were, are sinnes; not that they be so in their owne nature, but they so become through our naturall corruption. For we be euen as fustie vessels, the which doo corrupt the wine, though it be good that is powred into vs. And therefore, sith God is the author of all creatures, and that he made nothing but is good, and made no bare substances, and such as are furnished with no kind of helps, but gaue vnto euerie one a pronesse and inclination vnto those things which be holsome and profitable: it followeth, that not onelie natures and substances be good; but also the affects, which are by God ingraffed in them. Albeit, that in those which be wicked men, they drawe vnto them these two euils, which otherwise of themselues are good. First, by reason of originall sinne, nature is so corrupted and weakened, that good affects are not of such efficacie as they ought to be. Secondlie, they are not directed vnto God, as it behooueth that they should be; but rather to the imbracing of pleasures and earthlie delectations.

²⁶⁰ Wherby we may perceiue, there are foure degrées of men. The first are the basest, who be neither indued with morall vertues, nor yet with godlinesse: in these we may perceiue all things to be fraught with perturbations and disorder. Secondlie, there be others as yet aliens from godlinesse; howbeit, ciuill men, who by a certeine kind of habit, haue after a sort reuoked their affections to a mediocritie. The third sort are beléeuers in Christ; who notwithstanding they are not without sin, no more than are other mortall men, yet is not their sinne imputed vnto them. In the fourth & last place must those be put, which either were made by God at the beginning, or else are loosed from hence, and be now with Christ. They indéed haue no corrupt affections, neither on the second, nor yet on the third cause; but they haue them altogither good, absolute, and perfect. Howbeit, in nature there be not anie affects so corrupt, and so vicious, but in them may be séene somwhat that is good. ²⁶¹ For in all of them there dooth appéere some part of the institution of God. For that same first beginning, or (as I may so saie) the facultie & strength of these qualities had his originall from God; but the confusednesse either of imperfection, or of deformednesse, which commeth by reason of sinne, hath corrupted the same. Neither doo those euill affects hurt alone the grosser parts of the soule, ²⁶² but they also hurt the will and reason. For so did God fasten and bind togither those powers of the mind, as they might serue one another; namelie, that the affects should obeie reason, and that reason should rule and gouerne the affects, and temper the motions of the hart. Howbeit, it fareth otherwise; and so great a féeblenesse there is of the will, as being compared with the affects, it may séeme to be euen a fearefull child, sitting vpon a verie fierce horsse. Wherefore, the morall philosophers haue prefixed to themselues this end; namelie, to qualifie the affections by vertues, and to strengthen reason being weake.

²⁶³ 40 But which be the parts of the mind, that being instructed by vehement affects, doo disturbe reason, and make it féeble; Plato declared, who in the chéefe place appointed ²⁶⁴ ⟨…⟩, and in the inferiour place, ²⁶⁵ ⟨…⟩, and ²⁶⁶ ⟨…⟩. So that in these latter parts of the mind are placed the affects. And these powers of the mind, as it was said before, he iudged to be in the head, in the liuer, and in the hart. But Aristotle, for the generall word, tooke ⟨…⟩, which he diuided into thrée parts; to wit, ⟨…⟩, that is, Gréedie desire, Affectation, or Couetousnesse: ⟨…⟩, that is, Anger, or Vehemencie of the mind: & ⟨…⟩, that is, Will. Which parts, bicause they are apparant of themselues, there is no néed to expound them anie further. Yet this neuerthelesse will I adde, that according to right order, the inferiour appetites ought to be mooued, gouerned, and ruled by that same superiour, which is ⟨…⟩; to wit, Will: euen as the vppermost sphere doth guide the lower, as Aristotle writeth in his 3. booke De anima. And thus doubtlesse the case standeth: the inferiour powers, when they be stirred vp, and compell vs to the dooing of anie thing, are gouerned by the cogitation; and the cogitation by reason.

Yea, and euerie man hath experience in himselfe, that when anie naturall reason is applied, the disturbed affections are set in quiet: euen as the winds are feined to be suppressed by Aeolus. Wherefore, in man, the affects are obedient vnto the will it selfe; whereas in brute beasts, action immediatelie followeth vpon the motion of the affects. But our affections do perpetuallie expect the commandement of the will, vnlesse that some impediment doo oppose it selfe: as in children, and in mad men we sée it falleth out. Here perhaps thou wilt saie; Doo we not sée, ²⁶⁷ that in those, which are incontinent, the affects are mooued euen against the will? We answer, that indéed they rebell against the will; but that, as touching the motion and actions, they bring nothing to passe, vnlesse that the will doo command them. Indéed the affections doo resist the will, and trouble it, and finallie ouercome it, and lead it awaie to their owne opinion; which will, when it shall haue giuen hir assent, and shall haue ouerruled the matter, actions doo followe, not as it decréed at the beginning, but as it commandeth when it is ouercome.

41 But some thinke, ²⁶⁸ that the power of desiring, and of being angrie, is all one; bicause contraries belong all vnto one facultie: but things agréeable vnto nature, and things hurtfull to the same, are contrarie; and therefore they be both obiects of one part of the mind. As white and blacke, are obiects of the sight; a right and crooked line, are obiects of one and the same science; namelie, of the science Mathematicall; and a whole and a sicke man, are obiects of physicke. Herevnto we answer, that the obiects of the angrie and of the desiring power, are not so to be distinguished, by that which is agréeable, and that which is hurtfull, but that either of these parts hath respect vnto good and euill; howbeit, not after the like maner. The power, which desireth, hath respect vnto good and to euill absolutelie; that is to wit, that it may atteine the one, and auoid another. Neuerthelesse, otherwhile impediments and things that doo corrupt it, doo fall out betwéene: so that it is a difficult thing to obteine this, or to auoid that. And there dooth the power of anger shew it selfe, for the ouercomming of these difficulties; it wrestleth, and it earnestlie resisteth the impediments, to the intent we may either apprehend the good, or auoid the euill, according as we doo desire. So then the obiect of the angrie power is good and euill, according as the thing difficult and hard offereth it selfe. Hope is chéefelie an affection of the angrie power: for it is carried vnto that which is good, but yet a good that is absent, to the obteining wherof must be deuoured the impediment of expectation; yea, the power and the difficultie of the impediments must be ouercome.

But in what order those faculties shalbe placed among themselues, it héereby appéereth; in that the force of the angrie power beginneth at the power of desire, and endeth also at the same. For when anie man hath an iniurie doone vnto him, he is sad: but the affect of sadnesse perteineth to the facultie of desire. Against this euill (whereby the offended partie is made sad, to the intent it may be auoided) dooth anger interpose it selfe; which, by reuenge, coueteth to repulse that euill. But reuenge (as we all knowe) is a hard matter; which when it is performed, then succéedeth gladnesse, which belongeth to the power of desire, and there we cease to be angrie. Wherefore the power of anger is a defender, and also a striuer against, and dooth resist the desiring part. For the angrie part flieth from labours and gréefes, but the part desiring ouercommeth them, endureth them, and entereth into them, whether it will or no: and when the one of them enforceth hir action, the other contrariwise dooth slacken it. They which lust verie inordinatelie after women, are not angrie with them: and they which be angrie with them, are lesse inflamed with the desire of them. Wherfore the obiect of the angrie part, offendeth the desiring part; bicause (as we said right now) it flieth from labours and difficulties, wherevnto the angrie part offreth it selfe, & maketh it selfe readie to get the victorie. And it is a manifest thing, that of those two powers of the mind, the angrie part commeth the néerer vnto reason; for it is a helper of the same, to execute wholesome counsels: but the desiring part commeth néerer to the sense. And to deale by examples, in a matter which yet I thinke is plaine enough. Boldnesse and feare, being parts of this mind, be affects: for boldnesse dooth affect a good thing, which is difficult. But feare flieth an euill thing, which is hard to be auoided: for we feare not the euils, which vrge vs not, and may easilie be auoided. And thus much of the affects in generall; whereof not onlie the morall philosopher disputeth, but also the naturall philosopher, and the Physician, and Rhetorician.

