[4.] Where understanding therefore needeth, in those things Reason is the director of man’s Will by discovering in action what is good. For the Laws of well-doing are the dictates of right Reason. Children, which are not as yet come unto those years whereat they may have; again, innocents, which are excluded by natural defect from ever having; thirdly, madmen, which for the present cannot possibly have the use of right Reason to guide themselves, have for their guide the Reason that guideth other men, which are tutors over them to seek and to procure their good for them. In the rest there is that light of Reason, whereby good may be known from evil, and which discovering the same rightly is termed right.

The Will notwithstanding doth not incline to have or do that which Reason teacheth to be good, unless the same do also teach it to be possible. For albeit the Appetite, being more general, may wish any thing which seemeth good, be it never so impossible⁶; yet for such things the reasonable Will of man doth never seek. Let Reason teach impossibility in any thing, and the Will of man doth let it go; a thing impossible it doth not affect, the impossibility thereof being manifest.

There is in the Will of man naturally that freedom, whereby it is apt to take or refuse any particular object whatsoever being presented unto it⁷. Whereupon it followeth, that there is no particular object so good, but it may have the shew of some difficulty or unpleasant quality annexed to it, in respect whereof the Will may shrink and decline it; contrariwise (for so things are blended) there is no particular evil which hath not some appearance of goodness whereby to insinuate itself. For evil as evil cannot be desired⁸: if that be desired which is evil, the cause is the goodness which is or seemeth to be joined with it. Goodness doth not move by being, but by being apparent; and therefore many things are neglected which are most precious, only because the value of them lieth hid. Sensible Goodness is most apparent, near, and present; which causeth the Appetite to be therewith strongly provoked. Now pursuit and refusal in the Will do follow, the one the affirmation the other the negation of goodness, which the understanding apprehendeth⁹, grounding itself upon sense, unless some higher Reason do chance to teach the contrary. And if Reason have taught it rightly to be good, yet not so apparently that the mind receiveth it with utter impossibility of being otherwise, still there is place left for the Will to take or leave. Whereas therefore amongst so many things as are to be done, there are so few, the goodness whereof Reason in such sort doth or easily can discover, we are not to marvel at the choice of evil even then when the contrary is probably known. Hereby it cometh to pass that custom inuring the mind by long practice, and so leaving there a sensible impression, prevaileth more than reasonable persuasion what way soever. Reason therefore may rightly discern the thing which is good, and yet the Will of man not incline itself thereunto, as oft as the prejudice of sensible experience doth oversway.

Nor let any man think that this doth make any thing for the just excuse of iniquity. For there was never sin committed, wherein a less good was not preferred before a greater, and that wilfully; which cannot be done without the singular disgrace of Nature, and the utter disturbance of that divine order, whereby the preeminence of chiefest acceptation is by the best things worthily challenged. There is not that good which concerneth us, but it hath evidence enough for itself, if Reason were diligent to search it out. Through neglect thereof, abused we are with the show of that which is not; sometimes the subtilty of Satan inveigling us as it did Eve¹⁰, sometimes the hastiness of our Wills preventing the more considerate advice of sound Reason, as in the Apostles¹¹, when they no sooner saw what they liked not, but they forthwith were desirous of fire from heaven; sometimes the very custom of evil making the heart obdurate against whatsoever instructions to the contrary, as in them over whom our Saviour spake weeping¹², “O Jerusalem, how often, and thou wouldest not!” Still therefore that wherewith we stand blameable, and can no way excuse it, is, In doing evil, we prefer a less good before a greater, the greatness whereof is by reason investigable and may be known. The search of knowledge is a thing painful; and the painfulness of knowledge is that which maketh the Will so hardly inclinable thereunto. The root hereof, divine malediction; whereby the instruments¹³ being weakened wherewithal the soul (especially in reasoning) doth work, it preferreth rest in ignorance before wearisome labour to know. For a spur of diligence therefore we have a natural thirst after knowledge ingrafted in us. But by reason of that original weakness in the instruments, without which the understanding part is not able in this world by discourse to work, the very conceit of painfulness is as a bridle to stay us. For which cause the Apostle, who knew right well that the weariness of the flesh is an heavy clog to the Will, striketh mightily upon this key, “Awake thou that sleepest; Cast off all which presseth down; Watch; Labour; Strive to go forward, and to grow in knowledge¹⁴.”

