But for more full satisfaction of all those scruples that may arise from the seeming Novelty or Singularity of this opinion, I shall propose these following considerations.

Suppose it were a Noveltie:³ Yet ‘tis in Philosophy, and that is made up of nothing else; but receives addition from every dayes experiment. True indeed, for Divinity wee have an infallible rule that do’s plainly inform us of all necessary Truths; and therfore the Primitive Times are of greater Authority, because they were neerer to those holy Men who were the pen-men of Scripture. But now for Philosophy, there is no such reason: what ever the Schoole-men may talke; yet Aristotles works are not necessarily true, and hee himselfe hath by sufficient Arguments proved himselfe to be liable unto errour. Now in this case, if wee should speake properly, Antiquity do’s consist in the old age of the World, not in the youth of it. In such Learning as may be increased by fresh experiments and new discoveries: ‘tis we are the Fathers, and of more Authority than former Ages; because wee have the advantage of more time than they had, and Truth (wee say) is the Daughter of Time. However, there is nothing in this opinion so Magisterially proposed, but the Reader may use his owne liberty; and if all the reasons considered together, doe not seeme convincing unto him, he may freely reject it.

In those naturall points which carry with them any doubt or obscurity, it is the safest way to suspend our assents: and though we may dispute pro or con; yet not to settle our opinion on either side.

In weighing the Authority of others, ‘tis not their multitude that should prevaile,⁴ or their skill in some things that should make them of credit in every thing, but wee should examine what particular insight and experience they had in those times for which they are cited. Now ‘tis plaine, that common people judge by their senses; and therefore, their voices are altogether unfit to decide any Philosophicall doubt, which cannot well be examined or explained without discourse and reason. And as for the antient Fathers, though they were men very eminent for their holy lives and extraordinary skill in Divinitie; yet they were most of them very ignorant in that part of Learning which concernes this opinion, as appeares by many of their grosse mistakes in this kinde, as that concerning the Antipodes, &c. and therefore it is not their opinion neither, in this businesse, that to an indifferent seeker of Truth will bee of any strong Authority.

But against this it is⁵ objected, That the instance of the Antipodes do’s not argue any speciall ignorance in these learned Men: Or, that they had lesse skil in such humane Arts than others; since Aristotle himself, and Pliny, did deny this as well as they.

I answer:

1 If they did, yet this do’s make more to the present purpose: For if such great Schollers, who were so eminent for their knowledge in naturall things, might yet notwithstanding be grossely mistaken in such matters as are now evident and certaine: Why then wee have no reason to depend upon their assertions or Authorities, as if they were infallible.

2 Though these great Naturalists, for want of some experience were mistaken in that opinion, whilest they thought no place was habitable but the temperate Zones; yet it cannot be from hence inferred, that they denied the possibilitie of Antipodes: since these are such Inhabitants as live opposite unto us in the other temperate Zone; and ‘twere an absurd thing to imagine that those who lived in different Zones, can be Antipodes to one another; and argues that a man did not understand, or else had forgotten that common distinction in Geography, wherein the relation of the Worlds Inhabitants unto one another, are reckoned up under these three heads; Antaeci, Periaeci, and Antipodes. But to let this passe: ‘Tis certaine, that some of the Fathers did deny the being of any such, upon other more absurd grounds. Now if such as Chrisostome, Lactantius, &c. who were noted for great Schollers, and such too as flourished in these latter times, when all humane Learning was more generally profest, should notwithstanding be so much mistaken in so obvious a matter: Why then may wee not think that those Primitive Saints, who were the pen-men of Scripture, and eminent above others in their time for holinesse and knowledge, might yet be utterly ignorant of many Philosophicall Truths, which are commonly knowne in these dayes? ‘Tis probable, that the Holy Ghost did informe them onely with the knowledge of those things whereof they were to be the pen-men, and that they were not better skilled in points of Philosophy than others. There were indeed some of them who were supernaturally indowed with humane Learning; yet this was, because they might thereby bee fitted for some particular ends, which all the rest were not appointed unto: thus Solomon was strangely gifted with all kinde of knowledge, in a great measure, because he was to teach us by his owne experience the extreme vanity of it, (Eccl. 1. 18) that we might not so settle our desires upon it, as if it were able to yeeld us contentment. So too the Apostles were extraordinarily inspired with the knowledge of Languages, because they were to preach unto all Nations. But it will not hence follow, that therfore the other holy pen-men were greater Schollers than others. ‘Tis likely that Iob had as much humane Learning as most of them, because his Booke is more especially remarkable for lofty expressions, and discourses of Nature; and yet ‘tis not likely that he was acquainted with all those mysteries which later Ages have discovered; because when God would convince him of his owne folly and ignorance, he proposes to him such questions, as being altogether unanswerable; which notwithstanding, any ordinary Philosopher in these dayes might have resolued. As you may see at large in the thirty eighth Chapter of that Booke.

