VVhether it be lawfull to lie, for preseruing the life of our neighbour.

38 But there ariseth a harder doubt; ²¹² namelie, whether it be lawfull to make a lie, for the preseruation of our neighbors life? Augustine, ²¹³ De mendacio ad Consentium, saith; If a man shuld be in great perill of death, and the same man should also knowe, that his sonne were in extreame danger; who happening to die, thou hauing knowledge thereof, if the father aske thée; Dooth my sonne liue? And thou art sure that he also will die, if thou shew him that his sonne is departed, what wouldest thou doo in this case? Whether thou saiest, he liueth; or whether thou saiest, I cannot tell: thou liest. But if so be thou answer that he is dead, all men will crie out vpon thée, as though thou haddest committed man-slaughter; and as though thou, by thy heauie newes, haddest béene the occasion of the death of this father, being sicke, and lieng at the point of death. Augustine granteth that the case is hard; neither denieth he, but that (as a man) he should be mooued; and perhaps it might so chance, that affections would not suffer him to speake that, which is iust and right. But at the length he concludeth, that he ought not to lie.

And he addeth moreouer, that if thou knowe, that anie vnchast woman loueth thée inordinatelie, which also threateneth to kill hir selfe; ²¹⁴ yea and will doo it indéed, except thou assent to hir wicked lusts, whether herein thou oughtest to commit anie shamefull things against chastitie? I thinke not. So likewise (saith he) thou oughtest not to offend against the truth, for sauing of thy neighbors life. And moreouer, what a windowe should be opened vnto lieng, if we should determine to doo otherwise? For that, which one should thinke to be lawfull in respect of life, another would iudge that he may doo the same for monie; another for estimation, or for defending of lands and possessions. And so it would come to passe, that there would be no measure nor end of lieng. We may not suffer (saith Augustine ) that anie man should kill his owne soule for the bodilie life of another man. No, nor that it is lawfull to lie for the saluation of anie mans soule. Euerie lie (saith Iohn) is not of GOD. But we ought not to speake those things, which are not of God.

²¹⁵ 39 What if a man were sought out of murtherers to be killed, and that thou knewest that the man lieth there hidden, where thou presentlie art; and they demand of thée if thou knowest whether he be there or no? He answereth, that if thou be of a valiant courage, and as becommeth a christian, thou must saie; Where he is I knowe, but I will not vtter it, doo you what ye will. Notwithstanding, when the matter commeth to this point, that for the defense of anie mans life thou must make a lie: knowe thou, that thou oughtest to commit the matter vnto God, and that thou hast no more there to doo. Either thou must answer, that thou wilt not betraie him, or else thou must hold thy peace. But by thy silence the murtherer will suspect that he is in thy house, and then thou shalt séeme to haue giuen an occasion of his apprehension. But in verie déed, thou hast not giuen it; for thou canst not lett him to thinke what he will. Wherefore, the matter must rather be committed vnto God, than to make a lie. Howbeit, thou must temper thy words with singular consideration; namelie, that thou speake in such sort, as thou vtter not all, and yet speake not falselie. For in these cases, I thinke it is not forbidden; naie, I rather thinke it most lawfull to speake doubtfullie. And, as touching this question, this is sufficient.

VVhether for modestie sake it be lawfull to lie; vpon the second of Samuel, chapter the 9. verse the 8.

²¹⁶ 40 There be some so importunate men, as although God haue heaped his benefits vpon them, yet are they alwaies complaining; We haue borne the burthen and heate of the daie, ²¹⁷ and yet dooest thou make vs equall vnto them? Some also be so modest, as euen in prosperitie they humble themselues. Others be broken with miserie, and are become more humble. But they, which in their losses and afflictions reteine still the fearsenes of nature, be too insolent and obstinate. Humilitie is like a bridle, ²¹⁸ wherewith the insolencie of our nature must be held in his dutie. And men be most of all reclaimed vnto modestie, when they begin to consider how verie little they haue of themselues. Howbeit, the same humbling of our selues ought to be ioined with the acknowledging of Gods benefits. For manie, while they be either ignorant thereof, or else dissemble it, become like vnto beasts; as they, which cannot one whit vnderstand, with what benefits they be indued by God. But there must be a speciall regard had, that we doo not counterfet that modestie; and that the same consist not onelie in words, but in the mind also.

