IV. But to come unto that which of all other things in Scripture is most stood upon; that place of St. Paul they say is “of all other most clear, where speaking of those things which are called indifferent, in the end he concludeth, That ‘whatsoever is not of faith is sin.’ But faith is not but in respect of the Word of God. Therefore whatsoever is not done by the Word of God is sin.” Whereunto we answer, that albeit the name of Faith being properly and strictly taken, it must needs have reference unto some uttered word as the object of belief: nevertheless sith the ground of credit is the credibility of things credited; and things are made credible, either by the known condition and quality of the utterer1, or by the manifest likelihood of truth which they have in themselves; hereupon it riseth that whatsoever we are persuaded of, the same we are generally said to believe. In which generality the object of faith may not so narrowly be restrained, as if the same did extend no further than to the only Scriptures of God. “Though,” saith our Saviour, “ye believe not me, believe my works, that ye may know and believe that the Father is in me and I in him2.” “The other disciples said unto Thomas, We have seen the Lord;” but his answer unto them was, “Except I see in his hands the print of the nails, and put my finger into them, I will not believe3.” Can there be any thing more plain than that which by these two sentences appeareth, namely, that there may be a certain belief grounded upon other assurance than Scripture: any thing more clear, than that we are said not only to believe the things which we know by another’s relation, but even whatsoever we are certainly persuaded of, whether it be by reason or by sense?
Forasmuch therefore as it is granted that St. Paul doth mean nothing else by Faith, but only “a full persuasion that that which we do is well done4;” against which kind of faith or persuasion as St. Paul doth count it sin to enterprise any thing, so likewise “some of the very heathen have taught5, as Tully, ‘That nothing ought to be done whereof thou doubtest whether it be right or wrong6;’ whereby it appeareth that even those which had no knowledge of the word of God did see much of the equity of this which the Apostle requireth of a Christian man;” I hope we shall not seem altogether unnecessarily to doubt of the soundness of their opinion, who think simply that nothing but only the word of God can give us assurance in any thing we are to do, and resolve us that we do well. For might not the Jews have been fully persuaded that they did well to think (if they had so thought) that in Christ God the Father was, although the only ground of this their faith had been the wonderful works they saw him do? Might not, yea, did not Thomas fully in the end persuade himself, that he did well to think that body which now was raised to be the same which had been crucified? That which gave Thomas this assurance was his sense; “Thomas, because thou hast seen, thou believest,” saith our Saviour7. What Scripture had Tully for this assurance? Yet I nothing doubt but that they who allege him think he did well to set down in writing a thing so consonant unto truth. Finally, we all believe that the Scriptures of God are sacred, and that they have proceeded from God; ourselves we assure that we do right well in so believing. We have for this point a demonstration sound and infallible. But it is not the word of God which doth or possibly can assure us, that we do well to think it his word. For if any one book of Scripture did give testimony to all, yet still that Scripture which giveth credit to the rest would require another Scripture to give credit unto it, neither could we ever come unto any pause whereon to rest our assurance this way; so that unless beside Scripture there were something which might assure us that we do well, we could not think we do well, no not in being assured that Scripture is a sacred and holy rule of well-doing.
On which determination we might be contented to stay ourselves without further proceeding herein, but that we are drawn on into larger speech by reason of their so great earnestness, who beat more and more upon these last alleged words, as being of all other most pregnant.
Whereas therefore they still argue, “That wheresoever faith is wanting, there is sin;” and, “in every action not commanded faith is wanting;” ergo, “in every action not commanded, there is sin8:” I would demand of them first, forasmuch as the nature of things indifferent is neither to be commanded nor forbidden, but left free and arbitrary; how there can be any thing indifferent, if for want of faith sin be committed when any thing not commanded is done. So that of necessity they must add somewhat, and at leastwise thus set it down: in every action not commanded of God or permitted with approbation, faith is wanting, and for want of faith there is sin.