The occasion was this: Iob having (Cap. 13. 3) before desired that he might dispute with the Almighty concerning the uprightnesse of his owne wayes, and the unreasonablenesse of those afflictions which he underwent, do’s at length obtaine his desire in this kinde; and God vouchsafes in this thirty eighth chapter, to argue the case with him. Where he do’s shew Iob how unfit he was to judge of the wayes of Providence, in disposing of Blessings and Afflictions, when as he was so ignorant in ordinary matters, being not able to discerne the reason of naturall and common events. As⁶ why the Sea should bee so bounded from overflowing the land? What is the⁷ bredth of the Earth? what is the⁸ reason of the Snow or Hayle? what was the⁹ cause of the Raine or Dewe, of Ice and Frost, and the like. By which questions, it seemes Iob was so utterly pusled, that hee is faine afterwards to humble himselfe in this acknowledgement: (Cap. 42. 3) I have uttered that I understood not, things too wonderfull for me, which I knew not: wherefore I abhorre my selfe, and repent in dust and ashes.

So that ‘tis likely these holy Men had not these humane Arts by any speciall inspiration, but by instruction and study, and other ordinary meanes; and therefore Moses his skill in this kinde is called the Learning of the Egyptians. (Acts 7. 22) Now because in those times all Sciences were taughr onely in a rude and imperfect manner; therefore ‘tis likely that they also had but a darke and confuse apprehension of things, and were liable to the common errours. And for this reason is it, why¹⁰ Tostatus (speaking of Iosuahs bidding the Moone stand still as well as the Sun) sayes, Quod forte er at imperitus circa Astrorum doctrinam, sentiens ut vulgares sentiunt: That perhaps hee was unskilfull in Astronomy, having the same grosse conceit of the Heavens, as the vulgar had. From all which it may be inferred, that the ignorance of such good Men and great Schollers concerning these Philosophical points, can bee no sufficient reason, why after examination we should deny them, or doubt of their Truth.

‘Tis considerable,¹¹ that in the rudiments and first beginnings of Astronomy, and so in severall Ages after, this opinion hath sound many Patrons, and those too Men of eminent note and learning. Such was more especially Pythagoras, who was generally and highly esteemed for his divine wit, and rare inventions; under whose mysterious sayings, there be many excellent Truths to bee discovered.

But against his testimony, it is againe¹² objected; If Pythagoras were of this opinion, yet his Authority should not be of any credit, because he was the author of many other monstrous absurdities.

To this I answer: If a mans errour in some particulars should take away his credit for every thing else, this would abolish the force of all humane Authority; for humanum est errane. Secondly, ‘tis probable that many of Pythagora’s sayings which seeme so absurd, are not to be understood according to their letter, but in a mysticall sense.

2 But he objects again, that Pythagoras was not of this opinion; and that for two reasons: First, because no antient author that he had read ascribes it unto him. Secondly, it is contradictory to his other opinions, concerning the Harmony that was made by the motion of the Heavens; which could not consist with this other of the Earth’s motion.

To the first I answer: The Objector could not chuse but know that this assertion is by many antient authors ascribed to that sect, whereof Pythagoras was the chief. He might have seene it expresly in¹³ Aristotle himselfe: […].

In which the Philosopher do’s compendiously reckon up the three chiefe particulars implyed in the opinion of the Pythagorians. First, the Suns being in the centre of the World. Secondly, the earth’s annuall motion about it, as being one of the planets: thirdly, it’s diurnal revolution, wherby it caused day & night.