Yet to reteine that vertue, ²¹⁹ it is not lawfull for thée to make a lie vpon thy selfe for modestie sake. For Aristotle himselfe, in his Ethiks, reckoneth a lie among vnhonest things. And (as Paule saith; Wee must not doo euill, that good may come of it. Augustine, in his 8. epistle to Ierom, touching this matter, citeth the words of Paule to the Corinthians; ²²⁰ ) If Christ be not risen, in vaine is our preaching, and your faith also is in vaine. For we be found false witnesses of God, when we saie, that God raised vp Christ from the dead; whom he raised not vp, if the dead doo not rise againe. But here (saith Augustine ) a man might saie vnto Paule; Why dooest thou so much detest lieng, since the same tendeth to the setting foorth of the glorie of God? And he maketh Paule to answer, that he dooth detest such lies, and that it is no lesse euill, to commend things that be not true concerning God, than not to beléeue things that be true of him. Hereby we gather this argument; If it be not lawfull to lie for the honour of God, it is much lesse lawfull to lie for the reteining of anie vertue. Yea, and it is no lesse euill to ascribe to thy selfe euill, which thou hast not committed, than to arrogate vnto thy selfe anie good, which thou hast not doone.

41 Contrariwise neuerthelesse, ²²¹ Paule vnto Timothie séemeth somwhat to make a lie of himselfe; Christ (saith he) came to saue sinners, ²²² of whom I am the cheefe. For Paule was not the chéefe, or the greatest sinner. And in the 30. chapter of the Prouerbs, the prophet Agur, whether he were Salomon himselfe, or some other man; ²²³ I am (saith he) more foolish than all men, and the wisdome of man is not in me; I haue learned no knowledge, neither haue I the vnderstanding of holie things. Yet was he both a prophet, and a wise man, and answered prudentlie vnto questions. And Christ himselfe, of himselfe; I am (saith he) a woorme and no man, ²²⁴ a verie scorne of men, and the outcast of the people. Some defend these spéeches on this wise, saieng; that They, which haue thus amplified their sinnes, they onelie respected their owne strength, which they themselues had by themselues, and a certeine naturall inclination of their owne vnto euill. For they themselues sawe, that they should gréeuouslie haue fallen, vnlesse God had staied them. These in verie déed be no small prouocations, to make vs iudge humblie and lowlie of our owne selues. But it is one thing for a man to saie that he is prone and readie bent vnto euill; and an other thing to confesse that he hath doone some euill, which he hath not doone. For there is as much difference betwéene these, as there is betwéene act and power. Certeinlie, we may euerie one of vs slip, yet no man ought to saie that he hath slipped, when he hath not. We ought all to confesse our selues to be sinners, but none ought to ascribe vnto himselfe anie sinne by name, which he hath not committed.

I saie therefore, that those spéeches, which I haue made mention of, if they be throughlie weighed, they be true. For some be vttered after that sort, bicause absolutelie they be so; some, for that they be extolled by an excessiue spéech; some, bicause they be compared with an other thing by contention. ²²⁵ Paule calleth himselfe the principall sinner, either bicause he was the first that came vnto Christ, among those that persecuted the church of GOD; or bicause he iudged himselfe in verie déed to be chéefe and greatest of the sinners. Not as if there had béene no man that had sinned more heinouslie (for there were such as had sinned against the holie Ghost, there were those which had sinned without anie repentance:) but bicause that among all them, which were redéemed by Christ, and had obteined the mercie of God, he thought himselfe to haue sinned most gréeuouslie. For some had sinned of infirmitie, some of plaine error and incredulitie; some had procéeded so farre, as they crucified Christ, who neuerthelesse were afterward, by the preaching of the word of God, called home vnto repentance. ²²⁶ Therefore saith Peter in the Acts; I knowe brethren that ye did it by ignorance, euen as did your rulers. But Paule had no recourse vnto the sermons of the apostles: there was néed of greater bonds for the drawing of him vnto Christ. Wherevpon Christ spake thus vnto him from heauen; ²²⁷ Saule, Saule, whie persecutest thou me? With these men therefore he compareth himselfe: and of these he saith he is the principall.

