V. But against this it may be objected, and is, That the Fathers do nothing more usually in their books, than draw arguments from the Scripture negatively in reproof of that which is evil; “Scriptures teach it not, avoid it therefore:” these disputes with the Fathers are ordinary, neither is it hard to shew that the Prophets themselves have so reasoned. Which arguments being sound and good, it should seem that it cannot be unsound or evil to hold still the same assertion against which hitherto we have disputed. For if it stand with reason thus to argue, “such a thing is not taught us in Scripture, therefore we may not receive or allow it;” how should it seem unreasonable to think, that whatsoever we may lawfully do, the Scripture by commanding it must make it lawful? But how far such arguments do reach, it shall the better appear by considering the matter wherein they have been urged.
First therefore this we constantly deny, that of so many testimonies as they are able to produce for the strength of negative arguments, any one doth generally (which is the point in question) condemn either all opinions as false, or all actions as unlawful, which the Scripture teacheth us not. The most that can be collected out of them is only that in some cases a negative argument taken from Scripture is strong, whereof no man endued with judgment can doubt. But doth the strength of some negative argument prove this kind of negative argument strong, by force whereof all things are denied which Scripture affirmeth not, or all things which Scripture prescribeth not condemned? The question between us is concerning matter of action, what things are lawful or unlawful for men to do. The sentences alleged out of the Fathers are as peremptory and as large in every respect for matter of opinion as of action: which argueth that in truth they never meant any otherwise to tie the one than the other unto Scripture, both being thereunto equally tied, as far as each is required in the same kind of necessity unto salvation. If therefore it be not unlawful to know and with full persuasion to believe much more than Scripture alone doth teach; if it be against all sense and reason to condemn the knowledge of so many arts and sciences as are otherwise learned than in Holy Scripture, notwithstanding the manifest speeches of ancient Catholic Fathers, which seem to close up within the bosom thereof all manner good and lawful knowledge; wherefore should their words be thought more effectual to shew that we may not in deeds and practice, than they are to prove that in speculation and knowledge we ought not to go any farther than the Scripture? Which Scripture being given to teach matters of belief no less than of action, the Fathers must needs be and are even as plain against credit besides the relation, as against practice without the injunction of the Scripture.
St. Augustine hath said1, “Whether it be question of Christ, or whether it be question of his Church, or of what thing soever the question be; I say not, if we, but if an angel from heaven shall tell us any thing beside that you have received in the Scripture under the Law and the Gospel, let him be accursed2.” In like sort Tertullian3, “We may not give ourselves this liberty to bring in any thing of our will, nor choose any thing that other men bring in of their will; we have the Apostles themselves for authors, which themselves brought nothing of their own will, but the discipline which they received of Christ they delivered faithfully unto the people.” In which place the name of Discipline importeth not as they who allege it would fain have it construed, but as any man who noteth the circumstance of the place and the occasion of uttering the words will easily acknowledge, even the selfsame thing it signifieth which the name of Doctrine doth, and as well might the one as the other there have been used. To help them farther, doth not St. Jerome4 after the selfsame manner dispute, “We believe it not, because we read it not?” Yea, “We ought not so much as to know the things which the Book of the Law containeth not,” saith St. Hilary. Shall we hereupon then conclude, that we may not take knowledge of or give credit unto any thing, which sense or experience or report or art doth propose, unless we find the same in Scripture? No; it is too plain that so far to extend their speeches is to wrest them against their true intent and meaning. To urge any thing upon the Church, requiring thereunto that religious assent of Christian belief, wherewith the words of the holy prophets are received; to urge any thing as part of that supernatural and celestially revealed truth which God hath taught, and not to shew it in Scripture; this did the ancient Fathers evermore think unlawful, impious, execrable. And thus, as their speeches were meant, so by us they must be restrained.
