VIII.8. Their r power to command all persons, and to be over all causes ecclesiastical, whatsoever s .

VIII. Touching¹ the king’s supereminent authority in commanding, and in judging² of causes ecclesiastical; First, to explain therein our meaning, It hath been taken as if we did hold, that kings may prescribe what themselves think good to be done in the service of God; how the word shall be taught, how sacraments³ administered: that kings may personally sit in the consistory where bishops⁴ do, hearing and determining what causes soever do appertain unto those courts⁵: that kings and queens in their own proper persons are by judicial sentence to decide the questions which rise⁶ about matters⁷ of faith and Christian religion: that kings may excommunicate: finally, that kings may do whatsoever is incident unto the office and duty of an ecclesiastical judge. Which opinion because we count⁸ as absurd as they who have fathered the same upon us, we do them to wit that thus⁹ our meaning is, and no otherwise: There is not within this realm any¹⁰ ecclesiastical officer, that may by the authority of his own place command universally throughout the king’s dominions; but they of his¹¹ people whom one may command, are to another’s commandment unsubject: only the king’s royal power is of so large compass, that no man commanded by him according to order¹² of law, can plead himself to be without the bounds and limits of that authority; I say, according to order of law, because with us the highest have thereunto so tied themselves, that otherwise than so they take not upon them to command any.

And, that kings should be in such sort supreme commanders over all men, we hold it requisite, as well for the ordering of spiritual as of¹³ civil affairs; inasmuch as without universal authority in this kind, they should not be able when need is¹⁴, to do as virtuous kings have done. Joas¹⁵¹⁶, purposing to renew the “house of the Lord, assembled the Priests and Levites, and when they were together, gave them their charge, saying, Go out¹⁷ unto the cities of Judah, and gather of all¹⁸ Israel money to repair the house of your God¹⁹ from year to year, and haste the things: but the Levites hasted not. Therefore the king called Jehoiada, the chief, and said unto him, Why hast thou not required of the Levites to bring in out of Judah and Jerusalem, the tax of Moses, the servant of the Lord, and of the congregation of Israel, for the tabernacle of the testimony? For wicked Athaliah and her children brake up the house of God²⁰, and all the things that were dedicated for the house of the Lord did they bestow upon Baalim²¹. Therefore the king commanded, and they made a chest, and set it at the gate of the house of the Lord without; and they made a proclamation through Judah and Jerusalem, to bring unto the Lord the tax of Moses the servant of God²², laid upon Israel in the wilderness.” Could either he have done this, or after him²³ Ezechias the like concerning the celebration of the passover, but that all sorts of men in all things did owe unto those²⁴ their sovereign rulers the same obedience which sometime²⁵ Josua had them by solemn²⁶ vow and promise bound unto²⁷? “Whosoever shall rebel against thy commandments, and²⁸ will not obey thy words in all that²⁹ thou commandest him, let him be put to death; only be strong and of a good courage.”

Furthermore, judgment ecclesiastical we say is necessary for decision of controversies rising between man and man, and for correction of faults committed in the affairs of God; unto the due execution whereof there are three things necessary, laws³⁰, judges, and a supreme governor³¹ of judgments.

What courts there shall be, and what causes shall belong to each court, and what judges shall determine of every cause, and what order in all judgments shall be kept; of these things the laws have sufficiently disposed: so that his duty which³² sitteth in every³³ such court is to judge, not of, but after, the said laws³⁴: “Imprimis³⁵ illud observare debet judex, ne aliter judicet quam legibus, aut³⁶ constitutionibus, aut moribus proditum est³⁷.” Which laws (for we mean the positive laws of our own³⁸ realm concerning ecclesiastical affairs) if they otherwise dispose of any such thing than according to the law of reason and of God, we must both acknowledge them to be amiss, and endeavour to have them reformed: but touching that point what may be objected shall after appear.

Our judges in causes ecclesiastical are either ordinary or commissionary: ordinary, those whom we term Ordinaries; and such by the laws of this³⁹ land are none but prelates only, whose power to do that which they do is in themselves, and belongeth unto⁴⁰ the nature of their ecclesiastical calling. In spiritual causes, a lay person may be no ordinary; a commissionary judge there is no let but that he may be: and that our laws do evermore refer the ordinary judgment of spiritual causes unto spiritual persons, such as are termed Ordinaries, no man which knoweth any thing in⁴¹ the practice of this realm can easily be ignorant.