42 Now to set aside naturall philosophers and Physicians, ²⁶⁹ I will speake somwhat of Rhetoricians. They doubtlesse (as Aristotle testifieth in his second booke of Rhetoriks) doo first indeuour by arguments, to make men beléeue, that those things be true, which they affirme. And then doo they consider of the minds and affections of the iudges, and of those which heare them: for that carrieth a great weight vnto the cause. For they which fauour him that is guiltie, doo beléeue, that either he sinned not, or else that he made a verie small fault. But on the other side, if they shall hate him, they thinke with them selues, that either he is no innocent at all, or else that he is most guiltie of all. These affections, vnlesse that an Orator can change, qualifie, or turne vnto the contrarie; he shall labour in vaine. Wherefore Aristotle teacheth, that thrée things there must be considered. First, who they be that are prone to be affected, either this way or that. Secondlie, towards whom they are woont to be so affected. And finallie, for what causes their affections are mooued, either one waie or an other; to the intent that these things being knowne, they may easilie make them serue their purpose. But there be some, which thinke, ²⁷⁰ that this is not iust, or to be permitted; that in pleading of causes, affections should be mooued, since that the minds of the iudges, in discerning, ought to be at quiet: which cannot come to passe if the affects be troubled by an artificiall spéech of Orators.

Howbeit, they which speake this, séeme to me, that they distinguish not the nature of affects, by the vse of them; bicause in verie déed, the nature of affections is good, albeit that the vse of them be otherwhile good, and otherwhile euill. Also swords being made of iron, which is a good creature of God, doo serue sometime to a iust vse; and sometime to an vniust. And wherein (I beséech you shall the Orator offend; if, when in a good and iust cause, he shall sée the iudge ill affected towards the partie accused, he doo temper him with the art of eloquence, and doo drawe him vnto a contrarie mind, yea and stirre vp the motions of his hart to decrée grauelie and iustlie? Héere vndoubtedlie there shalbe no offense committed; but humane affections shalbe directed vnto the ends prescribed vnto them. For otherwhile the auditorie, and also the iudges become cold; as vnto whom it shall not suffice to haue shewed what is to be doone, vnlesse they be drawne therevnto, by stirring them vp with a verie vehement affect. But those Orators are to be reprehended, and restrained, which to this end direct eloquence for the moouing of affections; that the minds of the iudges may be disquieted, and that they may not sée what is iust. But yet, for these mens ill demeanor, must not that profitable cunning be banished from the affaires of men. For so ought the holie scriptures to be blamed, wherin the spirit of God, not onelie warneth what things are to be doone, and what to be auoided; but also stirreth vp the affections, that we may be the more compelled to obedience. And this will I haue to suffice as touching this matter.

Of some of the Affects seuerallie.

²⁷¹ 43 But now we thinke it good to speake somwhat of the affects seuerallie. Affects, as it is manifest, doo belong vnto the generall word of qualitie, and are conteined in that kind, which commonlie is called passion, and passible qualitie. But among these, there be two of a grosser sort, and verie common; I meane delectation and gréefe. They chéeflie haue their place in the sinewes, which be dispersed in a maner ouer all the bodie: vnto which sinewes, when things, either agréeable to nature, or else repugnant therevnto be applied, then we be either delited, or else doo sorrowe. Moreouer, there be other affects, which followe knowledge it selfe: whereby, as the nature of them is, so the hart dooth change his motion, according as good or euill shall be laid hold vpon in the knowledge; and that, either present or imminent. For when we féele that good is present, the hart is pleasantlie delited, and swéetlie affected therewith: and this affect is called gladnesse. But if so be we perceiue that the good is not present indéed, yet not far off, but readie; and that within a while we shall obteine it, then are we stirred vp with hope to pursue the same: and the hart in like maner is pleasantlie mooued. But when we perceiue that euill is present, the hart starteth backe with a gréeued motion: for it shrinketh, it abhorreth, and it is vexed. And this affection is commonlie called as well sorrowe as gréefe of mind. In Gréek it is ⟨…⟩; so called, as the Stoiks thinke of ⟨…⟩, that is, A loosing. For euen as the bodie of him that is sicke, is loosed through sicknesse; so likewise the mind séemeth, after a sort to be consumed with sadnesse.

There remaineth another knowledge of euill, the which indéed is not present, but such as is now néere at hand: that dooth the hart eschew, & euidentlie enough starteth from it by his motion: and such an affect is called feare. According to these principall affects, we will now intreat of those, which haue their originall from sadnesse or gréefe. And those are likewise reckoned to be foure; that is to wit, mercie, ²⁷² indignation, enuie, and emulation; of the which Aristotle did singularlie well write manie things in his booke of Rhetoriks. But before I deale particularlie with these, ²⁷³ we must demand one thing; to wit, whether affects are to be reckoned in the account of good or of euill things? The Stoiks accounted them in the number of euill, and condemned them generallie: being led by this reason; that by them the mind, the iudgement, and sound counsell is greatlie troubled. For they so hale and drawe the mind and reason to and fro, as it cannot peaceablie behold things naturall and diuine; neither yet determine of dooing things orderlie and rightlie. And further, bicause with the heauie loade of them, they driue men verie often to commit dishonest and vniust things: yea, and when they be somewhat more vehement, they hurt the bodie it selfe. These in a manner were the reasons of the Stoiks.

The Peripatetiks teach far otherwise; ²⁷⁴ namelie, that it is not true, which the Stoiks declare, except when affections be not chastised by reason, but are suffered to haue their immoderate scope. Bicause those affections, if they be comprised within certeine bounds, are both good & profitable: as being the matter of vertues, and which by nature were giuen, as the whetstone of them. For fortitude is greatlie furthered by the meanes of wrath: and compassion dooth attend vpon the vertue of clemencie. And in the same sort it may be said as touching the most part of them. But among these philosophers, ²⁷⁵ so disagréeing in themselues; sentence must be giuen according to the iudgement of the holie scriptures. They declare, that man, in respect both of the bodie, and of the soule, was created by God: and they adde; that All things, ²⁷⁶ whatsoeuer GOD made, were good. Therefore, séeing he himselfe planted the affects in man (I meane not wicked nor corrupt, as now we haue them, but perfect and sound, and which should obeie and serue reason) they of necessitie be good. Furthermore, the lawe of God dooth in euerie place commend mercie vnto vs: it preacheth repentance, which cannot be without sorowe & gréefe of mind. Dauid also wrote, and Paule repeated it; ²⁷⁷ Be ye angrie, and sin not. Yea & the matter hath stretched so far foorth, that affects are attributed euen to God himselfe; namelie, wrath, mercie, sorrowe, ²⁷⁸ repentance, and such like: which although they be not properlie spoken of him, yet this we must obserue, that in man, whatsoeuer by it selfe is vice and sinne in his owne nature, is neuer by the holie scriptures attributed vnto God.

Of Shamefastnes.

44 Shamefastnes, which is a meane thing, is commended; ²⁷⁹ yet is it no vertue, bicause men doo naturallie run thereinto, and sometime against their wils: for it is a sorrowe or feare for some euill that hangeth ouer our head, or into which we shall fall. But thou wilt saie, that affects are neither praised or dispraised, since they be naturall; how then can shamefastnesse be commended, and the extremities thereof condemned? I answer, that a méere affect is neither praised nor dispraised, but the measure therof is. It is praised, when it is in a meane; it is dispraised, if it be extreame. Here likewise in shamefastnesse there is found an excesse: and he which so excéedeth, is said to be ⟨…⟩, that is, Astonied, or abashed, who is ashamed at euerie thing. And on the other side, he is impudent, who although he be not altogither ashamed, yet he lacketh shamefastnesse more than becommeth him.