As for those alleged words of Cyprian5, “The Christian Religion shall find, that out of this Scripture rules of all doctrines have sprung, and that from hence doth spring and hither doth return whatsoever the ecclesiastical discipline doth contain:” surely this place would never have been brought forth in this cause, if it had been but once read over in the author himself out of whom it is cited. For the words are uttered concerning that one principal commandment of love; in the honour whereof he speaketh after this sort6: “Surely this commandment containeth the law and the Prophets, and in this one word is the abridgment of all the volumes of Scripture. This nature and reason and the authority of thy word, O Lord, doth proclaim; this we have heard out of thy mouth; herein the perfection of all religion doth consist. This is the first commandment and the last: this being written in the Book of Life is (as it were) an everlasting lesson both to Men and Angels. Let Christian religion read this one word, and meditate upon this commandment, and out of this Scripture it shall find the rules of all learning to have sprung, and from hence to have risen and hither to return whatsoever the ecclesiastical discipline containeth, and that in all things it is vain and bootless which charity confirmeth not.” Was this a sentence (trow you) of so great force to prove that Scripture is the only rule of all the actions of men? Might they not hereby even as well prove, that one commandment of Scripture is the only rule of all things, and so exclude the rest of the Scripture, as now they do all means beside Scripture? But thus it fareth, when too much desire of contradiction causeth our speech rather to pass by number than to stay for weight.
Well, but Tertullian doth in this case speak yet more plainly7: “The Scripture,” saith he, “denieth what it noteth not;” which are indeed the words of Tertullian8. But what? the Scripture reckoneth up the kings of Israel, and amongst those kings David; the Scripture reckoneth up the sons of David, and amongst those sons Salomon. To prove that amongst the kings of Israel there was no David but only one, no Salomon but one in the sons of David; Tertullian’s argument will fitly prove. For inasmuch as the Scripture did propose to reckon up all, if there were moe it would have named them. In this case “the Scripture doth “deny the thing it noteth not.” Howbeit I could not but think that man to do me some piece of manifest injury, which would hereby fasten upon me a general opinion, as if I did think the Scripture to deny the very reign of King Henry the Eighth, because it nowhere noteth that any such King did reign. Tertullian’s speech is probable concerning such matter as he there speaketh of. “There was,” saith Tertullian, “no second Lamech like to him that had two wives; the Scripture denieth what it noteth not.” As therefore it noteth one such to have been in that age of the world; so had there been moe, it would by likelihood as well have noted many as one. What infer we now hereupon? “There was no second Lamech; the Scripture denieth what it noteth not.” Were it consonant unto reason to divorce these two sentences, the former of which doth shew how the later is restrained, and not marking the former to conclude by the later of them, that simply whatsoever any man at this day doth think true is by the Scripture denied, unless it be there affirmed to be true? I wonder that a cause so weak and feeble hath been so much persisted in.
But to come unto those their sentences wherein matters of action are more apparently touched: the name of Tertullian is as before so here again pretended9; who writing unto his wife two books, and exhorting her in the one to live a widow, in case God before her should take him unto his mercy; and in the other, if she did marry, yet not to join herself to an infidel, as in those times some widows Christian had done for the advancement of their estate in this present world, he urged very earnestly St. Paul’s words, “only in the Lord10:” whereupon he demandeth of them that think they may do the contrary, what Scripture they can shew where God hath dispensed and granted license to do against that which the blessed Apostle so strictly doth enjoin11. And because in defence it might perhaps be replied, “Seeing God doth will that couples which are married when both are infidels, if either party chance to be after converted unto Christianity, this should not make separation between them, as long as the unconverted was willing to retain the other on whom the grace of Christ had shined; wherefore then should that let the making of marriage, which doth not dissolve marriage being made?” after great reasons shewed why God doth in converts being married allow continuance with infidels, and yet disallow that the faithful when they are free should enter into bonds of wedlock with such, [he] concludeth in the end concerning those women that so marry, “They that please not the Lord do even thereby offend the Lord; they do even thereby throw themselves into evil12;” that is to say, while they please him not by marrying in him, they do that whereby they incur his displeasure; they make an offer of themselves into the service of that enemy with whose servants they link themselves in so near a bond. What one syllable is there in all this prejudicial any way to that which we hold? For the words of Tertullian as they are by them alleged are two ways misunderstood; both in the former part, where that is extended generally to “all things” in the neuter gender, which he speaketh in the feminine gender of women’s persons; and in the latter, where “received with hurt” is put instead of “wilful incurring that which is evil.” And so in sum Tertullian doth neither mean nor say as is pretended, “Whatsoever pleaseth not the Lord displeaseth him, and with hurt is received;” but, “Those women that please not the Lord” by their kind of marrying “do even thereby offend the Lord, they do even thereby throw themselves into evil.”