Now, besides them which are authorized to judge in several territories, there⁴² is required an universal power which reacheth over all, importing⁴³ supreme authority of government over all courts, all judges, all causes; the operation of which power is as well to strengthen, maintain and uphold particular jurisdictions, which haply might else be of small effect; as also to remedy that which they are not able to help, and to redress that wherein they at any time do otherwise than they ought to do. This power being sometime in the bishop of Rome, who by sinister practices had drawn it into his hands, was for just considerations by public consent annexed unto the king’s royal seat and crown. From thence the authors of reformation would translate it into their national assemblies or⁴⁴ synods; which synods are the only help which⁴⁵ they think lawful to use against such evils in the Church as particular jurisdictions are not sufficient to redress. In which case⁴⁶ our laws have provided⁴⁷ that the king’s supereminent authority and power shall serve. As namely, when the whole ecclesiastical state, or the principal persons therein, do need visitation and reformation; when, in any part of the Church, errors, heresies, schisms⁴⁸, abuses, offences, contempts, enormities, are grown, which men in their several jurisdictions either do not or cannot help: whatsoever any spiritual authority or⁴⁹ power (such as legates from the see of Rome did sometimes exercise) hath done or might heretofore have done for the remedy of those evils in lawful sort (that is to say, without violation⁵⁰ of the law⁵¹ of God or nature in the deed done), as much in every degree our laws have fully granted that the king for ever may do, not only by setting ecclesiastical synods on work, that the thing may be their act and the king their motioner⁵² unto it, (for so much perhaps the masters of reformation will grant;) but by commissionaries⁵³ few or many, who having the king’s letters patents, may in the virtue thereof execute the premises as agents in the right, not of their own peculiar and ordinary but of his superemiment power.

When men are wronged by inferior judges, or have any just cause to take exception against them, their way for redress is to make their appeal. An⁵⁴ appeal is a present delivery of him which maketh it out of the hands of their power and jurisdiction⁵⁵ from whence it is made. Pope Alexander⁵⁶ having sometime⁵⁷ the king of England at the⁵⁸ advantage, caused him, amongst other things, to agree, that as many of his subjects as would, might appeal⁵⁹ to the court of Rome. “And thus,” saith one⁶⁰, “that whereunto a mean person at this day would scorn to submit himself, so great a king was content to be subject. Notwithstanding even when the pope,” saith he, “had so great authority amongst princes which were far off, the Romans he could not frame to obedience, nor was able to obtain that himself might abide at Rome, though promising not to meddle with other than ecclesiastical affairs.” So much are things that terrify more feared by such as behold them aloof off than at hand.

Reformers I doubt not in some cases⁶¹ will admit appeals⁶², made unto their synods; even as the church of Rome doth allow of them so they be made to the bishop of Rome. As for that kind of appeal which the English laws⁶³ do approve, from the judge of any⁶⁴ particular court unto the king, as the only supreme governor on earth, who by his delegates may give a final definitive sentence, from which no further appeal can be made; will their platform allow of this? Surely, forasmuch as in that estate which they all dream of, the whole Church must be divided into parishes, of⁶⁵ which none can have greater or less authority and power than another; again, the king himself must be but as a common member in the body of his own parish, and the causes of that only parish must be by the officers thereof determinable; in case the king had so much preferment⁶⁶, as to be made one of those officers (for otherwise by their positions he were not to meddle any more than the meanest amongst his⁶⁷ subjects with the judgment of any ecclesiastical cause), how is it possible they should allow of appeals to be made from any other abroad to the king?