And so Chrysostome, vpon this place, saith; that These words be against other words of his in the epistle to the Philippians. ²²⁸ For there he saith, that he was conuersant in the Iewish religion, without crime, and without complaint. But these things (saith he) are nothing repugnant. For euen they themselues, which had performed the righteousnesse of the lawe, yet were they sinners neuerthelesse. And although Paule spake those things modestlie of himselfe, yet did he not ascribe an vntruth vnto himselfe. For, notwithstanding he granteth himselfe to haue béene a persecuter, and a blasphemer; yet he saith not, that he was an adulterer, or a fornicatour, or a théefe; séeing these things should not haue béene true. The things obiected out of the Prouerbs, touching Agur the prophet, ²²⁹ were true by waie of comparing them vnto those things, whereof a demand was made. He saith that he had no wisdome; not in respect that the wisdome which he had, was no wisdome; but bicause the same, being compared vnto so great matters, might séeme to be none. So Socrates was woont to saie; This onlie I knowe, that I knowe nothing: bicause that knowledge, which he had, would be nothing, in comparison of the multitude of those things that he knew not. ²³⁰ So Christ called himselfe a woorme, and a reproch of the people; bicause men so accompted of him, by reason of his afflictions and crosse. Also in speaking, there hapneth somtime an excessiue or hyperbolicall spéech; such indéed as is not ioined with a a lie, but which may serue for the better setting foorth of the matter.

VVhether faith must be kept toward him that breaketh his promise.

42 In the beginning of the ninth chapter of the second booke of Samuel, Dauid demandeth; ²³¹ Is there anie man left aliue of the familie of Saule, to whom I may doo good for Ionathans sake? When he speaketh of Ionathan, he excludeth not God; naie rather, that which he did for Ionathans sake, he did chéefelie for God and godlinesse sake. So God saith, that he would doo well to the people of the Iews, for the couenant which he had made with Abraham; yet dooth he not exclude his owne goodnesse. Naie rather, he chéefelie includeth the same therein; séeing that couenant procéeded of the méere goodnesse and mercie of God. But thou wilt demand, whie Dauid saith that he will doo good vnto anie of the house of Saule, for Ionathans sake; and not for Saules owne sake. For in the 24. chapter of the first booke of Samuel, what time as he had cut off the skirt of Saules cloke, ²³² he being inforced by Saule to sweare, promised, that he would not root out his séed. Whereby he was bound, not onelie vnto Ionathan, but also vnto Saule. Some answer, that Dauid was now discharged of his oth; bicause Saule kept not promise with him, but had doone him excéeding great wrong. For he that breaketh his faith (saie they) let faith be broken with him. And Cicero, in his third booke of Offices, citeth a verse out of Accius an old Poet; Hast thou broken thy faith? Atreus, whom he bringeth in to speake, answereth; Neither haue I giuen neither doo I giue my faith to anie faithlesse person.

But this is no sure rule at all times. For if one be wicked, and false of promise: yet oughtest not thou for that cause to shrinke from thy promises; séeing God dooth oftentimes kéepe promise euen with vs that doo euill. He promised, that he would continue the kingdome, or else some great honour in the familie of Dauid, euen vnto Messias. He promised that he would giue a sonne which should redéeme mankind. Men vndoubtedlie were euill, vnfaithfull, and vnworthie to haue the promises kept with them: yet did he performe these things to them, according to his excellent faithfulnes. Some answer on this wise, that faith in déed must be kept with an euill and vnfaithfull man, if he be vnfaithfull towards other, so he be no such towards vs; or else, if he doo hurt vs, so it be not in the selfe same thing, wherein it was agréed vpon betwéene vs. Naie rather, if he faile euen in the verie same thing which is agréed vpon, yet must we kéepe promise: if by that meanes, neither his naughtinesse be increased; nor a greater power to doo hurt be giuen vnto him. We be therefore loosed of our promise, if the thing cannot be, which we haue promised; or else, if it should fall out ill vnto himselfe, to whom the promise is made: as if thou deliuer a sword vnto a furious man, which thou didst promise vnto a man of sobrietie; or if he wax woorse and woorse, as though, through thy patience, he meaneth to reape a benefit of his vnfaithfulnesse: or else, if thou shalt promise such a thing, as is against the word of God, or the profit of the Church or Common-weale. Therfore it is written in the 22. cause, question second; In euill promises breake thy faith.