Of Temperance.

45 Betwéene pleasures and gréefes, temperance is the meane; and intemperance the excesse. The defect hath no name. But bicause pleasure is of two kinds; some be of the mind, and those be commended of all men; as when a man reioiseth in the contemplation of God, and of nature: or delighteth in the remembrance of his well dooing, either else taketh pleasure in the helping and benefiting of others to his power. But the other kind of pleasure is more grosse, and is perceiued of the senses, not of the reason: and those are called corporall pleasures. Wherevpon Aristotle saith, that this vertue is not conuersant about the former vertues: for those things being most pure, haue no néed of moderation. It remaineth therefore, that temperance is placed in this latter kind. And yet hath it not place about all corporall things; but in those onelie, which belong vnto the sense of touching. But with touching thou must also vnderstand tasting: for those two senses (as it is written in the booke De anima ) are verie néere one to another. Wherefore, temperance shall be a mediocritie in pleasures of meate and drinke, and fleshlie desire. But wherefore dooth it not also moderate the pleasures, which come by the sight and by the hearing? Bicause the desire of those pleasures is not so great and vehement, as it is of these: neither are those so hurtfull as these be. For by these, if they be immoderate, men doo in a maner degenerate into brute beasts; but so doo they not through sounds, smels, or colours.

But admit that in this kind of pleasures also, which belong vnto the other senses, measure be excéeded; and that there is néed of some vertue, that kind of excesse is neuer accounted or called intemperance: but they, which so sinne, are accused of a certeine other sinne, not of intemperance. Wherefore, séeing that the vertue of temperance hath place, as well in pleasures, as in displeasures; whether of these affections is the more frequented matter thereof? Aristotle saith, that those be pleasures: for in the suppressing of them, we haue greater labour; and vnto the excesse of pleasure we séeme to be driuen by nature. Neither is it so hard a matter to resist displeasure, as it is to temper a mans selfe from pleasure. Vertue in verie déed is chéeflie conuersant about those things that be difficult. Furthermore, the gréefe of the mind, which belongeth to this vertue, ariseth of the defect or absence of pleasure. But it is far more easie, to abide the desire of a pleasure that is absent, than not to enioie a pleasure that is present. The defect or want in this matter had no name. A reason is brought; bicause there be not manie, naie rather, there be verie few, which doo altogither shun pleasures. Those things, which doo seldome happen, or be in a maner neuer séene, doo easilie want a name. But yet, saith Aristotle, they be ⟨…⟩, that is, Astonied. Neuerthelesse, we must thinke that they are properlie so called: for that word dooth also signifie them, which being oppressed with the force of sicknesse, haue no sense. And it may be, that some men, by reason of a sicknesse, or some dissolution of the sinewes, féele no taste of pleasure and fleshlie lust.

Of Mercie, and the affect called Nemesis.

46 But mercie is a gréefe of the mind, ²⁸⁰ which we conceiue for other mens aduersities: or (as Cicero saith) It is a gréefe taken for another mans miserie. Aristotle taught, that mercie is stirred vp, if we sée anie that doo suffer gréeuous things, which they haue not deserued. For if that the wicked doo suffer iust punishments, thereof ariseth no mercie. And besides, he thinketh, that those mishaps, whereby we are mooued with mercie, be cruell; otherwise, if they were but light, we would be mooued but little or nothing: to conclude, that those are mooued with mercie, which consider that such things may happen to themselues, or to some other of theirs. Wherevpon it is thought, that they, which enioie prosperitie, and doo iudge themselues blessed, are not inclined to mercie: naie rather, that they haue béene accustomed to triumph ouer poore wretches, as of those, whom they thinke are not able to hurt them. In like maner, he remooueth this affect from desperate and wretched men; bicause they feare, that nothing can happen vnto them more miserable than they haue: and thus, in that desperate fortune they séeme to haue become senselesse. Howbeit, if this were true, some man might doubt how mercie can be ascribed vnto God; since he without controuersie is the most blessed, and that nothing is able to hurt him.

But héerevnto we answer, that mercie is not properlie attributed vnto God; but by a metaphor taken of man; bicause he dooth those things, which mercifull men haue béene woont to doo. For they doubtlesse doo helpe the afflicted, the verie which thing also the godlie doo. Howbeit, I would not herein subscribe vnto Aristotle, that mercie is not to be shewed to them, which doo iustlie suffer punishment. ²⁸¹ For Samuel moorned a long time for Saule, who was reiected of God; not vndeseruedlie, but most iustlie. And no lesse did Christ moorne for the destruction of Ierusalem, ²⁸² which without doubt hanged ouer the head of that citie, not without desert, but for iust cause. Neither yet doo we allow, that the sinnes, which are committed of some, doo not stir vp mercie; but that onelie calamities and aduersities doo the same. For godlie men are no lesse agréeued for other mens chances, when they fall into great wickednesse, than when they be oppressed with vnhappie fortune. Wherefore we must not denie, that mercie is a good affect, when it followeth the word of God, and reason; especiallie, since the Lord hath pronounced with his mouth; ²⁸³ that Blessed are the mercifull, bicause they also shall obteine mercie.

47 An other affect, which ariseth of sadnesse and gréefe, is that, which they call Nemesis. The same hath no latin word, albeit of some it is called Indignatio, that is, Indignation: which yet, by that word doth not expresse all that affect. For indignation extendeth further than dooth Nemesis. ²⁸⁴ But omitting the word, we will thus define the thing; Nemesis is a sadnesse taken for the prosperitie of wicked men, bicause they séem to be vnworthie of that fortune. Iust and godlie men haue sometimes this affect reigning in them. Dauid, when he sawe the vngodlie flourish, ²⁸⁵ said; My feet had well neere slipped. Also Abacuk tooke it gréeuouslie, that the wicked were of so great power, that they oppressed the saints, ²⁸⁶ and deuoured the iust. And Iob séemeth in a maner to complaine vnto his fréends for the same thing. ²⁸⁷ Furthermore, Plutarch in the life of Homer praiseth this affect; and by reason thereof he far preferreth the Peripatetiks, in disputing of the affects, before the Stoiks, and especiallie by the iudgement of Homer: who affirmeth, that at the length God will angerlie punish, after that the wicked haue a certeine while floorished. Howbeit, this is to be obserued, that men in this respect are not gréeued thorough this affect; for that they shall suffer anie losse, by reason of the prosperitie of the wicked, or bicause that they by their power can hurt them. For if they were by this meanes gréeued, they should not be troubled with Nemesis, but rather with feare. But Nemesis is then, when a man is mooued of a stomach, and for that he hateth the vnworthinesse of the person.

48 This affect in two things communicateth with mercie; first, ²⁸⁸ bicause that either of them both is an heauinesse; secondlie, for that each of them is stirred vp through an vnworthinesse of the thing: Mercie, bicause good men are gréeued and oppressed; Nemesis, bicause wicked men liue fortunatelie. But héerein afterward they differ, bicause Nemesis hath respect vnto prosperous fortune; but mercie vnto sharpe fortune. So that Nemesis is, as it were a meane affect betwéene enuie and mercie; for of either it séemeth to take somewhat: of mercie it taketh vnworthinesse; of enuie, prosperitie, which it hath a respect vnto. And moreouer, ²⁸⁹ Aristotle teacheth, that none are affected with Nemesis, for other mens vertues. For if otherwise of vitious and corrupt men, they become moderate, strong and temperate men; we disdaine it not: bicause when they are adorned with vertues, they are no longer counted wicked men. But then at the last we are affected with Nemesis, when vnto wicked men there come those good things, wherwith we thinke that good men ought to be rewarded; as are riches, honors, authoritie, fauor, and such like. Neuerthelesse, godlie men must deale prudentlie with this affect, that when their minds are affected therewith, bicause of the fortunate state of the vngodlie, let vs haue a regard vnto God, who is the true gouernor and distributor of all good things. Wherefore, if men should bestowe those outward good things vpon the vnworthie, their vniustice might be iustlie reprooued. Howbeit, such a reprehension hath no place in GOD, bicause he dooth all things most iustlie. This, when Dauid did not diligentlie consider, he said; My feet had well neere slipt. ²⁹⁰ As though he should haue said; By reason of this Nemesis, I had almost gréeuouslie fallen. Wherfore we must sildome giue place to this affect, least we séeme to reprehend the prouidence of GOD.