Somewhat more show there is in a second place of Tertullian, which notwithstanding when we have examined it will be found as the rest are13. The Roman emperor’s custom was at certain solemn times to bestow on his soldiers a donative; which donative they received wearing garlands upon their heads. There were in the time of the emperors Severus and Antoninus14 many, who being soldiers had been converted unto Christ, and notwithstanding continued still in that military course of life. In which number, one man there was amongst all the rest, who at such a time coming to the tribune of the army to receive his donative, came but with a garland in his hand, and not in such sort as others did. The tribune offended hereat demandeth what this great singularity should mean. To whom the soldier, Christianus sum, “I am a Christian.” Many there were so besides him which yet did otherwise at that time; whereupon grew a question, whether a Christian soldier might herein do as the unchristian did, and wear as they wore. Many of them which were very sound in Christian belief did rather commend the zeal of this man than approve his action.
Tertullian was at the same time a Montanist, and an enemy unto the church for condemning that prophetical spirit which Montanus and his followers did boast they had received, as if in them Christ had performed his last promise; as if to them he had sent the Spirit that should be their perfecter and final instructor in the mysteries of Christian truth. Which exulceration of mind made him apt to take all occasions of contradiction. Wherefore in honour of that action, and to gall their minds who did not so much commend it, he wrote his book De Corona Militis, not dissembling the stomach wherewith he wrote it. For first, the man he commendeth as “one more constant than the rest of his brethren, who presumed,” saith he, “that they might well enough serve two Lords15.” Afterwards choler somewhat more rising with him, he addeth, “It doth even remain that they should also devise how to rid themselves of his martyrdoms, towards the prophecies of whose Holy Spirit they have already shewed their disdain. They mutter that their good and long peace is now in hazard. I doubt not but some of them send the Scriptures before, truss up bag and baggage, make themselves in a readiness that they may fly from city to city. For that is the only point of the Gospel which they are careful not to forget. I know even their pastors very well what men they are; in peace lions, harts in time of trouble and fear16.” Now these men, saith Tertullian, “they must be answered, where we do find it written in Scripture that a Christian man may not wear a garland17.”
And as men’s speeches uttered in heat of distempered affection have oftentimes much more eagerness than weight, so he that shall mark the proofs alleged and the answers to things objected in that book will now and then perhaps espy the like imbecility. Such is that argument whereby they that wore on their heads garlands are charged as transgressors of nature’s law18, and guilty of sacrilege against God the Lord of nature, inasmuch as flowers in such sort worn can neither be smelt nor seen well by those that wear them; and God made flowers sweet and beautiful, that being seen and smelt unto they might so delight. Neither doth Tertullian bewray this weakness in striking only, but also in repelling their strokes with whom he contendeth. They ask, saith he, “What Scripture is there which doth teach that we should not be crowned? And what Scripture is there which doth teach that we should? For in requiring on the contrary part the aid of Scripture, they do give sentence beforehand that their part ought also by Scripture to be aided19.” Which answer is of no great force. There is no necessity, that if I confess I ought not to do that which the Scripture forbiddeth me, I should thereby acknowledge myself bound to do nothing which the Scripture commandeth me not. For many inducements besides Scripture may lead me to that, which if Scripture be against, they all give place and are of no value, yet otherwise are strong and effectual to persuade.