The next thing we are to inquire is, What those things be which God permitteth with approbation, and how we may know them to be so permitted. When there are unto one end sundry means; as for example, for the sustenance of our bodies many kinds of food, many sorts of raiment to clothe our nakedness, and so in other things of like condition: here the end itself being necessary, but not so any one mean thereunto; necessary that our bodies should be both fed and clothed, howbeit no one kind of food or raiment necessary; therefore we hold these things free in their own nature and indifferent. The choice is left to our own discretion, except a principal bond of some higher duty remove the indifferency that such things have in themselves. Their indifferency is removed, if either we take away our own liberty, as Ananias did9, for whom to have sold or held his possessions it was indifferent, till his solemn vow and promise unto God had strictly bound him one only way; or if God himself have precisely abridged the same, by restraining us unto or by barring us from some one or moe things of many, which otherwise were in themselves altogether indifferent. Many fashions of priestly attire there were, whereof Aaron and his sons might have had their free choice without sin, but that God expressly tied them unto one10. All meats indifferent unto the Jew, were it not that God by name excepted some, as swine’s flesh11. Impossible therefore it is we should otherwise think, than that what things God doth neither command nor forbid, the same he permitteth with approbation either to be done or left undone. “All things are lawful unto me,” saith the Apostle12, speaking as it seemeth in the person of the Christian Gentile for maintenance of liberty in things indifferent; whereunto his answer is, that nevertheless “all things are not expedient;” in things indifferent there is a choice, they are not always equally expedient.
Now in things although not commanded of God yet lawful because they are permitted, the question is, what light shall shew us the conveniency which one hath above another. For answer, their final determination is, that13 “Whereas the Heathen did send men for the difference of good and evil to the light of Reason, in such things the Apostle sendeth us to the school of Christ in his word, which only is able through faith to give us assurance and resolution in our doings.” Which word only, is utterly without possibility of ever being proved. For what if it were true concerning things indifferent, that unless the word of the Lord had determined of the free use of them, there could have been no lawful use of them at all: which notwithstanding is untrue; because it is not the Scripture’s setting down such things as indifferent, but their not setting down as necessary, that doth make them to be indifferent: yet this to our present purpose serveth nothing at all. We inquire not now, whether any thing be free to be used which Scripture hath not set down as free: but concerning things known and acknowledged to be indifferent, whether particularly in choosing any one of them before another we sin, if any thing but Scripture direct us in this our choice. When many meats are set before me, all are indifferent, none unlawful, I take one as most convenient. If Scripture require me so to do, then is not the thing indifferent, because I must do what Scripture requireth. They are all indifferent, I might take any, Scripture doth not require of me to make any special choice of one: I do notwithstanding make choice of one, my discretion teaching me so to do. A hard case, that hereupon I should be justly condemned of sin. Nor let any man think that following the judgment of natural discretion in such cases we can have no assurance that we please God. For to the Author and God of our nature, how shall any operation proceeding in natural sort be in that respect unacceptable? The nature which himself hath given to work by he cannot but be delighted with, when we exercise the same any way without commandment of his to the contrary.
My desire is to make this cause so manifest, that if it were possible, no doubt or scruple concerning the same might remain in any man’s cogitation. Some truths there are, the verity whereof time doth alter: as it is now true that Christ is risen from the dead; which thing was not true at such time as Christ was living on earth, and had not suffered. It would be known therefore, whether this which they teach concerning the sinful stain of all actions not commanded of God, be a truth that doth now appertain unto us only, or a perpetual truth, in such sort that from the first beginning of the world unto the last consummation thereof, it neither hath been nor can be otherwise. I see not how they can restrain this unto any particular time, how they can think it true now and not always true, that in every action not commanded there is for want of faith sin. Then let them cast back their eyes unto former generations of men, and mark what was done in the prime of the world. Seth, Enoch, Noah, Sem, Abraham, Job, and the rest that lived before any syllable of the law of God was written, did they not sin as much as we do in every action not commanded? That which God is unto us by his sacred word, the same he was unto them by such like means as Eliphaz in Job describeth14. If therefore we sin in every action which the Scripture commandeth us not, it followeth that they did the like in all such actions as were not by revelation from Heaven exacted at their hands. Unless God from heaven did by vision still shew them what to do, they might do nothing, not eat, not drink, not sleep, not move.
