VII. By reason man attaineth unto the knowledge of things that are and are not sensible. It resteth therefore that we search how man attaineth unto the knowledge of such things unsensible as are to be known that they may be done. Seeing then that nothing can move unless there be some end, the desire whereof provoketh unto motion; how should that divine power of the soul, that “spirit of our mind1,” as the apostle termeth it, ever stir itself unto action, unless it have also the like spur? The end for which we are moved to work, is sometimes the goodness which we conceive of the very working itself, without any further respect at all; and the cause that procureth action is the mere desire of action, no other good besides being thereby intended. Of certain turbulent wits it is said, “Illis quieta movere magna merces videbatur2:” they thought the very disturbance of things established an hire sufficient to set them on work. Sometimes that which we do is referred to a further end, without the desire whereof we would leave the same undone; as in their actions that gave alms to purchase thereby the praise of men3.
Man in perfection of nature being made according to the likeness of his Maker resembleth him also in the manner of working: so that whatsoever we work as men, the same we do wittingly work and freely; neither are we according to the manner of natural agents any way so tied, but that it is in our power to leave the things we do undone. The good which either is gotten by doing, or which consisteth in the very doing itself, causeth not action, unless apprehending it as good we so like and desire it: that we do unto any such end, the same we choose and prefer before the leaving of it undone. Choice there is not, unless the thing which we take be so in our power that we might have refused and left it. If fire consume the stubble, it chooseth not so to do, because the nature thereof is such that it can do no other. To choose is to will one thing before another. And to will is to bend our souls to the having or doing of that which they see to be good. Goodness is seen with the eye of the understanding. And the light of that eye, is reason. So that two principal fountains there are of human action, Knowledge and Will; which Will, in things tending towards any end, is termed Choice4. Concerning Knowledge, “Behold, (saith Moses5,) I have set before you this day good and evil, life and death.” Concerning Will, he addeth immediately, “Choose life;” that is to say, the things that tend unto life, them choose.
But of one thing we must have special care, as being a matter of no small moment; and that is, how the Will, properly and strictly taken, as it is of things which are referred unto the end that man desireth, differeth greatly from that inferior natural desire which we call Appetite. The object of Appetite is whatsoever sensible good may be wished for; the object of Will is that good which Reason doth lead us to seek. Affections, as joy, and grief, and fear, and anger, with such like, being as it were the sundry fashions and forms of Appetite, can neither rise at the conceit of a thing indifferent, nor yet choose but rise at the sight of some things. Wherefore it is not altogether in our power, whether we will be stirred with affections or no: whereas actions which issue from the disposition of the Will are in the power thereof to be performed or stayed. Finally, Appetite is the Will’s solicitor, and the Will is Appetite’s controller; what we covet according to the one by the other we often reject; neither is any other desire termed properly Will, but that where Reason and Understanding, or the show of Reason, prescribeth the thing desired.
It may be therefore a question, whether those operations of men are to be counted voluntary, wherein that good which is sensible provoketh Appetite, and Appetite causeth action, Reason being never called to counsel; as when we eat or drink, and betake ourselves unto rest, and such like. The truth is, that such actions in men having attained to the use of Reason are voluntary. For as the authority of higher powers hath force even in those things, which are done without their privity, and are of so mean reckoning that to acquaint them therewith it needeth not; in like sort, voluntarily we are said to do that also, which the Will if it listed might hinder from being done, although about the doing thereof we do not expressly use our reason or understanding, and so immediately apply our wills thereunto. In cases therefore of such facility, the Will doth yield her assent as it were with a kind of silence, by not dissenting; in which respect her force is not so apparent as in express mandates or prohibitions, especially upon advice and consultation going before,
[4.] Where understanding therefore needeth, in those things Reason is the director of man’s Will by discovering in action what is good. For the Laws of well-doing are the dictates of right Reason. Children, which are not as yet come unto those years whereat they may have; again, innocents, which are excluded by natural defect from ever having; thirdly, madmen, which for the present cannot possibly have the use of right Reason to guide themselves, have for their guide the Reason that guideth other men, which are tutors over them to seek and to procure their good for them. In the rest there is that light of Reason, whereby good may be known from evil, and which discovering the same rightly is termed right.