49 Mercie is an affect profitablie ingraffed in our minds by God, ²⁹¹ whereby we are stirred vp to help and defend others. But we must take héed, that thereby we be not made so nice and effeminate, as thorough the same we should commit anie thing against the co~mandements and will of God. The holie scriptures reprehend Achab king of Samaria, bicause he spared Benhadad king of Syria, of whom he said; ²⁹² If he be aliue he is my brother. Also they condemne Saule, by the mouth of the prophet Samuel; ²⁹³ bicause he saued Agag king of Amalech aliue. And euen as it was said vnto another by the messenger of God; Thy soule shall be for his soule: so Saule, being a little before placed by God in the kingdome, was depriued thereof. What shall we then doo? Shall not sinnes be forgiuen? Seneca, in his second booke De clementia, the sixt chapter; Pardon (saith he) is a remission of punishment due, whereby he is forgiuen, which ought to haue béene punished. And so he thinketh it is not a wise mans part to giue pardon; bicause a wise man will neuer commit that, which ought not to be doone; or leaue anie thing vndoone, which ought to be doone. This reason of his séemeth to be good and effectuall enough, yet least we should be deceiued thereby, we must here make a profitable distinction of persons; namelie, of God, of princes, and of priuate men. ²⁹⁴ No man ought to doubt, but that God may forgiue whom he will, since that he is not bound to anie other mans lawes. Wherefore, in forgiuing, he is not said to remit that, which ought to haue béene punished. Besides this, he hath not so forgiuen men their faults, but that he hath punished them in his onelie begotten sonne Christ.

But we must otherwise thinke of the magistrate, to whom it is not lawfull to forgiue the punishments of sinnes, bicause he is commanded to giue iudgement according to the lawes: to whom neuerthelesse it is commanded, ²⁹⁵ either to release, or to aggrauate the punishments, according to the weight or maner of the crimes. So now, when he that is guiltie is cureable, and hath not gréeuouslie offended; the magistrate is sometime content with an easier punishment; and sometime he vseth a more sharpe reprehension or admonition: and so he neuer leaueth sinnes vnpunished. And euen he in punishing is not cruell, naie he rather correcteth, amendeth and healeth. Which worke is both a iust and mercifull worke: so farre is it off that it should be ascribed to seueritie or crueltie. And this will I also adde by the waie, which is written by the same Seneca; that To haue manie executions, is no lesse dishonourable to magistrates, than manie funerals to Physicians. But now, concerning priuate men, me thinketh it must be thus answered; It is their dutie to forgiue iniuries doone to themselues. Neither can Seneca his saieng take place in them; namelie, that a wise man will leaue nothing vndoone that ought to be doon, bicause reuengement is forbidden them by the lawe of almightie God: and they are commanded after a sort to punish such as sinne against them; ²⁹⁶ I meane in reproouing them. And they are willed to be content with that punishment, when those which haue offended them, are amended and cured. But contrariwise, if they perceiue them to be stubborne, they, by the commandement of God ought to complaine to the church, by whom at the last they are excluded; vnlesse they will be obedient therevnto. And when they are excluded out of the church, they may also be accused to the magistrate; wherein neuerthelesse there is not anie thing committed against clemencie: for such is the mind and purpose of the accusers, that by all meanes possible, according to Gods commandement, euill may be vtterlie taken awaie from among men.

Of Crueltie.

50 And as concerning crueltie, ²⁹⁷ we may easilie gather by the punishment doone vnto Adonibezeck, that too much crueltie displeaseth God: and thereof I thinke it came to passe, that as well by Gods lawes, as mans lawes (of those I meane which are accounted iust and honest) there haue béene certeine punishments prescribed for crimes, according to the gréeuousnesse of them; to the intent that iudges might haue the lesse libertie to exercise crueltie. Yea and lawiers haue added this rule, that punishments should rather be diminished by iudges, than augmented: which neuerthelesse must be vnderstood so farre foorth as the nature of the fault and vtilitie of the Common-weale will suffer. Which I therefore speake, bicause otherwhile those conditions, which commonlie they call circumstances, doo make the crime so odious and horrible, that the iudges must there of necessitie augment the punishment, which hath béene prescribed by the lawes; to the intent they may terrifie others fro~ so great & detestable offenses. And so Dauid, ²⁹⁸ when Nathan the prophet had set before him an execrable and horrible thing, decréed a more gréeuous punishment against him that was guiltie, than the lawe had prouided against common théeues, and stealers of cattell.

I haue therefore made mention of these, ²⁹⁹ bicause there were in the law thrée kinds of death appointed for euill dooers; I meane, hanging, stoning, and burning: wherevnto some of the Hebrues adde a fourth; namelie, the punishment of the sword. But bicause there is not (as farre as I knowe) anie mention thereof in the lawe, I haue therefore passed it ouer. We read that Adonias, Ioab, and Agag king of Amalech, were thrust thorough with swords; but we find it not prescribed by anie lawe or precept, that the guiltie should be put to death. Séeing therefore the matter is so, yet we perceiue, ³⁰⁰ that the children of Israel vsed in their tents a certeine extraordinarie kind of punishment against king Adonibezek. Neither will I beléeue, that they did this without the instinct of GOD: for God would punish the crueltie of this tyrant, with an exquisite punishment, which neuerthelesse was a rendering like for like. Which kind of horrible dooing, to the intent we may the easilier auoid, it shall not be gréeuous vnto vs to speake somewhat thereof.

³⁰¹ 51 This word crueltie, is deriued either of this Latine word Cruor, which signifieth Bloud, wherein cruell men like wild beasts doo delite; or else of Crudae carnes, which signifieth Rawe flesh, which barbarous and beastlie people doo sometimes eate: and it may be defined to be an euill habit, by the which we are inclined vnto sharpe and hard things aboue reason. And somtimes it happeneth, that crueltie is counted for a pleasure: with which wicked affection or habit, how some wicked tyrants haue somtime béene infected, it is euidentlie to be perceiued by manie examples. For the holie historie setteth before our eies Adonibezek: and the euangelicall historie maketh mention of Herod. ³⁰² The Ethnike poets haue made report of the crueltie of Atreus and Thiestes. And the most cruell fact of Xerxes king of the Persians is set foorth by Seneca in his third booke De ira, ³⁰³ the 17. chapter. When a certeine man named Pythius, who had well deserued at his hands, came vnto him, and desired of him to spare him one of his fiue sons from the wars, he co~manded him, as though he would grant him his request, to choose which of them he would haue to tarrie at home from the wars. And he did as he was bidden. But this most cruell tyrant commanded, that the yoong man, whom he had chosen, should be drawne one side of him one waie, and the other side of him another waie, vntill at the length he was torne in sunder: the one part whereof he commanded to be fastened in one corner of the waie, by the which the soldiers should passe; and the other in another corner: saieng, that by this meanes he purged his armie. Howbeit, not long after, he being most shamefullie ouercome and beaten by the Graecians, was constreined to flie awaie through the ouerthrowes and dead carcases of his owne soldiers.