But most of all, we be at libertie of our promise, if we being circumuented by anie fraud, haue promised anie thing that we ought not to haue doone; or else, if the things themselues be now changed. Some haue added; If thou being compelled either by force or feare, dooest promise anie thing that thou wouldest not. But it can scarselie be perceiued, how so great a feare and compulsion can happen vnto a couragious and good man, that he should promise that, which might be against either his dutie, or the word of God. Howbeit, if a man be fallen in such wise, he is at libertie. But aboue all, we must take héed, that we doo not craftilie colour our promises, and séeke by fraud and counterfet meanes to vnwind our selues out: séeing fraud (as Cicero verie rightlie said) dooth not vndoo periurie, but it tieth it fast. Dauid, when as perhaps he might haue inuented manie things to breake his promises; yet would he doo no such thing. For being a godlie prince, he was rather minded to followe truth and faithfulnesse.

43 Certeinlie, the nature and consideration of these two vertues; [namelie, truth and faith] is both alike, yet is it not altogither the selfe-same: wherein they doo agree, and how they differ, I will in few words declare. ²³³ Truth is a vertue, whereby we are readie to speake those things, which the meanings and cogitations of our mind doo expresse: for hereby, bicause we speake those things which we thinke, are we called faithfull and true of our word. And faith is a vertue, whereby is brought to passe, that our déeds be answerable to our promises. There is some conformitie on both parts. In truth there is a conformitie of words with the meaning of the mind, and in faith a conformitie of déeds with promises. So as lieng is contrarie vnto truth, and falsehood vnto faith. For Cicero thinketh; that Faith is so called, bicause that is doone which is spoken. And he defined the same after a sort on this maner; ²³⁴ Faith is a constancie of words and of couenants. In another place he saith, that Faith is the truth of a mans word.

But thus the definition will be more full; Faith is a good habit, according to right reason, whereby we are readie to doo those things that we haue promised. This definition (as I haue said) is more perfect, and it consisteth of a generall word, and of a difference. For faith apperteineth vnto iustice, and it causeth vs to yéeld vnto euerie man, that which perteineth to him; séeing what thou shalt promise to anie man, that is now become his, to whom thou hast promised. And the same vnlesse thou performe in time, thou withholdest that, which is another mans. And so great is the force of faith, as it comprehendeth in one all the parts of mans life: bicause neither matrimonie, neither the bargains which citizens haue among themselues, neither anie part of the Common-weale can consist without faith. It differeth (as I said) from truth, although with the same it hath manie things that be like. The matter of truth is infinite: for all things that we speake, are either true or false; whether they be past, whether they be present, or whether they be to come. But faith hath to doo onelie in promises: neuerthelesse, those promises must be of the thing that is good; and not of that, which is euill, or a hinderance to good: otherwise they ought not to be firme.

Wherefore, faith should haue the verie same companions ioined therewith, that an oth hath; namelie, truth, righteousnesse, and iudgement. So as he, that breaketh his prom⟨…⟩se, dooth not onelie sinne in so dooing; but he must also make amends for the hinderance, which through his vnfaithfulnesse the other partie receiueth, to whom the promise is made. Dauid, being singularlie adorned with these vertues, would not depart from the promises. For he made the promise of his owne accord, being not forced thereto by anie feare or violence: and that, which he promised, was neither repugnant to the word of God, nor yet hurtfull to the Common-weale. For is was a matter of good example, that so notable a king did fulfill his promise: neither was there anie danger, least they, to whom he had promised, should become the woorse by his promise: for they were alreadie dead. Wherefore, there was no cause, why he should shrinke from it. And bicause he would performe his promise vnto Saule, therefore he demanded, whether anie of his familie were remaining, whom he might doo good vnto. But he speaketh of Ionathan by name, bicause he was bound vnto him; not onelie by the bond of promise, but also of fréendship, and most néere acquaintance. Vndoubtedlie, he that faileth of his faith, is vnwoorthie to haue faith kept with him. Howbeit, we must haue a speciall regard vnto these circumstances; least for the naughtinesse of another, we also should become naught our selues, and séeke corners for periurie.

Of a Fable and Apollogie.