To his second reason I answer: First, that Pythagoras thought the Earth to be one of the Planets (as appeares by Aristotles testimony concerning him) and to move amongst them the rest. So that his opinion concerning the motion of the heavens, is not inconsistent with that of the earth. Secondly, but as for the coelestiall harmony, he might perhaps under this mysticall expression, according to his usuall custome, shadow forth unto us that mutuall proportion & harmonical consent, which he did conceive in the severall bignes, distance, motions of the orbs. So that notwithstanding these objections, it is evident that Pythagoras was of this opinion, and that his Authority may adde somwhat for the confirmation of it. Vnto him assented¹⁴ Aristarchus Samius, who flourished about 280 yeares before the Birth of our Saviour, and was by reason of this opinion, arraigned for prophanes and sacriledge by the Ariopagites, because he had blasphemed the deity of Vesta, affirming the earth to move. To them agreed Philaus, Heraclides, Pontius, Nicetas, Syracusanus, Ecphantus, Lucippus, and Plato himself, (as some think.) So likewise Numa Pompilius, as Plutarch relates it in his life; who in reference to this opinion, built the temple of Vesta round, like the universe: in the middle of it was placed the perpetuall vest all fire; by which he did represent the Sunne in the centre of the world. All these men were in their severall times of speciall Note, as well for their extraordinarie learning, as for this opinion.

‘Tis considerable,¹⁵ that since this Science of Astronomy hath bin raised to any perfection, there have been many of the best skill in it, that have assented unto that assertion which is here defended. Amongst whom was the Cardinall Cusanus,¹⁶ but more especially Copernicus, who was a man very exact and diligent in these studies for above 30 yeres together, from the yeare 1500 to 1530, and upwards: and since him, most of the best Astronomers have been of this side. So that now, there is scarce any of note and skil, who are not Copernicus his followers, and if we should goe to most voices, this opinion would carry it from any other. It would be too tedious to reckon up the names of those that may be cited for it; I wil only mention some of the chief: Such were Ioachinus Rheticus, an elegant writer, Christopherus Rothman, Mestilin, a man very eminent for his singular skill in this Science; who though at the first he were a follower of Ptolomy, yet upon his second and more exact thoughts, he concluded Copernicus to be in the right, & that the usual Hypothesis,¹⁷ praescriptione potiùs quàm ratione valet, do’s prevaile more by prescription then reason. So likewise Erasmus Reinholdus, who was the man that calculated the Pratenicall Tables from Copernicus his observations, and did intend to write a Commentarie upon his other Works, (Ibid) but that he was taken out of this life before hee could finish those resolutions. Vnto these also I might adde the Names of Gilbert, Keplar, Gallilaeus, with sundry others, who have much beautified and confirmed this Hypothesis, with their new inventions. Nay I may safely affirme, that amongst the varietie of those opinions that are in Astronomy, there are more (of those which have skill in it) that are of this opinion, not only than any other side, but than all the rest put together. So that now it is a greater Argument of Singularitie to oppose it.

‘Tis probable,¹⁸ that many other of the Antients would have assented unto this opinion, if they had been acquainted with those experiments which later times have found out for the confirmation of it: And therefore¹⁹ Rheticus and²⁰ Keplar doe so oten wish that Aristotle were now alive againe. Questionlesse he was so rational & ingenious a man (not halfe so obstinate as many of his followers) that upon such probabilities as these, he would quickly have renounced his owne Principles, and have come over to this side: for in one place, having proposed some questions about the heavens,²¹ which were not easie to bee resolved: He sets downe this rule, That in difficulties, a man may take a liberty to speake that which seems most likely to him: and in such cases, an aptnesse to guesse at some resolution, for the satisfying of our Philosophicall thirst, do’s deserve rather to bestiled by the name of Modestie, than Boldnes. And in another place,²² he referres the Reader to the different opinions of Astronomers, advising him to examine their severall tenents, as well Eudoxus as Calippus; and to entertaine that (not which is most antient, but) which is most exact and agreeable to reason.²³ And as for Ptolomy, ‘tis his counsell, that wee should endeavour to frame such suppositions of the Heavens, as might be more simple, being void of all superfluities: and he confesses, that his Hypothesis had many implications in it, together with sundry intricate and unlikely turnings; and therefore in the same place, hee seems to admonish us, that wee should not bee too confident the Heavens were really in the same Forme, wherein Astronomers did supposethem. So that ‘tis likely, ‘twas his chief intent to propose unto us such a frame of the coelestiall bodies, from which wee might, in some measure, conceive of their different appearances; and according to which, wee might be able to calculate their motions. But now, ‘tis Copernicus his endeavour, to propound unto us, the true naturall Causes of these severall Motions, and Appearances: It was the intent of the one, to settle the Imagination; and of the other, to satisfie the judgement. So, that wee have no reason to doubt of his assent unto this Opinion, if hee had but clearely understood all the grounds of it.