³⁰⁴ Sylla banished an innumerable companie of the citizens of Rome: but at the length he was most horriblie eaten vp of lice. Euen after the like sort died that most cruell Herod, as it is most manifestlie declared by Iosephus. Contrarie to this excéeding great wickednes and most heinous mischéefe is clemencie, which as a singular vertue dooth verie well become princes, and is an excellent ornament of christian men. Augustine in his third booke of Questions, question 31. defineth the same after this maner; ³⁰⁵ It is an habit, whereby men being stirred vp to hatred against anie man, are through goodnesse kept backe. ³⁰⁶ This vertue is a meane betwéene crueltie and foolish mercie. I call it foolish mercie, whereby our mind is so mooued with other mens miseries, that it declineth from sound counsell and iust reason. And for this cause are we ouercome of this affect, bicause we would neuer suffer such things, as we sée others iustlie and deseruedlie afflicted withall: and bicause we our selues indeuour to auoid the same, therefore we cease to punish the wicked.

52 Dauid, hauing ouercome his enimies, ³⁰⁷ did gréeuouslie punish them; he led the Ammonites foorth of the citie, and slue them, not after a vulgar maner, but he had sawes, wherwith he sawed them in sunder. And this is also shewed to haue happened vnto Esaie. And in the eleuenth chapter to the Hebrues, it is said of the saints, ³⁰⁸ that they were hewen in sunder. This kind of punishment perhaps was vsuall in those parts. Moreouer, he brought foorth chariots and sleds, that they should be drawne vpon them; and he also hewed them in sunder with axes and hatchets, he threw them into the kils of bricke or tile: all which are cruell things. ³⁰⁹ Dauid perhaps in these punishments, might séeme to haue degenerated from his owne nature: for he was méeke and gentle; but these séeme to be parts of excéeding great crueltie. What did he become another Phalaris? No: but if we will iudge by things, as they were doone, manie of them may séeme in the holie scriptures to haue béene cruell. ³¹⁰ For the Iewes so punished king Adonibesek, as they cut off the thumbes of his hands, and of his féet. Iosua brought foorth the kings, ³¹¹ which had hidden themselues in a caue; and they being prostrated vpon the earth, he would haue them to be troden vpon by the children of Israel, in such wise, that they should tread with their féet vpon euerie one of their necks: and afterward he hanged them vpon fiue trées. ³¹² Gedeon, in the eight chapter of the booke of Iudges, slue the elders of Succoth with thornes and briers. Saules sonnes, ³¹³ by the will and commandement of the Lord, were hanged vp. These things séeme at the first sight to be cruell; but they be not so. Which that it may appéere, doo but consider this; that about the executing of punishments, there be found in the minds of men, habits of vertue, and of vices.

Clemencie causeth minds to be bent vnto the mitigation of punishments, according vnto right reason. The vice that is in defect, is a certeine remissenesse and slacknesse in punishing: for we may sée manie, which doo not once touch heinous crimes. And on the other part, there is a certeine habit of fiercenesse and crueltie, that passeth measure. Those be called cruell (if we giue credit to Seneca, in his second booke De clementia ) which excéed a measure in punishing offenders. And, as we bréeflie touched, cruell men are so called either of Cruor, that is, Bloud: as who should saie, they be delited therewith; or else of Cruditas, that is, Rawnesse. For euen as those things, which be sodden, haue a pleasant taste; so haue rawe things an vnpleasantnesse ioined with them, togither with a certeine taste that is horrible. Those be sauage and cruell, which doo torment without a cause, as though they were delited with the torments of other men; euen as beasts that knowe not goodnesse and honestie, but haue onelie respect vnto swéetnesse and commoditie: either for that the sight of bloud is delitefull, or else bicause they will be fed with flesh. Now, since crueltie consisteth in this, that therein is a going beyond the measure of right reason; let vs sée, whether Dauid and others haue passed the bounds of reason. Certes, they followed a mediocritie; and those things, which they did, belonged vnto punishing iustice: for those were woorthie of the greatest punishments. Dauid followed reason, but yet a diuine reason; the which reason alone is called good. God stirred him vp vnto these things, not without a cause. And it was necessarie for him, since he was a grand capteine, to followe that reason, which God had shewed vnto him.

53 That the Ammonites were most wicked men, we may knowe it by manie causes. First of all, they against the lawe of nations, shamed the ambassadors of Dauid, in cutting short their beards and garments. They gaue an ill iudgement of the most godlie king Dauid; namelie, that he had sent that ambassage with a feigned hart, not to comfort the sonne of the king of the Ammonites, which was dead, but to destroie him. Againe, when the head citie was besieged, and that they had slaine Vrias, and other valiant men, they also vaunted against God. This did Nathan declare; ³¹⁴ Bicause thou hast prouoked mine enimies (saith he) to speake euill of me, the child, which is borne of thee, shall be slaine. If God slue the child of Dauid, bicause Dauid had giuen an occasion of blaspheming God; how much more gréeuouslie were they to be punished, which did this thing? And further, wheras they had doone iniuries vnto Dauid, yet did they first mooue war against him. And neither would they onelie hurt Dauid, but they also solicited others of his subiects and tributaries to forsake him. They disquieted all those regions of Syria and Mesopotamia: and that (which is most of all) they burned their sonnes and daughters for their idoll sake, which they worshipped. And what maruell was it, if they were throwne into the same fornaces, ³¹⁵ wherein they threw their owne children? This was a punishment of like for like.

And alwaies in those punishments, which are not reprooued in the scriptures, we must flie vnto this; namelie, that God gouerned those fathers. Some, to make these punishments the lesse, saie that all were not so handled; but the seigniors and princes onelie, which were as the staie and succour of the people. But Iosephus saith, that they were all rid out of the waie. And the scriptures also séeme to make it a generall punishment. Howbeit, I would thinke that some were excepted: for in the 17. chapter of the second booke of Samuel, we read, ³¹⁶ that Sobi the sonne of king Nahas, did helpe Dauid, when he was driuen out of the kingdome by Absolom. Wherevpon it is gathered, that the one sonne of king Nahas was slaine, and that the other was by Dauid made ruler of the countrie. These things are not so much to be woondered at in him, séeing he was a figure of the true Dauid, which at the last daie shall saie vnto all men; Go ye curssed into euerlasting fire, which is prepared for the diuell and his angels. Those punishments which God shall laie vpon the wicked in hell, are not cruell. They shall be as it were intollerable punishments, but yet they procéed of a right punishing iustice. He saith in the Gospell; ³¹⁷ Bring ye vnto me all them, which would not haue me reigne ouer them, and slaie them in my sight. Here let magistrates learne to haue a regard vnto right reason, when the guiltie are deliuered to them to be punished. It must not gréeue their mind to execute those punishments, which are iust, and commanded to be doone.

Of Enuie.

54 Now come we to enuie: ³¹⁸ the same did Cicero thinke should rather be called Inuidentia, than Inuidia: the which word Inuidentia we may in English call Enuieng, or Enuiousnesse; ³¹⁹ bicause among the Latinists, those that are enuied, are said to suffer enuie. But enuieng belongeth to them, which pine awaie with this kind of gréefe. And therefore he thinketh, that enuie or enuieng is so called, bicause they, which be enuious, doo looke too narrowlie to other mens prosperitie. Wherefore, ³²⁰ enuie is a gréefe taken at the prosperitie of other men; especiallie of them, which haue béene of like degrée with vs. For a poore man enuieth not a king; nor yet beggers, noble men. Enuie is of equals, and such as be like vnto our selues. And likenesse is considered in kindred, riches, beautie, age, wit, dignitie, and such like. The cause of enuieng is not in respect that we be afraid of harme to come vnto vs, by such men as we doo enuie; for that were feare: but that men of a certeine hatred and stomach cannot abide the prosperitie of others, especiallie of their like and equals: this worketh enuie.