²³⁵ 44 They saie that an apollogie is a kind of fable: ²³⁶ and a fable they define to be a narration of a false thing, deuised for commoditie or delite sake. Or (as Augustine, in his second booke, & 11. chapter De soliloquijs saith;) A fable is a lie, made for delectation sake, although properlie it cannot be called a lie. For the falsehood of it is straitwaie found out, and especiallie in apollogies. For in them are brought in insensible and vnreasonable creatures talking one with another, and intreating of verie weightie matters. And so soone as the hearer perceiueth this, he straitwaie vnderstandeth, that the matter is feigned, ²³⁷ and not so doone [as it is vttered.] And doubtlesse some fables are likelie to be true, and some are far from probabilitie. For it is verie likelie, that once there fell a contention betwéene Aiax and Vlysses for the armor of Achilles, which at the length was iudged vnto Vlysses: and that Aiax tooke so great displeasure thereat, as becomming mad, he slue himselfe. But contrariewise, it is without all probabilitie, that a woman was turned into a plant, or into a stone: ²³⁸ so as an apollogie may be likened to a fable that is not likelie to be true.

45 The kinds or sorts of a fable, are comedies, tragedies, satyrs, and narrations of harping and h⟨…⟩dicall poets, and also apollogies. But which of these feignings be lawfull, and which be not lawfull, may thus be defined. Those, which haue vnmanerlines and scurrilitie; that is, a mirth ioined with dishonestie, ought not to be admitted. But those, which are written honestlie, and with shamefastnesse, so that they can refresh the mind with some pleasure, and are also profitable to teach good maners, are not to be despised. That such, as be vnciuill, must be put awaie, it is confirmed by two testimonies of the apostle. To the Corinthians he writeth; Euill talke corrupteth good maners. ²³⁹ And vnto the Ephesians, the fift chapter, it is written; Let not whooredome, nor anie vncleannesse, ²⁴⁰ nor couetousnesse be named among you, as it becommeth saints. Then is added ⟨…⟩, filthinesse; ⟨…⟩, foolish talking; and ⟨…⟩, iesting; which are not comelie. By these words he reprooueth all communications, which are defiled either with dishonestie or scurrilitie.

The verie same sawe Plato, ²⁴¹ in his third booke De Repub. where he excludeth poets that spake of gods, as though they should speake of men: bicause they, in so writing, doo both dishonourablie treate of the nature of God, which is the best and most excellent; and also excuse the sinnes of common men, when as they testifie, that both the gods, and also noble men, did things alike. Which certeinlie we may perceiue in the comedie of Eunuchus in Terence, where Chaerea, ²⁴² a wicked yoong man, beholding a wanton table in the harlots house (wherein was painted Iupiter comming into Danae by a shower) began to haue a pleasure in himselfe; séeing he, being but a séelie man, did those things, which he perceiued by that table, that the chéefe god in old time had committed; I did it (saith he,) yea I did it with good will. Also, Cicero saith, ²⁴³ that Homer feigned these things, and translated humane things vnto the gods. But I would rather they had transferred diuine things vnto vs!

46 Augustine, in his second booke of confessions, the 15. and 16. chapters, ²⁴⁴ complaineth and soroweth, that he being a child and a yoong man, learned profitable words, but yet in vaine things. I would to God (saith he) I had béene instructed in profitable writings! I heard Iupiter thundering, and therwithall committing adulterie. The minds and affections of men are prone enough vnto vices. Wherefore it is wickedlie doone, that children and yoong men should in that age be stirred vp to sinne, by vile and filthie fables. But apollogies are profitable, which consisting both of honest words and good arguments, doo rightlie instruct that first age. Aesope, the ancient writer, ²⁴⁵ happilie exercised himselfe in this kind: although some doo ascribe his fables vnto Hesiodus, who was before Aesops time. But this one apollogie (whereof we now treat) was written long before the time of Aesope & Hesiodus. For the time of the Iudges, and namelie of Gedeon, was an hundreth yeares and more, before the war of Troie. There is an other apollogie also in the second booke of kings, ²⁴⁶ the 14. chapter, where Amasias obteining victorie of the Edomits, prouoked the king of Israel to make warre with him. Vnto whom king Ioas answered thus; The thistle of Libanon sent vnto the cedar that is of Libanon, and said; Giue thy daughter to my sonne to wife. And a wild beast went out of Libanon, and trode down the thistle. By which apollogie he shewed, that he was so much greater than Amasias the king of Iuda, as the cedar trée excelleth the thistle: and gaue him warning, that he should, after that sort, be troden downe and oppressed by his host, as the thistle perisheth that is troden downe by wild beasts.