To receive appeals from all other judges, belongeth unto the highest in power over⁶⁸ all; and to be in power over all, as touching the judgment of⁶⁹ ecclesiastical causes, this as they think belongeth only unto synods. Whereas therefore with us, kings do exercise over all kinds of persons⁷⁰ and causes, power⁷¹ both of voluntary and litigious jurisdiction⁷²; so that according to the one they visit⁷³, reform, and command; according to the other, they judge universally, doing both in far other sort than such as have ordinary spiritual power: oppugned herein we are⁷⁴ by some colourable shew of argument, as if to grant thus much unto any secular person it were unreasonable. “For sith it is,” say they⁷⁵, “apparent out of the Chronicles, that judgment in church matters pertaineth unto God; seeing likewise it is evident out of the Apostle⁷⁶, that the high priest is set over those matters in God’s behalf; it must needs follow that the principality or direction of the judgment of them is by God’s ordinance appertaining unto the high⁷⁷ priest, and consequently to the ministry of the Church: and if it be by God’s ordinance appertaining unto them, how can it be translated from them unto the civil magistrate?” Which argument, briefly drawn into form, lieth thus: That which belongeth unto God, may not be translated unto any other than⁷⁸ whom he hath appointed to have it in his behalf: but principality of judgment in church matters appertaineth unto God, which hath appointed the high priest, and consequently the ministry of the Church alone, to have it in this⁷⁹ behalf; therefore⁸⁰, it may not from them be translated to the civil magistrate. The first of which three⁸¹ propositions we grant; as also in the second that branch which ascribeth unto God principality in church⁸² matters. But that either he did appoint none but only the high priest to exercise the said principality for him; or that the ministry of the Church may in reason from thence be concluded to have alone the same principality by his appointment: these two points we deny utterly.

For concerning the high priest, there is first no such ordinance of God to be found. “Every high priest,” saith the Apostle⁸³, “is taken from among men, and is ordained for men in things pertaining to God:” whereupon it may well be gathered, that the priest was indeed ordained of God to have power in things pertaining unto God. For the Apostle doth there mention the power of offering gifts and sacrifices for sins⁸⁴; which kind of power was not only given of God unto priests, but restrained unto priests only. The power of jurisdiction and ruling authority, this also God gave them, but not them alone⁸⁵. For it is held, as all men know, that others of the laity were herein joined by the law with them. But concerning principality in church affairs (for of this our question is, and of no other) the priests neither had it alone, nor at all; but (as hath been already shewed) principality in spiritual affairs⁸⁶ was the royal prerogative of kings⁸⁷.

Again, though it were so, that God had appointed the high priest to have the said principality of government in those matters; yet how can they who allege this, enforce thereby that consequently the ministry of the Church, and no other, ought to have the same, when they are so far off from allowing as⁸⁸ much to the ministry of the Gospel, as the priesthood of the Law had by God’s appointment, that we but collecting thereout a difference in authority and jurisdiction amongst the Clergy, to be for the policy⁸⁹ of the Church not inconvenient, they forthwith think to close up our mouths by answering, “That the Jewish high priests⁹⁰ had authority above the rest, only in that they prefigured the sovereignty of Jesus Christ; as for the ministers of the Gospel, it is,” they say⁹¹, “altogether unlawful to give them as much as the least title, any syllable that any way⁹² may sound towards⁹³ principality?” And of the regency which may be granted, they hold others even of the laity no less capable than pastors⁹⁴ themselves. How shall these things cleave together?

The truth is, that they have some reason to think it not all of the fittest for kings to sit as ordinary judges in matters of faith and religion. An ordinary judge must be of that⁹⁵ quality which in a supreme judge is not necessary: because the person of the one is charged with that which the other’s authority dischargeth, without employing personally himself herein. It is an error to think that the king’s authority can have no force or⁹⁶ power in the doing of that which himself may not personally do. For first, impossible it is, that at one and the same time the king in person should order so many and so different affairs, as by his power every where present are wont to be ordered both in peace and in war⁹⁷, at home and abroad. Again, the king, in regard of his nonage or minority, may be unable to perform that thing wherein years of discretion are requisite for personal action; and yet his authority even then be of force. For which cause we say, that the king’s authority dieth not, but is, and worketh, always alike. Sundry considerations there may be, effectual to withhold the king’s person from being a doer of that which his power must notwithstanding⁹⁸ give force unto. Even⁹⁹ in civil affairs, where nothing doth either more¹⁰⁰ concern the duty, or better beseem the majesty of kings, than personally to administer justice unto their people, as most famous princes have done: yet, if it be in case of felony or treason, the learned in¹⁰¹ the laws of this realm do plainly¹⁰² affirm¹⁰³, that well may the king commit his authority unto another to judge between him and the offender; but the king being himself here¹⁰⁴ a party, he cannot personally sit to give judgment¹⁰⁵.