The Will notwithstanding doth not incline to have or do that which Reason teacheth to be good, unless the same do also teach it to be possible. For albeit the Appetite, being more general, may wish any thing which seemeth good, be it never so impossible6; yet for such things the reasonable Will of man doth never seek. Let Reason teach impossibility in any thing, and the Will of man doth let it go; a thing impossible it doth not affect, the impossibility thereof being manifest.
There is in the Will of man naturally that freedom, whereby it is apt to take or refuse any particular object whatsoever being presented unto it7. Whereupon it followeth, that there is no particular object so good, but it may have the shew of some difficulty or unpleasant quality annexed to it, in respect whereof the Will may shrink and decline it; contrariwise (for so things are blended) there is no particular evil which hath not some appearance of goodness whereby to insinuate itself. For evil as evil cannot be desired8: if that be desired which is evil, the cause is the goodness which is or seemeth to be joined with it. Goodness doth not move by being, but by being apparent; and therefore many things are neglected which are most precious, only because the value of them lieth hid. Sensible Goodness is most apparent, near, and present; which causeth the Appetite to be therewith strongly provoked. Now pursuit and refusal in the Will do follow, the one the affirmation the other the negation of goodness, which the understanding apprehendeth9, grounding itself upon sense, unless some higher Reason do chance to teach the contrary. And if Reason have taught it rightly to be good, yet not so apparently that the mind receiveth it with utter impossibility of being otherwise, still there is place left for the Will to take or leave. Whereas therefore amongst so many things as are to be done, there are so few, the goodness whereof Reason in such sort doth or easily can discover, we are not to marvel at the choice of evil even then when the contrary is probably known. Hereby it cometh to pass that custom inuring the mind by long practice, and so leaving there a sensible impression, prevaileth more than reasonable persuasion what way soever. Reason therefore may rightly discern the thing which is good, and yet the Will of man not incline itself thereunto, as oft as the prejudice of sensible experience doth oversway.
Nor let any man think that this doth make any thing for the just excuse of iniquity. For there was never sin committed, wherein a less good was not preferred before a greater, and that wilfully; which cannot be done without the singular disgrace of Nature, and the utter disturbance of that divine order, whereby the preeminence of chiefest acceptation is by the best things worthily challenged. There is not that good which concerneth us, but it hath evidence enough for itself, if Reason were diligent to search it out. Through neglect thereof, abused we are with the show of that which is not; sometimes the subtilty of Satan inveigling us as it did Eve10, sometimes the hastiness of our Wills preventing the more considerate advice of sound Reason, as in the Apostles11, when they no sooner saw what they liked not, but they forthwith were desirous of fire from heaven; sometimes the very custom of evil making the heart obdurate against whatsoever instructions to the contrary, as in them over whom our Saviour spake weeping12, “O Jerusalem, how often, and thou wouldest not!” Still therefore that wherewith we stand blameable, and can no way excuse it, is, In doing evil, we prefer a less good before a greater, the greatness whereof is by reason investigable and may be known. The search of knowledge is a thing painful; and the painfulness of knowledge is that which maketh the Will so hardly inclinable thereunto. The root hereof, divine malediction; whereby the instruments13 being weakened wherewithal the soul (especially in reasoning) doth work, it preferreth rest in ignorance before wearisome labour to know. For a spur of diligence therefore we have a natural thirst after knowledge ingrafted in us. But by reason of that original weakness in the instruments, without which the understanding part is not able in this world by discourse to work, the very conceit of painfulness is as a bridle to stay us. For which cause the Apostle, who knew right well that the weariness of the flesh is an heavy clog to the Will, striketh mightily upon this key, “Awake thou that sleepest; Cast off all which presseth down; Watch; Labour; Strive to go forward, and to grow in knowledge14.”