²⁴⁷ 47 These things haue I therefore rehearsed; bicause the Gréeke and Ethnike writers should not be thought to be the first inuenters of these profitable deuises. All men agree, that the vse of apollogies is then to be added, when we haue to deale with rude persons. For they vnderstand not what a perfect argument or an vnperfect meaneth; neither are they able to perceiue inductions: so that of particulars they might gather vniuersals. And they passe not vpon the examples of noble personages; bicause they themselues are abiect and base. Wherefore, séeing they be smallie instructed by those meanes, there remaine fained narrations: where they being allured with the strangenesse of the matter, giue great héed to the things that are spoken, and are otherwhiles at length persuaded. Moreouer, they are good to helpe memorie: for things, that are so new and pleasant, doo verie much delight; and those things, that be so pleasant, be not easilie forgotten. Furthermore, men can sooner abide themselues to be reprooued by apollogies, than by euident spéeches. For the plaine truth ingendereth hatred, but being couered with apollogies or darke spéeches, it may be abidden. At the beginning, the hearers know not wherevnto the matter tendeth: therefore being ignorant what will be spoken, they tarrie out the end, and perhaps be persuaded at the length. Christ finished the whole parable of the vine, ²⁴⁸ and at the end, the Scribes and Pharisies perceiued, that it was spoken against themselues. So also among the Romans, Menenius Agrippa, by an apollogie wan the co~mon people, which had diuided themselues from the Senators, to ioine themselues againe with them. For these causes are the parables, dreames, and visions of the prophets verie much vsed in the holie scriptures.

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← 30. The twelfe Chapter. ¶ The eight · Contents · 32. The xiiij. Chapter. The last precept →