Yea, but even as in darkness candlelight may serve to guide men’s steps, which to use in the day were madness; so when God had once delivered his law in writing, it may be they are of opinion that then it must needs be sin for men to do any thing which was not there commanded them to do, whatsoever they might do before. Let this be granted, and it shall hereupon plainly ensue, either that the light of Scripture once shining in the world, all other light of Nature is therewith in such sort drowned, that now we need it not, neither may we longer use it; or if it stand us in any stead, yet as Aristotle speaketh of men whom Nature hath framed for the state of servitude, saying, “They have reason so far forth as to conceive when others direct them15, but little or none in directing themselves by themselves;” so likewise our natural capacity and judgment must serve us only for the right understanding of that which the sacred Scripture teacheth. Had the Prophets who succeeded Moses, or the blessed Apostles which followed them, been settled in this persuasion, never would they have taken so great pains in gathering together natural arguments, thereby to teach the faithful their duties. To use unto them any other motive than Scriptum est, “Thus it is written,” had been to teach them other grounds of their actions than Scripture; which I grant they allege commonly, but not only. Only Scripture they should have alleged, had they been thus persuaded, that so far forth we do sin as we do any thing otherwise directed than by Scripture. St. Augustine was resolute in points of Christianity to credit none, how godly and learned soever he were, unless he confirmed his sentence by the Scriptures, or by some reason not contrary to them16. Let them therefore with St. Augustine reject and condemn that which is not grounded either on the Scripture, or on some reason not contrary to Scripture, and we are ready to give them our hands in token of friendly consent with them.
← The third Scripture proof, 1 Tim. iv. 5. · Contents · The first assertion endeavoured to be proved →
Footnotes
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Psalm xix. 8; Apoc. iii. 14; 2 Cor. i. 18. ↩
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John x. 38. ↩
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John xx. 25. ↩
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“And if any will say that St. Paul meaneth there a full πληροϕορίαν and persuasion that that which he doth is well done, I grant it. But from whence can that spring but from faith? How can we persuade and assure ourselves that we do well, but whereas we have the word of God for our warrant?” T. C. l. i. p. 27. [14.] ↩
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“What also that some even of those heathen men have taught, that nothing ought to be done whereof thou doubtest whether it be right or wrong. Whereby it appeareth that even those which had no knowledge of the word of God did see much of the equity of this which the Apostle requireth of a Christian man: and that the chiefest difference is, that where they sent men for the difference of good and evil to the light of Reason, in such things the Apostle sendeth them to the school of Christ in his word, which only is able through faith to give them assurance and resolution in their doings.” T. C. l. ii. p. 60. ↩
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[De Offic. i. 9: “Bene præcipiunt, qui vetant quidquam agere, quod dubites æquum sit an iniquum.”] ↩
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John xx. 29. ↩
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T. C. l. ii. p. 58. ↩
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Acts v. 4. ↩
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Exod. xxviii. 4, 43; xxxix. ↩
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Lev. xi. ↩
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1 Cor. vi. 12. ↩
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[T. C. ii. 60.] ↩
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Job iv. 12. [“A thing was secretly brought to me, and mine ear received a little thereof; in thoughts from the visions of the night, when deep sleep falleth on men,” &c.] ↩
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Arist. Pol. i. c. 5. [Ὁ κοινωνω̑ν λόγου τοσου̑τον ὅσον αἰσθάνεσθαι ἀλλὰ μὴ ἔχειν.] ↩
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August. Ep. 19. [al. 82. t. ii. 190. “Ego enim fateor caritati tuæ” (he is writing to St. Jerome,) “solis eis Scripturarum libris, qui jam canonici appellantur, didici hunc timorem honoremque deferre, ut nullum eorum auctorem scribendo aliquid errasse firmissime credam. Ac si aliquid in eis offendero literis quod videatur contrarium veritati, nihil aliud, quam vel mendosum esse codicem, vel interpretem non assecutum esse quod dictum est, vel me minime intellexisse, non ambigam. Alios autem ita lego, ut quantalibet sanctitate doctrinaque præpolleant, non ideo verum putem, quia ipsi ita senserunt, sed quia mihi vel per illos auctores canonicos, vel probabili ratione, quod a vero non abhorreat persuadere potuerunt.”] ↩