Which thing himself well enough understanding, and being not ignorant that Scripture in many things doth neither command nor forbid, but use silence; his resolution in fine is, that in the church a number of things are strictly observed, whereof no law of Scripture maketh mention one way or other20; that of things once received and confirmed by use, long usage is a law sufficient; that in civil affairs, when there is no other law, custom itself doth stand for law21; that inasmuch as law doth stand upon reason, to allege reason serveth as well as to cite Scripture22; that whatsoever is reasonable, the same is lawful whosoever is author of it; that the authority of custom is great23; finally, that the custom of Christians was then and had been a long time not to wear garlands, and therefore that undoubtedly they did offend who presumed to violate such a custom by not observing that thing, the very inveterate observation whereof was a law sufficient to bind all men to observe it, unless they could shew some higher law, some law of Scripture, to the contrary24. This presupposed, it may stand then very well with strength and soundness of reason, even thus to answer, “Whereas they ask what Scripture forbiddeth them to wear a garland; we are in this case rather to demand what Scripture commandeth them. They cannot here allege that it is permitted which is not forbidden them: no, that is forbidden them which is not permitted.” For long-received custom forbidding them to do as they did, (if so be it did forbid them,) there was no excuse in the world to justify their act, unless in the Scripture they could shew some law, that did license them thus to break a received custom.
Now whereas in all the books of Tertullian besides there is not so much found as in that one, to prove not only that we may do, but that we ought to do, sundry things which the Scripture commandeth not; out of that very book these sentences are brought to make us believe that Tertullian was of a clean contrary mind. We cannot therefore hereupon yield; we cannot grant, that hereby is made manifest the argument of Scripture negatively to be of force, not only in doctrine and ecclesiastical discipline, but even in matters arbitrary. For Tertullian doth plainly hold even in that book, that neither the matter which he intreateth of was arbitrary but necessary, inasmuch as the received custom of the Church did tie and bind them not to wear garlands as the heathens did; yea, and further also he reckoneth up particularly a number of things, whereof he expressly concludeth, “Harum et aliarum ejusmodi disciplinarum si legem expostules Scripturarum, nullam invenies25;” which is as much as if he had said in express words, “Many things there are which concern the discipline of the Church and the duties of men, which to abrogate and take away the Scripture negatively urged may not in any case persuade us, but they must be observed, yea, although no Scripture be found which requireth any such thing.” Tertullian therefore undoubtedly doth not in this book shew himself to be of the same mind with them by whom his name is pretended.
← The fourth Scripture proof, Rom. xiv. 23. T. · Contents · The first assertion endeavoured to be confir →
Footnotes
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Aug. cont. Liter. Petil. lib. iii. c. 6. [t. ix. 301: “Sive de Christo, sive de ejus Ecclesia, sive de quacunque alia re quæ pertinet ad fidem vitamque vestram, non dicam nos, nequaquam comparandi ei qui dixit, Licet si nos, sed omnino quod secutus adjecit, Si angelus de cœlo vobis annunciaverit præter quam quod in Scripturis legalibus et evangelicis accepistis, anathema sit.”] ↩
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T. C. l. ii. p. 80: “Augustine saith, Whether it be question of Christ, or whether it be question of his Church, &c. And lest the answerer should restrain the general saying of Augustine unto the Doctrine of the Gospel, so that he would thereby shut out the Discipline;” [Here T. C. alleges the passage ascribed to St. Cyprian, quoted by Hooker in the next note;] “even Tertullian himself, before he was imbrued with the heresy of Montanus, giveth testimony unto the discipline in these words, ‘We may not give ourselves,’ &c.” ↩
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Tertull. de Præscript. [c. 6: “Nobis vero nihil ex nostro arbitrio inducere licet, sed nec eligere quod aliquis de arbitrio suo induxerit. Apostolos Domini habemus auctores, qui nec ipsi quicquam ex suo arbitrio, quod inducerent, elegerunt: sed acceptam a Christo disciplinam fideliter nationibus adsignaverunt.”] ↩