As therefore the person of the king may, for just considerations¹⁰⁶, even where the cause is civil, be notwithstanding withdrawn from occupying the seat of judgment, and others under his authority be fit, he unfit himself to judge; so the considerations for which it were haply not convenient for kings to sit and give sentence in spiritual courts, where causes ecclesiastical are usually debated, can be no bar to that force and efficacy which their sovereign power hath over those very consistories, and for which, we hold without any exception that all courts are the king’s. All men are not for all things sufficient; and therefore public affairs being divided, such persons must be authorized judges in each kind, as common reason may presume to be most fit: which cannot of kings and princes ordinarily be presumed in causes merely ecclesiastical; so that even common sense doth rather adjudge this burden unto other men. We see it hereby a thing necessary, to put a difference, as well between that ordinary jurisdiction which belongeth to the clergy alone, and that commissionary wherein others are for just considerations¹⁰⁷ appointed to join with them; as also between both these jurisdictions, and a third, whereby the king hath a transcendent¹⁰⁸ authority, and that in all causes, over both. Why this may not lawfully be granted unto him, there is no reason.

A time there was when kings were not capable of any such power, as namely, while ¹⁰⁹they professed themselves open adversaries¹¹⁰ unto Christ and Christianity. A time there followed, when they, being capable, took sometimes more sometimes less to themselves, as seemed best in their own eyes, because no certainty touching their right was as yet determined. The bishops, who alone were before accustomed to have the ordering of such affairs, saw very just cause of grief, when the highest, favouring heresy, withstood by the strength of sovereign authority religious proceedings. Whereupon they oftentimes, against this new unresistible¹¹¹ power, pleaded that¹¹² use and custom which had been to the contrary; namely, that the affairs of the Church should be dealt in by the clergy, and by no other: unto which purpose, the sentences that then were uttered in defence of unabolished orders and laws, against such as did of their own heads contrary thereunto, are now altogether impertinently brought in opposition against them who use but the¹¹³ power which laws have given them, unless men can shew that there is in those laws some manifest iniquity or injustice.

Whereas therefore against the force judicial and imperial, which supreme authority hath, it is alleged, how Constantine¹¹⁴ termeth church-officers, “Overseers of things within the Church¹¹⁵,” himself, “of those without the Church:” how Augustine¹¹⁶ witnesseth, that the emperor not daring to judge of the bishops’ cause, committed it unto the bishops; and was to crave pardon of the bishops, for that by the Donatists’ importunity, which made no end of appealing unto him, he was, being weary of them, drawn to give sentence in a matter of theirs¹¹⁷: how Hilary¹¹⁸ beseecheth the emperor Constance to provide that the governors of his provinces should not presume to take upon them the judgment of ecclesiastical causes, to whom commonwealth matters only¹¹⁹ belonged: how Ambrose¹²⁰ affirmeth, that palaces belong unto the emperor, churches to the minister; that the emperor hath authority¹²¹ over the common walls of the city, and not in holy things¹²²; for which cause¹²³ he never would yield to have “the causes of the Church¹²⁴ debated in the prince’s consistory¹²⁵,” but “excused himself to the emperor Valentinian, for that being convented to answer concerning church matters in a civil court, he came not¹²⁶:” we may by these testimonies drawn from antiquity, if we list to consider them, discern how requisite it is that authority should always follow received laws in the manner of proceeding. For inasmuch as there was at the first no certain law, determining what force the principal civil magistrate’s authority should be of, how far it should reach, and what order it should observe; but Christian emperors from time to time did what themselves thought most reasonable in those affairs; by this mean¹²⁷ it cometh to pass that they in their practice vary, and are not uniform.