Enuie is alwaies had in euill things; and it is gréeuouslie reprehended in the holie scriptures; bicause it is most plainelie repugnant vnto charitie it selfe. For in the first epistle to the Corinthians, ³²¹ the 13. chapter, the apostle said; Charitie enuieth not. For Paule in that place did not take this Gréeke word ⟨…⟩, in his proper signification. But vnto the Galathians he hath more plainlie forbidden enuie, ³²² saieng; Be not desirous of vaine glorie, prouoking one another, and enuieng one another. In which place, not onelie enuie is reprooued, but also the mother thereof is shewed, ³²³ that is to wit, the desire of glorie. And this may we also note in the historie of the Iudges: for the Ephraits enuied Gedeon, bicause the glorie of so great a victorie séemed to haue come vnto him.

And this affect beareth rule in all those things, wherein we desire to excell. Neither yet dooth it forbeare vertues: for he that is enuious would not haue his equals, and such as be like vnto him, to excell in anie ornament of vertue. And the reason why enuie is conuersant among such as be alike, is, that although the prosperous fortune of our equals, and them that be like vs, dooth not plucke anie of our goods from vs, nor maketh vs lesse than we be; yet the enuious man dooth so conceiue of other mens goods, as if by them his honour and dignitie, his gaine and other ornaments should be diminished. ³²⁴ Neither must we omit, that euerie enuious man is a reioiser in euill things: for he delighteth in the aduersitie of his equals. Yet must not both these be accounted for one and the selfe same vice; séeing they apperteine to contrarie motions of the mind. For enuie is a gréefe or sadnesse; whereas he that reioiseth in euill things, is affected with delight. Otherwise these vices, although they be diuers, yet are they so linked togither, as there can be no enuious man, which is not mooued with a gladnesse of other mens harmes. And héereby it euidentlie appéereth, that enuie is méere repugnant vnto mercie, séeing mercie sorroweth for an other mans miserie, but an enuious man reioiseth for the same, by reason of the delight, wherewith he is affected to other mens harme. This motion of the mind is in him also, that is vexed or angred at the prosperitie of the wicked: for he that becommeth sad for the prosperitie of the wicked, the verie same man taketh pleasure, when he perceiueth them to be suppressed and in trouble.

Of Emulation.

³²⁵ 55 After this, we are to speake of Emulation; that is to wit, the greefe of mind, which we run into for other mens goods, which we our selues want, when as those things may become vs, and we be able to obteine them. We desire not by this motion of the mind, to haue other despoiled of those ornaments that they haue; but it gréeueth vs that we our selues be destitute of them: and it co~meth of a good nature thus to be affected. ³²⁶ Wherefore emulation is reckoned among commendable affections. Cicero in his Tusculane questions defineth, that héerof commeth a gréefe of mind; when an other man inioieth the good, which we our selues desire. The same author obserued, that emulation is otherwhile so taken, as it differeth nothing from enuieng; and therefore is sometimes reprooued. But if we vnderstand it in such sort, as we haue said, it is a commendable affect; bicause it maketh men the better: for it is accustomed to ingender the imitation of good things. ³²⁷ But we must take héed of that, which indéed we are prone vnto; namelie, that it degenerate not into hatred, and that emulation haue no such scope, as we should desire to despoile men, which be fortunate, honourable, and honest, of their ornaments and good things.

And for this cause Cicero said, ³²⁸ that that emulation is praise-woorthie, which is not like vnto the emulation that is in wooing; séeing this is the propertie of wooers, that they would so enioy their pleasures, as they may vtterlie exclude others. These cautions being had, emulation is both good and godlie. Wherefore Paule exhorted the Corinthians, that they should striue to excell one an other in charitie, ³²⁹ and in the better sort of graces. This affection is most occupied about vertues, and about all such things as are had in honour and admiration: for what soeuer thing a man contemneth and despiseth, he dooth not emulate. ³³⁰ Emulation hath ioined with it a perpetuall hope of obteining that which it desireth: for if a man despaire, it is not possible for him to emulate. And so much of these affects.

Of Reuenge.

56 Reuenge is of two sorts; one publike, ³³¹ and an other priuate. And as for publike, which ought to be exercised by the magistrate; so far is it off from prohibiting therof, as God commandeth the same; warning alwaies the magistrates, that they should execute iustice and iudgement, and not suffer wickednesse to escape vnpunished. ³³² But it is not lawfull for priuate men to reuenge, vnlesse it be, according to the prouerbe, To repell violence by violence. This is not prohibited them, when the magistrate cannot helpe them. For somtime the case happeneth so vpon the sudden, as a man cannot straitwaie flie to the helpe of the publike power. Wherefore we may then defend our selues, vsing neuerthelesse great moderation; to wit, that we onelie indeuour to defend our selues, and them that be committed vnto vs, not wishing with a mind of reuenge to hurt our aduersaries; in such sort as that action may procéed, not of hatred, but of charitie. Yet neuerthelesse, publike reuenge (as we haue said) is commanded by God. By the which precept, not onelie magistrates are bound, but the guiltie also are bound, that they should with a patient mind beare the correction and punishment, that is laid vpon them by the superiour power, for the crime which they haue committed. Which if they doo, let them vnderstand, that it belongeth vnto the commendation of iustice.

But doo not thou obiect vnto me the saieng of Aristotle, in his Rhetoriks, that according to other vertues, it is honest and laudable, not onlie to doo, but also to suffer. And he onelie excepteth iustice: for he saith; They which are punished, and doo suffer iustlie, must rather be dispraised than praised. For that, which he héere saith, is true; if thou respect the cause, for the which they be punished: that without doubt is not praise-worthie; sith they are punished for offenses. Yet on the other side, if thou respect his mind in suffering, which for a publike commoditie, and for other mens instruction, bicause of the commandement of God, that he may obeie him, and in detestation of the wickednesse committed, dooth willinglie submit him selfe to the lawes which are decréed; it must not be denied, but that such a one dooth iustlie, and is to be praised in such a stedfastnesse, & iust determination of his mind. But yet the praier of Samson may séeme at the first sight not to be verie godlie: ³³³ for he praieth, that it might be granted him to take reuenge vpon his enimies; bicause they put out both his eies. In verie truth, if he had ment to fulfill his wrath, we might not iustlie allow of his praier: for he should no more haue béene allowed of God, than if he had said expreslie; I beséech thée Lord to prosper either my theft or my adulterie.

Augustine saith, that Samson did these things, not of his owne accord; but by the drift and counsell of the holie Ghost. Besides, we must not thinke of Samson, as of a priuate man; but as of a magistrate, whom God himselfe had appointed. And surelie, it was not lawfull for him, as a priuate man, to reuenge iniuries; but as a magistrate, both he might, and should doo it. If we speake of a priuate cause, that must be of force, ³³⁴ which Paule said; Giue place vnto wrath; vengeance is mine, and I will repaie, saith the Lord. But in a publike cause, the magistrate, by the commandement and authoritie of GOD, must reuenge the iniurie doone vnto him: for he is Gods deputie vpon the earth. And God himselfe, although that oftentimes he reuengeth sinnes immediatlie, as they saie, by himselfe; yet dooth he for the most part punish by magistrats. Wherefore those words; Vengeance is mine, and I will repaie, doo nothing at all hinder the seueritie of magistrates, whereby they punish offenders. For they be the ministers of God; and that which they doo, God himselfe dooth it by them.