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Hieron. contra Helvid. [“Ut hæc quæ scripta sunt non negamus, ita ea quæ non sunt scripta renuimus. Natum Deum esse de virgine credimus, quia legimus: Mariam nupsisse post partum non credimus, quia non legimus.” t. ii. 13.] Hilar. in Ps. cxxxii. [§ 6. pag. 463: “Quæ libro legis non continentur, ea nec nosse debemus.” He is speaking of an apocryphal tradition, that the angels supposed by some to be mentioned in Genesis vi. 1, 4. used to haunt Mount Hermon especially.] ↩
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“Let him hear what Cyprian saith, The Christian Religion (saith he) shall find, that,” &c. T. C. l. ii. p. 80. ↩
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“Vere hoc mandatum legem complectitur et prophetas, et in hoc verbo omnium Scripturarum volumina coarctantur. Hoc natura, hoc ratio, hoc, Domine, verbi tui clamat auctoritas, hoc ex ore tuo audivimus, hic invenit consummationem omnis religio. Primum est hoc mandatum et ultimum; hoc in libro vitæ conscriptum indeficientem et hominibus et angelis exhibet lectionem. Legat hoc unum verbum et in hoc mandato meditetur Christiana religio, et inveniet ex hac Scriptura omnium doctrinarum regulas emanasse, et hinc nasci et huc reverti quicquid ecclesiastica continet disciplina, et in omnibus irritum esse et frivolum quicquid dilectio non confirmat.” [Arnold. Carnotens. de Baptismo Christi, ad calc. S. Cyprian. ed. Fell. pag. 33. Udall in his Demonstration of Discipline having quoted the same passage, Sutcliffe, Remonstrance to the Demonstration, page 17, meets it with the following, which occurs just before in the same tract: “Magister bone, libenter te audio, et cum adversaris mihi, etiam in plagis et doloribus intelligo disciplinam, nec latet me, te docente, ad siccandas corruptionum mearum putredines prodesse cauterium, et mundare cicatrices veteres salem disciplinæ tuæ, Evangelio tuo medente infusum… . You see, that which he first called Doctrine, he after, ἐξηγητικω̑ς, calleth Discipline.”] ↩
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Tertull. lib. de Monog. [c. 4: “Semel vim passa institutio Dei per Lamechum, constitit postea in finem usque gentis illius. Secundus Lamech nullus extitit, quomodo duabus maritatus. Negat Scriptura quod non notat.” p. 671.] ↩
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“And in another place Tertullian saith, That the Scripture denieth that which it noteth not.” T. C. l. ii. p. 81. ↩
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T. C. l. ii. p. 80: “And that in indifferent things it is not enough that they be not against the word, but that they be according to the word, it may appear by other places, where he saith, ‘That whatsoever pleaseth not the Lord, displeaseth him, and with hurt is received,’ ” lib. ii. ad Uxorem. ↩
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1 Cor. vii. 39. Ad Uxor. l. ii. c. 2. [“Cum dicit, Tantum in Domino, jam non suadet, sed exserte jubet… . Igitur cum quædam istis diebus nuptias suas de Ecclesia tolleret, id est, Gentili conjungeretur; idque ab aliis retro factum recordarer; miratus aut ipsarum petulantiam, aut consiliariorum prævaricationem, quod nulla Scriptura ejus facti licentiam proferrent, ‘Numquid,’ inquam, ‘de illo capitulo sibi blandiuntur primæ ad Corinthios, ubi scriptum est, Siquis frater infidelem habet uxorem, et illa matrimonio consentit, ne dimittat eam,’ &c. Hanc monitionem forsan fidelibus injunctis simpliciter intelligendam putent, (etiam infidelibus nubere licere,) qui ita interpretantur.” p. 198.] ↩
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[This is Hooker’s division (A, and B.). It implies the insertion of the pronoun before “concludeth.” Mr. Keble’s punctuation carries on the pronoun from “he demandeth,” line 1.] 1886. ↩
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“Quæ Domino non placent, utique Dominum offendunt, utique Malo se inferunt.” [Tertull. ad Uxor. lib. ii. c. 7.] ↩