Virtuous emperors, such as Constantine the Great was, made conscience to swerve unnecessarily from the customs¹²⁸ which had been used in the Church, even when it lived under infidels. Constantine, of reverence to bishops and their spiritual authority, rather abstained from that which himself might lawfully do, than was willing to claim a power not fit or decent¹²⁹ for him to exercise. The order which had¹³⁰ been before, he ratified¹³¹, exhorting bishops¹³² to look to the Church, and promising that he would do the office of a bishop over the commonwealth: which very Constantine notwithstanding, did not thereby so renounce all authority in judging of spiritual¹³³ causes, but that sometime he took, as St. Augustine witnesseth¹³⁴, even personal cognition of them; howbeit whether as purposing to give therein judicially any sentence, I stand in doubt. For if the other, of whom St. Augustine elsewhere speaketh, did in such sort judge, surely there was cause why he should excuse it as a thing not usually done. Otherwise there is no let, but that any such great person may hear those causes to and fro debated, and deliver in the end his own opinion of them, declaring on which side himself doth judge that the truth is. But this kind of sentence bindeth no side to stand thereunto; it is a sentence of private persuasion, and not of solemn jurisdiction, albeit a king or an emperor pronounce it.

Again, on the contrary part, when governors infected with heresy were possessed of the highest power, they thought they might use it as pleased¹³⁵ themselves, to further by all means therewith¹³⁶ that opinion which they desired should prevail; they not respecting at all what was meet, presumed to command and judge all men in all causes, without either care of orderly proceeding, or regard to such laws and customs as the Church had been wont to observe. So that the one sort feared to do even that which they might; and that which the other ought not they boldly presumed upon; the one sort of modesty¹³⁷, excused themselves where they scarce needed; the other, though doing that which was¹³⁸ inexcusable, bare it out with main power, not enduring to be told by any man how far they roved beyond their bounds. So great odds¹³⁹ between them whom before we mentioned, and such as the younger Valentinian, by whom St. Ambrose being commanded to yield up one of the churches under him unto the Arians, whereas they which were sent on the¹⁴⁰ message alleged, that the emperor did but use his own right, forasmuch as all things were in his power: the answer which the holy bishop gave them was¹⁴¹, “That the Church is the house of God, and that those things which be¹⁴² God’s are not to be yielded up, and disposed of at the emperor’s will and pleasure; his palaces he might grant unto whomsoever¹⁴³, but God’s own habitations¹⁴⁴ not so.” A cause why many times emperors did¹⁴⁵ more by their absolute authority than could very well stand with reason, was the over great importunity of heretics¹⁴⁶, who being enemies to peace and quietness, cannot otherwise than by violent means be supported.

In this respect therefore we must needs think the state of our own church much better settled than theirs was; because our laws have with far more certainty prescribed bounds unto each kind of power. All decisions¹⁴⁷ of things doubtful, and corrections of things amiss, are proceeded in by order of law, what person soever he be unto whom the administration of judgment belongeth. It is neither permitted unto prelate¹⁴⁸ nor prince to judge and¹⁴⁹ determine at their own discretion, but law hath prescribed what both shall do. What power the king hath he hath it by law, the bounds and limits of it are known; the entire community giveth general order by law how all things publicly are to be done, and the king as head¹⁵⁰ thereof, the highest in authority over all, causeth according to the same law every particular to be framed and ordered thereby. The whole body politic maketh laws, which laws give¹⁵¹ power unto the king, and the king having bound himself to use according unto law that power, it so falleth out, that the execution of the one is accomplished by the other in most religious and peaceable sort. There is no cause given unto any to make supplication, as Hilary did, that civil governors, to whom commonwealth-matters only belong, might¹⁵² not presume to take upon them the judgment of ecclesiastical causes. If the cause be spiritual, secular courts do not meddle with it: we need not excuse ourselves with Ambrose, but boldly and lawfully we may refuse to answer before any civil judge in a matter which is not civil, so that we do not mistake the nature either¹⁵³ of the cause or of the court, as we easily may do both, without some better direction than can be had¹⁵⁴ by the rules of this new-found discipline. But of this most certain we are, that our laws do neither suffer a spiritual court¹⁵⁵ to entertain those causes which by law¹⁵⁶ are civil, nor yet if the matter be indeed spiritual, a mere civil court to give judgment of it.

Touching supreme power therefore to command all men, in all¹⁵⁷ manner of causes of judgment to be highest, let thus much suffice as well for declaration of our own meaning, as for defence of the truth therein¹⁵⁸.

