PHIL. IV.5.
THESE Words are among several other precepts and counsels which seem to have no connexion with one another, and therefore I shall handle them absolutely without any reference to the Context.
And there are these three parts considerable in the words: 1. A Duty enjoined, Moderation. 2. The extent or manner of its being exercised, it must be known unto all men. 3. A reason or argument to enforce it, The Lord is at hand.
I have severed the Text into these parts for the more orderly explication of the several Terms contained in it.
I. Concerning the virtue enjoined, your Moderation, τὸ ἐπιεικὲς ὑμῶν. In the Original ‘tis an Adjective put Substantively, wherein there is a peculiar elegance and Emphasis. The Syriac and Arabic render it mansuetudo, meekness. The Vulgar, Arias Montanus, and others, modestia, modesty, a composedness of life and manners. The Aethiopic, Autoritas vestra, your Autority; for which there seems to be very little ground in the signification of the word. Others Humanitas: Our old Translation did render it by the word Patience. And the same original word is by our present Translation so rendred, 1 Tim. 3.3. Not given to filthy lucre, but patient, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπιεικῆ · sometimes ‘tis translated clemency or courtesie, Act. 24.4. sometimes gentleness, 2 Cor, 10.1. Titus 3.2. Iam. 3.17. 1 Pet. 2.18.
The Hebrews express the same notion by three words, derived from the root שלם, סלח, ישר. The one signifying rectitude, the other readiness to pardon, the other Peace.
1The Philosopher in his Ethicks, where he treats particularly of it, makes it to be a species or branch of Iustice, whereby we are directed and inclined to supply that by right reason, which is not provided for in the words of the written Law. Because ‘tis not possible in the making of general Rules or Laws to foresee all such particular cases and circumstances as may happen. Therefore that habit whereby a man is inabled and inclined to deal according to the equitable sense of the Law, and to allow for such particular circumstances as may make a real difference in several Cases, this is styled ἐπιείκεια or equity, which is a moral virtue placed betwixt the two extremes of ἀκριβοδίκαιον rigour, or summum jus on the one hand, insisting too much upon the letter; and relaxatio nimia, remitting too much from the true sense of it, on the other hand. Now both these extremes, the excess and the defect being evidently vices, it must thence necessarily follow, that the medium betwixt them must be a virtue, and have in it the obligation of a duty.
So that he who in those things which the Law-giver could not particularly provide for doth judg according to the equitable sense of the Law, is ἐπιεικής an equal Magistrate. And he who in such a case is willing to depart from his own strict right, out of compliance with that meaning which the Legislator would in such a case have particularly determined could he have foreseen it, is homo aequus, as a private person.
But now besides this forinsecal notion of the word as it refers to positive Laws, and the dispensation of justice, there may yet be another more general sense of it, with relation to all kind of differences and contests amongst men, whether in matters of Opinion or Interest; wherein they should demean themselves towards one another with such a kind of temper as may be mutually best for all, and may in the various changes and revolutions of things, most promote the good of mankind. And so ‘tis a virtue inclining us to such a kind of benign and equitable temper in our conversing with one another, whereby we may endeavour to preserve concord and amity in our treating concerning those things about which we differ.
There are some virtues that go under several names, and yet are of the same family and very near of kin, being differenced rather modally than specifically, from the quality and condition of the person by whom they are to be exercised. So the same virtue which in the generality of men we call meekness and gentleness, this in superiours is styled· clemency, which is lenitas superioris adversus inferiorem. Not that it hath any different form or act, but is only distinguished by the object towards whom ‘tis exercised, namely towards those of an inferior rank. And thus it is with this ἐπιείκεια, which is a kind of meekness, with this peculiar difference that it refers more especially to matters of controversie, and doth always incline to the most amicable and gentle way in judging of and accommodating of things, and such a prudent relaxation of the utmost rigor, as right reason shall direct according to the variety of cases and circumstances.