‘Tis reported of Clavius, that when lying upon his Death-bed, he heard the first Newes of those Discoveries which were made by Gallilaeus his Glasse, he brake forth into these words: Videre Astronomos, quo pacto constituendi sunt orbes Coelestes, ut haec Phaenomena salvari possint: That it did behoove Astronomers, to consider of some other Hypothesis, beside that of Ptolomy, whereby they might salve all those new appearances. Intimating that this old one, which formerly he had defended, would not now serve the turne: and doubtlesse, if it had been informed how congruous all these might have been unto the opinion of Copernicus, hee would quickly have turned on that side. ‘Tis considerable, that amongst the followers of Copernicus, there are scarce any, who were not formerly against him; and such, as at first, had been throughly seasoned with the Principles of Aristotle; in which, for the most part, they have no lesse skil, than those who are so violent in the defence of them. Whereas on the contrary, there are very few to bee found amongst the followers of Aristotle and Ptolomy, that have read any thing in Copernicus, or doe fully understand the Grounds of his opinion; and I thinke, not any, who having been once setled with any strong assent on this side, that have afterwards revolted from it. Now if we do but seriously weigh with our selves, that so many ingenious, considering men, should reject that opinion which they were nursed up in, and which is generally approved as the truth; and that, for the embracing of such a Paradox as is condemned in Schooles, and commonly cryed downe, as being absurd and ridiculous; I say, if a man doe but well consider all this, he must needs conclude, that there is some strong evidence for it to bee found out by examination; and that in all probabilitie, this is the righter side.

‘Tis probable,²⁴ that most of those Authors who have opposed this opinion, since it hath bin confirmed by new discoveries, were stirred up thereunto by some of these 3 insufficient grounds.

1 An over-fond and partial conceit of their proper inventions. Every man is naturally more affected to his owne brood, than to that of which another is the Author; though perhaps, it may bee more agreeable to reason. ‘Tis very difficult for any one, in the search of Truth, to find in himselfe such an indifferencie, as that his judgement is not at all swayd by an overweening affection unto that which is proper unto himselfe. And this perhaps might bee the first reason that moved the noble Tycho with so much heat to oppose Copernicus, that so hee might the better make way for the spreding of that Hypothesis, which was of his owne invention. To this I might likewise refer that opinion of Origanus and Mr. Carpenter, who attribute to the earth only a diurnall revolution. It do’s more especially concerne those men that are Leaders of severall sides, to beat downe any that should oppose them.

2 A servile and superstitious feare of derogating from the authoritie of the antients, or opposing that meaning of Scripture phrases; wherein the supposed infallible Church, hath for a long time understood them. ‘Tis made part of the new Creed, set forth by Pius the fourth, 1564, That no man should assent unto any interpretation of Scripture, which is not approved of by the authoritie of the Fathers. And this is the reason why the Iesuites, who are otherwise the greatest affectors of those opinions, which seeme to be new and subtill, doe yet forbeare to say any thing in defence of this; but rather take all occasions to inveigh against it.²⁵ One of them do’s expressely condemn it for a heresie. And since him, it hath bin called in by²⁶ two Sessions of the Cardinals, as being an opinion both absurd and dangerous. And therefore likewise doe they punish it, by casting the Defenders of it into the Popes truest Purgatorie, the Inquisition: but yet neither these Councels, nor any (that I know of) since them, have proceeded to such a peremptorie censure of it, as to conclude it a heresie: fearing perhaps, lest a more exact examinanation, and the discoverie of future times, finding it to bee an undeniable Truth, it might redound to the prejudice of their Church, and it’s infallibilitie. And therefore he that is most bitter against it, in the heat and violence of opposition, will not call it a heresie: the worst that he dares say of it, is, That it is opinio temeraria quae altero saltem pede intravit haeresios limen;²⁷ A rash opinion, and bordering upon heresie. Though unto this likewise he was incited by the eagernesse of disputation, and a desire of victorie, for it seemes many eminent men of that Church before him, were a great deale more milde and moderate in their censures of it.