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Footnotes

1. t The Dublin MS. has an interval of seven pages between this and the preceding dissertation. ↩

2. u the judging D. ↩

3. x the sacraments E. ↩

4. y the bishops E.C. ↩

5. z the Church E. the courts D. ↩

6. a do rise E. ↩

7. b matter D. ↩

8. c account E.Q.C.L. ↩

9. d this E.Q.C.L. ↩

10. e an E. ↩

11. f this E.Q.L. ↩

12. g the order E. ↩

13. h of om. E.Q.C.L. ↩

14. i serves D. ↩

15. k Josiah E.C. ↩

16. 2 Chron. xxiv. 4-9. ↩

17. l “Go out, &c.” (not giving the quotation at length.) D. ↩

18. m all om. E. ↩

19. n “the Lord” in later editions, “God” E.C. ↩

20. o the Lord God E.C. ↩

21. oo Balaam E′. ↩

22. p the Lord E.C. ↩

23. 2 Chr. xxx. 6. ↩

24. q these E.C.L.Q. ↩

25. r sometimes E.Q.L. ↩

26. s solemn om. E.C.L. ↩

27. Josh. i. 18. ↩

28. t “and will… . courage” om. D. ↩

29. u that om. E. ↩

30. x law D. ↩

31. y supreme governors E.C. ↩

32. z who E.Q.C.L. ↩

33. a any E.C.L.Q. ↩

34. b same law E. ↩

35. Just. Instit. l. iv. tit. 1. de Offic. Judic. ↩

36. c aut om. E.Q.C.L. ↩

37. d ut Imperator Justinianus E.C. ↩

38. e own om. E.Q. ↩

39. f the D. ↩

40. g belonging to E.C. ↩

41. h any of E. any thing the practice C.L.Q. ↩

42. i there om. D. ↩

43. k imparting E.C. ↩

44. l and D. ↩

45. m that D. ↩

46. n cause E. ↩

47. 1 Eliz. cap. 1. ↩

48. o schisms, heresies E. schisms om. C. ↩

49. p and E.Q.C.L. ↩

50. q the violation E.Q.C.L. ↩

51. r laws E.C. ↩

52. s motion E.Q.C.L. ↩

53. t commission E. commissioners Q.C.L. ↩

54. u appeal: and E.Q.C.L. ↩

55. x jurisdictions E.Q.C.L. ↩

56. [Alexander III. in the arrangement made after the murder of the Archbishop of Canterbury, ad 1172.] ↩

57. y sometimes E.Q.C.L. ↩

58. z the om. E. ↩

59. a have appeal E. ↩

60. Machiavel. Hist. Florent. lib. i. [“Che dovesse annullare tutte le cose fatte nel suo regno in disfavore della libertà ecclesiastica; e dovesse acconsentire, che qualunque suo soggietto potesse volendo appellare a Roma: le quali cose furono tutte da Enrico accettate, e sottomessesi a quel giudicio un tanto Re, che oggi un uomo privato si vergognarebbe a sottomettersi.” p. 21. ed. Genev. 1550.] ↩

61. a causes E. ↩

62. b appeals, but appeals made E.Q.C.L. ↩

63. 25 Hen. VIII. c. 19. ↩

64. c any certain particular E.Q.C.L. ↩

65. d in E.C.L. ↩

66. e favour or preferment E.Q.C. ↩

67. f the D. ↩

68. g of E. ↩

69. h judgment in E. ↩

70. o things, persons E.Q.C.L. ↩

71. oo supreme power E. ↩

72. p jurisdictions E.Q.C.L. ↩

73. q incite E. ↩

74. r we are herein E.C. ↩

75. T. C. l. iii. p. 154. 2 Chron. xix. 5. Heb. v. 1. ↩

76. s Apostles E. Apostle to the Hebrews Q. ↩

77. t high om. D. ↩

78. u but E.Q.C.L. ↩

79. x his E.Q.L. ↩

80. y ergo E.Q.C.L. ↩

81. z three om. E.C. ↩

82. a the Church D. ↩

83. Heb. v. i. ↩

84. b sin E.Q.C.L. ↩

85. c alone only } D. ↩

86. d but in spiritual or church affairs, (as hath been already shewed) it was E. The whole clause om. from “Church affairs” just before C.L. ↩