Footnotes

1. In 2. Sam. 16, vers. 21. A distribution of this place. ↩

2. What is contumelie. ↩

3. A definitiof contumelie. ↩

4. Three kinds of contumelie. ↩

5. The contrarie vnto contumelie. ↩

6. 2 Sam. 16, 20. ↩

7. When tawnts are sinnes, and no sinnes. 2. Sam. 16, 17. ↩

8. Another distinction. ↩

9. When tawnts are no contumelies. ↩

10. Gal. 3, 1. Luke. 24, 25 ↩

11. Esai. 1. Eze. 16. and else where. ↩

12. verse. 12. ↩

13. Of the causes of contumelies. Anger. ↩

14. 1. Sam. 16, 7
    ↩

15. Pride. ↩

16. Prou. 11, 2. ↩

17. 2 kin. 18, 30. ↩

18. Foolishnes. ↩

19. 1 Sam. 25, 14. Pro. 20, 30. ↩

20. Whether contumelie be s⟨…⟩aine. ↩

21. Pro. 10, 12. ↩

22. Matth. 5, 22. ↩

23. The weightinesse of vices is considered by their obiects. ↩

24. verse. 22. ↩

25. Whether contumelies ought to be suffered. ↩

26. Matth. 5, 30 ↩

27. Iohn. 18, 23 ↩

28. Pro. 26, 10. ↩

29. Pro. 26, 5. ↩

30. Why contumelies must be repressed. ↩

31. When contumelies must be suffered. ↩

32. Pro. 26, 4. ↩

33. I⟨…⟩ suffering of contumelies, what we must take heed of. ↩

34. What must be doone when we perceiue that a contumelie is not to be suffered. ↩

35. Gala. 6, 1. ↩

36. The reasons of Dauid weighed. ↩

37. Whether Dauid did well in bearing of the contumelies. ↩

38. In 1. Cor. 4. verse. 5. ↩

39. Iudgement in the Church, in the common-weale, and in a houshold are necessarie. ↩

40. Iudgements of two sorts. ↩

41. Ciuill and ecclesiasticall iudgements are not taken awaie. ↩

42. Matt. 18, 15. Matth. 7, 5. From whence priuate iudgements doo spring. Augustine. ↩

43. We must ⟨…⟩ot rashlie ⟨…⟩udge of o ⟨…⟩her mens faults. ↩

44. Gala. 6, 1. ↩

45. Augustine. ↩

46. Chrysost. ↩

47. What things shuld reuoke vs from rash iudgement. ↩

48. 1. Cor. 2, 15.
    ↩

49. Augustine. ↩

50. Esai 45, 9. ↩

51. Rom. 9, 20. ↩

52. If things of the holie scripture offend vs, whereto we must referre them. ↩

53. Gen. 11, 5. ↩

54. Gen. 18, 21. ↩

55. Augustine. Things that may be doone as well with a good mind as with a bad, must not be iudged of. ↩

56. Matth. 7, 1. 1. Cor. 4, 5. ↩

57. 1. Tim. 5, 24.
    ↩

58. verse. 22. ↩

59. Matth. 7, 1. ↩

60. Augustine. ↩

61. Gen. 16, 1⟨…⟩ ↩

62. In 1. Sam. 29, verse. 3. A definition of suspicion. ↩

63. 1. Sam. 2, 19.
    ↩

64. We must not giue place to our suspicions. Augustine. ↩

65. What is lawfull in suspicion. ↩

66. In 1. kin. 18 verse. 17. ↩

67. What maner of mockings be lawfull. Looke in 1. Sam. 22, verse. 16. ↩

68. verse. 12. ↩

69. The whole chapter. ↩

70. Ephe. 5, 4. ↩

71. In Iudg. 3⟨…⟩ ↩

72. Plautus. ↩

73. A definition of guilt. Seruius. ↩

74. Labeo. ↩

75. Another definition of guile. ↩

76. Vlpian. ↩

77. Cicero. ↩

78. Augustine. ↩

79. Iohn. 1, 14. ↩

80. Guile coms of a doublenes of the heart. verse. 3. ↩

81. Rom. 3, 4. Rom. 7, 18. ↩

82. 1. Pet 2, 22.
    ↩

83. Psal. 32, 2. ↩

84. Augustine. ↩

85. Psal. 34, 13. ↩

86. Flatterers. ↩

87. Homer. ↩

88. Good guile and euill guile. ↩

89. Chrysost. ↩

90. 1. Sam. 12, 13.
    ↩

91. Iudg. 3, 19. Exo. 12, 35. ↩

92. 2. Sam. 17, 7
    ↩

93. Gen. 34, 13. ↩

94. Ill guile is not forbidden against enimies. ↩

95. Who be verie enimies. ↩

96. Ierom. ↩

97. 1. Kin. 10, 21
    ↩

98. A guile vsed by the king of Denmarke against theeues. Augustine. ↩

99. Exo. 12, 35. ↩

100. Iosua. 8, 4. ↩

101. Ierom. ↩

102. Deut. 23, 20. ↩

103. 2. Co. 12, 1⟨…⟩.
     ↩

104. That is mockerie. ↩

105. The ciuill laws allow of guile against enimies. ↩

106. Attilius Regulus. ↩

107. An oth distinguished. ↩

108. Psal. 15, 4. ↩

109. Ierom. ↩

110. verse. 15. ↩

111. Augustine. ↩

112. Ambrose. ↩

113. Iosua 9, 4. ↩

114. An oth giuen for an vniust cause must be cut off. ↩

115. The Pope cutteth off oths both lawfull and vnlawfull. ↩

116. A prouerbe in the court of Rome. ↩

117. Ierom. ↩

118. verse. 15. ↩

119. A sophisticall act of the Thracians. ↩

120. A guile of the Romane legat against Antiochus. ↩