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← 26. The eight Chapter. The fift precept; of · Contents · 28. The tenth Chapter. The seuenth precept →

Footnotes

1. In. 1. Sam. 18. verse. 1. Of friendship. ↩

2. The definition of loue. ↩

3. A definition of friendship. ↩

4. The ends of true and false friendship. ↩

5. A reprehension of Epicurus. ↩

6. Dauid loued Ionathas not in respect of the generall commandement onlie. ↩

7. In Iudges. 9, verse. 24. ↩

8. Numb. 35, 6. ↩

9. Cicero. ↩

10. 2. Sam. 14, 6
    ↩

11. Who be murtherers. ↩

12. In this offense the will is to be punished. ↩

13. Matth. 5, 2⟨…⟩ ↩

14. Ierom. ↩

15. Cyprian. ↩

16. Augustine. ↩

17. Mark. 15, 25 ↩

18. Luk. 23, 44. ↩

19. In 2. kin. 1. ↩

20. Mat. 16, 53. ↩

21. Iohn. 18, 4. ↩

22. Iohn. 7, 46. ↩

23. 1. Sam. 5, 6.
    ↩
24. 2. Macha. 3. verse. 25. 1. Mac. 7, 43
    ↩

25. Luk. 10, 16. ↩

26. 3. kin. 13, 4.
    ↩

27. Num. 16, 2. ↩

28. In 2 King. 1, verse. 9. ↩

29. Luke. 9, 54. ↩

30. Looke In 2 Kings. 2, 23. ↩

31. 1. Kin. 17, 16
    ↩

32. Acts. 5, 5. Acts. 13, 11. ↩

33. Iohn. 4, 20. ↩

34. Warres of christians against the Turks. ↩

35. Fighting for the Gospell. ↩

36. Luke. 9, 55. ↩

37. In 1. Kin. 18 verse, 40. ↩

38. Why the Baalits were slaine. ↩

39. Whether Helias did well in killing of the Baalits. ↩

40. Gal. 1, 17. ↩

41. Looke In 1. Sam. 15, 31. Num. 25, 7. 1. Kin. 18, 40 ↩

42. An ill work cannot be made good by an intent. ↩

43. Rom. 3, 8. ↩

44. Rom. 14, 23 ↩

45. Luk. 1, 55. ↩

46. Deut. 18, 20 ↩

47. verse. 11. ↩

48. verse. 5. ↩

49. verse. 16. ↩

50. 1. kin. 18, 4. and 13.
    ↩

51. Iudg. 4, 15. ↩

52. Psal. 43, 10. ↩

53. 1. Sa. 15, 33.
    ↩

54. Exod. 2, 12. ↩

55. Act. 7, 24. ↩

56. Acts. 13, 11. Acts. 5, 5. ↩

57. 1. kin. 18, 23
    ↩

58. Gen. 22, 3. ↩

59. In Iudg. 9, verse. 5. ↩

60. The lawe of Numa Pompilius. ↩

61. Augustine. ↩

62. Augustines booke De patientia supposed not his. ↩

63. Romulus made no mention of parricide in his lawes. ↩

64. An answer of Solon. ↩

65. The punishment of parricides. ↩

66. Absolom. 2. Sa. 18, 14. ↩

67. Nero. Orestes. ↩

68. Cicero. ↩

69. Domitian. ↩

70. Carracalla. ↩

71. Abimelech. ↩

72. Iudg. 9. ↩

73. In 2. Sam. 2, verse. 12. ↩

74. Fighting by sword-plaie is reprehended. ↩

75. 1. Sam. 2, 11
    ↩

76. In. 1. Sam. 31, 11. ↩

77. Death in it owne nature is euill. ↩

78. verse. 26. ↩

79. That it is not lawfull for a man to kill himselfe. Arguments out of the scriptures. ↩

80. Looke In Gen. 9, 5. ↩

81. Exo. 20, 13. ↩

82. Iob. 17, 15. Matth. 10, 16, &, 23. ↩

83. 2. Sam. 1, 16
    ↩

84. Whence the rule of charitie must be taken. ↩

85. Augustine. Arguments out of the fathers. ↩

86. Matt. 27, 5. ↩

87. Ierom. ↩

88. Chrysost. ↩

89. Gal. 1, 4. ↩

90. Canons of the apostles ↩

91. Arguments out of the philosophers and poets. Plato. ↩

92. Aristotle. ↩

93. Virgil. ↩

94. Out of the Epigrams. ↩

95. Arguments out of the lawes. ↩

96. Contrarie examples of them that haue killed themselues. ↩

97. Why Cato killed himselfe ↩

98. M. Regulus ↩

99. Of Lucretia. ↩

100. That Lucretia was an adulteresse. ↩

101. Of Curtius. ↩

102. The virgins of Lemnos. ↩

103. Ionas. 1, 12. Of Ionas. ↩

104. Of Razis. ↩

105. 2. Ma. 14. 43
     ↩

106. The Donatists. ↩

107. The Donatists desirous of voluntarie death. ↩

108. 2. Ma. 14, 37
     ↩
109. 1. Cor. 13, 3
     ↩

110. Another argument of the Donatists. ↩

111. Dan, 3, 18. ↩

112. Rom. 5, 8. ↩

113. Another argument of the Donatists. ↩

114. Whether selfe-death may be lawfull for keeping of chastitie. ↩

115. Examples. ↩

116. Augustins opinion touching these examples. ↩

117. Iud. 16, 28. ↩

118. Heb. 11, 32. ↩

119. Exod. 20, 13 ↩

120. Exod. 11, 2. Gen. 22. 1. ↩

121. Whether for the cause of Gods glorie it be lawfull for one to kill himselfe. ↩

122. Iud. 16, 30. ↩

123. 2. Mach. 14. verse. 43.
     ↩

124. Rom. 3, 8. ↩

125. 2. Sam. 1, 16
     ↩

126. The conclusion of this place. ↩

127. In Rom. 12 verse. 19. ↩

128. Matt. 5, 39. ↩

129. Iohn. 18, 23. Acts. 23, 3. ↩

130. Luk. 22, 38. ↩

131. Ibidem. 49. ↩

132. In ⟨…⟩o. 11, 9 Looke 1. Cor. 16. at the end, and Iud. 5. 23. Gen. 9, 25. ↩

133. Num. 22, 5. Deut. 27, 13 ↩

134. Num. 5, 19. ↩

135. Ibidem. 21. ↩

136. Iosua. 6, 26 ↩

137. 1. King. 6, 34 Nehe. 13, 25 Or 2. of Esdras.
     ↩

138. Other write A⟨…⟩te⟨…⟩us. ↩

139. Augustine. ↩

140. Cursses in the prophets, are prophesies. ↩

141. Psalm. 2, 1. ↩

142. Psal. 22, 29. ↩

143. A place out of the Apocalypse. Apoc. 6, 10. ↩

144. Sinne two maner of waies destroied. ↩

145. The martyrs praie for the end of the world ↩

146. 2. Thes. 2, 8.
     ↩

147. A distinction of the men that cursse. ↩

148. A distinction of the euils which we praie for. ↩

149. In our owne cause we must be patient. Rom. 12, 14 ↩

150. An example of a priest of Athens. ↩

151. In Gods cause imprecations are sometime lawfull. ↩

152. In imprecations we must beware that the flesh be not stirred vp. ↩

153. 1. kin. 17, 1.
     ↩

154. Psal. 83, 17. ↩

155. The best waie of cursing. ↩

156. Matt. 6, 10. ↩

157. Acts. 13, 11. Acts. 5, 5. and .9. ↩

158. Acts. 8, 20. 1. Cor. 5, 5. ↩

159. Gal. 5, 12. ↩

160. 2. kin. 1, 10.
     ↩
161. 2. kin. 2, 24.
     ↩

162. Curssings & the sword of reuenge are compared togither. ↩

163. Rom, ⟨…⟩2, 14. Matth. 5, 24 ↩

164. Psal. 24, 4. ↩

165. 1. Tim. 2, 1.
     ↩
166. 1. Iohn. 5, 16
     ↩

167. What sinne we must not praie for. ↩

168. Contrarie motions in one will of the godlie. ↩

169. An example of Samuel toward Saule. 1. Sa. 15, 11. ↩

170. In 2. Sam. 8, verse. 10. ↩

171. Whether it be lawfull to reioise at the destruction of enimies. verse. 17. ↩

172. Exod. 15. ↩

173. 2. Sam. 1, 11 2. Sa. 18, 33. 2. Sam. 3, 32 1. Sa. 25, 39. 1. Sa. 15, 35.
     ↩