← Men’s first beginning to understand that Law · Contents · Of the natural way of finding out Laws by Re →
Footnotes
-
Eph. iv. 23. ↩
-
Sallust. [Cat. 21.] ↩
-
Matt. vi. 2. ↩
-
[See Arist. Eth. III. 2, 3. VI. 2.] ↩
-
Deut. xxx. 19. ↩
-
O mihi præteritos referat si Jupiter annos! [Virg. Æn. viii. 560.] ↩
-
[Chr. Letter, p. 11: “Heere we pray your helpe to teach us, how will is apt (as you say) freelie to take or refuse anie particular object whatsoever, and that reason by diligence is able to find out any good concerning us: if it be true that the Church of England professeth, that without the preventing and helping grace of God, we can will and doe nothing pleasing to God.”Hooker, MS. note. “There are certaine wordes, as Nature, Reason, Will, and such like, which wheresoever you find named, you suspect them presently as bugs wordes, because what they mean you do not indeed as you ought apprehend. You have heard that man’s Nature is corrupt, his Reason blind, his Will perverse. Whereupon under coulour of condemning corrupt Nature, you condemn Nature, and so in the rest.”“Vide Hilarium, p. 31.” (Ed. Basil. 1570; p. 822. ed. Bened.) “Vide et Philon. p. 33.” (Ed. Paris, 1552.) “et Dionys. p. 338.” (Par. 1562.)“Voluntas hominis natura sua non ligatur, sed vi vitiositatis quæ naturæ accessit.“ ‘Apt,’ originaliter apta, able. Ratio divinis instructa auxiliis potest omne bonum necessarium invenire, destituta nullum. Habet tamen omne bonum satis quidem in se quo probare se possit homini sedulo diligenterque attendenti. Sed nostra nos alio segnities avertit, donec studium virtutis Spiritus Sanctus excitat. Vide Cyprianum de sua conversione.” (Ad Donatum, Opp. p. 3. ed. Fell.) “Item ea quæ Sapientia de se profitetur in libro Proverbiorum atque alibi. Est itaque segnis humana ratio propter summam bonarum rerum investigandarum difficultatem. Eam difficultatem tollit lumen divinæ gratiæ. Hinc alacres efficimur, alioqui a labore ad libidinem proclives. Habet virtus vitio et plura et fortiora quæ hominem alliciant. Sed ea latent maximam partem hominum. Quid ita? Quia Ratio, quæ est oculus mentis, alto in nobis somno sepulta jacet otiose. At excitata et illuminata Sancti Spiritus virtute omnia dijudicat, et quæ prius ignota fastidio fuerunt, ea nunc perspecta modis omnibus amplectenda decernit.”] ↩
-
Εἰ δέ τις ἐπὶ κακίαν ὁρμᾳ̑, πρω̑τον μὲν οὐχ ὡς ἐπὶ κακίαν αὐτὴν ὁρμήσει, ἀλλ’ ὡς ἐπ’ ἀγαθόν. Paulo post: Ἀδύνατον γὰρ ὁρμᾳ̑ν ἐπὶ· κακὰ βουλόμενον ἔχειν αὐτὰ, οὔτε ἐλπίδι ἀγαθου̑ οὔτε ϕόβῳ μείζονος κακου̑. Alcin. de Dog. Plat. [c. 38. ed. Oxon. 1667.] ↩
-
[Arist. Eth. Nic. VI. 2: Ὅπερ ἐν διανοίᾳ κατάϕασις καὶ ἀπόϕασις, του̑το ἐν ὀρέξει δίωξις καὶ ϕυγή.] ↩
-
2 Cor. xi. 3. ↩
-
Luke ix. 54. ↩
-
Matt. xxiii. 37. ↩
-
“A corruptible body is heavy unto the soul, and the earthly mansion keepeth down the mind that is full of cares. And hardly can we discern the things that are upon earth, and with great labour find we out the things which are before us. Who can then seek out the things that are in heaven?” Sap. ix. 15, 16. ↩
-
Eph. v. 14; Heb. xii. 1, 12; 1 Cor. xvi. 13; Prov. ii. 4; Luke xiii. 24. ↩