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T. C. lib. ii. p. 81. “And to come yet nearer, where he disputeth against the wearing of crown or garland, (which is indifferent of itself,) to those which objecting asked, where the Scripture saith that a man might not wear a crown, he answereth by asking, where the Scripture saith that they may wear. And unto them replying that ‘it is permitted which is not forbidden,’ he answereth, that ‘it is forbidden which is not permitted.’ Whereby appeareth that the argument of the Scriptures negatively holdeth not only in the doctrine and ecclesiastical discipline, but even in matters arbitrary, and variable by the advice of the Church. Where it is not enough that they be not forbidden, unless there be some word which doth permit the use of them; it is not enough that the Scripture speaketh not against them, unless it speak for them; and finally, where it displeaseth the Lord which pleaseth him not: we [one] must of necessity have the word of his mouth to declare his pleasure.” ↩
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[Caracalla.] ↩
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Tert. de Coron. Milit. c. 1. [“Dei miles cæteris constantior fratribus, qui se duobus dominis servire non posse præsumpserat, solus libero capite, coronamento in manu otioso.” The reading before Pamelius was “servire posse præsumpserant.” (So Oehler. 1853.)] ↩
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[“Plane superest ut etiam martyria recusare meditentur, qui prophetias ejusdem Sp. Sancti respuerunt. Mussitant denique tam bonam et longam sibi pacem periclitari. Nec dubito quosdam Scripturas emigrare, sarcinas expedire, fugæ accingi de civitate in civitatem. Nullam enim aliam Evangelii memoriam curant. Novi et pastores eorum in pace leones, in prœlio cervos.” p. 205.] ↩
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[Quatenus illud opponunt, “Ubi autem prohibemur coronari? hanc magis localem substantiam causæ præsentis aggrediar.” ibid.] ↩
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[Ibid. c. 5. “In capite quis sapor floris? quis coronæ sensus, nisi vinculi tantum? quia neque color cernitur, neque odor ducitur, nec teneritas commendatur. Tam contra naturam est florem capite sectari, quam cibum aure, quam sonum nare. Omne autem quod contra naturam est monstri meretur notam penes omnes, penes nos vero etiam elogium sacrilegii, in Deum naturæ Dominum et auctorem.”] ↩
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[Ibid. c. 2. “Facile est statim exigere, ubi scriptum sit, ne coronemur? At enim ubi scriptum est, ut coronemur? Expostulantes enim Scripturæ patrocinium in parte diversa, præjudicant suæ quoque parti Scripturæ patrocinium adesse debere. Nam si ideo dicetur coronari licere, quia non prohibeat Scriptura, æque retorquebitur ideo coronari non licere, quia Scriptura non jubeat.”] ↩
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[Ibid. c. 3. “Etiam in traditionis obtentu exigenda est, inquis, auctoritas scripta. Ergo quæramus an et traditio non scripta non debeat recipi? Plane negabimus recipiendam, si nulla exempla præjudicent aliarum observationum, quas sine ullius Scripturæ instrumento, solius traditionis titulo, exinde consuetudinis patrocinio vindicamus.” He then instances in the customs of interrogatories in baptism, of trine immersion, and several other Church usages.] ↩
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[Ibid. c. 4. “His igitur exemplis renunciatum erit, posse etiam non scriptam traditionem in observatione defendi, confirmatam consuetudine… . Consuetudo autem etiam in civilibus rebus pro lege suscipitur, cum deficit lex.”] ↩
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[Ibid. “Nec differt, Scriptura an ratione consistat, quando et legem ratio commendet. Porro si lex ratione constat, lex erit omne jam quod ratione constiterit a quocunque productum.”] ↩
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[Ibid. “Hanc (rationem divinam) nunc expostula, salvo traditionis respectu, quocunque traditore censetur: nec auctorem respicias, sed auctoritatem: et inprimis consuetudinis ipsius, quæ propterea colenda est, ne non sit rationis interpres, ut si hanc Deus dederit, tunc discas, cur nam observanda sit tibi consuetudo.”] ↩
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[Ibid. c. 2. “Neminem dico fidelium coronam capite nosse alias, extra tempus tentationis ejusmodi. Omnes ita observant a catechumenis usque ad confessores et martyres, vel negatores. Viderint, unde auctoritas moris, de qua cum maxime quæritur. Porro cum quæritur [cur] quid observetur, observari interim constat. Ergo nec nullum nec incertum videri potest delictum, quod committitur in observationem suo jam nomine vindicandam, et satis auctoratam consensus patrocinio.” And c. 3, “Habentes observationem inveteratam, quæ præveniendo statum fecit.”] ↩
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Ibid. c. 4. ↩