174. In Rom. 11. ↩

175. In Rom. 12 verse. 14. ↩

176. 1. Sam. 26, 9.
     ↩

177. Vespasianus. ↩

178. Matt. 5, 45. ↩

179. Luke. 9, 54 ↩

180. Luke. 22, 51 ↩

181. Matt. 26. 50, ↩

182. Luke. 23, 43 ↩

183. Luke. 23, 34 ↩

184. Rom. 5, 8. ↩

185. How manie waies our aduersaries misreports doo benefit vs. ↩

186. Matt. 5. 10. ↩

187. verse. 11. ↩

188. Rom. 5, 3. ↩

189. Iam. 1, 4. ↩

190. Matth. 5, 11 ↩

191. 1. Cor. 4, 12
     ↩

192. Gal. 5, 12. ↩

193. Psal. 69, 12. ↩

194. Whether it be lawfull alwaies to cursse enimies. ↩

195. Exod. 32, 11 Gen. 18. ↩

196. 1. Sa. 15, 11. Iere. 10, 24.
     ↩

197. Luke. 19, 41 ↩

198. Matt. 11, 25 ↩

199. Wherein consisteth the magnanimitie of christians. ↩

200. The error of Aquinas ↩

201. Matt. 5, 44. Rom. 12, 14 ↩

202. In Iudg. 1. verse. 17. Looke in 1. Cor. 16. at the end. ↩

203. Gal, 1. 8. Rom. 9, 3. ↩

204. or separated from Christ. 1. Co. 16, 22 ↩

205. Iosu. 6. 17. ↩

206. Whether the destruction of cities belong to the seruice of God. ↩

207. Iosua. 7, 1. ↩

208. 1. Sa. 15, 11.
     ↩

209. The forme of the cursse ↩

210. The end thereof. ↩

211. The matter of the same. ↩

212. Acts. 25, 14. ↩

213. Iude. 11, 39. Ieptha. ↩

214. Agamemnon. ↩

215. The efficient cause of the cursie. ↩

216. Deut. 7, 16. ↩

217. Iosua. 6, 17. ↩

218. Num. 21, 2. ↩

219. 1. Sam. 15, 3
     ↩

220. Num. 12. ↩

221. Augustine. ↩

222. Matt. 5, 43. ↩

223. Who is our neighbour. ↩

224. Luke. 10, 30 ↩

225. Psal. 109. ↩

226. Augustine. ↩

227. Gal. 5, 12. ↩

228. Acts. 13, 11, Act. 5, 5. & 9 ↩

229. Note a distinction. ↩

230. 1. Sam. 26, 9
     ↩

231. What we must speciallie take heed of in dooing the businesse of God. ↩

232. Luke. 9, 54. ↩

233. Whether it be lawfull to cursse tyrants, and to praie against them. Augustine. ↩

234. Augustine. ↩

235. 1. Sa. 15, 11.
     ↩

236. Ierem. 9, 1. ↩

237. Luke. 19, 41 ↩

238. God requireth not of vs a Stoicall lacke of compassion. ↩

239. What affect is. ↩

240. What affects doo followe touching. ↩

241. What affects doo spring from the cogitation. ↩

242. Passions. ↩

243. Gladnesse, ↩

244. Sadnesse. Hope. Feare. ↩

245. The places or organs of the affects. ↩

246. That the hart is the seate of the affects. ↩

247. Deut. 6, 5. Mark. 12, 30 ↩

248. How the naturall affects do belong to the hart. ↩

249. That the affects are no violent motions. ↩

250. The efficient cause of the affects. ↩

251. Why the affects are in some more feeble, and in other more vehement. ↩

252. Whether affects be opinions. ↩

253. Whether all affects be euill. ↩

254. Acts. 5, 51. ↩

255. Ill affects are repugnant to right reason ↩

256. Good and laudable affects. ↩

257. ⟨…⟩ or the impassibilitie of the Stoiks must be auoided. ↩

258. Whence it coms that there is a dissenting of the affects from reason. ↩

259. How the affects may be gouerned. ↩

260. Foure degrees of men. ↩

261. In all affects there is som good thing. ↩

262. Ill affects hurt the will and reason. ↩

263. In what parts of the mind be the affects. ↩

264. The part that ruleth. ↩

265. The lusting part. ↩

266. The wrath full part. ↩

267. Whether the affects be mooued against the will. ↩

268. Whether the powers of desire & of anger be all one. ↩

269. How Rhetoricians dispose themselues in the moouing of mens affections. ↩

270. Whether it be lawfull for Orators to iudge mens affections. ↩

271. In Iudg. 8, verse. 1. Looke before part. 2. chap. 2. and also vpon 1. Sam. 18, 8. and 1. Cor. 3, verse. 3. ↩

272. Foure affects which arise of greefe. ↩

273. Whether affects be among the number of good or of euil things. ↩

274. The Peripatetiks. ↩

275. What the holie scriptures determine of affects. ↩

276. Gen., 131. ↩

277. Psal. 4, 5. Ephes. 4, 26. ↩

278. That which is sinne in his owne nature is neuer attributed vnto God. ↩

279. In the commentaries vpon Aristotles Ethiks. ↩

280. In Iudg. 8, verse. 1. ↩

281. 1. Sa. 25, 11.
     ↩

282. Luk. 19, 41. ↩

283. Matt. 5, 7. ↩

284. A definition of Nemesis. ↩

285. Psal. 73, 2. Abac. 1, 1. ↩

286. Iob. 21, 1. ↩

287. Plutarch. ↩

288. The agreement and difference betweene mercie and Nemesis. ↩

289. Aristotle. ↩

290. Psal. 73, 2. ↩

291. In Iud. 1. 7. That mercie is a profitable affect. ↩

292. 1. Kin. 20, 42
     ↩
293. 1. Sa. 15, 29.
     ↩

294. By whom punishments may be forgiuen and how far foorth. ↩

295. A measure for magistrats to punish by. ↩

296. What reuenge priuate men must vse. ↩

297. In Iud. 1. ↩

298. 2. Sam. 12, 5
     ↩

299. Three kinds of death in the lawe of God. ↩

300. An extraordinarie punishment of the Hebrues. ↩

301. The definition of crueltie. ↩

302. Matt. 2, 16. ↩

303. The crueltie of Xerxes. ↩

304. The miserable end of Sylla. ↩

305. Clemencie defined. ↩

306. A foolish kind of mercie. ↩

307. In 2. Sam. 12, verse. 31. ↩

308. Heb. 11, 37. ↩

309. Whether Dauid were cruell. ↩

310. Iudg. 1, 6. ↩

311. Iosua. 10, 27 ↩

312. Iudg. 8, 16. ↩

313. 2. Sam. 21, 9
     ↩
314. 2. Sa. 12, 14.
     ↩

315. The punishment of like for like. ↩

316. 2. Sa. 17, 37.
     ↩

317. Matt. 25. 41. ↩

318. In Iudg. 8, verse. 1. ↩

319. Wherein enuie and enuiousnes doo differ. ↩

320. A definition of enuie. ↩

321. 1. Cor. 13, 4.
     ↩

322. Gal. 5, 26. ↩

323. Looke In Gen. 26, 24. and In 2. King. 6, 16. Iudg. 8, 1. ↩

324. An enuious man is called a reioiser in euill things. ↩

325. Of emulation. ↩

326. Emulation is reckoned among laudable affects. ↩

327. We must take heed that emulation degenerate not into enuie. ↩

328. Cicero. ↩

329. 1. Cor. 1, 31.
     ↩

330. Emulation hath hope ioined with it. ↩

331. In Gen. 42, verse. 7. Looke part. 4, chap. 15. art. 16. ↩

332. It is lawfull to repell violence by violence. ↩

333. Iud. 16, 28. Whether the praier of Samson in the 16. of Iudges were good or ill. ↩

334. Rom. 12, 19. ↩