IX. The last thing of all which concerns the king’s supremacy is, whether thereby he may be exempted from being subject to that judicial power which ecclesiastical consistories have over men. It seemeth, first, in most men’s judgments to be requisite that on earth there should not be any alive altogether without standing in awe of some by whom they may be controlled and bridled.
The good estate of a commonwealth within itself is thought on nothing to depend more than upon these two special affections, fear and love: fear in the highest governor himself; and love, in the subjects that live under him. The subject’s love for the most part continueth as long as the righteousness of kings doth last; in whom virtue decayeth not as long as they fear to do that which may alienate the loving hearts of their subjects from them. Fear to do evil groweth from the harm which evildoers are to suffer. If therefore private men, which know the danger they are subject unto, being malefactors, do notwithstanding so boldly adventure upon heinous crimes, only because they know it is possible for some transgressor sometimes to escape the danger of law: in the mighty upon earth, (which are not always so virtuous and holy that their own good minds will bridle them,) what may we look for, considering the frailty of man’s nature, if the world do once hold it for a maxim that kings ought to live in no subjection: that, how grievous disorders1 soever they fall into, none may have coercive power over them? Yet so it is that this we must necessarily admit, as a number of right well learned men are persuaded.
Let us therefore set down first, what there is which2 may induce men so to think; and then consider their several inventions or ways, who judge it a thing necessary, even for kings themselves, to be punishable, and that by men. The question itself we will not determine. The reasons of each opinion being opened, it shall be best for the wise to judge which of them is likeliest to be true. Our purpose being not to oppugn any save only that which reformers hold; and of the rest, rather to inquire than to give sentence. Inducements leading men to think the highest magistrate should not be judged of any, saving God alone, are specially these. 1. First, as there could be in natural bodies no motion of any thing, unless there were some which moveth3 all things and continueth unmoveable4; even so in politic societies there must be some unpunishable, or else no man shall suffer punishment. For sith punishments proceed always from superiors, to whom the administration of justice belongeth, which administration must have necessarily a fountain that deriveth it to all others, and receiveth it5 not from any; because otherwise the course of justice should go infinitely in a circle, every superior having his superior without end, which cannot be: therefore a well-spring it followeth there is, and a supreme head of justice, whereunto all are subject, but itself in subjection to none. Which kind of preeminence if some ought to have in a kingdom, who but the king should have it? Kings therefore no man can have lawfully power and authority to judge. If private men offend, there is the magistrate over them, which judgeth. If magistrates, they have their prince. If princes, there is Heaven, a tribunal, before which they shall appear: on earth they are not accountable to any.
2. Which thing likewise the very original of kingdoms6 doth shew.
“His second point, whereby he would make us odious, is, that we think the prince may be subject to excommunication; that is, that he is a brother7, that he is not without but within the Church8. If this be dangerous, why is it printed and allowed in the famous writings of bishop Jewel9: ‘In that the high priest10 doth his office when he excommunicates and cuts off a dead member from the body, so far forth the prince, be he never so mighty, is inferior to him. Yea not only to a bishop, but to a simple priest?’ Why is it suffered which Mr. Nowell hath written11, ‘The prince ought patiently to abide excommunication at the bishop’s hands?’ Why are not the worthy examples of emperors rased12 out of the histories, seeing they have been subject to his [this] censure13?”