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Footnotes

1. Eph. iv. 23. ↩

2. Sallust. [Cat. 21.] ↩

3. Matt. vi. 2. ↩

4. [See Arist. Eth. III. 2, 3. VI. 2.] ↩

5. Deut. xxx. 19. ↩

6. O mihi præteritos referat si Jupiter annos! [Virg. Æn. viii. 560.] ↩

7. [Chr. Letter, p. 11: “Heere we pray your helpe to teach us, how will is apt (as you say) freelie to take or refuse anie particular object whatsoever, and that reason by diligence is able to find out any good concerning us: if it be true that the Church of England professeth, that without the preventing and helping grace of God, we can will and doe nothing pleasing to God.”Hooker, MS. note. “There are certaine wordes, as Nature, Reason, Will, and such like, which wheresoever you find named, you suspect them presently as bugs wordes, because what they mean you do not indeed as you ought apprehend. You have heard that man’s Nature is corrupt, his Reason blind, his Will perverse. Whereupon under coulour of condemning corrupt Nature, you condemn Nature, and so in the rest.”“Vide Hilarium, p. 31.” (Ed. Basil. 1570; p. 822. ed. Bened.) “Vide et Philon. p. 33.” (Ed. Paris, 1552.) “et Dionys. p. 338.” (Par. 1562.)“Voluntas hominis natura sua non ligatur, sed vi vitiositatis quæ naturæ accessit.“ ‘Apt,’ originaliter apta, able. Ratio divinis instructa auxiliis potest omne bonum necessarium invenire, destituta nullum. Habet tamen omne bonum satis quidem in se quo probare se possit homini sedulo diligenterque attendenti. Sed nostra nos alio segnities avertit, donec studium virtutis Spiritus Sanctus excitat. Vide Cyprianum de sua conversione.” (Ad Donatum, Opp. p. 3. ed. Fell.) “Item ea quæ Sapientia de se profitetur in libro Proverbiorum atque alibi. Est itaque segnis humana ratio propter summam bonarum rerum investigandarum difficultatem. Eam difficultatem tollit lumen divinæ gratiæ. Hinc alacres efficimur, alioqui a labore ad libidinem proclives. Habet virtus vitio et plura et fortiora quæ hominem alliciant. Sed ea latent maximam partem hominum. Quid ita? Quia Ratio, quæ est oculus mentis, alto in nobis somno sepulta jacet otiose. At excitata et illuminata Sancti Spiritus virtute omnia dijudicat, et quæ prius ignota fastidio fuerunt, ea nunc perspecta modis omnibus amplectenda decernit.”] ↩

8. Εἰ δέ τις ἐπὶ κακίαν ὁρμᾳ̑, πρω̑τον μὲν οὐχ ὡς ἐπὶ κακίαν αὐτὴν ὁρμήσει, ἀλλ’ ὡς ἐπ’ ἀγαθόν. Paulo post: Ἀδύνατον γὰρ ὁρμᾳ̑ν ἐπὶ· κακὰ βουλόμενον ἔχειν αὐτὰ, οὔτε ἐλπίδι ἀγαθου̑ οὔτε ϕόβῳ μείζονος κακου̑. Alcin. de Dog. Plat. [c. 38. ed. Oxon. 1667.] ↩

9. [Arist. Eth. Nic. VI. 2: Ὅπερ ἐν διανοίᾳ κατάϕασις καὶ ἀπόϕασις, του̑το ἐν ὀρέξει δίωξις καὶ ϕυγή.] ↩

10. 2 Cor. xi. 3. ↩

11. Luke ix. 54. ↩

12. Matt. xxiii. 37. ↩

13. “A corruptible body is heavy unto the soul, and the earthly mansion keepeth down the mind that is full of cares. And hardly can we discern the things that are upon earth, and with great labour find we out the things which are before us. Who can then seek out the things that are in heaven?” Sap. ix. 15, 16. ↩

14. Eph. v. 14; Heb. xii. 1, 12; 1 Cor. xvi. 13; Prov. ii. 4; Luke xiii. 24. ↩