ROM. XII.19.
I HAVE treated of late in a former Discourse concerning the virtue of Moderation; shewing the true nature and necessity of it, and how seasonable and proper the pressing of it hath been and will continually be for all places and times; And more particularly for such as in any revolution are apt to think it least seasonable, who for that very reason have more need to be put in remembrance of their duty in this particular.
Now because this other subject of Revenge is of near affinity to it; being in some sense the object of it, according to that definition of Seneca where he describes Clemency and Moderation to be Temperantia animi in potestate Vlciscendi; A temperance of mind when we have the power and opportunity of revenge: Therefore I could not but judg it a very proper Subject to be annexed to the former, and this Text as proper to found a discourse upon of this nature as any other.
In the former part of this Epistle, the Apostle had insisted at large upon several points of faith, more particularly upon that great Doctrine of Justification. In this Chapter he proceeds to lay down certain precepts of Christianity concerning practice and obedience, beginning with those that refer to God, in the three first verses: And amongst them, with that which is the foundation of all the rest, namely that we wholly devote and resign up our selves unto his spiritual service. v. 1.
Then he proceeds to such duties as we owe to our Neighbours, whether, 1. Those that are fellow-members of the same Church, partakers of the same faith; from ver. 4. to the 13. Or 2dly, such as are enemies and persecutors, v. 14. Bless them which persecute you; and again, v. 17. Recompence to no man evil for evil. And because ‘tis a duty (this) of more than ordinary difficulty, very much against the natural inclinations of men, therefore he returns again to the enforcing of it, in the words of the Text, and so to the end of the Chapter.
The Text is a Dissuasive from the sin of Revenge; in it there lye four particulars very obvious:
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An insinuating compellation, Dearly beloved.
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The Precept or Prohibition it self, Avenge not your selves.
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A direction for the better observance of this precept, But rather give place unto wrath.
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A Reason or Argument for the enforcing of it, For it is written, Vengeance is mine, or belongs to me. I will repay saith the Lord.
I shall briefly explain the several Terms.
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The Compellation; ἀγαπητοί, Dearly beloved. ‘Tis but one word in the Greek, but because of the special Emphasis of it, signifying the most cordial love, therefore is it thus rendred in the English. And upon this account ‘tis usually ascribed to an onely child; so the 70 translate that place, Gen. 22.2. Thine onely Son, thy dearly beloved Son. In which sense ‘tis frequently used by other Greek Authors, Homer, Plutarch, and others (as divers Criticks have observed.) It signifies the dearest and most intimate affection. The Apostle doth use it both here and in several other places, that by so mild and obliging a compellation he might the better insinuate and prevail with those whom he is to perswade: Suitable to his own rule, In meekness instructing those that oppose themselves.
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The Precept or Prohibition it self, μὴ ἑαυτοὺς ἐκδικοῦντες, non vosmet ipsos defendentes. So the Vulgar, very improperly both as to the force of the word and the scope of the place. There are two particulars to be enquired unto for the explication of this clause: What is meant by Revenging. Revenging our selves.
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What this […], Vltio or Vindicta is may be very proper to be discussed, because ‘tis by several Authors used in such various and equivocal senses; sometimes for a Passion of the mind, so Plato defines it in his Book de Legibus, Vindicta est passio justitiae sequax; sometimes for a virtue, amongst the Catalogue of which Aristotle doth reckon it. Eth. lib. 4. And so likewise Aquinas 2. 2dae, making the two extremes of it to be cruelty, and too much remission or abjectness. And sometimes likewise ‘tis reckoned for a vice, as in the Text, and according to the most usual acception of the word. And there is reason enough why it may be referred to each of these heads, because supposing it to be the first, a Passion, it must likewise be capable of being both a Virtue and a Vice.