In the search of Theologicall Truths, it is the safest method, first of all to looke unto Divine Authority; because that carryes with it as cleer an evidence to our Faith, as any thing else can be to our reason. But on the contrary, in the examination of Philosophicall points, it were a preposterous course to begin at the testimony and opinion of others, and then afterwards to descend unto the reasons that may bee drawne from the Nature and Essence of the things themselves: because these inartificiall Arguments (as the Logicians cal them) doe not carry with them any cleere and convincing evidence; and therefore should come after those that are of more necessary dependance, as serving rather to confirme, than resolve the Iudgement.
But yet, so it is, that in those points which are besides the common opinion, men are carried away at the first by the generall cry, and seldome or never come so farre as to examine the reasons that may bee urged for them. And therfore, since it is the purpose of this discourse to remove those prejudices which may hinder our judgement in the like case, ‘tis requisite that in the first place there bee some satisfaction given to those Arguments that may bee taken from the Authoritie of others.
Which Arguments are insisted on by our adversaries with much heate and violence.
What (say they) shall an upstart Noveltie thrust out such a Truth as hath passed by successive tradition through all Ages of the World? and hath bin generally entertained, not onely in the opinion of the vulgar, but also of the greatest Philosophers and most learned men?1 Shall wee thinke that amongst the multitude of those who in severall times have been eminent for new inventions and strange discoveries, there was none able to finde out such a Secret as this, besides some fabulous Pithagorians, and of late Copernicus? Is it possible that the World should last for above five thousand yeares together, and yet the Inhabitants of it be so dull and stupid, as to be unacquainted with it’s motion? Nay, shall wee thinke that those excellent men, whom the Holy Ghost made use of in the penning of Scripture, who were extraordinarily inspired with supernaturall Truths, should notwithstanding be so grossely ignorant of so common a matter as this? Can wee beleeve, if there were any such thing, that Iosuah, and Iob, and David, and Solomon, &c. should know nothing of it? Certainly it must needs argue a strong affectation of Singularitie, for a man to take up any groundlesse fancy against such antient and generall Authority.
I answer: As wee should not bee so fondly conceited of our selves, and the extraordinary Abilities of these present ages, as to thinke every thing that is antient to be absolute: Or, as if it must needs bee with opinions, as it is with cloths, where the newest is for the most part best. So neither should we be so superstitiously devoted to Antiquitie, as to take up every thing for Canonicall, which drops from the pen of a Father, or was approved by the consent of the Antients. ‘Tis an excellent saying, (Alcinous) […]. It behoves every one in the search of Truth, alwaies to preserve a Philosophicall liberty: not to be so inslaved to the opinion of any man, as to thinke what ever he sayes to be infallible. We must labour to find out what things are in themselves by our owne experience, and a through examination of their natures, not what another sayes of them. And if in such an impartiall enquiry, we chance to light upon a new way, and that which is besides the common rode, this is neither our fault, nor our unhappinesse.
Not our fault, because it did not arise from Singularity or Affectation. Not our unhappinesse, because it is rather a Priviledge to be the first in finding out such Truths, as are not discernable to every common eye. If Noveltie should alwaies be rejected, neither would Arts have arrived to that perfection wherein now wee enjoy them, nor could we euer hope for any future reformation: though all Truth be in it self Eternall; yet in respect of mens opinions, there is scarse any so antient, but had a beginning, and was once counted a Noveltie; and if for this reason it had been condemned as an errour, what a generall darknesse and ignorance would then have been in the World, in comparison of that light which now abounds; according to that of the Poet:2 Quod si tam Antiquis Novit as invisa fuisset, Quam nobis, quid nunc esset vetus aut quid haberet, Quod legeret tereretque viritim publicus usus? If our Forefathers had but hated thus, All that were new, what had been old to us? Or, how might any thing confirmed be, For publicke use, by it’s Antiquitie?