Paul the third, was not so much offended at Copernicus, when he dedicated his Worke unto him.

The Cardinall of Cusa, do’s expresly maintaine this opinion.

Scombergius, the Cardinall of Capua, did with much importunitie and great approbation, beg of Copernicus the commentaries that he writ in this kind. And it seems the Fathers of the Councell of Trent, were not such confident defenders of Ptolomy’s hypothesis against Copernicus, as many now are. For speaking of those intricate subtilties, which the Fancies of men had framed, to maintain the practice of the Church, they compared them to Astronomers, who (say they) do faine Excentricks and Epicijcles, and such engines of Orbes, to save the Phenomena; though they know there are no such things. But now, because this opinion of Copernicus in later times hath been so strictly forbidden, and punished, it will concerne those of that Religion, to take heed of medling in the defence of it, but rather to submit the liberty of their reason, unto the command of their Superiors, and (which is very absurd) even in naturall Questions, not to assent unto any thing, but what authoritie shall allow of.

3. A iudging of things by sence, rather than by discourse and reason: a tying of the meaning of Scripture, to the letter of it; and from thence concluding Philosophicall points, together with an ignorance of all those grounds and probabilities in Astronomie, upon which this opinion is bottomed. And this in all likelihood, is the reason why some men, who in other things perhaps are able Schollers, doe write so vehemently against it: and why the common people in generall doe cry it downe, as being absurd and ridiculous. Vnder this head I might referre the opposition of Mr. Fuller, Al. Ross. &c.

But now, no prejudice that may arise from the bare authoritie of such enemies as these, will be liable to sway the judgement of an indifferent considering man; and I doubt not but that hee, who will throughly weigh with himselfe these particulars that are here propounded, may find some satisfaction for these Arguments, which are taken from the seeming Noveltie and Singularitie of this Opinion.

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← Book 2, To the Reader · Contents · Book 2, Proposition 2. That there is not any place in Scriptures, from which →

Footnotes

1. Alex. Ross. de Terrae motu, contra Lansb. lib. 1. sect. 1. cap. 10. ↩

2. Horat. lib. 2. ep. 1. ↩

3. Consid. 1. ↩

4. Consid. 2. ↩

5. Alex. Ross. l. 1. sect. c. 8. ↩

6. V. 8. 10, 11. ↩

7. Ver. 18. ↩

8. Ver. 22. ↩

9. V. 28. 29. ↩

10. Iosh ca. 10. Quaest. 19. ↩

11. Consid. 3. ↩

12. Alex. Ross. l. 2. so. 2. c. 10. ↩

13. De Coelo, lib. 2. ca. 13. ↩

14. Archime des de araenae numero. ↩

15. 4. Consid.
    ↩

16. De docta ignor. lib. 2. cap. 12. ↩

17. Praef. ad Narrat. Rhetici. ↩

18. 5 Consid. ↩

19. in Narratione. ↩

20. Myst. Cosmogr. cap. 1. Item praef. ad 4. l. Astr. Copern. ↩

21. de Coel. l. 2. c. 12. ↩

22. Met. lib. 12. cap. 8. ↩

23. Alm. lib. 13. cap. 2. ↩

24. 7 Consid. ↩

25. Serrarius Commen. in Ios. cap. 10. Quaest. 14. So Lipfius Phisiol. l. 2. ↩

26. Ann. Dom. 1616. item 1633. ↩

27. Fromondus Antarist. cap. 6. ↩