87. e kings only E. ↩

88. f so E.Q.C.L. ↩

89. ff so E′. politie Gauden. ↩

90. g priest E.C. ↩

91. h they say om. E. ↩

92. i whereof E.C.L.Q. ↩

93. k to E. ↩

94. l the pastors E. ↩

95. m the E.C.L.Q. ↩

96. n nor E. ↩

97. o at war E.D. in Q.C.L. ↩

98. p notwithstanding his power must E. ↩

99. q unto, even E.C.L. ↩

100. r more either E.Q.C.L. ↩

101. s of D. ↩

102. t plainly om. E. ↩

103. Staunf. Pleas of the Crown, l. ii. c. 3. [fol. 54. ed. 1574. “Le Roy in person ne peut estre judge ne seer in judgment in treason ou felony, eo quod il est un des parties al judgment.”] ↩

104. u there E.C.L. ↩

105. x What follows does not appear in the first edition, but was added, in 1662, by Bishop Gauden. ↩

106. y consideration D. ↩

107. z consideration D. ↩

108. a hath transcendent E.Q.C.L. ↩

109. b when E.Q.C.L. ↩

110. c enemies E.C. ↩

111. d this unresistible E.Q. an unresistable C. ↩

112. e the E.Q.C.L. ↩

113. f that E.C.L. ↩

114. T. C. lib. iii. p. 155. ↩

115. Euseb. de Vita Constant. lib. iv. [c. 24. Ἐν ἑστιάσει ποτὲ δεξιούμενος ἐπισκόπους, λόγον ἀϕη̑κεν, ὡς ἄρα εἴη καὶ αὐτὸς ἐπίσκοπος, ὡ̑δέ πη αὐτοι̑ς εἰπὼν ῥήμασιν ἐϕ’ ἡμετέραις ἀκοαι̑ς· ἀλλ’ ὑμει̑ς μὲν τω̑ν εἴσω τη̑ς ἐκκλησίας, ἐγὼ δὲ τω̑ν ἐκτὸς ὑπὸ Θεου̑ καθιστάμενος ἐπίσκοπος ἂν εἴην.] ↩

116. Aug. Ep. 162. [al. 43. c. 7. t. ii. 297. “Neque enim ausus est Christianus imperator sic eorum tumultuosas et fallaces querelas suscipere, ut de judicio episcoporum qui Romæ sederant ipse judicaret; sed alios, ut dixi, episcopos dedit.”] Ep. 166. [al. 105. c. 2.] t. ii. 299, [43. 20. “Eis” (Donatistis) “ipse cessit, ut de illa causa post episcopos judicaret, a sanctis antistitibus postea veniam petiturus.” t. ii. 97.] ↩

117. Besides these testimonies of antiquity which Mr. Cartwright bringeth forth, D. Stapleton, who likewise (Doct. Prin. l. 5. cont. 2. c. 18.) citeth them one by one to the same purpose, hath augmented the number of them by adding other of the like nature: namely, how Hosius the bishop of Corduba (apud Athan. in. Ep. ad Solit. Vit. agentes) answered the emperor, saying, “God hath committed to thee empire; with those things that belong to the Church he hath put us in trust.” How Leontius bishop of Tripolis (Suid. in verb. Leontius) also told the selfsame emperor as much: “I wonder how thou, which art called unto one thing, takest upon thee to deal in another. For being placed in military and politic affairs, in things that belong unto bishops alone thou wilt bear rule.” ↩

118. Hilar. ad Constant. lib. i. § 1. [“Provideat et decernat clementia tua, ut omnes ubique judices, quibus provinciarum administrationes creditæ sunt, ad quos sola cura et solicitudo publicorum negotiorum pertinere debet, a religiosa se observantia abstineant.” col. 1218. ed. Bened.] ↩

119. r only commonwealth matters E. ↩

120. Ambros. lib. v. Ep. 33. [al. 20. § 16. by an error of the press in the Benedictine edition, for § 19. “Ad imperatorem palatia pertinent, ad sacerdotem ecclesiæ. Publicorum tibi mœnium jus commissum est, non sacrorum.” II. 857.] ↩