121. Ierom. ↩

122. An oth dissolueth not former bonds. ↩

123. 1. Cor. 7, 9.
     ↩

124. Whether faith must be kept with Heretiks. ↩

125. They which come vnto princes vpon safe conduct, be not in their power. ↩

126. Of Iehu. ↩

127. Whether promise giuen to theeues is to be kept. ↩

128. Attilius Regulus. ↩

129. What is to be considered in a generall oth. ↩

130. The fact of Iehu. ↩

131. A seruiceable lie. ↩

132. Rom. 3, 8. ↩

133. Matth. 5, 16 ↩

134. Exod. 28. ↩

135. 1. Kin. 10, 22
     ↩

136. The guile of Iehu was vsed in the persecution of the Priscillianists. ↩

137. 1. Kin. 18, 23
     ↩
138. 2. Kin. 10, 31
     ↩

139. Exod. 12, 3. ↩

140. Good guile and euill guile. ↩

141. Deut. 13. 5. and 6. ↩

142. Why Iehu pretended an honour and seruice vnto Baal. ↩

143. Exo. 14, 23. ↩

144. The fact of Constantius Cesar. ↩

145. A lie of Iulian the Apostata. ↩

146. In Iud. 3. at the end. ↩

147. Dissimulation is of two sorts. ↩

148. In the Commentaries vpon Aristotles Ethiks. ↩

149. After what maner Christ dissembled. 1. Cor. 2, 8. ↩

150. Luke. 24, 28 ↩

151. Of Dauids dissimulation. Looke in 1. Sam. 21. at the end. ↩

152. 1. Sa. 21, 13.
     ↩

153. Psal. 34. ↩

154. Gregorie. ↩

155. Augustine. ↩

156. Of truth. ↩

157. What is truth. Cicero. ↩

158. Augustine. ↩

159. Augustine. ↩

160. Truth is a vertue. ↩

161. The generall word of truth. ↩

162. Two faults in speeches. ↩

163. What thing truth requireth. ↩

164. Aristotle. ↩

165. 2. Cor. 12, 6.
     ↩

166. He that speaketh lesse of himselfe than he hath, lieth not. ↩

167. We must not lie for humilitie sake. ↩

168. Exo. 20, 16. ↩

169. Rom. 3, 4. ↩

170. verse. 21. ↩

171. Psal. 51, 8. ↩

172. verse. 16. ↩

173. Ephes. 4, 25. Col. 3, 9. ↩

174. 2. Cor. 3, 8.
     ↩

175. Matt. 22, 16. ↩

176. Of a lie. ↩

177. Augustine. ↩

178. Inequalitie the generall word of a lie. ↩

179. Three things incident to a lie. ↩

180. The distinction of a lie. ↩

181. Aristotle. ↩

182. Looke In 2. Sam. 16, verse 33. ↩

183. A lie is wicked and must be shunned. ↩

184. Psal. 5, 6. ↩

185. Psal. 5, 6. ↩

186. In a lie is an abuse of signes. ↩

187. Augustine. ↩

188. What kind of lie is most greeuous. ↩

189. In a pernicious lie are two euils. ↩

190. A sporting lie. ↩

191. Augustine. ↩

192. Whether a s⟨…⟩ssable lie be sinne. ↩

193. Psal. 5, 6. ↩

194. Plato. ↩

195. Aristotle. ↩

196. Rom. 3, 8. ↩

197. Plato in an error. ↩

198. Who are to be excused of a lie. ↩

199. Rom. 15, 24 and 28. ↩

200. 2. Cor. 1, 15.
     ↩

201. Exod. 1, 19. ↩

202. Iosua. 2, 5. ↩

203. Augustine. ↩

204. Gregorie. ↩

205. Looke In Gen. 12. at the end, and 19. 8. Gen. 12, 13. ↩

206. Augustine. ↩

207. Gen. 22, 5. Looke In Gen. 27, 19. ↩

208. Gen. 27, 19. ↩

209. 2. Kin. 10. 18
     ↩

210. Augustine. Two kinds of men. ↩

211. Note a distinction. ↩

212. Looke In 2. Sam. 15, 33 ↩

213. Augustine. ↩

214. A similitude. ↩

215. We must not lie no not to saue a mans life. ↩

216. Looke In 1. King. 17, 18 ↩

217. Matt. 20, 12 ↩

218. Humilitie or modestie. ↩

219. A man may not for modestie sake lie of himselfe. Rom. 3, 8. ↩

220. 1. Co. 15, 14
     ↩

221. An obiection. ↩

222. 1. Tim. 1, 15
     ↩

223. verse. 2. ↩

224. Psal. 22, 7. ↩

225. In what respect Paule calleth himselfe the principall sinner. ↩

226. Acts. 3, 17. ↩

227. Acts. 9, 4. ↩

228. Phil. 3, 6. ↩

229. How Agur had no wisdome. ↩

230. Psal. 22, 6. ↩

231. Whether it were lawfull to doo good for Ionathans sake. ↩

232. verse. 22, and 23, ↩

233. Wherein truth and faith do⟨…⟩ differ. ↩

234. A definition of faith. ↩

235. In Iudg. 9. ↩

236. What a fable is. Augustine. ↩

237. Of fables some are likelie to be true, and some not. ↩

238. An apollogie. ↩

239. 1. Co. 15, 33
     ↩

240. Ephes. 5, 3. and 4. ↩

241. Plato. ↩

242. Terence. ↩

243. Cicero. ↩

244. Augustine. ↩

245. Aesope. ↩

246. verse. 9. ↩

247. The vse of apollogies. ↩

248. Matt. 21, 33. ↩