121. s the authority E.Q.C.L. ↩

122. [“Ambrose hath a worthy saying, wherein he plainly noteth both what a Christian prince may do in these things that appertain unto the Church, and how a godly bishop should in that case behave himself. ‘When it was proposed unto me,’ saith he, ‘that I should deliver the plate or vessel of the Church, I made this answer: If there were any thing required that was my own, either land, house, gold or silver, being of my own private right, that I would willingly deliver it: but that I could not pull any thing from the Church of God. And moreover I said, that in so doing I had regard to the emperor’s safety, because it was not profitable either for me to deliver it, or for him to receive it. Let him receive the words of a free minister of God: if he will do that is for his own safety, let him forbear to do Christ injury.’ ” Bishop Cooper’s Adm. p. 212.] ↩

123. [T. C. i. 193. al. 154. ap. Whitg. Def. 700.] ↩

124. [See Epistle 21, throughout.] ↩

125. t consistories E.C.L. ↩

126. u D inserts here in the text, “Besides these testimonies,” &c. (as in note 3, p. 440.) ↩

127. x means E.C.L.Q. ↩

128. y custom E.Q.C.L. ↩

129. z fit and lawful C. ↩

130. a hath E. ↩

131. b ratifieth E.Q.L. ↩

132. c the bishops E.Q.C.L. ↩

133. d special E. ↩

134. Ep. 68. [D. al. 88. § 3. t. ii. 162. C, D. Ed. Bened. Antwerp. 1700.] ↩

135. e it pleased C.L. ↩

136. f therewith om. E.Q.C.L. ↩

137. g sort modestly D. ↩

138. h is E.C. ↩

139. i odds was between E.Q. is C. ↩

140. k his E.Q.C. this L. ↩

141. Ep. xx. § 16. (19.) “Mandatur denique, ‘Trade basilicam.’ Respondeo, ‘Nec mihi fas est tradere, nec tibi accipere, imperator, expedit. Domum privati nullo potes jure temerare, domum Dei existimas auferendam?’ Allegatur, imperatori licere omnia, ipsius esse universa. Respondeo, ‘Noli te gravare, imperator, ut putes te in ea, quæ divina sunt, imperiale aliquod jus habere. Noli te extollere, sed si vis diutius imperare, esto Deo subditus. Scriptum est, quæ Dei Deo, quæ Cæsaris Cæsari.’ ” t. ii. 857.] ↩

142. l that are E. which are Q.C.L. ↩

143. m whomsoever he pleaseth, but E. ↩

144. n habitation E.Q.C. ↩

145. o do E. ↩

146. p wicked heretics E.Q.C.L. ↩

147. q decision E.L. correction C. ↩

148. r prelates E.D. ↩

149. s or D. ↩

150. t the head E.D.L. ↩

151. tt gave E. ↩

152. u may E.Q.C.L. ↩

153. x either the nature E.Q.C.L. ↩

154. y had om. E. ↩

155. See the statute of Edw. I. and Edw. II. [13 Edw. I. st. 4. Circumspecte agatis; 24 Edw. I. De Consultatione; 9 Edw. II. st. 1.] and Nat. Brev. touching Prohibition, [p. 30. Lond. Tottell, 1584.] See also in Bracton these sentences, lib. v. [Tract. v.] cap. 2. “Est jurisdictio quædam ordinaria, quædam delegata, quæ pertinet ad sacerdotium, et forum ecclesiasticum, sicut in causis spiritualibus et spiritualitati annexis. Est etiam alia jurisdictio ordinaria vel delegata, quæ pertinet ad coronam, et dignitatem regis, et ad regnum in causis et placitis rerum temporalium in foro seculari.” Again: “Cum diversæ sint hinc inde jurisdictiones, et diversi judices, et diversæ causæ, debet quilibet ipsorum imprimis æstimare, an sua sit jurisdictio, ne falcem videatur ponere in messem alienam.” Again: “Non pertinet ad regem injungere pœnitentias, nec ad judicem secularem; nec etiam ad eos pertinet cognoscere de iis, quæ sunt spiritualibus annexa, sicut de decimis et aliis ecclesiæ proventionibus.” Again: “Non est laicus conveniendus coram judice ecclesiastico de aliquo, quod in foro seculari terminari possit et debeat.” [fol. 400, 401. ed. 1569.] ↩

156. z the law E.C.L. ↩

157. a and in all E.Q.C.L. ↩

158. b What follows is all found in D. alone of the MSS. with an interval of a blank leaf. But § 1, 2. is printed in Clavi Trabales, p. 92-94: as far as “to any,” p. 446. ↩